

ARTICLE XXXVI

Of Consecration of Bishops and Ministers.

The Book of Consecration of Archbishops and Bishops, and Ordering of Priests and Deacons, lately set forth in the time of *Edward* the Sixth, and confirmed at the same time by authority of Parliament, doth contain all things necessary to such Consecration and Ordering: neither hath it anything, that of itself is superstitious and ungodly. And therefore whosoever are consecrated or ordered according to the rites of that Book, since the second year of the forenamed King *Edward* unto this time, or hereafter shall be consecrated or ordered according to the same rites; we decree all such to be rightly, orderly, and lawfully consecrated and ordered.

De Episcoporum et Ministrorum Consecratione.

Libellus de Consecratione Archiepiscoporum et Episcoporum, et de Ordinatione Presbyterorum et Diaconorum, editus nuper temporibus *Edwardi VI*, et auctoritate Parliamenti illis ipsis temporibus confirmatus, omnia ad ejusmodi consecrationem et ordinationem necessaria continet; et nihil habet, quod ex se sit aut superstitiosum aut impium. Itaque quicumque juxta ritus illius Libri consecrati aut ordinati sunt, ab anno secundo prædicti regis *Edwardi* usque ad hoc tempus, aut in posterum juxta eosdem ritus consecrabuntur aut ordinabuntur, rite, atque ordine, atque legitime statuimus esse et fore consecratos et ordinatos.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

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| Book | = <i>libellus.</i> |
| Set forth | = <i>editus.</i> |
| To be | = <i>esse et fore.</i> |
| Rightly, orderly, and lawfully | = <i>rite,¹ atque ordine, atque legitime.</i> |

As Article XXIII gives the general teaching of our Church on the Ministry, so the present Article adds the specific instruction in regard to our form of the Ministry, consisting of the three Orders of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. The corresponding Article, XXXV of 1553, was more general, and included a reference to the Prayer Book as well as to the Ordinal, both of which were stated to be scriptural, and therefore to be received. The title and exact wording are as follows:—

Of the Book of Prayers and Ceremonies of the Church of England.

“The Book which of very late time was given to the Church of England by the King’s authority and the Parliament, containing the manner and form of praying, and ministering the Sacraments in the Church of England, likewise also the book of Ordering Ministers of the Church, set forth by the aforesaid authority, are godly, and in no point repugnant to the wholesome doctrine of the Gospel, but agreeable thereunto, furthering and beautifying the same not a little; and, therefore, of all faithful members of the Church of England, and chiefly of the ministers of the word, they ought to be received and allowed with all readiness of mind, and thanksgiving, and to be commended to the people of God.”

The Article was entirely re-cast when it appeared in its present form.

¹ *Rite* = correctly (in respect of form and manner). In Article XXV, *rite* is rendered “duly.”

I.—THE HISTORY OF THE ORDINAL

It is important to note what happened at each stage of the history in the sixteenth century.

1. No change was made in the Roman Catholic ritual of Ordination during the reign of Henry VIII, except the omission of the declaration of obedience to Rome.

2. But in 1549 the Pontifical was abandoned and a new form of Ordination was issued with the First Prayer Book, by which six men were consecrated Bishops. Although the Prayer Book and Ordinal are now one book, yet the fact that even to the present day the Ordinal has a separate title-page and preface shows that originally they were two distinct books. The First Prayer Book contained no Ordination Services, but these were provided later by the issue of what is generally called the First English Ordinal.

3. Both Prayer Book and Ordinal were revised in 1552 and superseded by the Second Prayer Book, and what is known as the Second Ordinal. These two books were connected with the Act of Uniformity, and although the Ordinal was in the Prayer Book it had its own title-page, and thus was strictly distinguished from the actual "Book of Common Prayer"; and the Act of Uniformity, 1552, distinguishes between the two. It was doubtless for this reason that Article XXXV of 1553 mentioned both the Book "Of Praying," and also the Book "Of Ordering."

4. These two books were, of course, suppressed by Mary, who repealed Edward's Acts of Uniformity, and re-established everything as it had been before the last year of Henry VIII. It has often been pointed out that this is a striking proof of the essential Roman Catholicism of Henry VIII, and altogether sets aside the popular Roman Catholic view that he is the founder of the English Church.

5. On Elizabeth's accession, 1558, Mary's Act was repealed, and the Second Prayer Book of Edward VI restored as the basis of revision. The Elizabethan Act speaks of the uniform order of Service at the death of Edward, which had been repealed by Queen Mary "to the great decay of the due honour and discomfort of the professors of the truth of Christ's religion." Then the Act of Mary was repealed "only concerning the said book," thereby leaving in strict legal force Mary's repeal of the rest of Edward's Protestant action. This at once raises the question as to the meaning of "the said book," because there was some doubt as to whether the Ordinal was included and intended. The authorities evidently considered the Ordinal of 1552 restored, because it was used at Parker's Consecration, and there is no record of any Consecration or Ordination being performed with any other form than that of 1552. But criticism was raised in regard to this point, that Elizabeth's Act did not expressly mention the Ordinal, and as a result those who were favourable to the Church of Rome maintained that the Ordinations and

Consecrations were invalid, because they held that the Ordinal of 1552 was still repealed by the Statute of Mary. This controversy was regarded as so important that it was felt necessary to make quite sure by the passing of an Act in 1566 to declare the validity of the Consecrations under the Ordinal of 1552, and to determine the use of it for the future.¹

6. But, meanwhile, on the revision of the Articles in 1563, the present statement was put forth vindicating the validity of all Ordinations "since the second year of Edward VI," thereby including both the First and Second Ordinals. This made everything quite clear, and the validity of Protestant Ordinations was thus settled both in regard to the Second and also to the First Ordinal, under the latter of which two of Parker's consecrators had been consecrated in 1550.

7. The whole question was reviewed in 1662, when this Article received its last authorisation, and it is interesting that no change should have been made in the wording of the Article at that time even after the lapse of over a century. The only change made in 1662 was the requirement of Episcopal Ordination for the ministry, as seen in the preface, and one or two slight, but not fundamental, changes were made in the Ordinal itself.

II.—THE CHARACTER OF THE ORDINAL

1. The Ordinal is first described as that "lately set forth in the time of Edward the Sixth, and confirmed at the same time by the authority of Parliament." There is, of course, no doubt that it refers to the present Ordinal, which, with the exception of the addition to the preface, and the slight changes already referred to, is exactly the same as it was at that time.

2. The Ordinal is described as sufficient. "Doth contain all things necessary to such Consecration and Ordering." This is evidently directed against the Church of Rome, which has all along denied the sufficiency and therefore the validity of our Ordination. There are three main grounds taken by the Church of Rome.

(1) It is said that our Ordinal has no chrism and no delivery of the sacramental *instrumenta*. In accordance with this Queen Mary and Bonner made up what they regarded as deficiencies in those ordained under the Edwardian Ordinal by anointing their hands, and Pole similarly arranged for the delivery of the vessels and the use of the words referring to the offering of the sacrifice. To this we reply that there is no proof of these being required in Scripture for Ordination, and no indication that they were ever used in the early Church. Not only so, we go further, and point out that of the seven particulars included and made prominent in the mediæval Ordinal only one has been retained by our Church, and we alone of the Reformed Churches have done this. This one item being the words, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost, etc.," and the fact that these

¹ Hardwick, *History of the Articles of Religion*, p. 131, and Note 1.

come from Scripture make their retention and the omission of the other six all the more significant.¹

(2) It is said that the Ordinal of 1553 had no words to distinguish Bishop from Priest. This is verbally true, the words "For the office of a Priest (or Bishop) in the Church of God," being inserted in 1662. But apart from this, the entire Service should be consulted, when there would be no doubt at all as to the precise purpose of the action. Even the Roman Ordinal itself is quite general.

(3) It is said that the Ordinal lacks Intention. The charge of invalidity, based on the history of the Elizabethan Ordinations, is now not mentioned by Roman Catholic authorities. It is evidently regarded as no longer a tenable position. The result is that everything is concentrated on the lack of Intention. Now public Intention must be judged by the Service itself, and this in turn must be tested by Scripture. It will, thereby, be seen what ministry our Church intends, and the decision will be in accordance therewith. We have obviously no right to think of any mere private Intention or any opinion of the Scriptural Intentions as essential. When this is clearly understood it will be seen at once that everything turns upon the character of the ministry. If the New Testament ministry means what the Church of Rome understands by it, namely a sacerdotal priesthood, then it is clear that our Orders are void in the eyes of Rome, but if, on the other hand, as we hold, the New Testament ministry is that of an evangelistic and pastoral Presbyterate, then our Ordinal is ample for the purpose. The various references to "sacrifice" in the Holy Communion Office clearly refer either to Calvary or to our spiritual sacrifices as believers; never once to the Lord's Supper itself.

It would be well if all controversy were concentrated on this point; viz., What is the true character of the primitive Christian ministry? When this is settled all questions of Intention are at once resolved. It has been well said that Rome might find no difficulty in recognising our Orders if she held that the ministry was the episcopal Presbyterate of the New Testament. But as long as she requires Ordination for the purpose of exercising sacerdotal functions it is impossible for her to regard our ministers as equivalent to her priests.² It is, therefore, futile, and a waste of time to discuss questions of Intention in view of the

¹ Dimock, Article, "Ordinal," *Protestant Dictionary*, p. 474. The seven are:

"(1) Prefatory address, with statement of sacerdotal functions. (2) Delivery of *casula* (i.e. the *chasuble* which is the mass vestment) with a benediction containing the doctrines of Real Presence and of Transubstantiation. (3) Unction. (4) *Traditio instrumentorum*, with power to offer sacrifice and celebrate Masses. (5) The words (following the second imposition of hands), 'Accipe Spiritum Sanctum,' etc. (6) *Unfolding the casula*. (7) The final Blessing with the words, 'ut . . . offeratis placabiles hostias pro peccatis' " (*ut supra*, p. 474, Note 2).

² "Rome's doctrine of Orders involves the doctrine of *her* Real Presence, and of *her* Real Propitiatory oblation of Christ (really present on the altar) for the living and the dead. And this doctrine we hold and profess to belong to the class of 'blasphemia figmenta, et perniciosæ imposturæ.' How, then, can our Orders be valid in her view? And how can we consistently desire that it should be otherwise?" (Dimock, *Christian Doctrine of Sacerdotium*, p. 133).

fundamental difference between what is understood as ministry, for as long as this difference exists there cannot possibly be agreement between the two Churches.¹

3. The Ordinal is stated to be Scriptural. "Neither hath it any thing that of itself is superstitious and ungodly." This is intended to meet an objection from the opposite quarter, the extreme Protestant party, who were subsequently called Puritans. The assumption of superstition and ungodliness is pretty certainly due to the presence in the Ordinal of the words of St. John xx. 22, 23: "And when He had said this, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." It should be, however, remembered that the difficulty is not a Prayer Book, but a Bible one, for, as we have already seen,² there is no reference in the words to the pronouncement of absolution in the Services, but to the proclamation of the Gospel of Forgiveness and its alternative. The words are thus a definite personal application to the one individual of the general authority given by our Lord to the whole Church, as represented in the Upper Room. Nor can the words, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" come under this charge of ungodliness, since the words are merely the repetition of our Lord's commission and are most properly regarded as a prayer.³ It is also noteworthy to recall once again that these words are not found in any Ordinal earlier than the thirteenth century.⁴ So that in any case the words are not essential to the conferring of ministry. It will also help to clear thought if it is remembered that Ordination gives ministerial authority, the right to exercise ministry, not spiritual power, or the capability to do

¹ "It comes, then, simply to this: Can we surrender the principles for which the Anglican Church has steadily contended for the last 350 years? Or can we hold the doctrines of our Church, and, with a due regard for the ordinary and rational rules by which historical documents are interpreted, can we reconcile the sense of our historical and authoritative standards of doctrine with the authoritative doctrine of the Church of Rome? The only answer to each question is, *It is impossible*" (Bishop of Edinburgh, Address to Diocesan Synod, 1895, p. 9).

² See on Article XXIII, pp. 317, 320.

³ For Hooker's defence of this form see *Eccl. Pol.*, Bk. V, Ch. LXXVII.

⁴ "The difference between such ordination and our Lord's ordaining of His first ministers recorded in St. John, xx. is this. In the latter case, Christ Himself, to whom the Spirit is given without measure, gave of that Spirit authoritatively to His disciples; and so, in giving, He breathed on them, as showing that the Spirit proceeded from Him. But, in the other case, our bishops presume not to breathe, nor did the Apostles before them; for they know that ordaining grace comes not from them, but from Christ, whose ministers they are; and so they simply, according to all Scriptural authority, use the outward rite of laying on of hands, in use of which they believe a blessing will assuredly come down from above" (Harold Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 784).

"These words, *receive the Holy Ghost*, may be understood to be of the nature of a wish and prayer; as if it were said, *may thou receive the Holy Ghost*; and so it will better agree with what follows, *and be thou a faithful dispenser of the word and sacraments*. Or it may be observed, that in those sacred missions, the Church and Churchmen consider themselves as acting in the *name and person* of Christ" (Burnet, *On the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 456).

⁴ *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, Vol. II, p. 1513.

spiritual work. The latter naturally comes from prayer. Thus, the laying on of hands gives commission, and prayer is intended to suggest spiritual qualification. Further, the words "Whosoever sins," etc., are clearly to be interpreted by the words which immediately follow: "And be thou a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His holy Sacraments." This, in general, is the Anglican reply to those who were, or are, tempted to speak of this part of the Ordinal as "manifest blasphemy."¹

4. The Ordinal is declared to be valid. All who are consecrated and ordered according to this Book, whether past or future, are decreed to be "rightly, orderly, and lawfully consecrated and ordered." The Latin equivalent for "rightly" is *rite*, that is, in due form and manner. This is the Church of England claim, and it stands to-day as it has stood for over three centuries, maintaining that all Bishops consecrated and all clergy ordained under the Ordinals from 1549 onwards have been properly qualified to exercise their ministry. They were ordained "by public prayer, with imposition of hands," and thereby were "approved and admitted by lawful authority." Thus, these Orders have been "continued and reverently used and esteemed in the Church of England."

The subject of the validity of Anglican Orders was raised in 1896 by the effort of Lord Halifax and others, who desired to obtain a Declaration of the validity of Anglican Orders from the Pope of Rome. But the effort proved vain, and, instead, the Pope pronounced in unqualified terms the invalidity of our Orders. This was based on the usual Roman Catholic argument of lack of form, because there is no reference to the power to offer sacrifice, and lack of Intention, because our Ordinal is alleged to intend another than the Church idea of ministry. But this only raises again the question already considered, as to the character of the ministry. It is perfectly true that our ministry is intended to be something quite different from the idea of ministry which obtains in the Church of Rome, and as long as there is this fundamental cleavage any further discussion seems to be vain. We maintain that our ministry is scriptural and primitive, and, as such, fulfils all the requirements of scriptural lawfulness and spiritual validity. The action taken by our Church in the sixteenth century to remove from the Ordinal the various mediæval accretions clearly shows the significance of "these radical rejections by a Church professing such conservative principles."² And this leads to only one conclusion, that as long as we possess a true scriptural ministry and a true primitive idea of the functions of the New Testament Presbyterate, our Ordinal must stand condemned in the eyes of Rome, and so also must the Ordinations of the early Church. And so we conclude that:—

"It is impossible to study fairly the history of our Ordinal without seeing that

¹ Hardwick, *ut supra*, p. 210.

² Dimock, Article, "Ordinal," *Protestant Dictionary*, p. 477.

there is a doctrinal gulf between the Church of England and the Church of Rome.”¹

¹ Dimock, *ut supra*, p. 480.

It is sometimes said that the Article asserts that there was “nothing superstitious or ungodly” in the Ordinal of 1550, and that as that Ordination Service was inserted in the Communion Service of the Prayer Book of 1549 we are compelled to believe that “there was nothing superstitious or ungodly” in that Book as well. It might have sufficed to refer to the history of the Article to show that any such definite approval of the First Prayer Book and First Ordinal was not intended by the revisers of 1563. Such an argument, if argument it can be called, overlooks the facts connected with the revision of 1662 by which we are now bound, for the last Act of Uniformity provides that subscription to this Article shall be understood to apply to the present Ordinal, just as before that time it had applied to the two Ordinals of Edward VI. And as to those who lived between the First Ordinal and the Ordinal of 1662, it may be pointed out that the greater number of Ordinations took place under the Second Ordinal, and the purpose of the Article is to vindicate the Ordinations under both Ordinals. As to the First Ordinal, the only possible application of the Article is that that Book contained nothing which was “of itself superstitious or ungodly.” And this is literally true. Perhaps the greatest proof that no weight is to be attributed to this contention is the fact that it is not discussed in any representative modern books on the Articles, and is only found in those works which endeavour to discover some basis for the views which were altogether unknown in the Church of England before 1833. There can be no doubt that the question stands at present in the light of the Act of 1662, and points us to the belief that our present Ordinal “contains nothing superstitious and ungodly.” (A full discussion of this point will be found in Tomlinson, *The Prayer Book, Articles, and Homilies*, Ch. XXII, p. 269).

IV. THE HOUSEHOLD OF FAITH—*continued*

CORPORATE RELIGION

E. CHURCH AND STATE (ARTICLES XXXVII-XXXIX)

37. THE CIVIL MAGISTRATES.

38. CHRISTIAN MEN'S GOODS, WHICH
ARE NOT COMMON.

39. A CHRISTIAN MAN'S OATH.

ARTICLE XXXVII

Of the Civil Magistrates.

The Queen's Majesty hath the chief power in this realm of *England*, and other her dominions, unto whom the chief government of all estates of this realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Civil, in all causes doth appertain, and is not, nor ought to be, subject to any foreign jurisdiction.

Where we attribute to the Queen's Majesty the chief government, by which titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended, we give not to our Princes the ministering either of God's Word, or of the Sacraments; the which thing the Injunctions also lately set forth by *Elizabeth* our Queen, do most plainly testify; but that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly Princes in Holy Scriptures by God Himself: that is, that they should rule all states and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and wildoers.

The Bishop of *Rome* hath no jurisdiction in this realm of *England*.

The Laws of the Realm may punish Christian men with death, for heinous and grievous offences.

It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the Magistrate, to wear weapons, and serve in the wars.

De Civilibus Magistratibus.

Regia Majestas in hoc *Angliæ* regno, ac cæteris ejus dominiis, summam habet potestatem, ad quam omnium statuum hujus regni, sive illi Ecclesiastici sint sive Civiles, in omnibus causis suprema gubernatio pertinet, et nulli externæ jurisdictioni est subjecta, nec esse debet.

Cum Regiæ Majestati summam gubernationem tribuimus, quibus titulis intelligimus animos quorundam calumniatorum offendi, non damus Regibus nostris aut verbi Dei, aut Sacramentorum administrationem; quod etiam Injunctiones, ab *Elizabetha* Regina nostra nuper editæ, apertissime testantur; sed eam tantum prærogativam, quam in Sacris Scripturis a Deo ipso omnibus piis Principibus videmus semper fuisse attributam: hoc est, ut omnes status atque ordines fidei suæ a Deo commissos, sive illi Ecclesiastici sint sive Civiles, in officio contineant, et contumaces ac delinquentes gladio civili coerceant.

Romanus Pontifex nullam habet jurisdictionem in hoc regno *Angliæ*.

Leges Regni possunt Christianos, propter capitalia et gravia crimina, morte punire.

Christianis licet, ex mandato Magistratus, arma portare, et justa bella administrare.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

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| King's Majesty | = <i>Regia Majestas.</i> |
| Lately set forth | = <i>nuper edita.</i> |
| To their charge | = <i>fidei suæ.</i> |
| Bishop of Rome | = <i>Romanus Pontifex.</i> |
| The laws may punish | = <i>leges possunt punire.</i> |
| Heinous offences | = <i>capitalia crimina.</i> |
| To serve in the wars ¹ | = <i>justa bella administrare.</i> |

So important were the changes made in this Article in 1563 that it may almost be said to have been reconstructed. Its present form is certainly a great improvement on the original. The first two paragraphs of the

¹ The English of the XLII had "lawful wars."

present Article date from 1563, and were substituted for a simple but strong assertion of the Royal Supremacy in the corresponding Article of 1553, which read as follows: *Rex Angliæ est supremum caput in terris, post Christum, Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ, et Hibernicæ.* "The King of England is supreme head in earth, next under Christ, of the Church of England and Ireland." The third clause, referring to the Bishop of Rome, remained unaltered. Then followed in 1553 a statement which was omitted in 1563: *Magistratus civilis est a Deo ordinatus atque probatus: quomobrem illi non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam obediendum est.* "The civil magistrate is ordained and allowed of God: wherefore we must obey him, not only for fear of punishment, but also for conscience' sake." The remainder of the Article in its present form has been unaltered, except for the very slight verbal alteration in 1571 of "the laws of the Realm," "*Leges Regni*" instead of "the Civil Laws," "*Leges civiles.*"

The object of the Article seems to have been threefold, dealing with the Royal Supremacy, the Papal Supremacy, and certain current objections to the right of the State to call upon Christian subjects to enter upon military service.

In view of the important questions arising out of the Article it seems well to look first of all at the Article itself in the way of a brief analysis, before considering its various points in detail.

I.—THE STATEMENTS OF THE ARTICLE

1. The Claim of the Royal Supremacy.—This is the teaching of the first clause, and it is put in two forms. (a) It extends to all estates of the realm, ecclesiastical and civil; (b) it excludes all foreign jurisdiction.

2. The Meaning of the Royal Supremacy.—This is stated in the second section, and was due to "the minds of some slanderous folks." Both Roman Catholics and Puritans, from different standpoints, took exception to the chief government attributed to the Crown. (a) First, the meaning is stated negatively. It is not to be understood as giving to the Crown the ministry either of the Word or the Sacraments; (b) Then it is stated positively. All that is to be understood is "that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly Princes in Holy Scriptures by God Himself." This reference to the Old Testament and the duty of Princes to rule all estates committed to their charge is, of course, to be understood in the light of the sixteenth century, when Church and State were regarded in a way as identical though from different standpoints.

3. The Denial of the Papal Supremacy.—The Latin equivalent of "Bishop" is *Pontifex*, and there seems to be no doubt that the denial is due to what has preceded in regard to the Royal Supremacy. The statement that the Bishop of Rome has no jurisdiction means that he has no

right to it, because it would imply usurpation of the authority of the Crown.¹

4. Illustrations of Royal Supremacy.—Two matters are specifically mentioned in the Article as illustrating and expressing the extent to which the Royal Supremacy may be rightly understood to act: (a) the right of capital punishment; (b) the right of military service.

II.—THE ROYAL SUPREMACY

For the first three hundred years of the history of the Church, Christianity had necessarily no relation to earthly kings. When Constantine assumed authority people thought that all was well, and that the results would be advantageous to the Church. The fact was either forgotten or else ignored that he was not a Christian, and that his interposition carried with it serious consequences to the purity and liberty of the Church. But after the period of persecution the relief was so great that it was hardly surprising that Constantine's efforts were approved and welcomed. Added to this, it would seem as though the Church had forgotten the teaching of the New Testament concerning the Coming of the Lord, and had imbibed the idea that the Church was to penetrate and permeate with spiritual influence the whole world. All these things led to the acceptance of Constantine's interference, which, in the light of history, can hardly be regarded as otherwise than disastrous. Certainly tyranny was very often used, and for several centuries good and evil resulting from the relations of Church and State were only too evident. To this day in the East the State dominates the Church to such an extent that in Russia the State may be regarded as supreme.

In the West further complications arose through the growth of the Papacy of Rome, for what might have been regarded as a natural and legitimate primacy soon became a supremacy which resulted in tyranny. Temporal as well as spiritual power was claimed by the Pope, and it is not surprising that both Kings and Bishops felt the grievances of the position. The Reformation was essentially a reaction against this by the definite abjuring of the Roman Supremacy.

At this point, however, a difficulty naturally arose as to the transfer of power. Limiting ourselves to England, it is seen that the transfer of authority from the Pope to the King began about 1531, and Convocation was quite ready to accept this, regarding the King as Protector and Supreme Head, though with the qualifying clause "as far as the law of Christ permits."²

¹ It is significant that Bishop Forbes in his discussion of this sentence distinguishes between realm and Church. "Not in this Church of England, but in this realm," arguing that the question is civil only and not spiritual (*Explanation of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 773). This is a curious way of ignoring the statements of the Article which include ecclesiastical as well as civil causes.

² "Ecclesiæ, et cleri Anglicani, cujus singularem protectorem unicum et supremum dominum, et quantum per Christi legem licet, etiam supremum caput ipsius majestatem recognoscimus" (Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 762, Note 1).

Following this date Parliament began to pass Acts restraining Papal jurisdiction and leading to an assertion of the Supremacy of the Crown, and in 1534 both clergy and Parliament accepted the position of the King as "Supreme Head." But the term "Head" was open to obvious objections, and was really only used by Henry to indicate the supersession of the authority of the Papacy. It was continued by Edward and Mary, but dropped by Mary on her marriage in 1554. When supremacy was restored by Elizabeth the term "Head" was altered to "Governor," and was explained by the Injunctions of 1559 as "Under God to have rule over all persons whether civil or ecclesiastical."¹ In this sense, therefore, there was a very definite alteration in the idea of the Royal Supremacy, and in the light of the Queen's action in regard to the first paragraph of Article XX, it is evident that while she insisted with characteristic firmness on governing the Church, yet she was equally strong about it being the Church and not the Crown which had "power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith." But the wise avoidance of the term "Head" by Elizabeth and the substitution of "Governor," while admirable in itself and particularly valuable for the prevention of ambiguity and confusion,² did not in the least affect the determination of Elizabeth to dominate everything, whether ecclesiastical or civil.

This power of the Crown was very ill-defined, and no one can doubt that it was arbitrarily used both by Elizabeth and the Stuarts, even although the Canons of 1603-4 say that Royal authority meant only such as had been given to Christian Princes in Scripture and the early Church. It was only ascertained and limited by the revolution of 1688.³

The connection between the Crown and the Church is naturally closer with an Establishment than with those who are free from it, for the civil power has more control over an Established Church. Thus the appeal to-day in England to Parliament tends to suggest a civil control rather than what Parliament was originally, the representation of the laity of the Church, and the confusion in the present day is due to the fact that Parliament no longer represents lay-Churchmen only, and because the powers of the Crown have passed to Parliament. While, therefore, it is true that "in the present day the Royal Supremacy signifies little more than the supremacy of the civil law and courts over ecclesiastical legislation and jurisdiction,"⁴ yet it must never be forgotten that the essence of the Royal authority was the assertion of the supremacy of the lay power and not the interference of the State as such. Just as, before the

¹ Cardwell, *Documentary Annals*, Vol. I, p. 232. See also Index, s.v., Supremacy of Crown.

² "The Queen is unwilling to be addressed, either by word of mouth or in writing, as the head of the Church of England. For she seriously maintains that this honour is due to Christ alone, and cannot belong to any human being soever" (Jewel to Bullinger, *Zurich Letters*, Vol. I, p. 33).

³ Boulton, *The Theology of the Church of England*, p. 286.

⁴ Boulton, *ut supra*, p. 286.

Reformation, the supremacy of the Pope was regarded as the expression of the superiority of the clergy over the laity, so that supremacy of the Crown was intended in the opposite direction, to assert the independence and power of the laity. And this was actually the case as long as Parliament represented only the laity of the Church.¹

It may be well, therefore, to state afresh the position of the Church of England. In theory the Monarch is the source of justice to all his subjects, and the supreme ruler of all classes of people, so that if anyone feels an injustice in any ecclesiastical or civil Court he has freedom to appeal to the Sovereign for redress.

The question has become acute in recent times in regard to what have been called "Spiritual Courts," by which is meant Courts representing the clergy only. Those who advocate this position are opposed to the Royal Supremacy as implying an undue encroachment of the civil on the ecclesiastical sphere because its decisions are made by a Court which is not ecclesiastical. It is, therefore, necessary to state briefly what has actually been the case since the time of the Reformation. During the reigns of Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I, jurisdiction was exercised by the Court of High Commission, consisting of Bishops and ecclesiastical lawyers. This Court was abolished just before the time of the Commonwealth and was never restored, its functions being transferred to a Court of Delegates appointed by the Sovereign. This was brought to an end in 1832, and a Committee of the Privy Council was appointed to exercise jurisdiction in all cases in which appeals apply to the Crown. The chief Judges of the Court are members of this Board, and for ecclesiastical purposes one Bishop at least must be included. The Court is called the "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," and its function is judicial, not legislative. It has been rightly described as the Canon Law of the Church, and the position of the Church of England as an Established Church necessarily puts her under a restriction in regard to alteration of doctrine or ritual, no such alteration being possible without the consent of the State. It will be seen, therefore, that the difference in the Courts during the last three centuries has not involved any matter of essential principle, the difference being one of form.

At the foundation of the objection to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council lies the old idea that the laity have no right to legislate on questions of doctrine and worship, which, it is urged, ought to be limited to the clergy. Added to this, there is the persistence of the unfortunate idea that the laity are somehow or other not the "Church," forgetful of the fact that the New Testament term from which we get the word "clergy" includes all the people of God (1 Pet. v. 3). It is, therefore, essential to insist upon the right and full meaning of the term "Church," as including both clergy and laity. To speak of a student entering the "Church" when the "Ministry" is meant, shows the fallacy of this position. The clergy were already members of the Church when lay-

¹ Harold Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 802.

men, and no one can doubt that in Holy Scripture the government of the Church, as we have seen, is vested in the entire Christian community.

It must also never be overlooked that the English Reformation was pre-eminently a movement of the laity, as expressed by Parliament. The action and influence of individual clergymen like Cranmer, Latimer, and others, is, of course, undoubted, but speaking generally, it was not Convocation, but Parliament that took the lead in all matters connected with the Reformation. It is significant that Parliament, not Convocation, first gave the title of "Supreme Head" to the King in opposition to the Papacy.¹ The First Prayer Book of 1549 was prepared and authorised by the Crown and Parliament before being sanctioned by Convocation, and the First Ordinal was authorised, and these two books revised in the same way. Even Queen Mary re-established the pre-Reformation position by Parliament. When Elizabeth succeeded to the throne it was again Parliament that took the lead in the Reformation movement, and even the Prayer Book of 1604 was prepared and authorised by the Crown without the assent of either Parliament or Convocation. All these facts tend to show that the laity all along have taken a very definite part in the Reformation settlement.

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that

"the constitutional character of the supremacy of the Crown . . . does not differ in principle from that exercised by William I or Edward I, being in its essence the right of supervision over the administration of the Church, vested in the Crown as the champion of the Church, in order that the religious welfare of its subjects may be duly provided for."²

In reality there is a great difference in principle, because since the Reformation there has been no real question of the Crown championing the Church for the purpose of providing for the religious welfare of its subjects. On the contrary, the action of the Crown has been very largely exercised on behalf of the laity against the clergy. Then, too, the general question has been affected by the rejection of the Pope, and the claim that the Royal Supremacy affects all causes, both ecclesiastical and civil. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Royal Supremacy, as exercised in the sixteenth century, was decidedly a "new thing,"³ and was directed mainly against the supremacy of the Pope and for the purpose of insisting upon the liberty of England, both clergy and laity together, in regard to matters ecclesiastical.

Some illustrations from recent years may help to distinguish the issues more clearly and to state the truth of the position of the Church of England. In 1850 a circular was issued by three clergymen,⁴ advocating certain changes in the meaning of the Royal Supremacy in matters eccle-

¹ In 1534.

² Wakeman, *Introduction to the History of the Church of England*, p. 321.

³ "The supremacy itself was no new thing" (Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 771).

⁴ Archdeacon Manning, Archdeacon Wilberforce (both of whom went over to the Church of Rome), and Dr. Mill of Cambridge.

siastical. These clergymen appealed for signatures to a document, stating that the meaning was not the supremacy of the Sovereign in all spiritual things or causes, but only "over the temporal accidents of spiritual things," whatever that might mean. The argument was that there was a distinction to be drawn between the Royal Supremacy as interpreted by the Articles and Canons of the Church, and as defined and established by Canon Law, the latter being said to give the Crown a power which was opposed to "the Divine office of the Universal Church as prescribed by the law of Christ." In reply to this appeal it was pointed out that there was no ground for this distinction, and the Statute Law gave the Crown supreme authority "as well in all spiritual and ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal," and that these very words were inserted in Canon 36 of 1603-4. It was also shown that even Convocation must obtain the sanction of the Crown to put forth any declaration, and that the Articles were first published under the authority of the Crown, while even the Book of Common Prayer was not brought before Convocation till the last revision of 1662, but was drawn up by Royal authority and enforced by the legislature. This has certainly been the acknowledged doctrine of our Church from the accession of Queen Elizabeth.¹ An additional proof of this position is seen when reference is made to the former practice of appealing to the Pope. It is said that the establishment of the Royal Supremacy was intended only to exclude foreign jurisdiction, but it is sometimes overlooked that the jurisdiction of the Crown was actually substituted for this foreign jurisdiction, thereby not merely abolishing the Papal Supremacy, but establishing the Royal Supremacy in its place. All appeals, therefore, which had formerly been made to the Pope were henceforward to be made to the Crown.

This position can be amply vindicated both from history and from the nature of the case. It is well known that in the fourth century the prevalence of Arianism among the clergy seriously endangered vital Christianity, and at that time if the Church and the clergy had been regarded as identical the consequences would have been very serious. Then, too, as there is no question whatever of the State making laws for the Church, but only interpreting the laws as they stand, it might reasonably be supposed that the supreme civil Governor was in every way fitted to mediate and moderate in matters of dispute. All that the Crown claims is the power of preventing the Church from being compelled to accept anything that a majority of the clergy might sanction, and also to prevent the laity being compelled to accept an interpretation being put upon the formularies of the Church, which is regarded as untrue to the doctrinal and national position of the Church. The idea that clerical legislation and interpretation necessarily carries truthfulness and accuracy is contradicted by much that has happened during the centuries. It was, therefore, not difficult to show that those who appealed for a change were really insisting upon something quite novel in the way of inter-

¹ See Jewel's *Apology*.

pretation, something that was neither Anglican nor Roman Catholic, and to which the names of "Catholic truth" and "Church principles" had been inaccurately and really unfairly given.¹

More recent events show the impossibility of accepting the position of those who insist upon what they call a "Spiritual Court." It is well known that the Court of Arches, which is under the personal jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Canterbury, is a Spiritual Court. It will be remembered that the Lincoln Judgment by Archbishop Benson also came under the same category, and still later, Archbishops Temple and Maclagan issued certain opinions against Reservation and Incense. All these might well be called Spiritual Courts, and yet the decisions were in each case refused and opposed. Not only so, but on one occasion when the Archbishop of Canterbury deprived a clergyman for heresy, an appeal was made by those who supported him to the Privy Council, and the appeal was successful. Under these circumstances it would seem as though the plea for "Spiritual Courts" is as unreal in character as it certainly is untrue to all that we know of the history and genius of the Church of England. So long, therefore, as the Church of England is established it is essential for due freedom that a final appeal should be made to the King, and that all coercive jurisdiction should be regarded as coming from the State alone, that all men, clergy and laity, must remain subject to the law as it has been stated by various Acts of Parliament, and that in all ecclesiastical causes as well as civil every Churchman must be able to appeal to the "King as Supreme." If, and when, the time comes for Disestablishment, as it has come in Ireland and elsewhere, there is no doubt that the government of the Church will be vested in Synods as representative of the whole Church, and in this way the difficulty which some feel in regard to civil interference, and which others feel in regard to undue clerical interference, will find their proper solution.²

A brief consideration is necessary to the objection taken to the Article with special reference to the relation of Church and State. It is, of course, true that the Jewish Church was national, and the Christian Church is catholic in the sense of universal, and, as such, it is not necessarily bound up with an Establishment. The peculiar position of the Jewish Church in relation to the State, and in the light of God's purposes of redemption for the whole world, make it impossible to use Jewish Princes as illustrations of Christian Princes in the way that the Article does, a view that was adopted by Churchmen and Puritans alike. A far better interpretation of the right position between Church and State is found in such passages as Roms. xiii.; 1 Peter ii. 13-17. Then, too, the Jewish Church was theocratic in a way that the Christian Church never has been, or can be.

¹ The story of this Declaration and its criticism is taken in substance from the pamphlet by the late Dean Goode, *Reply to the Letter and Declaration Respecting the Royal Supremacy.*

² This general subject can be studied in Maitland, *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England*; Tomlinson, *Lay Judges*; Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*; A. L. Smith, *Church and State in the Middle Ages*; Two Articles on "Canon Law," *Protestant Dictionary*.

It is, of course, easy to say that the influence of the State on the Church is injurious, and many Churchmen would be ready to admit this. But, on the other hand, Establishment is cherished by many because of its essential value as a national testimony to God. It must never be forgotten that Church and State are equally Divine in their proper places, though the distinction between them is vital and fundamental. As the State is based upon the law of compulsion involving outward adherence only, and the Church is based upon the law of love expressive of an inward willingness, it can easily be seen that with weapons so different the two can never be formally one. Indeed, they never have been, and whether we believe in Establishment or not, the precise spiritual relations of Church and State are quite clearly laid down in Holy Scripture. Many Churchmen make a great distinction between the Establishment of a Church *de novo* and the rejection of an existing Establishment. The former would probably not be accepted by anyone; the latter is thought by many to involve a serious rejection of God. The matter is one involving grave differences of view, and whatever may be the precise relation in the future between the English Church and the State there can be no doubt that, as in Scotland, there will be a definite and determined insistence upon the two great principles that the State shall not control the Church and that the clergy shall not control the laity.

III.—THE PAPAL SUPREMACY

The Article is quite clear that “the Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England,” and this at once raises the question of the Papal Supremacy considered in relation to the past and also to the present. Roman Catholics themselves are not all agreed as to the precise power of the Papacy. The Gallican theory is that a General Council is supreme, the Pope being its mouthpiece. The Ultramontane view is that the Pope is supreme as the personal Head of the Church. Since 1870 the latter theory, known as Ultramontanism, has come more and more to the front, the tendency being to concentrate all authority in the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*.¹ The Roman arguments are mainly two in number.

1. The argument from Scripture.—First of all attention is called to the prominence of St. Peter in the Gospels, and this is easily and readily admitted, but prominence is not necessary for primacy, and the latter does not inevitably follow from the former. The words addressed to St. Peter in regard to authority in matters of Church discipline (Matt. xvi. 19) were afterwards addressed to the other disciples as well (Matt. xviii. 18) so that there was no monopoly of “binding” and “loosing.” In view of other Scripture passages referring to the Apostle Peter it is difficult to see how the primacy can be fairly argued. Thus, he is sent

¹ For an outline of Barrow’s great argument from his *Treatise of the Pope’s Supremacy*, see Boulton, *The Theology of the Church of England*, pp. 289–301.

by the other Apostles to Samaria (Acts viii. 14); he is compelled to explain his action in regard to Cornelius (Acts xi.); he does not occupy any leading or predominant position in the Council of Jerusalem (Acts xv. 6-35); and he is actually withstood at Antioch by St. Paul (Galatians ii.). These facts, together with St. Paul's claim to Apostolic equality (2 Cor. xii. 11), and St. Peter's own references to himself in his addresses and epistles, do not support the theory of primacy.

But the most important passage from Scripture is the well-known "Rock" passage: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church" (Matt. xvi. 18). It is not at all certain that the reference is to Peter in person, especially if any distinction may be drawn between the two Greek words *Petros* and *Petra*. Perhaps the best exegetical suggestion is that the reference is neither to Peter only nor to his confession only, but to the man confessing, thereby including both the person and what he said.¹ This is in harmony with other references in Scripture to our Lord in relation to the Church (Eph. ii. 20; 1 Pet. ii. 1-5). It would almost seem as though the latter passage were the Apostle's own commentary on his Master's words. Then, too, no early Father interpreted the passage in the Roman Catholic way, and not a single Greek Father connected the position of the Bishop of Rome with the prominence given to St. Peter.²

There is no doubt that the authority and infallibility of the Pope are made to depend solely on this text, and practically all apologists for the Church of Rome make it prominent. If, therefore, in the words of a modern writer,³ this foundation is mined, the Church resting upon it is shown to be the weakest of ecclesiastical structures. Now it is well known that at his ordination every Roman priest has to take a solemn oath of allegiance to the Creed of Pope Pius IV, and in this Creed these words appear concerning the Scriptures: "Neither will I take and interpret them otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers." This "unanimous consent of the Fathers" fails entirely when applied to the text in question. This difference of opinion was forcibly shown at the Vatican Council of 1870 by the late Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis, U.S.A. He was not permitted to deliver his speech, but it was

¹ Lindsay, *The Church and Ministry*, p. 25 f.

² "It is a marvellous thing that upon these words the Bishop of Rome should found his supremacy; for whether it be *super petram* or *Petrum*, all is one matter; it maketh nothing at all for the purpose to make a foundation of any such supremacy. For otherwise when Peter spake carnally to Christ (as in the same chapter a little following) Satan was his name, where Christ said, 'Go after me, Satan'; so that the name of Peter is no foundation for the supremacy, but as it is said in Scripture, *Fundati estis super fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum*, that is, by participation (for godly participation giveth name of things,) he might be called the head of the Church, as the head of the river is called the head, because he was the first who made this confession of Christ, which is not an argument for dignity, but for the quality that was in the man" (Gardiner, *Sermon*, in 1548. Quoted in Hardwick, *History of the Articles of Religion*, p. 398).

³ Rev. Arthur Galton, who himself went over to Rome and returned under the influence of this text.

afterwards printed at Naples, and he pointed out that the ancient Fathers gave no fewer than five interpretations of the word "rock." (1) The first declared that the Church was built on Peter, an interpretation endorsed by seventeen Fathers. (2) The second understood the words as referring to all the Apostles, Peter being simply the Primate. This was the opinion of eight Fathers. (3) The third interpretation asserted that the words applied to the faith which Peter professed, a view held by no less than forty-four Fathers, including some of the most important and representative. (4) The fourth interpretation declared that the words were to be understood of Jesus Christ, the Church being built on Him. This was the view of sixteen writers. (5) The fifth interpretation understood the term "rock" to apply to the faithful themselves, who, by believing on Christ, were made living stones in the temple of His body. This, however, was the opinion of very few. It is, therefore, clear that there is no such thing as "the unanimous consent of the Fathers" in regard to the interpretation of this text, and Archbishop Kenrick concluded his speech by saying that "if we are bound to follow the majority of the Fathers in this thing, then we are bound to hold for certain that by the 'rock' should be understood the faith professed by Peter, not Peter professing the faith." It is also noteworthy that no fewer than forty-four witnesses from among the Fathers are adduced by the Roman Catholic divine, Launay, to prove that by the "rock" is to be understood not Peter himself, but the faith which he professed.¹ It is also impossible to overlook the fact that in the Roman Missal itself the Collect for the Vigil of St. Peter and St. Paul's Day reads thus: "Grant, we beseech Thee, Almighty God, that Thou wouldest not suffer us, whom Thou established on the Rock of the Apostolic Confession, to be shaken by any disturbances."

It is doubtless true, as Hort points out, that "the most obvious interpretation of this famous phrase is the true one," that St. Peter himself, as the spokesman, interpreter, and leader of the rest, was the rock which Jesus Christ had in view.² But even if this were proved beyond all question it would still be necessary to require proof of authority to transmit the power, and this is, of course, wholly lacking. There is not the slightest hint given that Peter could transmit the authority to anyone, and, in particular, there is no suggestion whatever that any of the Bishops of Rome are to be considered as the "successors" of the Apostles. It is hardly without point, in view of present controversies, that though ample reference is made to Christians in Rome, and even to "Bishops" in other places, nothing is said of any "Bishop" as then existing in the Church at Rome. This assumption that Peter's authority can be transmitted depends upon another assumption, namely, that Bishops are "successors

¹ Included in these are Origen, Augustine, Chrysostom, and even Pope Gregory the Great, who in his Commentary on the Psalms says plainly: "The Son of God is the Rock from which Peter derived his name and on which He said He would build His Church."

² *Christian Ecclesia*, p. 16.

of the Apostles." But, as we have seen in our study of the Christian ministry, this is impossible. Apostleship required certain conditions (Acts i. 22; 1 Cor. xv. 7-9), and the moment such conditions were impossible Apostleship, as such, ceased to be. As already observed, we gladly recognise and emphasise continuity with Apostolic doctrine and life, but this is altogether different from what is understood as Apostolic Succession in the Episcopate. Ministerial continuity by means of the commission of Ordination is one thing, but continuity in the sense of Apostolic authority transmitted only by a particular line is quite another, and for the latter there is no Scriptural warrant at all. This being the case the great passage, on any interpretation, is to be limited to St. Peter, giving him that natural and rightful authority which we observe he used in the Acts of the Apostles, but not referring to anything beyond his personal and individual qualifications for the special work to which he had been called. The privileges are personal rather than official, and are necessarily limited to him, and are not capable of transmission to any "successor." The other passages which are sometimes adduced in support of this contention of St. Peter's primacy really do not touch the question at all, for St. Luke xxii. 31, 32 was at once a warning and an encouragement in view of the awful sin of denying his Master, and St. John xxi. 15-17 may be regarded as the complementary passage to the former, including a threefold reminder of the denial and a threefold restoration to his former position. Altogether, therefore, we may say without any hesitation that Scripture gives no warrant for identifying St. Peter's prominence with his primacy.

2. The argument from History.—Two points are involved here, and though they are distinct they may perhaps be considered together: (a) St. Peter's primacy; (b) St. Peter's Roman episcopacy. We may set aside as unnecessary to be discussed the question whether St. Peter was ever in Rome. There is nothing in the New Testament to warrant it and much that seems to be opposed to it, but tradition outside the New Testament seems to favour it, and it matters little whether we accept it or not.¹ It is, of course, perfectly clear that the Church of Rome was not founded by St. Peter; or, indeed, by any other Apostle, as the Epistle to the Romans clearly implies and teaches. With regard to the question whether St. Peter was ever in any sense of the word Bishop of Rome, history is quite clear that he was not. The idea curiously appears first in the second century heretical document, called the Clementine Homilies, which claim that Clement was the immediate successor of Peter, but Irenæus says that the Church in Rome was founded by Peter and Paul, and he gives Linus as the first Bishop. To the same effect is the testimony of Tertullian and the Apostolic Constitutions.² Later writers, like

¹ In the Bampton Lectures for 1913, *The Church of Rome in the First Century*, the Rev. G. Edmundson favours the view that St. Peter did go to Rome.

² Irenæus, *adv. Hær.*, Ch. III, p. 3; Tertullian, *de Præscript.*, Ch. XXXII; *Apostolic Constitutions*, Bk. VII, Section 46.

Eusebius, Jerome, and Epiphanius, agree with this position. While, then, it is quite likely that the Apostle Peter reached Rome and was there put to death by martyrdom according to tradition,¹ there is no proof whatever that he remained, according to the Roman Catholic theory, twenty-five years as bishop, a position which is absolutely impossible according to chronology and historical grounds.

The view that St. Peter being Bishop of Rome was the natural and necessary Primate of that and of all other Churches is not only without support in Church history, but there is much against it. The well-known action and attitude of Polycarp against Anicetus in regard to the observance of Easter; the action of Irenæus against Victor; the opposition of Cyprian to Stephen; and the protest of Augustine against Celestinus, all show with unmistakable clearness the position of the Church of Rome among the other Churches. Not least of all is the protest of Gregory the Great against the use of the title of Universal Bishop for the chief pastor of the Roman Church, and he actually said that whoever should assume it should be regarded as the forerunner of Antichrist.²

Then, too, this primacy, and therefore supremacy, was never acknowledged in the Eastern Church; indeed, it could not have been admitted. The history of the early General Councils afford positive proof of this contention, since the Pope was not only not President, but until the Fourth Council was not at all influential in any of the decisions. The first step in the direction of the Roman supremacy seems to have been associated with the Council of Sardica, 347, when Athanasius naturally appealed to the Church of Rome to adjudicate, and the Canons of Sardica appointed the Pope as judge. But this was all new, and the Council was not a General Council. The idea, however, was fruitful, and developed into very much more by the time of Innocent III. Later on the political change from Rome to Constantinople gradually helped the Papacy. The Emperor had been called *Pontifex Maximus* in connection with the Pagan relation to Church and State, and when the Empire was transferred to Constantinople it was natural that the Bishop of Rome, as the chief person remaining in the city, should have transferred to him the Imperial title of *Pontifex Maximus*. But such a stupendous claim as is involved in the Roman supremacy ought to have an unquestioned historical basis, and it literally has none. The decretals in the Middle Ages which were used to support the Roman position are now admitted on all hands to have been forged.

Coming to our own country, it is sometimes said that England was in the Patriarchate of Rome. The very idea of a Patriarchate arose almost certainly from civil usage. A Bishop was regarded as presiding over

¹ Bishop Lightfoot holds that St. Peter reached Rome in A.D. 64, and was soon afterwards put to death in the Neronian Persecution (*Apostolic Fathers*, Part I, Vol. II, pp. 497, 498).

² Maclcar and Williams, *Introduction to the Articles of the Church of England*, pp. 416-418.

παροικία (our "parish"); a Metropolitan over ἐπαρχία (our "province"); and a Patriarch over διοίκησις (our "diocese"). There were seven civil divisions in the East and seven in the West, and ecclesiastically there were one hundred and eighteen provinces with Patriarchates in their cities: Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria. All the others were primacies. But Rome had no power even over Milan, much less over Britain. There was a British Church before the coming of Augustine of Canterbury, and his mission did not and could not give jurisdiction to Rome. But gradually, especially through the action of Wilfrid and the results of the Norman Conquest, England became an integral part of the Roman Church until the Reformation. There were protests from time to time, but they were all civil, never ecclesiastical and spiritual.¹

As the topstone of an ecclesiastical edifice the Papacy could be regarded as a natural evolution, and, as such, not essentially antichristian. It is only when the demand is made that this must be so and nothing else is right that it becomes impossible and intolerable on all grounds. Even the Reformers were at first ready to acknowledge the primacy of Rome, but only *jure humano*. But Rome would not be content with this, and transformed ecclesiastical development into Divine laws. Then, too, the question of primacy has not only developed into that of supremacy, but into the much more serious claim to infallibility, Rome insisting that the Pope is infallible when defining any question of faith or morals.²

In the doctrine of the Papacy we have the most signal example of the principle on which a spurious Catholicism proceeds, namely, the transformation of a natural ecclesiastical development into essential Divine laws of Christianity by means of a legal system. Two main ideas are at the root of this transformation. (1) The sacerdotal idea of the ministry,

¹ "Here again the Church of England, so far as *represented by its Synods*, acknowledged its identity with the Church of Rome; just as did the 'Determination' of 1413 above mentioned. When most independent of the civil power, the hierarchy of England owned itself bound by the laws of the Church of Rome and declared its authority derived from the Popes. This was near the eve of the Reformation.

"Thus we see the Church of England on its clerical side more and more separated from the civil power from the Conquest to the Reformation; more and more identifying itself with the Church of Rome from Henry I to the Reformation. The Crown had its share in encouraging Papal domination, from its being continually in need of the influence of the hierarchy; but Parliament, so far as its direct enactments went, resisted Papal usurpations, and was the only body in the Constitution that maintained a consistent attitude of independence in regard to the See of Rome" (Hole, *A Manual of Church History*, p. 113; see also pp. 28, 52, 72, 82).

² "Pastors and faithful of whatsoever right and dignity, as well individually as all together, are bound by the obligation of the hierarchical subordination, and of true obedience, not only in things pertaining to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and regimen of the Church diffused throughout the entire world. . . . This is a doctrine of Catholic Truth, from which no one can deviate, and yet preserve faith and salvation. . . . Also we teach and declare the Pope to be the Supreme Judge of the Faithful, and that all causes relating to the ecclesiastical consideration may be referred to his judgment; the judicial sentence of the Apostolic See (than whose authority there is not a greater) may be revised by no one. Neither is it lawful for anyone to judge his judgment" (*Vatican Council*, Session IV, Ch. III).

involving mediation; (2) the visibility of the Church as essential, with the consequent need of a topstone. It has often been pointed out that Cyprian's view of the episcopate necessarily required the Papacy as the culminating point of the ecclesiastical pyramid.¹

And it is important to point out that it is futile to spend time on disproving the doctrine of Roman supremacy and infallibility if we leave untouched the roots from which it sprang, for it would produce something essentially like it if this form were abolished. If any sacerdotal view of the Church is held to be *jure divino*, it is impossible to take up a distinguishable position against Rome. The idea of a Catholicism which is not Roman is doomed to futility and destruction by the severe logic of facts. The only adequate safeguard against Roman supremacy is the assertion of the great verities emphasised at the Reformation and embodied in our Articles.²

IV.—ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE ROYAL SUPREMACY

The Article adduces two cases in which it is claimed that the Royal Supremacy may be asserted over individual Christian lives.

1. The Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.—The inclusion of this seems to be due to the fact that such a position was questioned in the sixteenth century. It is a recognition of authority, and is in harmony with the primitive teaching of Gen. ix. 6. It should be noted that the question is stated as permissible, and does not touch the larger question whether capital punishment is or is not advisable.

2. The Lawfulness of Military Service.—A distinction is to be drawn here between defence and defiance. The Article teaches that the exercise of force is sometimes necessary, and that it is therefore lawful for Christian men under proper authority to engage in military duties. While, then, the Article rightly opposes anything like anarchy on the part of Christian men, it is impossible to question the well-known but rough words of the American General, Sherman, that "War is hell."³ Here, again, there seems to be no doubt that the teaching of the Article is directed against

¹ On these subjects see Fairbairn, *Catholicism, Roman and Anglican*, pp. 167-189; Moyes, *London Eucharistic Congress*, p. 37 f.; Litton, *The Church of Christ*.

² Proof of this can be seen by a comparison of Bishop Gore's *Roman Catholic Claims* with Dom Chapman's *Bishop Gore and Roman Catholic Claims*. It must be frankly confessed that the latter is easily victorious on almost every point. Another illustration is found in Littledale's *Plain Reasons against joining the Church of Rome*, in which the plainest of all reasons is significantly omitted. So also with Brinckman's *Notes on the Papal Claims*. For valuable books on the Roman Controversy see Dearden, *Modern Romanism Examined*; Von Hase, *Handbook to the Controversy with Rome*, Vols. I and II; Salmon, *The Infallibility of the Church*; and *The Papal Council*, by Janus.

³ On the subject of Christianity and War see Mozley, *University Sermons*, V; Paget, *The Hallowing of War*; Maclear and Williams, *ut supra*, p. 497; Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, Section 2, pp. 233, 234; Hobhouse, *The Church and the World in Idea and in History*, p. 13 f., 23. *The Attitude of the Church towards War*, by Bishop H. E. Ryle (Liverpool Lectures, No. 12), a brief but valuable summary of the history and true position.

extremists in the sixteenth century who defied all civil authority and opposed the lawfulness of war.¹

The question of Christianity and War has naturally received special attention through recent events, and the truth of the Article has been seriously questioned. But the distinction between wars of aggression and defence remains valid, and the teaching of the Article, especially with its Latin reading, *justa bella*, is undoubtedly in accord with the New Testament principles of the Christian's relation and duty to the State. Christianity does not remove us from interest in national life. When it is said that Christians are "not of this world" it does not mean "not of this nation," for "world" and "nation" are not interchangeable terms. As Christians we share in national blessings and privileges, and are as much part of the nation as are non-Christians. Grace does not destroy or set aside natural relationships, whether of the family or of the State. On the contrary, it sanctifies and uplifts them. So that being "under grace" is compatible with being "under government," and God is as much the Ruler of nations as He ever was. When St. Paul showed patriotism in relation to Israel (Rom. ix. 14; x. 1) and claimed the rights of Roman citizenship (Acts xvi. 37; xxii. 25-28), he was not thereby disloyal to his Heavenly citizenship.

The War has helped us to understand certain aspects of New Testament teaching as never before. Thus, while the law of the Sermon on the Mount is clear in regard to individuals, it is not to be similarly applied to personal responsibilities for others. The law is plain that envy, hatred, and malice are as absolutely wrong in nations as they are in individuals, and so is revenge. Not only so, but the very existence of war is a clear proof that the law of God has somehow been broken, for if it had been perfectly obeyed, it would have made war impossible. But when violence, aggression, and tyrannical cruelty are seen, the question at once arises as to what Christianity requires of Christians. As long as the individual's own life is concerned, the matter is plain, but the problem becomes acute when he is responsible for others. The difficulty in some minds is due to a confusion between retaliation and resistance. The former is unchristian; the latter is not. Resistance of evil may be and often is a positive duty, for if a man or woman were to yield to pressure in the face of certain aspects of evil, it would imply a weak and sinful compliance. There is also no essential distinction between police force and military force, because in both instances force is exercised to resist evil. The kind and degree of resistance, or of the force required to overcome it, are quite irrelevant to the issue, and if when a burglar resists he gets maimed or killed, the householder or the policeman is not

¹ "Quin et Anabaptistarum profligandus est agrestis stupor, qui negant licere Christianis magistratum gerere, quasi propterea Christus in terras descenderit, ut rerum publicarum administrationem aboleret. Imo vero Spiritus Sanctus statuit principes et magistratus esse Dei ministros, ut benefactis favorem suum impartiant, et maleficia supplicii constringant; quæ duo si rebus humanis abessent, maxima sequeretur omnium rerum confusio" (*Reformatio Legum, De Hæresibus*, c. 13).

regarded as guilty of murder any more than the soldier is considered guilty on the battlefield. The contention that "Thou shalt not kill" is a prohibition of war is impossible, because the Jewish nation to which this command was given "had a strict military organisation constituted by the very authority from which the commandment came" (Dale).

When Christ said, "Resist not evil," He was stating in pithy, proverbial form the general principle of individual life. But to deduce from it a doctrine of universal non-resistance is to pervert the true meaning. If this verse is taken literally, why may not others be similarly interpreted? (See St. Matt. v. 42; vi. 19.) As long as the wrongs inflicted are personal, the Christian's attitude is that of meekness, but when the wrong is done to others, resistance becomes a duty. The whole idea of St. Matt. v. 39 is personal and has no reference to war, or to civic affairs. So that in any world where men are not what they ought to be, some form of force will be necessary, and the Christian attitude to those who are aggressively brutal and unjust must be one of opposition and resistance in the highest interests of the community. Whenever, therefore, compulsory military service is the law of the land, it is impossible to doubt that Christians are justified in responding to the claim of the Government to take up arms in defence of the country. Government is still as much as ever the Divine method of maintaining order and putting down evil (Rom. xiii.).

It is sometimes said in opposition to this line that "all they that take the sword shall perish by the sword," and it is interpreted with literalness, as though it means that everyone who fights must necessarily be killed. But this is obviously not true, as history abundantly proves. Yet the principle of the words remains as our Lord intended it to be understood, and if the emphasis is placed on the word "take" the true idea will be seen. The words are directed against that spirit of militarism which aims at aggression merely for conquest.

We conclude, therefore, that it is not and cannot be a sin to be a soldier, for not only do we find to-day many of the most earnest Christians in the ranks, but the Bible nowhere condemns a soldier's life. Indeed, God Himself appeared before Joshua in military form (Josh. v. 21-23). Although it would be certainly wrong to say that the Bible approves of all wars, there are many aspects of war, and many different kinds of war. So that in regard to a Christian man voluntarily becoming a soldier, each must judge for himself according to his conscience in the light of Holy Scripture.

We may sum up the matter by pointing out that under certain conditions a Christian ought to be ready to draw and use the sword. He should do so when the rights of man are invaded, since no man lives to himself, but is part of a social order for which we are all responsible. A Christian man is justified in fighting when the righteousness of the cause is clear, for tyranny in its attempt to over-ride liberty is manifestly wrong in the sight of God. Then, too, war by Christians is justifiable

when the resources of peace are really exhausted and the enemy still refuses to lay aside his tyranny and hatred. Once again, a Christian can legitimately enter into war when his individual conscience is clear. Our Lord always respected the rights of conscience, and when conscience is illuminated by the fundamental and essential truth of Holy Scripture, the matter must necessarily be left to the sincerity of the believer.

One other text has been much discussed during the recent War, namely, "Love your enemies," and again the need must be urged of distinguishing between personal and social attitudes; between individual life and corporate responsibility. No one questions for a moment that the command is absolutely binding on the individual, not, of course, as including pleasurable affection, but certainly as excluding all personal animosity and wish for evil. But the case is altogether different when the word is applied to an organised community, for other elements then enter into the problem which prevent us from using the precept to avoid hostility against national wrongdoing. The following words of the late Bishop of Durham in a letter to the *Spectator* make this distinction between the individual and the State clear and convincing:—

"There is no approach to a complete analogy between an organised community and a person, however much we may 'personify' the community. The State is not at all a personality: it is a great complex of personalities. It is such a complex that its organisation largely exists on purpose that the community may safeguard its personal components in their several interests and liberties, particularly its weaker components. From this point of view the State is morally right, is morally bound, to take indignant and resolute action when its members' lawful interests, of peace, security, liberty, are violated or forcibly threatened by another State. We are nowhere commanded by our Lord to love other people's enemies as such. Where others are concerned, as victims of wrong, a wholly new element enters the scene. We see a ruffian maltreat a woman, or a child. The aggressor, as such, is in no respect an object for our goodwill. He is an evil to be, by all possible means, quelled and also punished. And the State, when its member suffers violence and wrong, is called to act thus, as the third party interposing to protect and avenge another party."

It has been suggested that the attitude of the Pacifist is really due to the fallacy of believing that physical force is in itself an evil. This is certainly the weakness of several religious and philosophic systems, and is essentially the same as the old Gnostic position, that matter is evil and that only spiritual weapons are lawful. And yet, if matter and its force were created by God, it is impossible to say that these are evil *per se*, or that power, whether physical or intellectual or volitional, is inherently evil. As a matter of fact, this is often the only weapon that man can use to further his purpose. And so it may be concluded that the moral significance of force lies only in its use, and it is the unnecessary or cruel employment alone that is wrong. Force has to be used to slay an animal for food, and no one can say that this is wrong in itself, so long as our

employment is humane. The same is obviously true in social, civic and national affairs. For this reason, it is contended that a war of defence for the sake of righteousness and liberty is unquestionably justified, and, as it has been well said, the true conclusion is not "peace at any price," but righteousness at any cost¹

¹ "Ought Followers of the Galilean to be Pacifists?" by H. W. Magoun, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. LXXIII, p. 55 (January 1916).

"We are Christians, servants of a religion of love which expresses itself equally by gentleness and by force, never by supineness, never by hate. Is a Christian less loving when he seizes the bridle of a runaway horse, to save innocent bystanders from being trampled under its hoofs? He gives all for love, force, and reason freely flung into the service of the right. Has one forgotten Christ when one risks his life to restrain a maniac crazed with disease and near to throttling an innocent neighbour? Could one's love, one's Christianity, be other than hypocrisy if one was not faithful unto death, withholding no service called for? Force directed to noble ends is not base. Tiny forces that wag tongue or pen in reasoning and persuasion are no more Christian than the brute elemental force that launches a lifeboat. Our religion may call for any power we possess. He who holds back any service in the hour of need does but lip service to his God" ("America's Duty," by R. C. Cabot, *Outlook*, New York, 4th April 1917).

ARTICLE XXXVIII

Of Christian Men's Goods, which are not common.

The riches and goods of Christians are not common, as touching the right, title, and possession of the same, as certain Anabaptists do falsely boast. Notwithstanding, every man ought, of such things as he possesseth, liberally to give alms to the poor, according to his ability.

De illicita bonorum Communicatione.

Facultates et bona Christianorum non sunt communia, quoad jus et possessionem, ut quidam Anabaptistæ falso jactant. Debet tamen quisque de his quæ possidet, pro facultatum ratione, pauperibus eleemosynas benigne distribuere.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS

Of Christian men's goods, which are not common. = *de illicita bonorum communicatione.*

Riches = *facultates.*

As touching the right, title, and possession = *quoad jus et possessionem.*

IN 1553 and 1563 the title was *Christianorum bona non sunt communia*, "Christian men's goods are not common." The present titles date from 1571. The Latin is somewhat difficult to interpret. Dr. Hey suggests that it should be rendered, "Of the Unlawfulness of Acting as if all Goods were common." The Article is undoubtedly directed against certain extremists in the sixteenth century. The Reformers were obviously anxious to give the Church of Rome no handle for associating them with fanatical sects which arose in the age of the Reformation.

I.—THE TEACHING OF THE ARTICLE

1. The possessions of Christian men are not public property in regard to right, title, and possession.—This was the error of "certain Anabaptists" who were prevalent in England and on the Continent. The error is indicated in the *Reformatio Legum*,¹ and is also dealt with in more than one Confession of the Reformed Churches. In addition to the rejection of Infant Baptism the Anabaptists went to the extreme of abolishing all law and proclaiming the absolute equality of all Christian people. The outcome was fanaticism and Antinomianism, which led to terrible results. At the same time these extremes must not blind us to the fact that Anabaptism contained in it certain truths which found

¹ "Excludatur etiam ab eisdem Anabaptistis inducta bonorum et possessionum communitas, quam tantopere urgent, ut nemini quicquam relinquunt proprium et suum. In quo mirabiliter loquuntur, cum furta prohiberi divina Scriptura cernant, et eleemosynas in utroque Testamento laudari videant, quas ex propriis facultatibus nostris elargimur; quorum sane neutrum consistere posset, nisi Christianis proprietates bonorum et possessionum suarum relinqueretur" (*De Hæresibus*, c. 14).

emphasis in opposition to the errors of Rome, and in spite of the deplorable excesses of certain forms of Anabaptism it is impossible to overlook the underlying truths of their position.¹

2. The obligation of Christian giving proportionately to possession.—The word “alms” is singular, from the French, “elms,” based on the Greek, ἐλεημοσύνη.

II.—THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

Property as the fruit of industry is involved in the very notion of society as it exists by natural law, and if Christians have nothing of their own there can be no place for bounty and no necessity for liberality. It is important to bear in mind this essential and vital principle of the rightfulness of property when duly and legally obtained.² There is no proof that the action of the early Christians (Acts ii. 44 ; iv. 32) was anything more than a temporary expression of Christian fellowship, and certainly there is no proof of it ever being required as of Divine or permanent obligation. It is obvious that everything was purely voluntary and not compulsory (Acts v. 4). How can a man steal or covet his own? What is the meaning of such phrases as “rich in this world” (1 Tim. vi. 17), and “this world’s good” (1 John iii. 17)?

The early Church after the time in the Acts, as seen in Justin Martyr and Tertullian, clearly shows that no such community of goods was in existence, and Clement of Alexandria wrote his Treatise, *Quis Dives Salvetur*, to show that there was no need for a Christian man to give up his possessions.

The insistence of the Article on almsgiving is, of course, one of the clearest Christian duties, and is found almost everywhere in the New Testament in precept and practice (Rom. xii. 13 ; 1 Tim. vi. 17-19 ; Heb. xiii. 16).³

The New Testament has three great principles of giving, and these call for careful attention and constant emphasis on the part of all who are required to teach. (a) A man is to give according as God hath prospered him (1 Cor. xvi. 2) ; (b) he is to give according to his ability (Acts xi. 29) ; (c) he is to give according to his heart’s purpose (2 Cor. ix. 7). It is suggestive and significant of the true Christian life that in the last passage the word rendered “cheerful” is that from which we obtain the English word “hilarious.” All the principles and methods of Christian giving may be carefully studied from St. Paul’s two chapters, 2 Cor. viii. ; ix. It will thus be seen that giving is to be “according to” (κατὰ) not “out of” (ἐκ). A man may easily give a very small amount “out of” his abundance, but this will not be Christian giving. He must

¹ For a full and discriminating discussion of Anabaptism, see Lindsay, *The History of the Reformation*, Vol. II, pp. 430-463 ; Forsyth, *Faith, Freedom, and the Future*, passim.

² For a careful study of this subject, see Clow, *Christ in the Social Order* ; Flint, *Socialism* Ch. XI.

³ The Eleventh Homily in the Second Book is on “Almsdoing.”

give "according to" his abundance, or whatever he has. The New Testament is thus true to its genius in avoiding all reference to a specific proportion like the Old Testament rule of the tithe. In harmony with the essential feature of Christianity as a religion of principle, not of rule, it lays the burden upon the enlightened spiritual mind to give "according to" what is possessed, pointing out that giving is one of the most definite and searching proofs of the reality of the Christian life (1 John iv. 20, 21; iii. 17, 18).

ARTICLE XXXIX

Of a Christian Man's Oath.

De jure jurando.

As we confess that vain and rash swearing is forbidden Christian men by our Lord Jesus Christ, and *James* His Apostle; so we judge that Christian religion doth not prohibit, but that a man may swear when the Magistrate requireth, in a cause of faith and charity, so it be done, according to the Prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth.

Quemadmodum juramentum vanum et temerarium a Domino nostro Jesu Christo et Apostolo ejus *Jacobo*, Christianis hominibus interdictum esse fatemur; ita Christianorum religionem minime prohibere censemus, quin jubente magistratu, in causa fidei et charitatis jurare liceat, modo id fiat juxta Prophetæ doctrinam, in justitia, in judicio, et veritate.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Of a Christian man's oath | = | <i>de jure jurando.</i> |
| Christian religion | = | <i>Christianorum religionem.</i> |
| The prophet's teaching | = | <i>Propheta doctrinam.</i> |

LIKE the last Article, this dates from 1553, though with a different title. Originally it was: *Licet Christianis jurare*, "Christian men may take an oath." This also is directed against the Anabaptists, who had imbibed the view that oath-taking, even in Courts of Justice, was wrong. The condemnation of this is also seen in the *Reformatio Legum*.¹

I.—THE PROHIBITION

The Article frankly acknowledges that "vain and rash swearing is forbidden Christian men." The word "oath" comes from the Anglo-Saxon "ath," and means a solemn affirmation with appeal to God as to the truth of the declaration. This appeal implies at once the renunciation of the Divine favour and the imprecation of the Divine justice if the statements are proved to be false. Oaths are of two kinds: one asserts, simply stating something to be true; the other promises, pledging the word in regard to truth. The latter would include such promises as what are known as the oath of allegiance, the oath of office, the oath of witnesses in Courts. The "vain and rash swearing" referred to in the Article doubtless has in view such passages as St. Matt. v. 33-37; St. James v. 12, and the vanity and rashness are clearly regarded as profane and irreverent, and therefore rightly forbidden because opposed to the true idea of the Gospel.

¹ "Præterea nec juramentorum Anabaptistæ legitimum relinquunt usum, in quo contra Scripturarum sententiam et veteris Testamenti patrum exempla, Pauli etiam Apostoli, imo Christi, imo Dei Patris procedunt; quorum juramenta sæpe sunt in sacris literis reperta" (*De Hæresibus*, c. 15).

II.—THE PERMISSION

The oath-taking that is claimed to be allowable is the solemn affirmation when required, and the Article rightly states that Christianity does not forbid such solemn statements when required by authority "in a cause of faith and charity." This kind of oath or solemn assertion is seen to be allowed and even ordered in Scripture (Deut. vi. 13). Our Lord Himself submitted to such without any question or objection (Matt. xxvi. 63). St. Paul often used it in connection with affirmations of the Gospel and of his own personal attitude (Rom. ix. 1; 2 Cor. i. 23; Gal. i. 20). It is also even recognised as associated with God Himself (Heb. vi. 16-18). It is evident, therefore, that such passages at once qualify, and in particular those in St. Matthew and St. James, and abundantly vindicate the practice of oath-taking in Courts of Justice, by solemnly appealing to the presence of God in support of statements made. The reference at the end of the Article lays down the principle of such taking of oaths. It must be done "according to the prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth." The allusion is to the words of Jeremiah (iv. 2). Granted these conditions, an oath is perfectly legitimate. It is no doubt correct that if men were always strictly truthful oaths would not be required, but in view of the presence of evil in the world the necessity of some solemn attestation seems inevitable, and for this purpose it is to be regarded as quite lawful and right for a Christian.¹

¹ The Seventh Homily in the First Book is on the subject of "Swearing and Purgatory," where the passage from Jeremiah is quoted and explained.

CONCLUSION

IN the light of the history and substance of the Articles several important questions remain for consideration.

RELATION OF THE ARTICLES TO THE PRAYER BOOK

It is sometimes argued that the Prayer Book and Articles are contradictory, and Pitt's words are often quoted, that the Church of England has a Popish Liturgy, an Arminian clergy and Calvinistic Articles. But notwithstanding its cleverness the statement is not only incorrect, but really reveals the ignorance of its author. There is no essential difference between the Prayer Book and the Articles, as the following facts show :

1. There was a distinct and considerable difference between Cranmer and some of the extreme Protestants of the sixteenth century, and he should not be identified with them.¹ Indeed, Cranmer's learning and balance of judgment are more evident to-day than ever.² And it is to Cranmer that we owe almost entirely both the Prayer Book and the Articles.

2. Archbishop Parker is known to have been a disciple and admirer of Cranmer,³ and Parker's action in connection with Article XXIX shows the essential nature of his doctrine on the Holy Communion.

3. The essentially Protestant attitude of Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury, and final Editor of the Articles and a collaborator with Parker is well known.

4. The addition on the Sacraments made to the Catechism in 1604 did not involve any difference of doctrine, because the very wording of the questions and answers can be traced to Nowell's *Little Catechism*, a well-known Reformation document.⁴

¹ Hardwick, *ut supra*, p. 32.

² "Of the men, who were raised up to guide their country through the perils of that stormy crisis, and who finally succeeded in rebuilding for us what has proved itself a sanctuary not only from the malice of the Romanist, but also from a flood of Puritanical innovations, none was so illustrious and untiring as the primate of all England. After granting that the life of Cranmer was disfigured here and there by human blemishes; after granting that the caution and timidity of his nature had degenerated, on some rare occasions, into weakness and irresolution, he is still, if we regard him fairly as a whole, among the brightest worthies of his age: to him we are indebted, under God, for much of the sobriety of tone that marks the English Reformation, or in other words, for the accordance of our present system with the Apostolic models" (Hardwick, *ut supra*, p. 67 f.; see also pp. 68-70).

³ Hardwick, *ut supra*, p. 118.

⁴ Dimock, *Papers on the Eucharistic Presence*, pp. 289-429; Nowell's *Catechism* has been reprinted by Grove.

5. In 1662 no change whatever was made in the Articles, and it is well known that the reinsertion with a change of wording of the Black Rubric did not involve any change of doctrine on the Holy Communion; indeed, the proposal emanated from the Puritan party.¹

These facts are sufficient to show that there is no difference whatever between the Prayer Book and the Articles on points of doctrine, though there is naturally an obvious difference between the Book of Common Prayer and the Articles when they are considered in relation to their character and purpose. Thus the Act of Uniformity expressly restricts the clergy to "the use of the Book of Common Prayer," and this view is endorsed by the Act 23 of George II. And this use of the Prayer Book is based on the belief and affirmation that it does not contain anything "contrary to the Word of God." But with reference to the Articles the case is decidedly different, for these were drawn up as a test of doctrinal soundness for the clergy, and naturally the law requires an acknowledgment that they are "agreeable to the Word of God" and a declaration of "unfeigned assent" to them, while the original Act declared against the maintenance of "any doctrine contrary to them." Thus we see at once the natural difference between the assent required to the Book of Common Prayer and to the Articles. In the former case we are concerned with Formularies of devotion; in the latter with a standard of belief. But it would be impossible to regard Formularies of devotion as providing an exact standard of faith such as we have in the Articles, and so all that is required concerning the Prayer Book is a declaration of belief that there is nothing in the Book contrary to Holy Scripture, while in regard to the Articles a declaration is required which shows that they were intended to be the standard of faith and test of orthodoxy. Not only, therefore, is there no contradiction between the two, as seen by their history, but, further, the essential difference of character and purpose is seen by the very different requirements from the clergy with respect to them. The Prayer Book is rightly regarded as an incomparable book of devotion, and as such it is to be valued and used, but the Articles, and not the Prayer Book, are the Church's confession of faith and the true test of essential Anglican doctrine on the matters included within their scope.

RELATION OF THE ARTICLES TO ROME

That the Articles were not intended to be merely pacificatory, but also a plain statement of the Anglican position against the Church of Rome ought to be clear from the Articles themselves. In addition to the original declarations in the Forty-two Articles of 1553, we have seen that a further anti-Roman sharpening was given to them in 1563. But it will be worth while to call attention in detail to the reference to Rome contained in the Articles.

¹ Dimock, *ut supra*, pp. 465-476. See also Perry, *English Church History*.

1. In Article XIX the Church of Rome is said to have erred not only in regard to Ceremonies, but also in matters of Faith.

2. In Articles VI, XX, XXI, XXII, there is an appeal to Holy Scripture as the sole and supreme standard of truth.

3. In Article XIV there is a plain reference to the Roman Catholic doctrine of "Works of Supererogation."

4. In Article XXII reference is made to the Romish doctrines of Purgatory, Indulgence, Veneration of Images and Relics, and Invocation of Saints.

5. Article XXIV teaches that public prayers are to be in the vernacular tongue.

6. Article XXV opposes the Roman Catholic view of the seven Sacraments and Processions of the Host.

7. Article XXVIII speaks definitely against Transubstantiation, Reservation, Elevation, Adoration of the Sacrament.

8. Article XXX refers to the Roman practice of withholding the cup from the laity.

9. Article XXXI speaks in the strongest terms against the "sacrifices of Masses" as derogatory to the sacrifice of Christ.

10. Article XXXII takes the opposite view of the Roman practice of the compulsory celibacy of the clergy.

11. Article XXXVI insists upon the validity of our Orders in opposition to Rome.

12. Article XXXVII states that the Bishop of Rome "hath no jurisdiction in this Realm of England."

13. Article XV in speaking of Christ alone as without sin is in opposition to the Immaculate Conception and sinlessness of the Virgin Mary.

14. Article XXIX involves opposition to the Roman doctrine of the Lord's Supper, in insisting that the wicked do not partake of the Body of Christ when they receive the elements.

Is it possible to avoid drawing the plain inference from all these statements that the Articles condemn in a very unmistakable way the essential doctrines of the Church of Rome?

It might have been thought that this would have been more than sufficient to indicate the mind of the Anglican Church, but, strange to say, several attempts have been made to explain away this very obvious anti-Roman position by saying that the Articles had no intention of denouncing Roman official doctrine, but only certain extreme tenets of certain men in the mediæval Church of Rome. This means that when we read so often of Rome and "Romish" in the Articles we are to understand some extremists of the Middle Ages, though their very existence is quite mythical. The first of these attempts dates from the time of Charles I, when a Dominican monk, named Davenport, who wrote under the title of Franciscus à Sancta Clara, endeavoured to prove that the Articles could be interpreted so as to avoid the condemnation of Rome. His book is a curious illustration of intellectual ingenuity. The

next attempt was made in the celebrated Tract XC of Dr. Newman, who took similar ground, especially in Articles XXII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXXI. He seems to have been inspired by Davenport's attempt, and endeavoured to distinguish between Roman and Catholic, urging that the Articles only denounced the former and not the latter. Such efforts justify the language of Archbishop Whately, who said :—

“To bring the Articles to bear such a sense as what Mr. Newman thought Catholic tradition required, was a task of no little difficulty. Indeed, he set such an example of hairsplitting and wiredrawing—of shuffling equivocation and dishonest garbling of quotations—as made the English people thoroughly ashamed that any man calling himself an Englishman, a gentleman, and a clergyman, should insult their understandings and consciences with such mean sophistry.”¹

It is not surprising that the Tract led to its condemnation by the Heads of Houses at Oxford, for

“Evading rather than explaining the sense of the Thirty-nine Articles and reconciling subscription to them with the adoption of errors which they were designed to counteract.”

But in spite of Newman giving permission twenty years afterwards to republish the Tract, still later on in 1883 Newman came to see that his interpretation was impossible, and he frankly confessed it.² Since his day similar efforts have been made, but with little or no success in the light of the history of the sixteenth century which gave the Articles birth.³ The words of Prebendary Meyrick are assuredly true that “we have the Thirty-nine Articles to serve as a permanent breakwater against the inrush of Mediævalism and Popery.”⁴

¹ *Cautions for the Times*, p. 231.

² See on Article XXXI.

³ By writers like Bishop Forbes, Rev. Vernon Staley, Dr. B. J. Kidd, Dr. Darwell Stone, Rev. T. A. Lacey, Rev. F. W. Puller, Rev. E. Tyrrell Green, and to some extent Bishop Gibson. As an illustration, the words of Bishop Forbes may be mentioned, which speak of Article XXXVII as referring to the absence of Papal jurisdiction in the “Realm” not in the “Church” of England, as if this distinction between Church and Realm could stand in the light of the well-known circumstances of the sixteenth century. But it is significant that most of the points emphasised by Newman in Tract XC find no allusion in Gibson's and Green's works, though they do elsewhere.

⁴ *A Protestant Dictionary*, p. 44.

The view of a scholar who is outside our Church may also be cited: “Against the abuses and the errors of Rome there is no weakening or wavering of the Anglican protest. With all their halting between two opinions, their want of theological originality, their intentional incompleteness, they have been a noble bulwark of Protestant conviction, and possess a simple dignity and Catholicity of their own. Against their measured testimony, spoken with the formula of Trent as clearly in view as those of Lutheranism and Calvinism, even the interpretative casuistry and antiquarian imagination of the Oxford Movement urged their forces in vain. Their intention, their spirit, and their language are unquestionably Protestant” (Curtis, *History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith*, p. 182).

The facts connected with the Council of Trent, adduced above, point in the same direction.

THE CHARACTER OF THE ARTICLES

Objection is sometimes raised to the Articles because it is said they are "in no sense a Creed." It is, of course, perfectly true that the Articles are not a Creed in the sense that the three Creeds mentioned in Article VIII are. But in view of the position of the English Church in relation to Rome, as expressed in the sixteenth century, the Articles have been set forth by our Church as a statement of Faith on the particular points with which they deal, and, as such, they are undoubtedly binding on clergy of the Church as expressive of Church of England doctrine. As already indicated, the various Reformed Churches in the sixteenth century were compelled to set out their own beliefs in opposition to Rome, and the Articles embodied the positive teaching of the Anglican Church on a number of vital and important points. A careful consideration of the statements of the Articles in connection with such subjects as the Nature of God, the Person and Work of Christ, the Holy Trinity, the Resurrection, the Nature of Sin, the Truth of Justification, the Necessity and Power of Good Works, and other similar doctrines, will show beyond all question what the Church of England holds and teaches on these fundamental questions, and it is impossible to charge the Articles with any vagueness or hesitation on these topics. Then, too, as it has been well pointed out, the Articles are studiously careful, balanced, and moderate in regard to many matters about which there have been differences of opinion among Christian people. If the language of the Articles on such subjects as Predestination, the Church, and the Ministry be examined it will be seen how cautious and wise are the statements, while rightly requiring for its own members certain general lines of truth. Further, it is impossible to overlook the remarkable balance and clearness in regard to the Sacraments. While insisting upon their Divine authority, the greatest possible care is taken to insist upon their value as means of grace, and at the same time the impossibility of regarding them as channels of blessing apart from definite faith in the promises of God. Nothing could be more definite than the teaching of the Articles concerning what is often called sacramental grace, that is, grace received in the due Scriptural use of these Divine ordinances.¹ From all this it is quite clear that the Articles are characterised by features that make them an admirable compendium of doctrine on the particular subjects treated.

THE PERMANENT VALUE OF THE ARTICLES²

The question is often raised whether Creeds and Confessions should be permitted to exist any longer, whether they have not had their day

¹ Prebendary Meyrick in the *Protestant Dictionary*, p. 42; and Bishop J. C. Ryle's *Knots Untied*, p. 63 ff.

² *Literature*.—Curtis, *History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith*, Chs. XXIII, XXIV (very important); Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, last chapter.

and ceased to be of service; whether, indeed, they are not hindrances to intellectual progress and checks on spiritual liberty. But it may be questioned whether this view possesses anything of real value to warrant it. The testimony derivable from Communions without Creeds and Confessions is not encouraging.¹ That a Church should know where it stands and that its teachers should have a clear idea of what they are to teach seem pretty evident propositions. Assuming, as we must, a settled, clear, and definite faith in God and truth, is it not natural to express it? Belief in God, in Christ, in the Holy Spirit—what is this but a Creed? Not only so, but it involves, however inchoately, an interpretation. Thought is inevitable and expression of thought equally so. Could anything be more dogmatic than modern science and modern rationalism? Even the agnostic must have a Creed. “No rational being can be Creedless,” says Flint, and Herbert Spencer’s words are well worth quoting again:—

“Religious creeds, which in one way or other occupy the sphere that rational interpretation seeks to occupy and fails, and fails the more the more it seeks, I have come to regard with a sympathy based on community of need: feeling that dissent from them results from inability to accept the solutions offered, joined with the wish that solutions could be found.”²

Creeds and Confessions can be shown to have had a necessary place in the circumstances of the times in which they arose, and they bear testimony to the reality, force, and persistence of Christian truth and life.³

But it is, of course, essential that Creeds and Confessions should be continually made subject to the light of Scripture interpreted by growing Christian experience. John Robinson’s words are true that “The Lord hath yet more light and truth to break forth from His Holy Word,” and there is no reason why the Church should not revise her Formularies and adapt them to new needs. They are confessedly subordinate to Scripture, the supreme Rule of Faith, and fuller knowledge of the latter will naturally result in newer expressions of the former. The boast of *semper eadem* is a confession of spiritual sterility and stationariness. It may doubtless be wise and necessary to revise rarely and cautiously, but the principle of revision must be granted by all who know the genius of Christianity. As Creeds are based on Scripture, it is only natural that extension of the knowledge of the Bible should influence confessional expressions. The position that Creeds are sacrosanct and exempt from criticism is impossible, though at the same time the fact that Creeds come

¹ “The religious bodies which proclaim their freedom from dogma have not been overwhelmed by applications for admission to their membership” (Curtis, *ut supra*, p. 429).

² *Autobiography*. See Curtis, *ut supra*, p. 430.

³ “It is in truth unthinkable that the vast aggregate of doctrinal symbols, evolved by the Church in all lands during nineteen centuries of intense activity, should have proceeded from any but a profoundly natural and honourable instinct in the soul of faith” (Curtis, *ut supra*, p. 432).

to us with the weight of authority will naturally make us pause long before either summarily rejecting or submitting them to serious modification. The problem on every side is difficult, but it exists and has to be faced.¹ We, therefore, rejoice and glory in a Creed and Confession as a guide, standard, and protection of the truth, while we claim a perfect right to revise its statements whenever necessary for spiritual light, life, and progress.²

ETHICS OF SUBSCRIPTION³

The question of subscription to Creeds and Articles is fraught with great and grave difficulties, and it was the consciousness of this that led to the endeavour made in 1865 to loosen the bonds and provide relief in a general rather than a detailed endorsement. What, then, are we to understand by assent to our Formularies? Let us state it in the words of a modern writer:—

“Assent to a historic Creed or Group of Articles, under whatever formula, involves a reference, not merely to what is fondly termed the *plain meaning* of its sentences, but also to its historical meaning, purpose, background, and spirit.”⁴

When this view is taken there need be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at the mind of the Church. The same view may be presented in the words of a Churchman:—

“A careful study of the Articles and the Prayer Book reveals the fact that Anglican Theology moves along certain definite and distinctive lines (see especially Articles VI, XI, XIX, XX, XXIII, XXV, XXIX, XXXI, XXXVI). These lines of doctrine distinguish it from Romanism on the one hand and from the extreme forms of Protestantism on the other. Subscription to the Articles should imply loyalty to these distinctive principles. It is not compatible with adherence to those opposing principles and practices which are distinctive of Rome on the one hand or of Anabaptism on the other. But within its own lines

¹ “How to change without loss of continuity, how to grow without loss of identity, how to be free in doctrine while clinging to a sacred past, how to meet the protean spirit of the times without bowing down to it, yet without alienating its rightful instincts and flouting its proper needs—these are the practical difficulties to the mind of a Church which would be true to the past, honest with the present, and helpful to the future” (Curtis, *ut supra*, p. 441).

² “Theology is a living science. The immense progress made in other departments of thought in the nineteenth century could not fail to show itself also in Theology. Biblical Criticism and Natural Science have thrown new light upon the problems of Theology. Men think in new categories, and it is inevitable that the definitions and propositions of the sixteenth century should be inadequate to express the best theological thought of our own day. But it is one thing to recognise the need for re-statement and quite another to put forth any re-statement which would command universal assent. This may be possible some day. When that day comes, let the task be taken in hand in humble dependence upon the guidance of the Spirit of God” (J. B. Harford, Article, “Articles of Religion,” *The Prayer Book Dictionary*, p. 52).

³ *Literature*.—Curtis, *ut supra*, Ch. XXV.

⁴ Curtis, *ut supra*, p. 455.

there is scope for a genuine evolution of Anglican Theology in the light of present day knowledge.”¹

In the Gorham Judgment of 1850 the Court said that :—

“ In all cases in which the Thirty-nine Articles, considered as a test, admit of different interpretations, it must be held that any sense of which the words fairly admit may be allowed, if that sense be not contradictory to something which the Church has elsewhere allowed or required.”

Two recent incidents help to illustrate this. In October 1913, Bishop Gore wrote to *The Times* protesting against a statement of the President of the Baptist Union, in which the latter referred to the differences in the Church of England in spite of the fact that Churchmen used the same Prayer Book “ and have signed the same Articles.” The Bishop thereupon called attention to the fact that, as in 1865 the form of subscription was changed, it is now impossible to say that the clergy “ sign the Articles.” What they now do is to give a general assent to the doctrine contained in the three Formularies of the Articles, Prayer Book, and Ordinal. So that according to Bishop Gore it is impossible to describe this as “ signing the Articles.” On this, the then Bishop of Manchester, Dr. Knox, wrote, calling attention to the exact wording of the declaration made by ordinands and clergy about to be licensed or beneficed. The declaration refers not to doctrine in general, but to “ the doctrine of the Church of England as therein set forth.” Dr. Knox held that this distinction is important, because otherwise it might easily permit of some signing the declaration while holding *ex animo* all the doctrines of the Church of Rome, which doctrines they believe to be contained within the Anglican Formularies. Dr. Knox then added :—

“ The very solemn questions put to ordinands imply that this Church and Realm has received and holds its own doctrine, and sacraments, and discipline, the said doctrine being ‘ set forth,’ that is, honestly and definitely expounded in the Prayer Book and Articles. It is to this doctrine that assent is required, not to any form of doctrine loosely ‘ contained ’ in those Formularies twisted to suit each man’s taste as to what he chooses to believe.”

All this illustrates and confirms the principle set forth above that assent involves a historical spirit. Bishops Knox and Henson are correct in emphasising the essential and characteristic features of Church of England doctrine as that to which the clergy are pledged, and as to the meaning of this there is no reasonable doubt. Whatever may have been the intention of those responsible for the change in 1865 as to the relaxation of subscription, it may be still questioned what precisely it does mean. The assertion that the doctrine is “ agreeable to the Word of God ” seems to leave the position practically very much as it was before. The

¹ J. B. Harford, *ut supra*, p. 52.

doctrine of the Church of England can only be found in its Formularies, and these are fundamentally the same as they were three centuries ago, and on the general subject it is impossible not to agree with the opinion that those who are called upon to preach the doctrines of the Church should be ready to proclaim them positively and heartily.¹ Nor does the Act of 1865 fundamentally alter the truth of our Church historian when he says :—

“ Subscription to the Articles has been exacted with the hope of securing uniformity of doctrine in those churchmen who deliberately assume the office of public teachers. It accordingly involves their own appropriation of the Articles as the exponent of their individual opinions—so far, at least, as such opinions bear on subjects which have been determined by authority in that code of doctrine; and, while pledging every clergyman to full and positive faith, subscription is the act by which he also formally renounces errors and corruptions which are there repudiated or proscribed.”²

Creeds in the past have been either normative or apologetic. Apologetic Creeds will be needed to the end of time in order that Christianity may be stated in terms of current thought. Normative Creeds are mainly for the use of teachers, describing the limits in which they may and should move, and if they are regarded as landmarks, not as goals, they will always be useful, if not essential. One concluding caution may be given :—

“ If the Creeds represent *Catholic* Doctrine, the Catechism contains elementary and the Articles more advanced *Anglican* Doctrine, and with these last may be grouped the incidental statements in the Prayer Book. It would be well if preachers and teachers avoided such expressions as ‘The Church,’ or ‘The whole Church teaches . . .’ when enunciating Doctrine not covered by these. What they affirm may be some truth contained in Scripture, or taught by the Primitive Church, but which has not found place in our Formularies; but it may be some doubtful interpretation, or later tradition. It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to cite the Mediæval Church, or St. Thomas Aquinas, on points of Doctrine, but it is not legitimate to give forth *dicta* carrying no higher authority as if they had the endorsement of the whole Catholic Church, or the ratification of our own branch of it. Much prejudice against ‘Church teaching’ would be

¹ “In an irreligious and latitudinarian age, an opinion was started, that the Articles were only Articles of peace, that is, that those who signed them only engaged not to contradict their assertions. This appears to me to be no better than a transparent fallacy, by which persons, whose worldly interest, as tutors or incumbents, required their conformity to this standard of doctrine, endeavoured to pacify their consciences. Such when they preach must at best be silent on tenets, on which they dissent from the judgment of the Church to which they profess to adhere; but what society would be satisfied with neutrality? Surely Churchmen have a right to demand, that the doctrines of their Church should not merely be not opposed, but that they should be explained and enforced” (Macbride, *Lectures on the Articles*, p. 36 f.).

² Hardwick, *ut supra*, p. 222. See also Article, “Subscription to Articles,” *Protestant Dictionary*, p. 716 f.; *The Declaration of Assent*, by the late Bishop of Gloucester (Dr. Gibson).

avoided if those who speak for the Church would with more uniform care distinguish : (*a*) what all Christians agree to find in the New Testament ; (*b*) what the Catholic Church has enshrined in her Creeds ; (*c*) those elementary truths which have always been taught, and underlie the common worship, rites, and sacraments of the Church ; (*d*) that wider range of truth which the English Church has soberly and with restraint defined in her Articles and incidentally in the Prayer Book ; (*e*) such further truths drawn from Scripture as are agreeable to the foregoing ; (*f*) such alleged truths as at least appear to be at variance with Catholic or Anglican formularies, though a court of law would not necessarily regard them as excluded ; (*g*) Doctrines admitted to contravene both the letter and spirit of the formularies.”¹

¹ G. Harford, Article, “Doctrine,” *The Prayer Book Dictionary*, p. 290.