

ARTICLE VII

Of the Old Testament.

De Veteri Testamento.

The Old Testament is not contrary to the New: for both in the Old and New Testament everlasting life is offered to Mankind by Christ, who is the only Mediator between God and Man, being both God and Man. Wherefore they are not to be heard, which feign that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises. Although the Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies and Rites, do not bind Christian men, nor the Civil precepts thereof ought of necessity to be received in any commonwealth; yet notwithstanding, no Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral.

Testamentum vetus novo contrarium non est: quandoquidem tam in veteri, quam in novo, per Christum, qui unicus est mediator Dei et hominum, Deus et homo, æterna vita humano generi est proposita. Quare male sentiunt, qui veteres tantum in promissiones temporarias sperasse confingunt. Quanquam lex a Deo data per Mosen, quoad cæremonias et ritus, Christianos non astringat, neque civilia ejus præcepta in aliqua republica necessario recipi debeant, nihilominus tamen ab obedientia mandatorum, quæ Moralia vocantur, nullus quantumvis Christianus est solutus.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

Who is the only Mediator	= <i>qui unicus est Mediator.</i>
Wherefore they are not to be heard	= <i>Quare male sentiunt.</i> ¹
For transitory promises.	= <i>in promissiones temporarias.</i>
No Christian man whatsoever	= <i>nullus quantumvis Christianus.</i> ²
Free from obedience.	= <i>ab obedientia solutus.</i>

THIS is a corollary to and application of Article VI in regard to the Old Testament and, as such, it constitutes part of the teaching of the Church on the Rule of Faith. In the Forty-two Articles of 1553 there were two Articles, the sixth and the nineteenth, each dealing with aspects of the Old Testament, and in 1563 they were brought together to form this Article because of their kindred topics. The first half of this Article (to the word "promises") formed the sixth Article of 1553, with the title, *Vetus Testamentum non est rejiciendum* ("The Old Testament is not to be rejected"). But that Article began thus: *Testamentum Vetus, quasi Novo contrarium sit, non est repudiandum, sed retinendum* ("The Old Testament is not to be put away, as though it were contrary to the New; but to be kept still"). The second half of the present Article formed the nineteenth of 1553, with the title, *Omnes obligantur ad moralia legis præcepta servanda* ("All men are bound to keep the moral commandments of the law"). That Article began thus: *Lex a Deo per*

¹ In the XLII, "*Non sunt audiendi*," and hence the English.

² Translated in Article XIX of the XLII, "No man (be he never so perfect a Christian)."

Mosen, licet quo ad Cæremonias et Ritus. But only the first clause of it was incorporated in 1563 to make our seventh Article. The remainder of Article XIX of 1553 was as follows: *Quare illi non sunt audiendi, qui sacras literas tantum infirmis datas esse perhibent, et Spiritum perpetuo jactant, a quo sibi quæ prædicant suggeri asserunt, quanquam cum sacris literis apertissime pugnent* ("Wherefore they are not to be hearkened unto, who affirm that Holy Scripture is given only to the weak, and do boast themselves continually of the Spirit, of whom (they say) they have learned such things as they teach, although the same be most evidently repugnant to the Holy Scripture"). This was probably omitted because the difficulty had ceased by the time of Queen Elizabeth.

The Article is plainly directed against erroneous views rife at the time of the Reformation, and perhaps there are also echoes of similar errors in the early Church. We know the Gnostics held that the Old Testament is opposed to the New. Extreme Protestants in the sixteenth century insisted that the ceremonial law was binding,¹ while from another standpoint the Anabaptists taught that Christians were free from the law.² Then, again, there were those who held that internal illumination was sufficient without the written Word.³ These are referred to in the sentence of Article XIX of 1553, omitted in 1563.

I.—THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS⁴

I. The Article states that the Old Testament "is not contrary to the New." There is, of course, no question of exact spiritual equality, which has never really been held. The two Testaments are united in all essential features of a progressive revelation without exalting the Old to the spiritual level of the New, and the essential principle is taught by our Lord and His Apostles (Matt. v. 17 f.; John v. 39).

¹ "De iis, qui vetus Testamentum aut totum rejiciunt, aut totum exigunt. Deinde quomodo priscis temporibus Marcionitarum sordes, Valentinianorum et Manichæorum fluxerunt, et aliæ similes earum multæ fæces, a quibus vetus Testamentum ut absurdum malumque, et cum novo dissidens, repudiabatur, sic multi nostris temporibus inveniuntur, inter quos Anabaptistæ præcipue sunt collocandi, ad quos si quis vetus Testamentum alleget, illud pro abrogato jam et obsoleto penitus habent, omnia quæ in illo posita sunt ad prisca majorum nostrorum tempora referentes. Itaque nihil eorum ad nos statunt pervenire debere. Aliorum autem contrarius est, sed ejusdem impietatis error, qui usque adeo vetus ad Testamentum adhærescunt, ut ad circumcisionem et a Mose quondam institutas cæremonias necessario nos revocent" (*Reformatio Legum, De Hæresibus*, c. 4).

² "Here I note only one thing, which is the temerity, ignorance, and blasphemy of certain phantastical heads, which hold that the prophets do write only to the people of the Old Testament, and that their doctrine did pertain only to their time; and would seclude all the Fathers that lived under the law from the hope of eternal salvation. And here is also a note to be gathered against them which utterly reject the Old Testament, as a book: nothing necessary to the Christians which live under the Gospel" (Alley's *Poore Man's Librarie*, II, 97; quoted in Hardwick, *On the Articles*, p. 395).

³ Hardwick, *History of the Articles of Religion*, p. 99 f., and Notes, p. 374.

⁴ For the topics of this Article see Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* (Second Edition), pp. 44-48.

2. The ground of this unity is stated to be the revelation of Jesus Christ as the Messiah. "Both in the Old and New Testament everlasting life is offered to Mankind by Christ, who is the only Mediator between God and Man." It is because Christ is the subject of both Testaments as the Divine Mediator that we can speak of the vital unity between them (Acts x. 43; Rom. iii. 21; Gal. iii. 24).

A careful study of the Old Testament will reveal three lines of spiritual teaching. (a) It is a book of unfulfilled prophecies. From the beginning to the end (Gen. iii. 15 to Mal. iv. 1), while there are prophecies of a temporal and temporary nature which find their fulfilment, the bulk of the announcements refer to the Messiah, and the Old Testament closes with the spirit of expectation. (b) It is also a book of unexplained ceremonies. On almost every page there are references to sacrifices and offerings, and yet there is comparatively little explanation of the meaning of these elements of worship. When the entire organisation of Levitical sacrifices, rites, and ceremonies comes into view the necessity of their explanation becomes more acute, and yet the book closes with little or no real elucidation. (c) It is also a book of unsatisfied longings. From the opening pages to the close there is the frequent expression of desire for God and satisfaction on the part of man. The heart cries out for the Living God and for the blessings God has promised, and though there is great there is no perfect satisfaction, for notwithstanding all the references to the King and the Kingdom, and to God in relation to the spiritual life, as recorded in the Psalms, the book closes in incompleteness (Heb. vii. 19). These are the three threads running through it, and they enable us to understand that the Old Testament is almost entirely concerned with the Divine preparation for the redemption of the world; the preparation of the Messiah for the people, and of the people for the Messiah. It is only when we turn to the New Testament that we find the explanation of all this incompleteness. On the very first page we have the keynote, "That it might be fulfilled," and we are soon able to realise that (a) Jesus Christ the Prophet fulfils (in His life) the prophecies; (b) Jesus Christ the Priest explains (in His death) the ceremonies; and (c) Jesus Christ the King satisfies (in His resurrection) the longings. And so "Jesus, my Prophet, Priest, and King" is the key of the lock, the perfect explanation of the Old Testament and the justification of all its spiritual teaching. Thus, the Article is strictly correct in emphasising the unity and pointing to the ground of this oneness between the two Testaments (Luke xxiv. 27).

II.—THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Article goes on to state that the Old Testament is not concerned with transitory matters alone. "Wherefore they are not to be heard, which feign that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises." The outlook of the Old Testament is quite evidently concerned with an

expectation beyond the present life, and emphasises a reality apart from things visible, and yet in the face of this clear statement it is natural to enquire why the Old Testament lays such emphasis on the present, the visible and the temporal. The answer may be found in connection with God's purposes with Israel, which were mainly concerned with temporal and national life in preparation for the Divine revelation for the world. Israel was to be God's depository of redemption, and, as such, it was to be expected that the work of preparation would be specially prominent, as the people were trained for their position in relation to other nations and to the whole world. So that it is not surprising that there is comparatively little in the Old Testament with reference to the future life. But the future life is clearly there; and, indeed, is involved in the very relation of the Jew to God. The fact of fellowship between the Israelitish believer and God necessarily implied an everlasting relationship. It never seemed to enter into the consciousness of the godly Jew that this relationship with God was capable of coming to an end. In spite of all the changes and chances of this mortal life he felt that his union and communion with God would last for ever. It is this more than anything else that constitutes the real testimony of the Old Testament to a life beyond the grave (Psa. xvi. 11; lxxiii. 24; cf. John viii. 56; Heb. xi.). Our Lord's reference to God as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and therefore the God of the living, not of the dead, indicates at once the fact of the future life and its obscurity in Old Testament times. To the same effect are the words of the Apostle when literally rendered: "Our Saviour Jesus Christ who . . . hath illuminated life and immortality through the Gospel" (2 Tim. i. 10).¹

III.—THE TEMPORARY ELEMENTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Article proceeds to state with great care that notwithstanding this unity and spirituality there are features in the Old Testament that are not of obligation among Christian men to-day. "The Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies and Rites, do not bind Christian men, nor the Civil precepts thereof ought of necessity to be received in any commonwealth." In this statement we have suggested some of the characteristics of the Old Testament which, while necessary and important for the Jews in their relation to God, are no longer of force for the Christian Church. Although the Article limits its attention to ceremonial and civil laws there is much more in the Old Testament which is now outside the life of Christian people, and the following may perhaps be regarded as a summary of those elements which are purely temporary and not of permanent binding force:

1. The Ceremonial Law.—The whole of the Levitical institutions of priesthood and sacrifice are obviously no longer binding, since they were

¹ For a fuller discussion see Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, and A. B. Davidson, *Old Testament Theology*.

all fulfilled in the Lord Jesus Christ (Col. ii. 17; Heb. ix. 11; x. 1, 11, 12).

2. The Civil Precepts.—The identity of Church and State among the Jews, and the entire arrangement necessary for the preparation of Israel as the medium of God's revelation are all things of the past, and now it is impossible to insist upon the civil precepts being "of necessity received in any commonwealth."

3. The Theocracy.—The direct government by God was intended for Israel's life as the channel of God's religion of redemption, but even with Israel a pure theocracy proved to be too high and spiritual, and a theocratic monarch was introduced. It goes without saying that no such theocracy is possible to-day in connection with the Christian Church, or any Christian nation.

4. The Legal Spirit and Coercive Attitude.—The Old Testament had for its keynote, "Do, and thou shalt live," and we know from the New Testament that the keynote of the Gospel is "Live in order to do." The whole tendency of the Jewish life was works, and a spirit of coercion is implied in "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." All these features are necessarily removed from the spirit of the New Testament, and form part of the temporary elements to which the Article refers. It is noteworthy how strikingly true to modern thought on the Old Testament this emphasis on the temporary features is, and a consideration of it will keep us from the two extremes of regarding the Old Testament as entirely on a level with the New and from the opposite standpoint of dispensing with it altogether. While there are temporary features there are also, as we shall see, other features that are of lasting force and obligation.

IV.—THE PERMANENT ELEMENTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Article in stating the obligation of the Christian man to the moral law suggests a topic which is much larger than this precise reference, because there are elements in the Old Testament equally permanent, and therefore equally binding. It will be worth while to consider these.

1. The Doctrine of God.—This is of permanent value, because it is not superseded by that of the New Testament. We are not to understand the revelation of Scripture concerning God as somewhat like the early and later stages of a science, the latter perhaps contradicting and superseding the former. But rather should it be considered as the progressive record of one continuous and increasing revelation. Our Lord and His Apostles do not in any way represent the Old Testament view of God as set aside; on the contrary, that doctrine is taken for granted, while it is naturally revised and completed. Even the manner of communication from God in its twofold characteristic of solemnity and sublimity cannot be said to be superseded by the New Testament. It has been rightly said

that the characteristic feature of the Godhead in the Old Testament is Holiness, and that in the New, Love, so that the complete revelation of the character of God is Holy Love.¹ The following special features of the Old Testament doctrine of God should be noted.

(a) The Existence of God.—The Semitic idea of God as transcendent, which is found in the Old Testament, is a great safeguard against Pantheism.

(b) The Personality of God.—As already noted, there is no need to be afraid of Anthropomorphism, which is the highest conception of Deity possible to us.

(c) The Uniqueness of God.—The prophets never tire of emphasising the truth that Jehovah alone is the one true God (Isa. xlv. 8).

(d) The Relation of God to man.—In various forms the Old Testament teaches from the beginning to the end that God and man are capable of fellowship, and that as it was originally, so it is the Divine intention consequent upon sin, that man should be restored to this true relation.

(e) The Revelation of God to man.—This is a fact in the Old Testament which is at the foundation of everything in the New Testament. Christ takes for granted this prior revelation and builds upon it (Matt. v. 21; Heb. i. 1, 2).

(f) The Character of God.—The Old Testament revelation is of God as essentially righteous both in regard to present and future. There will be a judgment based upon this eternal righteousness.

2. The Experience of Holy Men.—It is significant that there is no Psalter in the New Testament, that being almost the only part of the Old Testament writings without a counterpart in the New. Perhaps the reason for this is that the experience of believing people is essentially the same in all ages, implying and involving personal union with God. There is nothing more striking than the Christian use of such Psalms as the 16th, the 23rd, and the 103rd, as expressive of the highest Christian feelings to-day.

3. The Symbolical Teaching.—Although, as we have seen, all the offerings and types found their complete fulfilment in our Lord Jesus Christ, yet their principles abide, and the various characters, institutions, and events have a permanent value for instruction. They are written "for our admonition" (1 Cor. x. 11).

4. The Moral Lessons of History.—The Old Testament stories are not merely beautiful, but true. God is behind them, and the people of Israel were only instruments in carrying out His purpose. It is for this reason that St. Paul emphasises the importance of the Old Testament, as "written for our learning" (Rom. xv. 4).

5. The Moral Law.—This is the specific feature mentioned in the

¹ Hegel, quoted by Edward Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 185, speaks of Judaism as the religion of sublimity as contrasted with the Greek religion of beauty. Cf. Butcher, *Harvard Lectures*, I.

Article. "No Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral." It is sometimes believed that the Reformation led to Antinomianism, but this was emphatically not the case in regard to those who were truly representative of that great movement. The moral law was clearly understood to convince of sin (Rom. iii. 20; iv. 15; v. 20; vii. 7-13). But with equal clearness it was taught that the law could not give judicial standing. It was, to use St. Paul's words, "the schoolmaster" to lead to Christ (Gal. iii. 24). But when the penitent and believing sinner became united to Christ he realised that he was "under law to Christ" (1 Cor. ix. 21), and the Ten Commandments were soon seen to embody and emphasise permanent principles long anterior to Judaism. While, therefore, the law could not justify, the believer fully recognised and accepted the place of the law as part of his attitude of loyal response to Christ (Eph. vi. 1 f.). In this connection the ethics of the Old Testament call for notice, because they are not really utilitarian. They emphasise the absolute majesty of the moral law, and while the Old Testament does not hesitate to indicate the present value of obedience to God, yet it is impossible to say that morality and utility are synonymous and identical terms. Then, too, the Old Testament doctrine of sin contains a principle of permanent validity because it teaches that sin is an offence against God, and not a mere infirmity of nature, or a misfortune, but a positive vice and crime. Consequently the prohibition of sin in plain terms means a great deal, especially as it is always rooted in the eternal principles of righteousness and law.

6. The Element of Prophecy.—Whether we think of that part of the Old Testament which is fulfilled, or of the much larger section dealing with the Messiah, the prophetic parts are of vital value and are as capable of inspiring with hope to-day as they ever were.

All this teaches that we must avoid the two extremes: the one of ignoring the Old Testament altogether, the other of regarding it as of equal value with the New Testament. The former was the error of Marcion, who thought he was able to save the New Testament by throwing away the Old, thinking that the Old Testament was morally defective by reason of its severity. But it should always be borne in mind that if God is to be thought of at all as directing history and being the Judge of mankind, righteousness must be predicated of Him, whether in the Old Testament or out of it. The key to the solution of the problem is in the principle of progressive revelation, and every element of moral inferiority in the Old Testament is to be judged by it. While we are not to be guided to-day by many of the examples of the Old Testament, it is equally true that in so far as what was said and done at the time was due to the revelation of God, that revelation was perfect at that time, whatever additional truth came afterwards for newer needs. We have thus to distinguish carefully between the dispensational truth and the permanent truth in the Old Testament; that is, between those elements

intended solely for immediate needs and those which are of eternal validity. To put it in another way, it is essential to remember the difference between what is written *to* us and *for* us. All Scripture was written "for our learning," but not all was written to us directly, much of it being addressed to the Jews primarily and often exclusively, and therefore only intended for us to-day by way of application. Thus, the first Commandment is of permanent value and force, but the introductory words, giving the motive for it (Exod. xx. 2) are no longer applicable, except by means of a process of spiritualising. This principle of the progress of doctrine is vital to all true understanding of the Old Testament, for thereby it is at once seen that development does not mean contrariety.¹

The other error of regarding the Old Testament as equal to the New will be safeguarded by considering the one as supplementary to the other. It is simple truth that the New Testament could not stand alone, and the various doctrines found therein are seen to be the supplement and complement of what is recorded in the Old Testament. In the Old, God is revealed in history; in the New, in connection with individual redemption. In the Old, God's unity is emphasised; in the New, the Divine Trinity. So that there is profound truth in Beaconsfield's striking paradox that Christianity is incomprehensible without Judaism, and the authenticity of the Second Testament depends on its congruity with the First.²

V.—THE PROBLEM OF THE OLD TESTAMENT TO-DAY

The term "Old Testament Criticism" is often heard to-day, and it is at once important and inevitable, for no one can use the Bible without being a "critic"; that is, one who exercises his judgment. There is nothing unlawful in criticism; indeed, it is absolutely essential. Another term is also very familiar, "Higher Criticism," and this, too, calls for special attention. As Lower Criticism is concerned with the text of the Bible and involves the study and comparison of manuscripts and versions, so Higher Criticism investigates the origin, structure and contents of Scripture, being concerned with the historical setting and study of the books in the light of the times when they were presumably written. There is, however, a tendency to think that our view of the Old Testament has to be materially different from that of our forefathers, and it is sometimes thought that Higher Criticism is so technical as to be possible only for scholars and that ordinary Christians have nothing else

¹ A valuable pamphlet on this subject is *Progressive Revelation: Its Power on Old Testament Morality* (The Bible League, London).

² "It stands to reason, that to describe the ceremonial of Judaism, for example, apart from the cardinal doctrines of Christianity, is like writing a history of the acorn and saying nothing of the oak to which it grows; it stands to reason that the theologian who defines the Christian doctrine of the Atonement without reference to the expiatory features of Mosaism, might as wisely undertake a philosophical biography and ignore the entire story of childhood, and the early display of hereditary tendencies" (Cave, *The Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice*, Preface, p. 7).

to do but accept the decisions of scholarship. But this is not the case, since ordinary Christians are dependent on scholars for two things only: a true text and a true translation, and when these are obtained every Christian has a right and a duty to test all things for himself. It is admitted by leading scholars themselves that ordinary Christians can decide the outstanding problems from a careful study of the English Bible alone. It is, therefore, important to understand in general what is involved in the modern critical discussions of the Old Testament. It is true and fair to say that the simple but all-important issue is the historical trustworthiness of the Old Testament as it has come down to us to-day.

1. The Critical Problem.—This is both literary and historical. (a) There are three crucial points in the literary aspect. (1) The question of documents.—It is generally admitted that the Pentateuch, and to a great extent the rest of the Old Testament, is composed of different strata, but it is quite another question whether the dissection favoured by modern criticism can be proved to be true. (2) The date of Deuteronomy.—It is allowed on every hand that this is the key to the critical position. Criticism says that it was not written by Moses, but discovered in the time of Josiah (2 Kings xxii.), having been composed perhaps a century or so before. It is perfectly true that if this critical position is correct the ordinary view collapses. The book is either substantially Mosaic, or else it is not. This is a definite and direct issue on which the two schools are absolutely at variance. (3) The date of those parts of Exodus and Leviticus which are connected with a Tabernacle worship, now technically known as the Priests' Code. Do these date from the time of Moses or from the age of Ezra? These elements are practically inclusive of the vital literary issues.

(b) There are also three crucial points in the historical aspect. (1) Are the prophets before the law, or may we still use the old term, "the law and the prophets"? (2) Does the Theocracy as depicted in the Pentateuch date from the time of Moses, or was it not an actual fact before the Babylonian Exile? (3) Was Israel's religion of Monotheism in its purity a late evolution or an early revelation? It will be at once seen that there is a close connection between these two aspects, and it does not seem possible to separate them. Modern criticism, however, argues that they can be distinguished, while extreme criticism, which is decidedly more logical, says this is impossible. The difficulty is that extreme criticism, as represented by some of the leading scholars like Kuenen and Wellhausen, approaches the Old Testament with purely naturalistic and rationalistic presuppositions, and on the basis of these dissects the documents. It is difficult to see how conclusions can be accepted when supernatural premisses are denied. Even moderate criticism is constantly arguing about Israel's religion, based on the literary grounds of dissection. So that it seems impossible to say that the problem is literary and not historical, since on the basis of the literary dissection historical conclusions

are drawn. Even admitting to the full literary strata and different authors, this is no argument for placing the earliest documents as late as the ninth century B.C. So that the real problem facing us to-day is the trustworthiness of the Old Testament, both as a historical record and as a spiritual revelation.

2. The Reaction.—There does not seem much doubt that during the last few years the whole question has been reopened, and matters that were thought to be settled beyond all doubt are being discussed as fully as ever. In Germany and in England there are leading scholars who have raised the whole question connected with the critical theory, both in regard to its documents and to its presupposition of evolution as accounting for Israel's religion. Archæology is bearing its testimony in favour of the historical accuracy of the Old Testament, and new schools of criticism are rising in which the whole critical hypothesis is subjected to a severe and destructive criticism. It is being allowed by an increasing number of scholars that the fundamental principles on which the modern criticism of the Old Testament has proceeded are no longer tenable.

3. The Claim of the Old Testament.—Meanwhile, it is important to remind ourselves of the actual facts of the case. The Old Testament, with its thirty-nine books of varied kinds and dates, offers an immense field for study, in which questions arise that cannot possibly be settled without careful critical consideration. But the book, as it now stands, is marked by three elements, each of which must be faced and explained. (a) The Old Testament professes to be the record of a supernatural, continuous revelation to mankind in general, and then to Israel. This, whether right or wrong, is quite obvious, and calls for a proper explanation. The real question is whether the Old Testament view of religion is the result of a Divine revelation or of a human evolution. There is no doubt that the Old Testament itself founds everything on a belief in a Divine intervention with "Thus saith the Lord" as its keynote. (b) The presence of this revelation gives to the book a remarkable unity, which in spite of its variety is patent to all careful readers; indeed, the presence of these two elements of variety and unity is one of the most striking features of the book. Starting from the earliest period of the human race, the Old Testament proceeds through the patriarchal period to the Mosaic age, and the time of the Monarchy, and at each point there is a development and yet a unity of conception which links later books with the former in the one profound thought of an expected Deliverer, the Messiah. (c) The revelation and its unity are proved by the claim to inspiration found in the Old Testament. Whether we think of the earlier portions, or follow the story down through the ages, observing annals, poetry, prophecy, the supreme thought at every point is the presence of an all-pervading power that stamps these books as spiritually vital and ethically efficacious for human life. It is this threefold claim to a Divine revelation, a Divine unity, and a Divine inspiration that

stands out quite obviously in the Old Testament and compels attention and demands explanation.

4. How, then, may ordinary students of the Bible test the various critical hypotheses of the present day? The following are suggested as some of the ways by which an examination can be made and conclusions derived.

(a) A careful consideration of the historical fact of the Jewish nation. Modern criticism compels a complete reconstruction of the national life, as recorded in the Old Testament, and as there is nothing whatever in Jewish history to support this reconstruction the question at issue becomes a very vital one.¹

(b) The evidence of Archæology. Very few can discuss questions of Hebrew philology, but the evidence of archæology is available for, and tangible by all. During the last sixty years a vast number of discoveries have been made in Egypt, Palestine, and Assyria, and not one of these has gone to support the critical position. Not only so, but a number of leading archæologists, formerly critics, have abandoned that view and now oppose it.

(c) The necessity of spiritual work. No one doubts the blessing of the Spirit of God on those who hold the conservative view. The seal of the Christian Church is on the books as they are, and the lessons have been brought home to us in their present form, so that any doctrine of the Bible for spiritual men must bear the stamp of the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Truth. The conservative view has been abundantly blessed in all ages, but it can hardly be said that the critical view has had this seal.

(d) The witness of our Lord and His Apostles. This does not mean the invocation of the authority of Christ to close all questions, but simply the adducing of the witness of the Old Testament in support of the contentions of historical scholarship. The witness of Christ and His Apostles is clearly in harmony with the Jewish and the Church's view of the Bible, and the only question between our Lord and His opponents was as to the interpretation of that Scripture, the authority of which both sides accepted.

(e) The testimony of spiritual experience. There is that in the Bible which defies dissection and analysis because it transcends all historical and literary severances. The Bible is foremost a spiritual book, brought home to the heart by the Holy Spirit, and it is here that much criticism entirely fails us. Truth requires verification by the spiritual man, and when the Word of God is allowed to be our "critic" (Heb. iv. 12) it soon reveals its true character to the thoughtful, open-minded, spiritual follower of Christ.

¹ "The critical hypothesis, as it at present stands, assumes that the Jewish national consciousness was deliberately and successfully falsified, and that what the Jews have always believed to be the beginning of their religious life was really the end of it. I believe that this is both incredible and impossible" (Dean Wace, Paper read at the Victoria Institute, June 1913).

The matter is thus vital and is not merely literary, but historical, theological, and spiritual. This does not mean that there are no difficulties in the old view, but it does imply that the new view does not remove them. Nor is there any real standing-ground between the conservative and rationalistic positions, for if the modern critical view is correct, not only is the conservative position wrong, but Jewish history, Church history, and experience during the centuries, and even the New Testament are all wrong. Is it possible that the tradition of centuries is essentially erroneous? The deepest interests are also involved, for it is proving impossible to stop short with the Old Testament, and the same scholars are now engaged on a dissection of the New Testament, which tends to give a picture of Jesus Christ our Lord scarcely discernible from a naturalistic and Unitarian position. So that what is required is a threefold criticism: a Lower Criticism, dealing with words and sentences under the guidance of grammar and dictionary; a Higher Criticism, which gets behind the text and endeavours to discover all that is possible of times, circumstances, conditions of various books; and not least of all what may be called a Highest Criticism, which is based on spiritual sympathy, insight, and experience. This last is often possessed by humble, true-hearted souls, who do not know anything of literary, critical, and historical problems, but who do appreciate the religious and spiritual aspects of the Old Testament, and whose sincere judgment calls for respectful consideration before any merely intellectual conclusions can be regarded as entirely satisfactory. "The musical know what is music."

We may rest perfectly satisfied that no criticism of the Old Testament will ever be accepted by the Christian Church as a whole, which does not fully satisfy the following conditions:—

1. It must admit in all its assumptions, and take fully into consideration, the supernatural element which differentiates the Bible from all other books.

2. It must be in keeping with the enlightened spiritual experience of the saints of God in all ages, and make an effectual appeal to the piety and spiritual perception of those who know by personal experience the power of the Holy Ghost.

3. It must be historically in line with the general tradition of Jewish history and the unique position of the Hebrew nation through the centuries.

4. It must be in unison with that Apostolic conception of the authority and inspiration of the Old Testament, which is so manifest in the New Testament.

5. Above all, it must be in accordance with the universal belief of the Christian Church in our Lord's infallibility as a Teacher, and as "the Word made Flesh."

It is not too much to affirm that when modern Higher Criticism can satisfy these requirements, it will not merely be accepted, but will command the universal, loyal, and even enthusiastic adhesion of all Christians.

ARTICLE VIII

Of the Three Creeds.

The Three Creeds, *Nicene Creed*, *Athanasius's Creed*, and that which is commonly called the *Apostles' Creed*, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.

De Tribus Symbolis.

Symbola tria, *Nicanum*, *Athanasii*, et quod vulgo *Apostolorum* appellatur, omnino recipienda sunt et credenda: nam firmissimis Scripturarum testimoniis probari possunt.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

Creeds = *Symbola.*
Of Holy Scripture = *Scripturarum.*

THIS Article comes from the Forty-two Articles of 1553, and has remained virtually unaltered except that the words *et credenda* "and believed," were added in 1563, the other changes being merely verbal. It is a special application of Article VI in regard to the Rule of Faith, and no doubt it was placed here to show the adherence of the Church of England to the old faith of England.¹ At the same time it expresses a view which is fundamental to the position taken by the Reformers, showing clearly why they received the Creeds, that it was not on the authority of the Church, but because of the truth emphasised in Article VI, the supremacy of Holy Scripture.² The language of the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum* should also be noted.

"Et quoniam omnia ferme, quæ ad fidem spectant Catholicam, tum quoad beatissimam Trinitatem, tum quoad mysteria nostræ redemptionis, tribus Symbolis, hoc est, Apostolico, Niceno, et Athanasii, breviter continentur; idcirco ista tria Symbola, ut fidei nostræ compendia quædam, recipimus et amplectimur, quod firmissimis divinarum et canonicarum scripturarum testimoniis facile probari possint."³

I.—THE CREEDS

The word "Creed" comes from the Latin *credo*, with which both the Apostles' and the Nicene Creed commence. The Athanasian Creed does not begin in this way because it was not originally a personal confession, but a declaratory and expository statement of the true belief.

1. The Latin equivalent for "Creed" is *Symbolum*, *σύμβολον*. The

¹ Hardwick, *History of the Articles of Religion*, p. 44.

² Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* (Second Edition), p. 41.

³ *De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*, c. 5.

suggestion that the word was *symbolé*, *συμβολή*, meaning a collection, the Creed being the work of the Apostles, one sentence to each man, is manifestly incorrect both etymologically and historically, for *symbolé*, *συμβολή*, was never used for the Creed. The word almost certainly meant "watchword," or "badge," referring to the oath or password required before an initiation. The best illustration of the term is the Early Church custom of repeating the Creed to the Catechumen orally on the eve of baptism, which was called *Traditio symboli*, and then requiring the repetition of it before the actual baptism, which was called *Redditio symboli*.

2. The number is three, and the order of enumeration is of some interest. The Nicene Creed probably comes first because it was used at Holy Communion; the Athanasian comes next perhaps because it was used daily at Prime; while the Apostles' is mentioned last because connected with ordinary use. And yet in the Articles of 1536 and in the *Reformatio Legum* the order is Apostles', Nicene, Athanasian.

3. The names of the Creeds are, of course, those by which they are usually known, for "as the Apostles' Creed was not composed by the Apostles, and the Nicene Creed is not the Creed of Nicæa, so the Athanasian Creed is not the work of Athanasius."¹ To the same effect are the words of Burnet: "None of them are named with any exactness."²

II.—THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CREEDS

The wording of the Article is important. These confessions of our faith "ought thoroughly to be received and believed." The Latin equivalent of "thoroughly" is *omnino*, "altogether," emphasising very much more than mere intellectual credence. While the form of the Creeds is not strictly Scriptural and Apostolic, the contents are considered to be so, and on this account they call for thoroughness of acceptance. It is important to see from this where the Church of England stands in regard to the fundamental truths expressed in these formularies. Nothing could be clearer than this statement in committing the Church of England to a thorough belief in the verities set forth in the Creeds.

III.—THE GROUND OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE CREEDS

This thorough reception and belief is based upon agreement with Scripture. "For they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." It is not therefore the universality of their usage, though that is important, or their antiquity, which is equally noteworthy, but their Scripturalness. This is the basis of their acceptance in the Church, and the Article thereby subordinates the Creed to the principle laid down in Article VI. Creeds are no exception to this requirement of the sufficiency, supremacy, and finality of Holy Scripture.

¹ Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 329.

² Burnet, *On the Articles*, p. 126

IV.—THE HISTORY OF THE CREEDS¹

The original germ would seem to have been a simple confession of faith in our Lord Jesus Christ (Matt. xvi. 16; Acts viii. 37), but the present form of the Creed is evidently an amplification of the baptismal formula (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). This order of reference to the Persons of the Trinity is the framework of all later Creeds, and we may perhaps see some justification for this method in certain statements of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. viii. 6; 1 Tim. iii. 16).

1. The Apostles' Creed.—This, though latest in its present form, is the earliest in substance. In origin it is a Western Creed, and the substance of it can be traced back to the Roman Church about the middle of the second century. In the Church of Aquileia, 400, such a Creed was in use, and it is here that the phrase, "He descended into hell," is first found. The present form is Gallican, dating about 750. It would seem that the Creed represents a gradual expansion of the baptismal formula.

2. The Nicene Creed.—The history of this Creed is, of course, associated with the Arian controversy, and at the Nicene Council, 325, the Creed which was taken as the basis of discussion was a document associated with Eusebius of Cæsarea. As the outcome of the discussions this Eusebian Creed became the basis of the Council's statement, with the significant and crucial addition of the word *Homoousios*, to safeguard the Deity of our Lord against Arianism. In reality a new Creed, founded on that of Cæsarea, was issued by the Council. This ended with the words, "And in the Holy Ghost."

But this literal Nicene Creed is not the one which we now use as Nicene, for certain important enlargements took place after the Nicene Council. Between Nicæa, 325, and Constantinople, 381, controversy became rife in regard to the Deity of the Holy Ghost, and the Creed, as we have it (apart from the *Filioque* clause), seems to have been based upon the local Creed of the Church of Jerusalem. It is first met with in a work of Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, 373, or 374, and is also found in some lectures of Cyril of Jerusalem. Dr. Hort has paid special attention to this interesting question, and his conclusion, as now stated, is thus described by a well-known authority, "The proof that he there offered has been accepted by practically all scholars as final, and need never be laboured through at length again."² But Bishop Gibson does not accept this view without certain material qualifications.³

How this local Creed of Jerusalem became the Creed of the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople is not clearly known, but it is thought

¹ It is unnecessary to state in detail the various points and stages of the history of these documents. Three modern works are ample for this purpose. Bishop Gibson, *The Three Creeds* (Oxford Library of Practical Theology); Dr. A. E. Burn, *The Apostles' Creed, The Nicene Creed, The Athanasian Creed* (three volumes, Oxford Church Text Books); C. H. Turner, *The History and Use of Creeds and Anathemas in the Early Centuries of the Church*. Earlier works are Maclear, *Introduction to the Creeds*; Swete, *The Apostles' Creed*; Lias, *The Nicene Creed*. A fuller bibliography is given in Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 316.

² C. H. Turner, *ut supra*, p. 41.

³ Gibson. *ut supra*, pp. 169-174.

that Cyril of Jerusalem, one of the leading Bishops there present, laid his Creed before the Council and it was received as an orthodox document. At any rate, at Chalcedon, in 451, it was received as the Creed of Constantinople, following immediately on the Creed of Nicæa. The addition of the *Filioque* clause is usually associated with the Council of Toledo, 589.¹ Although, therefore, the Creed is not strictly Nicene in the sense that it was drawn up at that Council, yet it may be rightly described by this name because "it contains the great formula which was then inserted in the Creed, and it guards and maintains the faith that was then defined against Arianism."² Three matters connected with the English translation are usually noted.

(a) "By Whom all things were made."—The original clearly shows that the Son, not the Father, is referred to as the Agent of creation. "Through Whom all things were made" (John i. 3, 8).

(b) "The Lord and Giver of Life."—Attempts are sometimes made to express accurately the original idea, which is "The Lord and the Life-giver," referring to the Deity of the Holy Spirit in a way that the present English version cannot do. The new Canadian Prayer Book has a comma after Lord.

(c) "One Catholick and Apostolick Church."—It has often been a matter of surprise that there is no English equivalent to the word "Holy," and if, as is often thought, the omission was originally due to a printer's mistake, the question naturally arises why it has never been corrected. There seems no doubt whatever that the word "Holy" ought to be read in order that we may understand the four essential marks of the true Church as "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic."

3. The Athanasian Creed.—The history and authorship of this document are matters of great controversy, because it is neither a Creed, nor does it come from Athanasius as the author. Waterland argues very ably for the authorship of Hilary of Arles, 429, and there does not seem much doubt that it was due to some author of the fifth century. Not many years ago a prevalent view was that it consists of two separate parts which were brought together in the present form of the Creed in the eighth century.³ But this is now universally rejected, and more recent authorities tend to return to an approximation to Waterland's view, at least of the date. It is thought that while verse 34 excludes Eutychianism, yet because that heresy is not formally condemned the Creed must be before 451. Ommanney argues that it probably arose in South Gaul in the fifth or sixth century. It was clearly influenced by the writings of St. Augustine. Bishop Dowden does not think that any evidence yet produced enables us with confidence to assign the authorship to any known writer, though he is strongly in favour of some time in the fifth century for its date.⁴

¹ But see Burn, *ut supra*.

² Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 115.

³ In Swainson's and Lumby's works on the Creeds.

⁴ Bishop Dowden, *Further Studies in the Prayer Book*, pp. 132-134.

Its use as a Creed is peculiar to the Church of England, and was probably due to the desire of our Reformers to emphasise the importance of instruction and the necessity of an intelligent, clear, full faith. Up to that time the Creed had been used as a Canticle. Since then it has become definitely a confession of faith. It should be remembered that it is intended for those who already possess the actual faith.¹ The first verse refers to the necessity of holding the faith, meaning thereby to retain what we possess, not to obtain what we have not. It is not, therefore, for the heathen or those outside the Church, but for the Church's own members, to safeguard them against error, to prevent them letting go what they have. As there is a tendency to deflect from the true standard the Creed is a test, a safeguard, like the plumbline or the spirit-level. And so it does not pass any judgment on man, or individuals, but is a declaration of the whole counsel of God on the matters concerned. It has two parts, dealing respectively with the Christian doctrine of God and the Christian doctrine of the Person of Christ, emphasising the importance of revelation and redemption. It means that we must have right thoughts of God and Christ, especially since in Christ alone God is a reality and power in human life. Mohammedanism separates Him completely from men. Buddhism loses Him entirely in the world. Paganism of every sort has no contact of God with men, no mediation, no salvation, no grace, no love. It is, therefore, essential and important to have true ideas of God, and so it is unfair to speak of the Creed as teaching salvation by correct opinions. Indeed, it refers to our giving account of our own works, though opinion always governs conduct. The Creed is to be regarded as an amplification of Scripture, and we only receive it because it can be proved thereby.

It is urged that the clauses about condemnation are really no stronger than those found in the New Testament (Mark xvi. 16; John iii. 36; xii. 48), so that what Scripture means the Creed means. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the acceptance of the doctrines of the Creed and the use of the document itself in public services as a Creed. There are many who accept the former while thinking the latter inexpedient. They feel it better to avoid putting on the lips of a general congregation highly technical words and solemn assertions which can only be properly understood in the light of their original purpose and after due interpretation. It is noteworthy that the Church has never

¹ "These condemnatory expressions are only to be understood to relate to those who, having the means of instruction offered to them, have rejected them, and have stifled their own convictions, holding the truth in unrighteousness, and choosing darkness rather than light: upon such as do thus reject this great article of the Christian doctrine, concerning one God and Three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and that other concerning the Incarnation of Christ, by which God and man was so united as to make one person, together with the other doctrines that follow these, are those anathemas denounced; not so as if it were hereby meant, that every man who does not believe this in every tittle must certainly perish, unless he has been furnished with sufficient means of conviction, and that he has rejected them, and hardened himself against them" (Burnet, *On the Articles*, p. 127).

included anathemas in any formulary of public worship, so that our present use of the Athanasian Creed has been rightly described as "a definite and far-reaching change from what had previously been the case."¹ It is also observable that Bishop Dowden is of opinion that "there is nothing essential to the faith in the retention of the minatory clauses."² Further, it is well known that the American Church has omitted the use of this Creed altogether, while the Church of Ireland, though retaining it in its place in the Prayer Book, has, by omission of the rubric, dispensed with its use in public service.³ The Canadian Church has also made its use optional.

V.—THE USE OF CREEDS

1. The Place of the Creeds in our Church needs brief notice. The Apostles' Creed is used daily at Morning and Evening Prayer, in the Baptismal Services, and in the Visitation of the Sick. The Nicene Creed is used at Holy Communion; and the Athanasian Creed is appointed for thirteen times in the course of the Christian Year, when it is ordered to be used instead of the Apostles' Creed, and is especially associated with the Festivals of Christmas, Easter, Ascension Day, Whitsunday, and Trinity Sunday.

2. The Character of Creeds.—It is usual to distinguish between Creeds in the East and in the West. The East seems to emphasise ideas, while the West lays stress on facts, and although these are two different aspects of the same Christian verity, yet perhaps the usage indicates something of an essential distinction between the two sections of the Christian Church. The East was always primarily philosophical and theological, while the West was mainly practical. It is thought that these features are best seen respectively in the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds, while perhaps it may be added that the Athanasian Creed partakes of both features.⁴

3. The Value of Creeds.—Creeds are useful as conditions of fellowship, tests of orthodoxy, and a subsidiary Rule of Faith.⁵ They were almost certainly a necessity when Christianity came in contact with the world of Greek thought, and yet their somewhat abstract and even philosophic statements did not involve any essential change of view from that found in Holy Scripture. The Creeds only state explicitly what is implicit in the New Testament. The change was simply one of emphasis,

¹ "The sense of the Spirit-bearing body, as true and real a thing as its more formal decisions, has always, it would seem, been clear in the end against the exaltation of anathemas into an integral and permanent part of the worship of the Christian people" (C. H. Turner, *ut supra*, p. 88).

² Dowden, *ut supra*, p. 127.

³ For various views on the history, meaning, purpose, and liturgical use of the Athanasian Creed, see the valuable works by Dowden and Turner, already mentioned; and *Some Thoughts on the Athanasian Creed*, by Dean Armitage Robinson; and *The Athanasian Creed in the Twentieth Century*, by R. O. P. Taylor.

⁴ Westcott. *The Historic Faith*, pp. 191-212.

⁵ Litton, *ut supra*, p. 43.

necessitated very largely by heresy. It is often urged that the Creeds are unwarranted when viewed in the light of the simplicity of early Christian teaching, and it is asserted that they represent a corruption through the dogmatic strength of Greek philosophy. But this is not the case.

“The truth is just the reverse. The novel element in the compound was not philosophy, but the Gospel. The steps which led to the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity are the steps by which the Christian spirit made for itself a home in the existing intellectual environment. However speculative in form, every one of them was due to a practical interest. . . . Putting ourselves back at the point of view of the men who made the decisions, and imagining ourselves faced with like questions, we should have been obliged to answer them in the same way.”¹

In the East the Creeds commenced with the plural, “We believe,” while in the West the change was made to the singular, “I believe.” It is often said that this expresses a fundamental difference between East and West in the fact that the latter laid greater stress upon individuality, though Dr. Burn believes that this does not represent any such vital difference, but simply the difference between conciliar and baptismal Creeds.²

4. The Danger of Creeds.—Of course, any such compendium of Christian truth has its peril, because it is so obviously incomplete. Rules of Faith derived from Scripture were never intended to express every element and aspect of the truth, and Creeds are not so much what we are to believe as what we do believe on the doctrines included. A Creed has been well described as a *norma crediti* rather than a *norma credendi*, a landmark, not a goal, a term of communion rather than a statement of truth in its entirety. When this is understood there need be no hesitation in the use of Creeds.

5. The Place of Creeds.—They are intended to lead up to personal reliance, and the intellectual statement of truth is only a guide to the simple yet perfect trust of the soul in God. This is clearly seen from the Church Catechism, which first of all sets out the Articles of Belief, and then leads up to the further question of personal “Belief in God.” This is in strict harmony with the distinctions drawn in the New Testament between believing a fact (1 John v. 1), believing a person’s word (John iv. 21), and trusting a person (John iii. 36). The same distinction is found in the Latin: *credo Deum esse*; *credo Deo*; *credo in Deum*.³

Note.—Versions of the Creeds in Greek, Latin, and English will be found in Turner’s work, already cited; Harold Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 288; and Westcott, *The Historic Faith*, p. 187.

¹ W. A. Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, pp. 143, 145.

² *The Apostles’ Creed*, p. 4.

³ For a fine treatment of this essential element see *The God We Trust*, by G. Johnston Ross. A series of lectures on the Apostles’ Creed.

III. THE LIFE OF FAITH

ARTICLES IX–XVIII

PERSONAL RELIGION

A. ITS COMMENCEMENT (ARTICLES IX–XIV)

DOCTRINES CONNECTED WITH JUSTIFICATION

9. ORIGINAL OR BIRTH-SIN.
10. FREE-WILL.
11. THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN.
12. GOOD WORKS.
13. WORKS BEFORE JUSTIFICATION.
14. WORKS OF SUPEREROGATION.

AT this point a long group of Articles commences, extending from IX to XVIII, wholly different from those preceding it, being concerned with personal religion, not with the verities or the Rule of Faith. The one topic is the application of truths to personal life. The group has also a historical significance, for it declares the Anglican position in relation to the great Continental sections of the Reformation movement, the Lutheran or German on the one side, and the Swiss and French on the other, first under Zwingli and then under Calvin. Of the first division the watchword was Justification by Faith; of the second, Predestination and Election. Our position, while insular, was not isolated, because insularity was impossible, since Continental thought necessarily affected ours and compelled us to define our position. This group may therefore be divided into two smaller groups. The first extends from IX to XIV, and is associated with Article XI on Justification. This, which forms a compact group, was of very great importance in the sixteenth century, because the Reformation was beyond all else an assertion of personal religion and of the attitude of the soul to God. The subjects of these Articles were in everyone's mouth, and the Council

of Trent had to give as much care to them as we had to our Articles. It is significant that the first Article of the Augsburg Confession on the Holy Trinity was immediately followed by one on Original Sin. On this the Reformation primarily turned. The Reformers said, as Bradwardine (1290-1349) Archbishop of Canterbury had said three centuries before, that the Roman Church was essentially Pelagian. In regard to purely controversial questions the prominence of this group is perhaps no longer important either inside or outside the Church, for outside the Church the battle is concerned with the first and second groups of Articles on first principles, while inside controversy has shifted to the fourth group on the Church and Sacraments. But while from the purely historical and theological standpoints the importance of this group has either passed away or become considerably less, yet spiritually and pastorally it is of permanent truth and value. The controversy is not and can never be extinct, for the principles are eternal.

The topics and relationships of these Articles should be noted. Articles IX and X deal with the actual condition of man in two respects: his original sin, carrying with it the need of atonement (Article IX); and his freedom of will, emphasising the need of grace (Article X). These are prefatory. Then comes Article XI on Justification, declaring what God does for us and how His work in Christ is received. The three following Articles show our fellow-working with God: Article XII declares our fellow-working as it ought to be, showing the value of works when put in their proper place; Articles XIII and XIV show the perversion of works, the one seeking to make us independent of God, showing the worthlessness of works when put in the wrong place; and the other, dealing with a view which was alleged to provide beyond God's requirements, is a link of connection between the two groups, having points of contact with Justification and Sanctification, showing that no Christian can attain to God's requirements. We can, therefore, see the coherence of this first group, though the second, while somewhat looser, is still in a measure coherent. They are not quite so compact, but may be associated with the Christian life, and in particular with Article XVII. Article XV shows that no Christian can fully attain to God's requirements; Article XVI that none need despair of restoration should he fall; Article XVII denies the possibility of a hell upon earth, as Article XV denied the possibility of a heaven upon earth; and then Article XVIII is the goal, of which the earlier Articles were the commencement. Article XVIII appropriately closes the group with a warning against that spirit of indifference which holds that true faith does not matter.

ARTICLE IX

Of Original or Birth Sin.

De Peccato Originali.

Original sin standeth not in the following of *Adam*, as the *Pelagians* do vainly talk;) but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of *Adam*: whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated; whereby the lust of the flesh, called in the Greek *phronema sarkos*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh, is not subject to the Law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin.

Peccatum originis non est, ut fabulantur Pelagiani, in imitatione Adami situm; sed est vitium et depravatio naturæ cujuslibet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati; qua fit, ut ab originali justitia quam longissime distet, ad malum sua natura propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat; unde in unoquoque nascentium, iram Dei atque damnationem meretur. Manet etiam in renatis hæc naturæ depravatio; qua fit, ut affectus carnis, Græce *φρόνημα σαρκός*, quod alii sapientiam, alii sensum, alii affectum, alii studium carnis interpretantur, legi Dei non subiciatur. Et quanquam renatis et creditibus nulla propter Christum est condemnatio, peccati tamen in sese rationem habere concupiscentiam fatetur Apostolus.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

Of Original (or Birth) Sin	= <i>De Peccato originali.</i>
Original sin	= <i>Peccatum originis.</i>
As the Pelagians do vainly talk	= <i>ut fabulantur Pelagiani.</i>
In the following of Adam	= <i>in imitatione Adami</i> ¹
Standeth not	= <i>non est situm.</i>
Fault and corruption of the nature	= <i>vitium et depravatio naturæ.</i>
Very far gone	= <i>quam longissime distet.</i>
In every person born into this world	= <i>in unoquoque nascentium.</i>
Regenerated	= <i>renatis.</i>
Infection of nature	= <i>naturæ depravatio.</i>
The lust of the flesh	= <i>affectus carnis.</i>
In them that are regenerated	= <i>in renatis.</i>
For them that are baptized	= <i>renatis.</i>
[Omitted]	= <i>propter Christum.</i> ²
Concupiscence and lust	= <i>concupiscentiam.</i>
The nature of sin	= <i>peccati rationem.</i>

THE subject of Original Sin was at the forefront of the Reformation, and as the verbal alterations in the Article are very few it is clear that there was essential unity among the Reformers on this doctrine. It is thought

¹ The genitive of *Adamus*, *Adami*, m. 2. In Article X the word Adam is Latinised thus: *Adam*, *Adæ*, m. 1.

² For Christ's sake.

by some that the Article, which dates from 1553, is based on the corresponding one in the Confession of Augsburg from the Concordat of 1583.¹ But others think that the resemblance is only slight, and that it indicates little else than the general agreement among all Reformed Confessions.² It is also likely, or at least possible, that the Article is so worded as to state the true doctrine on the relation of baptism to original sin.³

In 1553, after the words "Pelagians do vainly talk" were *et hodie Anabaptistæ repetunt*, "and the Anabaptists to-day repeat." These words were omitted in 1563, probably because the error was not rife then, and also to leave the reference more general and avoid diverting attention from the Roman aspect. The Latin text is of particular importance in this Article.

"It is a link of connection with the scholastic phraseology of the Middle Ages, which must to some extent be understood by all who desire to appreciate the doctrinal position assumed by our Reformers. For they had been trained in the language, and now stood opposed to the system of the schoolmen."⁴

In addition to the important equivalents noted above the following points should be specially observed:—

(1) In 1553, "former righteousness which he had at creation" was altered in 1563 to the present phrase.

(2) In 1553 the word "baptized" was altered in 1563 to "re-generated."

(3) In 1553 *studium* was altered in 1563 to *studium carnis interpretantur*.

(4) *Nascentium*, "born," means at, not after birth (not *natorum*).

(5) *Renatis et credentibus*, "for them that believe and are baptized."

(6) "And lust," no equivalent in the Latin.

(7) *Peccatum originale* and *Peccatum originis* are equivalent terms.

I.—THE MEANING OF ORIGINAL SIN

Before considering in detail the teaching of the Article it is necessary to enquire into the nature of sin as moral evil. For this purpose we must seek to know what is the essential moral characteristic of man. What is it that constitutes him a moral agent?

¹ Hardwick, *History of the Articles of Religion*, p. 62; Harold Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 237.

² Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 358; Boulton, *The Theology of the Church of England*, p. 77.

³ "In labe peccati ex ortu nostro contracta, quam vitium originis appellamus, primum quidem Pelagianorum, deinde etiam Anabaptistarum nobis vitandus et submovendus est error, quorum in eo consensus contra veritatem sacrarum Scripturarum est, quod peccatum originis in Adamo solo hæserit, et non ad posteros transierit, nec ullam afferat naturæ nostræ perversitatem, nisi quod ex Adami delicto propositum sit peccandi: noxium exemplum, quod homines ad eandem pravitatem invitat imitandum et usurpandum" (*Reformatio Legum, De Hæresibus*, c. 7).

⁴ Boulton, *ut supra*, p. 76.

It is, first, his conscious relation to law, emphasis being placed on the consciousness, since, of course, all beings are subject to law. But man is sensible that in not acting up to it he is imperfect and guilty. Law applies to inanimate and also to animate natures, and it is in connection with the latter that man's moral attitude to God and his fellows is seen. But in proportion as man's spirit, soul and body form one being, the law has to deal both with inanimate nature and the ordinary animal nature. In regard to man law is concerned with his relation to the Law-giver, for law is the revelation of man being in contact with another and higher Will. This is the simplest form of the idea of God in the heart, and on this basis alone arises the duty of natural religion. Then, too, law concerns man's relations to his fellows and to the world around him, and it follows from this that the perfection of our own nature is blessedness, since there is such a thing as an ideal for our life as that which is dependent on our true relation to God and man. Law is either naturally discerned or supernaturally revealed, and the Apostle Paul insists upon both of these (Rom. i. 18; ii. 15).

But it is necessary to take another step. Men are not only conscious of law, but of responsibility to obey it, and this is the evidence of freedom of will which rests on the double basis of our own consciousness and the collective consciousness of man as seen in language ("you ought"), in institutions (laws), and in all religions.

Yet again, man not only has this consciousness, but also a conscience, a further and higher faculty, perpetually bearing witness to his obligation to use freedom in obedience to the law of his nature, whether declared by nature or revelation. Conscience has been called the "Categorical Imperative" (Kant). But this Imperative must be distinguished in two ways: sometimes it applies to the general principle of doing right; at others to the specific dictates or application of general principles of right and wrong. In determining this the co-ordinate faculties come into play, particularly the reason, and so this sense of duty is capable of indefinite enlargement.

Now these three facts are inherent in man's nature everywhere. They are antecedent to revelation and are recognised without its aid. They may be regarded as the basis of natural religion and ethics, and are the elements of man's normal state, as it ought to be.

But when we pass to man's condition, as it is, we come to the momentous question of moral evil, though here again we are not dependent on revelation for the fact of its existence. Nothing is so prevalent as this fact in all religions, for there is a universal consciousness, exemplified in history, confessed in literature, and experienced in life, that man is out of harmony with the law of his nature. The certainty and consciousness of this in man is a characteristic of him in relation to other animals, for of none else can it be said that they are out of harmony with the law of their nature.

It is striking that testimony is available to show that man acquiesces

in the state he finds himself, and thus, original evil is acknowledged by all. When we say *evil* we do not mean in the full sense *sin*, for there are two aspects of evil to be distinguished, even though they cannot be separated. Evil may be either an unconscious or a conscious violation of law. Beings born corrupt, inheriting a certain taint and bias of will are partakers of evil which did not originate with the will. But another form originates with the act of the will itself, and then we have sin in the proper sense. Children are born with an evil nature in a state of what is called depravity, and when reason dawns they know something of right and wrong, though they only have a partial responsibility, but in course of time they become fully responsible for the sin of their own will. Adam was placed under law, and disobedience was sin. When a further law was given under Moses, disobedience again became sin and involved personal guilt, but with those who were not thus brought into contact with the law sin was not imputed or counted as guilt, though its consequences remained. So that evil has a double aspect, physical and personal. Physically, wrong-doing entails inevitable consequences; but, personally, it is not imputed as guilt so long as there is no clear revelation of law. But directly the law is recognised it is imputed. Human nature, as Butler points out, in its essential idea is a balanced constitution, and he shows that through sin every part is impaired. It is this that constitutes what the Article calls Original Sin.

The English word "sin" seems to be allied to the Latin *sons*, meaning "guilty," "sinful," and apparently the origin of the Latin term is "real," from the present participle of *εἶμι*, "I am." "Language regards the *guilty* man as the man *who it was*" (Curtius).¹ It is also worth while to distinguish between vice, crime, and sin. Vice is wrong-doing against our own nature; crime is wrong-doing against our fellows; sin is wrong-doing against God.

At this point it is necessary to observe the more important words found in Scripture for sin. The most frequent is *ἀμαρτία*, "error," "missing a mark." Others are *παράβασις*, "transgression," "crossing a boundary" and *παράπτωμα*, "fall," "to drop by the wayside out of a proper path."

It is essential to distinguish between "sin" and "sins," between the principle and the practice, the root and the fruit. This distinction is seen in Rom. i. 19 to v. 11 (sins) and Rom. v. 12 to viii. 39 (sin), and also in 1 John i. 8, 10; John i. 29 with 1 John iii. 5. Original sin has to do with the former of these, the evil principle, the root within our nature.²

The phrase "original sin" is not found in Scripture, and is thought to have been due to St. Augustine in the fifth century. It is not the most accurate phrase to employ, especially because the Article speaks also of "original righteousness," and there cannot be two things "original." Perhaps a better term would be "inborn sinfulness," referring to that

¹ See Skeat, *Concise Etymological Dictionary*, s.v.

² Article, "Sin," *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*; Orr, *Sin as a Problem of To-day*.

principle of evil which has infected human nature by reason of the original connection of the race with Adam in contrast to actual sins which men themselves have committed. It is an endeavour to go behind the sinful acts and to explain the fact that all men possess that wrong element which the Bible calls sin.

The Article makes no reference to original guilt, and this is sometimes said to be due to the fact that guilt is personal, while sin is in the race. But it should not be overlooked that the phrase "original guilt" occurs in Article II, and something like this seems to be the truth of Holy Scripture. Indeed, a modern writer holds that the phrase "original guilt" balances the language of the Ninth Article, and represents much more nearly the dominant idea of the New Testament, and that guilt rather than sin "emphasises the fact that Christ's relation to sin in its social aspect is precisely the same as in its individual manifestations"¹ It is probably more correct to say that both guilt and sin are true, the former being imputed and the other imparted. Certainly the force of Rom. v. 12 (Greek) seems to indicate this. And if it should be said that the imputation of guilt is unreal and impossible, it may be shown to be met by the imputation of righteousness, which on any ground is part of our Lord's redemptive work on our behalf. There is, therefore, no injustice, or even unreality in speaking of original guilt, since it is met and more than met by the provision of Divine righteousness in Christ. If one is true so is the other. Adam's posterity stands just where he stood after the Fall. The "probation" of the race was at an end when its first parent fell. And now Christ, the last Adam, meets and more than meets the sin and guilt of the first Adam (Rom. v. 12-19; 1 Cor. xv. 22).

The Article first defines original sin negatively, as not consisting in copying Adam's example. "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam."

Then it is defined positively as the defect and corruption of the nature. "But it is the fault and corruption of the nature" (*vitium et depravatio*). This inborn sinfulness is not only deviation, but deliberation; not mere absence of ethical vitality, but the positive presence of disease. As such, it is therefore unnatural in the sense that it was originally no part of human nature.²

Thus sin, while primarily a matter of the will, is very much more. No doubt in the strict sense of the word "sin" means "voluntary surrender to evil," but the fact goes very much deeper. It is "the propensity to evil in individuals which seems to be inexplicable from anything falling

¹ Simpson, *Fact and Faith*, pp. 107, 101.

² A striking testimony to this truth is seen in the words of Lord Morley, quoted by Dr. Simpson in *Fact and Faith* (p. 104), in which that statesman, writing an Introduction to a work of Emerson, criticises the American philosopher because he takes no account of "That horrid burden and impediment on the soul, which the Churches call sin, and which, by whatever name we call it, is a very real catastrophe in the moral nature of man" (p. 105).

within the individual's own life."¹ It is this that the Article emphasises as something far deeper than either act or volition. It is the presence of a moral disturbance in our nature, and concerns the dispositions and tendencies before the will begins to act. The tendency is there antecedent to our consciousness, and can rightly be called sinful.

"By Original Sin then seems to be meant the solicitations of the lower nature conceived of proleptically as sin, because, as present in the nature of a rational or moral being, they constitute the potentiality of the sin, which consists in such a being's yielding to them, despite the consciousness that to do so is wrong."²

PELAGIANISM

The Article refers to the Pelagians, and it is essential to know a little of what Pelagianism means. During the first four centuries theological controversies were concerned with the Nature of God and the Person of Christ, and it was only after these questions were practically settled that Christian thought became directed to the personal aspects of truth. All along, however, the results of the Fall and the necessity of grace had been emphasised, but it was only in the fifth century that the subject of sin came into prominence in connection with the heresy of Pelagius. In order to emphasise free-will he denied the ruin of the race and the necessity of grace. This was not only something novel, it was really opposed to vital Christianity, and the struggle was soon seen to be one for the very life of the Gospel. The fundamental principle of Pelagianism is the assumption of human ability to do all that righteousness requires, and thus to provide not only its own salvation, but even its own moral and spiritual perfection.³ From this general position the following results of the teaching of Pelagius were soon seen:—

- (1) Adam was created mortal and would have died if he had not sinned. Contrast "lest ye die" (Gen. ii. 17; iii. 3).
- (2) The sin of Adam hurt only himself.
- (3) Infants are, therefore, just as Adam was before his fall.
- (4) Man is able to keep God's commandments if he will.
- (5) And so, all men may be sinless if they choose, and many saints even before Christ actually lived free from sin.

Thus, Pelagius denied the whole doctrine of inborn sinfulness, and with it the belief that man needed supernatural help for the purpose of obeying the Divine commands. The tendency of Pelagianism was two-fold: (a) to make sin a matter of isolated acts, and therefore entirely separated from what preceded and followed. But it is impossible to ignore the continuity of life and to reduce man's nature to a number of disconnected voluntary acts. It is obvious that if sin is nothing more than

¹ Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 118.

² Webb, *ut supra*, p. 127.

³ "This is the core of the whole theory; and all the other postulates not only depend upon it, but arise out of it. Both chronologically and logically this is the root of the system" (Warfield, *Two Studies in the History of Doctrine*, p. 6).

the assertion of the will and the will remains intact after each act, the individual act of an individual man cannot possibly affect the acts of men as yet unborn.¹ (b) To disparage the need of Divine grace as a help to man's weakness through sin. It has been well described as the anthropological side of Arianism in separating man from God.

Although Pelagianism did not issue in any schism, and was perhaps a serious tendency rather than formally a distinct heresy, yet its consequences were absolutely vital to true Christianity.

"It is simply the Christianity of human nature, or that reconstruction of the Gospel scheme which approves itself to natural reason and superficial worldly observation; hence its constant reappearance in the Church."²

It is true that the Pelagians spoke of grace, but they did not mean by it that supernatural provision in Christ which is intended to meet human sin. The universality of sin was, as our Article suggests, accounted for by Adam's example and the power of habit, and no corruption of nature even by the growth of habit was allowed.

The teaching of Pelagianism found its antagonist and conqueror in St. Augustine, for when this novel explanation of man's nature and needs was set forth, it compelled a reconsideration of the entire teaching of Christianity as to human nature and the work of our Lord Jesus Christ.³

ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

Notwithstanding the efforts of St. Augustine, Pelagianism continued in the form of semi-Pelagianism, and seriously affected the thought of the Middle Ages, and the result was the full Roman Catholic doctrine seen in the sixteenth century. It was taught that original righteousness was not connatural with man, but a superadded gift which, when removed, leaves no detriment behind. The result was that original sin was regarded

¹ "Our life is all of a piece, and the most seemingly isolated actions have both their antecedents and their consequents. The will is not a mere form of choice, which remains unaffected by the actual choices which a man makes; it *is* affected by them; it gains contents, character, we might almost say nature, from them. If the atomic theory of sin were true—that it consisted only in separate actions—there could be no such thing in man as moral character, either bad or good; for such character is produced by the abiding and cumulative effect of precisely such actions" (Denney, *Studies in Theology*, p. 81).

Warfield (*ut supra*, p. 10) quotes from Matheson in illumination of the essential nature of Pelagianism:

"Dr. Matheson finely says (*Expositor*, I-IX, 21)—'There is the same difference between the Christian and Pagan idea of prayer as there is between the Christian and Pagan idea of sin. Paganism knows nothing of sin, it knows only sins: it has no conception of the principle of evil, it comprehends only a succession of sinful acts.' This is Pelagianism too."

² Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* (Second Edition), p. 153.

³ For the external history of the Pelagian controversy and of St. Augustine's part in it, see Warfield, *ut supra*, pp. 13-139; Bethune Baker, *Early History of Christian Doctrine* Ch. XVII; Bright, *Anti-Pelagian Treatises*.

as the loss of this original righteousness, and the effects of the Fall were simply corporeal, the difference being between a ship in a calm and the same ship in a storm through no fault of the ship. The Council of Trent differs from us in asserting that in Baptism all is removed which is sin, and that though concupiscence remains it is not sin, but is called so because it proceeds from and leads to sin.

REFORMATION DOCTRINE

This Roman doctrine with all its practical consequences led the Reformers to make definite and strong counter-statements. The Roman Catholic doctrine of "mere nature" was held to be a figment and inconceivable because against experience. The loss of original righteousness was therefore held to be a change involving a corruption of nature. Deprivation must include "depravation." In opposition to Rome, we add that concupiscence is "of the nature of sin," meaning as the Article teaches, an infection of nature which is essentially sinful. It has been well remarked, "How the Council could define a thing which is both the effect and the cause of sin not to be in itself sin, or sinful, is not easy to perceive."¹ Further, the question of this concupiscence in the unbaptised was not faced by the Council, which was "prudently silent on this point; for it is evident that a thing which is not sin in the baptised, and yet is common to them and the unbaptised, cannot be sin even in the latter."² It is well to remember that the New Testament deals with sin as a principle before it deals with sins as the aggregation of transgressions or omissions. Following the New Testament in this respect, the Reformers mainly emphasised the *depravatio* and its source.

The fact is that the Roman Catholic doctrine grew from Pelagianism and was essentially Pelagian in its features. There is no power in nature to enable man to do good, and his greatest need is the grace of God.

II.—THE EXTENT OF ORIGINAL SIN

"Of every man that naturally is ingendered of the offspring of Adam." This statement of the universality of sin has two implications of great importance connected with the word "naturally," for thereby Christ is excluded because He was ingendered, but not naturally, and the mother of our Lord is included because she was naturally ingendered.³

The Article clearly associates the inborn sinfulness of man to-day with the first transgression. There was something in Adam which rendered sin possible and which was influenced by an appeal from without. Adam had the liability to sin, but not the tendency. He was innocent, but not in the strict sense virtuous, and somehow or other the effect of sin upon his nature led to its propagation among his descendants.

When we seek to understand the cause of all this we naturally think

¹ Litton, *ut supra*, p. 164, Note 5.

² Litton, *ut supra*, p. 164.

³ Litton, *ut supra*, pp. 149-151.

of the historic connection of man to-day with the first man, the head of the race, for inborn sinfulness in the individual is a testimony to the racial unity of mankind. The Fall is a fact, account for it how we may, a case of arrested development, and the causal connection of sinfulness to-day with the primeval sin is clear, even though we may not know exactly what was the nature of the latter. There are three elements in human life that together account for sin; heredity, environment, and freedom, and it is impossible to overlook any one of them. Those who endeavour to explain sin merely as a matter of environment and of freedom fail at the vital point, which seems to imply hereditary tendencies. There is still an inscrutable fact which compels attention and calls for explanation. There seems to be no doubt that St. Paul in his great passage in Rom. v. 12-21 derives inborn sinfulness from the Fall as recorded in the story in Genesis, and argues that the sin of Adam has affected all mankind with an inherited tendency to evil. It is impossible to overlook the significance and vital importance of this passage, and no exegesis worthy of the name can avoid the implication of the Apostle's teaching that "by one man sin entered into the world."¹ Nor is the force of this really affected by any theory of the precise character of the story in Genesis, for it is essential to distinguish between the fact of the Fall and its literary form. Even though we may regard the story as pictorial, yet, nevertheless, figures of speech embody and even intensify the facts which they symbolise.² To the same effect is the Apostle's teaching in 1 Corinthians, in which the twofold connection of Adam and Christ with humanity is clearly pointed out. "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv. 22).³

The Pelagian view of sin has found several modern advocates who, speaking of the Old Testament, say that there is no evidence that any connection between human sinfulness and Adam's transgression had as yet occurred at all to the human mind.⁴ But it has been well pointed out that the Old Testament bears ample proof of the universality of human sinfulness, e.g. Gen. vi. 12; Psa. xiv. 1; li. 5; Job xiv. 4; xv. 14; xxv. 4, and the belief in human descent from Adam who was made without sin and afterwards became sinful "at least suggests connection between the common descent and the common sinfulness of man as cause and effect." Further, it has been shown that we are compelled to attempt to discover the sources of St. Paul's teaching, and if we regard these as arising outside the Old Testament it only puts the problem further back,

¹ "If you wish to know whether a man is a theologian, turn to his Greek Testament, and if it opens of its own accord to the fifth chapter of Romans, and you find the page worn and brown, you may safely set him down as a devotee of the sacred science" (Stearns, *Present Day Theology*, p. 321).

² Martensen, *Dogmatics*, p. 155; Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, p. 146.

³ Modern criticism admits that with the abandonment of the historical character of Genesis iii. we are left with "no account in the Bible of the origin of sin, thus excluding the subject from a strictly Biblical theology" (Orchard, *Modern Theories of Sin*, p. 24).

⁴ So Tennant, *Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin, and Origin and Propagation of Sin*.

and compels the enquiry as to whence these writers who influenced St. Paul derived their teaching.¹ If, moreover, it be said that the doctrine of the Fall, found in Genesis and again in the teaching of St. Paul, is not found elsewhere in the Old Testament, the answer is that "the whole tenor of the Scriptural representation of man" points in the direction of sinfulness as due to its entrance at the beginning of the race, for "at no point in Scripture history does man appear as standing in right or normal relation with God."² So that the only conclusion that seems reasonable and possible is that "if a Fall were not narrated in the opening chapters of Genesis we should still have to postulate something of the kind to account for the Bible's own representation of the state of man."³

III.—THE RESULT OF ORIGINAL SIN

"Whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit."

The first effect of inborn sinfulness is stated negatively in the form of deprivation (*privatio*); "man is very far gone from original righteousness." The Latin equivalent is particularly noteworthy; *quam longissime*; that is, "as far as possible," meaning thereby as far as he can, consistent with essential human nature. This is in entire harmony with the Scripture record of man's condition (Gen. vi. 5; viii. 21; Jer. xvii. 9; Rom. vii. 18; viii. 7). It is at this point that we may understand the meaning of St. Paul's words: "dead in trespasses and sins" (Eph. ii. 1). It seems impossible to limit this statement to the result of voluntary action, it must apply to something far deeper. The word "dead" when used metaphorically in the moral realm refers, of course, to moral inability, not moral insensibility. It means that man has been so thoroughly deprived of moral and spiritual power that he is incapable of doing the will of God.

"The doctrine of spiritual inability, as consequent upon the corruption of man's nature by sin, remains and will always remain to represent the great truth that there is *one* thing which man cannot do *alone*. He cannot bring his state into harmony with his nature."⁴

Then the positive aspect of inborn sinfulness is stated in the Article: "Is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always

¹ Eck, *Sin*, p. 14, Note.

² Orr, *God's Image in Man*, p. 198.

³ Orr, *ut supra*, p. 201.

⁴ Denney, *Studies in Theology*, p. 85:

"It is a mistake, in all probability, in discussing this subject, to enter into metaphysical considerations at all; the question of man's inability to any spiritual good accompanying salvation is a question as to matter of fact, and is to be answered ultimately by an appeal to experience. When a man has been discovered, who has been able, *without Christ*, to reconcile himself to God, and to obtain dominion over the world and over sin, *then* the doctrine of inability, or of the bondage due to sin, may be denied; *then*, but *not till then*" (Denney, *ut supra*, p. 85).

contrary to the spirit." This is more than deprivation, for it implies the actual existence of an evil principle (*depravatio*). There is a constant conflict of flesh and spirit with an unholy dominance of the former. It is also noteworthy that this is said to be so "always." It is in entire harmony with this doctrinal statement that the devotional language of our Prayer Book has such phrases as, "There is no health in us"; "From whom all holy desires . . . do proceed"; "We have no power of ourselves to help ourselves"; "Can do no good thing without Thee." It is important to notice that in the Eastern Church the main emphasis was upon the aspect of deprivation (*privatio*), while in the West the emphasis was invariably upon the depravity (*depravatio*).

This necessitates a careful consideration of the phrases "total depravity" and "total corruption," because there is not a little confusion in regard to them. It is a case where usage fixes the meaning, because "total depravity" is not to be regarded as identical with "total corruption." The distinction between the two has well been stated, that "total depravity" means the condition of the nature in which the will refuses to obey the conscience in *everything*, while "total corruption" is the condition in which the will refuses to obey the conscience in *anything* and chooses evil in everything. It expresses the *extent*, not the *degree* of man's corruption. Thus, "total depravity" does not mean the absolute loss of every vestige of good, but that evil has affected every part of the nature and that nothing has remained untouched. The illustration has been used of a watch which may be of gold, and yet because it does not keep time it is of no use as a watch, notwithstanding the fact that it is made of gold. Or a cup of water with a few drops of poison is poisonous throughout, but not as poisonous as it could be. In like manner, "total depravity" does not for a moment mean that man has lost every vestige and trace of the Divine image in which he was made (Gen. ix. 6; I Cor. xi. 7; Jas. iii. 9). But it does mean that sin has so affected his nature that he cannot do anything that is good without the grace of God.¹

So that it is altogether inadequate to speak of sin as merely human deprivation of God. The Biblical idea is much greater and deeper, involving separation from God though the separation is not the sin itself, but one of its consequences. Sin is defiance, revolt, and implies a deliberate, voluntary breaking away from the Divine will and a violation of

¹ "What it means is not that every individual is as bad as he can be, a statement so transparently absurd that it should hardly have been attributed to any one, but that the depravity which sin has produced in human nature extends to the whole of it. There is no part of man's nature which is unaffected by it. Man's nature is all of a piece, and that which affects it at all affects it altogether. When the conscience is violated by disobedience to the will of God, the moral understanding is darkened, and the will is enfeebled. We are not constructed in water-tight compartments, one of which might be ruined while the others remain intact; what touches us for harm, with a corrupting, depraving touch, at a single point, has effects throughout our nature none the less real that they may be for a time beneath consciousness" (Denney, *ut supra*, p. 83).

the Divine order. "Sin is lawlessness" (1 John iii. 4). Thus, sin at its deepest is the rejection of God and disobedience to His will. This involves a distortion of man's life, nature, and relationship with God, involving inability to do good and responsibility for what is evil. Sin is, therefore, much more than something merely negative and privative. Just as pain is a positive experience and not the mere absence of pleasure, so sin is both negative as the refusal to will what is good, and positive as implying the attitude of the will towards unrighteousness.

This view of sin is in harmony with universal experience. It is a fact to be accounted for. Man was created innocent, with no imperfection or flaw in the material, and it was God's purpose that he should develop from an innocent into a virtuous and perfect man. Modern science, not being concerned with moral realities, is unable to recognise anything abnormal in human development, and speaks only of the process of evolution, but the Bible and the Christian Church assume a very definite interruption of the process of development. Man's self-will has been exercised in opposition to the will of his Creator, and this constitutes the Fall, the marring of God's creative work and the thwarting of His Divine purpose. No one can say that the evolution of the human race has been normal in the moral sphere, for while on every other hand the universe indicates the presence of order and harmony, in human life there is just the opposite of disorder, lawlessness, and discord. It is, therefore, impossible to avoid connecting human sin to-day with the sin of our progenitors, for otherwise God would be made the author of evil. There is nothing more certain in the realm of physical science than the order of nature, and yet there is nothing more certain in the realm of morals than the presence of disobedience to law. Everything, therefore, in the Bible, in history, and experience testifies to the fact that man is not one who is merely imperfect and gradually making progress towards a state to which he has not yet attained, but that he has fallen from a primeval condition of innocence by reason of his self-will.

IV.—THE CONDEMNATION OF ORIGINAL SIN

"And therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation."

The wording of the English Article is very significant in its clear distinction between person and nature, between the sinner and his sin. "Every person born . . . it deserveth." This is sometimes charged with being philosophically incorrect, but it is certainly true spiritually, for while everyone is born into this world with the evil principle within derived and inherited, it is only as the individual asserts himself and does what is wrong that he is personally subject to the Divine condemnation.

"Is it not, in fact, the nature and not the person that is regarded in all such statements? Sin may be considered abstractedly from the person in whom it

resides : in its own nature it is *ἀμαρτία*, or a missing of the mark, and *ἀνομία*, or contrariety to the Divine Law. In whomsoever, therefore, it is found, even as a latent potentiality, it must *in itself* be an object of God's displeasure ; but it does not follow that the person must be so, still less that the sentence on sin will in such a case be actually inflicted. The *fomes*, or tendency, which if the infant lives will assuredly give birth to actual sin, cannot in God's sight be a thing indifferent ; but as it is only an objective guiltiness (to which the will has not consented, because the subject is incapable of will), it may be covered from God's sight by an objective atonement (not appropriated by an act of will) ; so that the infant himself, if he dies as an infant, is not, and never has been, an object of God's wrath."¹

The word "deserveth" is also important, expressing the Divine justice and emphasising what sin is entitled to receive. It does not for a moment say that every case of inborn sinfulness actually receives the Divine judgment, but only refers to its essential nature in the sight of God. It is a profound truth that while Scripture does not hesitate to emphasise in the strongest way the actual fact of inborn sinfulness and its essential blameworthiness in the sight of God, yet on the other hand, "in no case does original sin, considered in and by itself, carry with it the penalty of eternal condemnation."²

Some little explanation of the phrase, "God's wrath and damnation" seems necessary. The New Testament statement, "the wrath of God" (*ὀργὴ θεοῦ*), always means His judicial displeasure against sin. There is, of course, nothing personal, arbitrary, and vindictive, but always and only that which is righteous in the Divine attitude towards that which is wrong. Sin, to use a Bible phrase, is "the abominable thing which God hates" (Jeremiah xlv. 4).

This reference to the Divine condemnation of inborn sinfulness is a definite reminder, as we have already seen, of man's conscious relations to law, and of his conscious responsibility to obey that law because of his possession of a conscience. Sin is the abuse of human freedom, and there is nothing more fundamental in the universe than the eternal distinction between right and wrong as it appears and appeals to man. No view of evolution can ever be allowed to destroy this basis of moral life. This at once introduces the question of guilt, for Scripture invariably associates sin and guilt. Whether we think of inborn sinfulness or personal transgression, sin is always regarded in Scripture as absolutely inexcusable and involving man in Divine condemnation.³ By guilt is to be understood responsibility for sin and as a consequence the danger of God's righteous displeasure. Of course, as there are degrees of guilt in sin, so there will be degrees of punishment, but we are now concerned with the fact that

¹ Litton, *ut supra*, p. 162.

² Litton, *ut supra*, p. 163.

³ "Sin in its broadest and most comprehensive sense is inexcusable, incurs the wrath of God, entails guilt and punishment, and therefore, whether original or actual, is equally ethical, equally personal. There is no warrant in Scripture for regarding it under any circumstances as a pathological condition" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 116).

the sinner whose conscience is awake invariably admits his responsibility and guilt. There is nothing more distinctive of human nature than the action of conscience in charging the soul with responsibility. This fact cannot possibly be explained away, for it is one of the fundamental realities in the universe. Nor is it merely the consciousness of actual disobedience, but the realisation of a spiritual state which is opposed to the will of God. The guilt of sin is invariably associated with the consciousness of a personal relation to God, and in that a consciousness of the breach of those relations. Whatever qualifications may be made, and however we may attempt to explain or even palliate sin, this consciousness of guilt remains. "The objective fact of evil is accompanied by the subjective side of moral condemnation."¹ This sense of guilt in man is thus an instinctive but very real confession that he has fallen, and as Coleridge has said, "A fall of some sort or other is the fundamental postulate of the moral history of man."²

This consideration of sin in the light of law is essential to a true understanding of the problem. Evil is a mystery in any case, but it would be absolutely inexplicable if God were supposed to place man under a law of development, which makes sin a necessity of his progress. This would altogether banish moral guilt. The animal impulses which we are to overcome are not sin in the lower creation, and it is impossible to identify sinful propensities with animal powers since in such a case there would be no moral responsibility. It must never be forgotten that human sins have no prototype in the lower creation. Thus, it would be impossible to speak of such things as pride and avarice among animals. Evolution fails to account for the present moral state of mankind,³ and it is obviously incorrect to say with Matthew Arnold that sin is not a monster, but only an infirmity. It is impossible to assert that sin is merely a survival of the brute in man, for, as we have seen, its characteristic is moral, not physical. Besides, when we examine our own heart our conscience at once testifies to the fact of moral responsibility. Whence then has man this moral sense? Nothing can rid him of it, and any denial really means the denial of life itself, to say nothing of Christianity.

Nor can we be satisfied to call sin inherited temperament, and still less is it to be explained simply by environment, for, if this were all, then it is obvious that, as we are often not responsible for our environment, we could not be responsible for our sin, and such a position is really indistinguish-

¹ See J. Scott Lidgett, *The Christian Religion*, p. 437 f.

² "This witness of the conscience is confirmed by everything we read in Scripture. A bad conscience is never treated there as a groundless fear of God; it is a reflection, all too feeble at the best, of God's awful judgment upon sin. A great mass of modern theology denies this. . . . But to make sin unreal is to make redemption unreal also; it is to cast the shadow of illusion over the whole extent of man's relations with God. There is nothing, I believe, which at the present time needs more to be insisted on, in theology and in gospel preaching, than the objectivity and reality of guilt" (Denney, *ut supra*, pp. 93, 94).

³ Orr, *ut supra*, pp. 158, 209, 298.

able from the Pelagianism of old days, since Pelagius "never denied that our environment is a source of temptation."¹

A familiar modern explanation of sin is that it is identical with selfishness, and here again we are conscious of inadequacy, for our life involves very much more than ourselves and our brothers. There are three circles of life: our relation to self; to our fellows; and to God. And when this is realised it is at once seen that sin and selfishness are not synonymous. Selfishness is, of course, one of the consequences and manifestations of sin, but it is not sin itself. Sin involves something far more than this. The New Testament definition of sin is not selfishness, but "lawlessness." Law is as real in the moral world as in the physical, and no definition of sin is adequate that does not regard it as a violation of the law of God, whether of conscience or Scripture. Without the conception of law there is no place for forgiveness, and, indeed, no need of it, for apart from law and responsibility to it the sinner is only in error and needs instruction alone. But we know that information is not redemption, and the deepest element that satisfies man is the Divine judgment on sin and deliverance from it. It must never be forgotten that our views of sin and salvation are related and inextricably bound up. As is the one, so will be the other.

We therefore hold that sin in its fullest sense is (a) an act; (b) an attribute of the nature; and (c) an attitude of the spirit. Scripture sometimes emphasises one and sometimes another of these. As such, sin is the corruption of the stock by race connection. The fact of propagated tendencies can hardly be denied, and this is a factor when the time of choice comes. Yet transmission and propagation do not lead to excuse or palliation. If it be said that this thought of the unity and solidarity of the race in sin and guilt is an impossible position, the reply is that there need be no difficulties in view of the fact that Christ died for the race. As sin has affected the whole of humanity, so the death of Christ meets and more than meets this universal fact. "Since by man came death by man came also the resurrection of the dead."²

MODERN THEORIES OF SIN

The various views held on this subject have been helpfully distinguished as follows:—³

¹ Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 120.

² As modern writers seem to think that this doctrine of inborn sinfulness can only be based on separate texts of Scripture, and that these texts do not warrant the exegesis often given to them, it is well to remember that the truth of original sin does not depend upon any isolated texts of Scripture, but on the whole trend and tendency of the Biblical revelation concerning man and redemption.

"The appearance of strength in Dr. Tennant's attack upon the biblical argument for the doctrine of original sin is chiefly due to his giving a negative turn to the proof-text method. He rests his case in this direction upon what the proof-texts do not prove, that is, when *separately considered*. He ought to have reckoned with the contention that catholic doctrine affords an explanation of all the relevant phenomena of revelation, *inductively considered*" (Hall, *Evolution and the Fall*, p. 140, Note).

³ Orchart, *ut supra*.

(1) Theories which trace sin to the will of man (represented by Kant, Coleridge, and Muller).

(2) Theories which regard sin as a necessity (represented by Schelling, Weisse, and Hegel).

(3) Theories which seek to explain sin by confining it within the bounds of religion (represented by Schleiermacher and Ritschl).

(4) Theories which seek to explain sin from empirical observation (represented by Pfeiderer and Tennant).

The conclusion drawn by the author of the book now referred to is that most of these modern theories "tend to reduce largely the circle of human conduct to which sin in the strict sense can be applied, and to cast serious suspicion upon the alleged consciousness of guilt, in that they fail to confirm its judgment by the philosophical, religious, or empirical methods, at least in its depth and extent."¹

Speaking of Dr. Tennant's theory, which is best known as the latest and ablest attempt in English theology to solve the problem, the same writer adds, "It is doubtful whether an empirical account really gives us an origin of sin at all."² There is no doubt that the fact of guilt is the key to the position, and no explanation of sin which ignores this or sets it aside can be regarded as true, because with the guilt is associated the need and provision of an atonement, and the two may be said to stand or fall together. It is, therefore, pretty certainly true that "on the basis of current anthropological theories we can never have anything but defective and inadequate views of sin."³ And anything defective and inadequate in this respect will assuredly bear upon the question of redemption, for superficiality in our consciousness of the nature and power of sin will tend not merely to a superficial statement of the Atonement of Christ, but to the destruction of the idea of atonement itself.⁴

Reviewing the entire subject, it is clear that human sinfulness consists on the one hand of an inborn tendency to evil, and on the other in the free choice of the individual man. The fact of an inherited tendency to sin cannot well be denied, a propensity which, while it leads to actual guilt, is not in itself culpable. But beyond this, voluntary choices which a person makes after the stage of moral responsibility are, of course, affected by the developed natural tendency, and it is impossible to conceive of conscious moral corruption which does not depend upon inherited tendencies. It is this combination of the evil principle and the evil act that constitutes sin in its completeness, and at the same time provides the problem of human sinfulness. Each attempt to solve the problem contains an important element of truth, and the subject is undoubtedly two-sided, according as man is considered either as a member of the race or as a distinct individual. It is impossible to disregard either side, though in our endeavour to include both it is easy to conceive of difficulties and contradictions. The prevailing tendency of modern thought is to ignore

¹ Orchard, *ut supra*, p. 102.

² Orr, *ut supra*, p. 11.

³ Orchard, *ut supra*, p. 95.

⁴ Orr, *ut supra*, p. 11.

the former element of inborn sinfulness, and to concentrate attention solely upon human acts. But no such partial view will suffice to meet all the facts of the case, and whatever difficulties and contradictions exist it is our duty to emphasise the facts on both sides, to adjust them to one another to the best of our ability, to recognise that there is an inscrutable element which at present is beyond our ken, and to believe that there will be an adjustment which will enable us to understand the awful fact of sin in God's universe. Meanwhile, it will be our safety to give attention to the conclusions stated by the great German writer, Julius Müller, in his Preface to *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*.

“That everything in Christianity is connected more or less directly with the great facts of Sin and Redemption, and that the plan of Redemption, which is the essence of Christianity, cannot be rightly understood until the doctrine of Sin be adequately recognised and established. Here, certainly, if anywhere, Christian theology must fight *pro aris et focis*.”

V.—THE PERMANENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN

The rest of the Article is concerned with teaching that this “infection of nature” remains in the regenerate, and that although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptised, yet that this infection of nature “hath of itself the nature of sin.”

The Character of Original Sin.—It is here described as “infection of nature.” It answers to the former phrase, “fault and corruption of the nature.” It is further spoken of as “the lust of the flesh” and its Greek equivalent is given; *φρόνημα σαρκός* (Rom. viii. 6). The effort of the Article to interpret this term is particularly interesting: “Which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh.” It is probable that all these aspects are rightly included in the full meaning of the term, which suggests the general bent of the entire nature, thought, feeling, will. The principle of the idea is best understood from a reference to the passages where the word and its cognates are found: Matt. xvi. 23 (*φρονεῖς*, “thou savourest”); Rom. viii. 5 f. (*φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, the minding of the flesh); viii. 27 (*φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος*, the minding of the Spirit); xii. 16 (*φρονοῦντες*, mind); Phil. iii. 19 (*φρονοῦντες*, mind), Col. iii. 2 (*φρονεῖτε*, set your affection). It is further said, following the teaching of St. Paul, that this lust of the flesh is not subject to the law of God (Rom. viii. 7).

The Permanence of Original Sin.—“Doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated.” It is clear that whatever happens in connection with regeneration this evil principle of sin remains. Nor is there any distinction between the “regenerated” and the “sanctified,” as though it were possible for this “infection of nature” to be removed by some Divine act subsequent to regeneration. Any distinction of this kind may safely be said to have been altogether outside the view of the Reformers; indeed, it cannot be said to exist in reality, but is only used in certain

quarters as a distinction by which it is attempted to justify a theory of the entire removal of the evil principle.

The Safeguard.—The Article clearly shows that no one will be condemned merely for the possession of inborn sinfulness. "There is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized." The Latin equivalent here is particularly noteworthy: *renatis et credentibus nulla propter Christum est condemnatio*. Here the Article translates the Latin *renatis* (born again) by the English "baptized," and also omits to translate the Latin *propter Christum*. This use of *renatis* for "baptized" seems to show clearly that in the minds of the Reformers Baptism refers to birth, not life, to the introduction of an already living being into a new sphere, not the bestowal of the primal germ of life.

It is sometimes said that Baptism removes the "taint" of original sin. But at once the question arises, What is this "taint"? It can only mean guilt or principle,¹ and if guilt is personal and cannot be said to exist in an unconscious child, there remains only the principle which, according to the Article, continues to exist in the regenerated. What, then, are we to understand by "taint"? The question shows how necessary it is to be quite clear as to the meaning and fact of Baptism.²

The Sinfulness of Original Sin.—The closing words of the Article are that "the Apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin." *In sese rationem peccati*. It is sometimes said that this phrase does not really mean that concupiscence is essentially and inherently sinful, but only that "it leads to sin."³ It is also urged that it is difficult to say exactly what the Article means on this point, and that its ambiguity was probably designed to emphasise the truth that while not in itself sinful, concupiscence is so closely connected with sin that if unchecked sin will be its result.⁴ On this view a distinction is based between our Article and certain other Protestant formularies, which speak of concupiscence as "true and proper sin," and special attention is called to the proposal of the Westminster Assembly to substitute "is truly and properly sin" for the milder statement of our Article.⁵ But there seems to be some confusion here, because the paragraph in the Article is concerned with what is "true and proper sin in the regenerate," since "concupiscence and lust" must, of necessity, mean the same as "this infection of nature." Either, therefore, it is sin or it is not, and it is noteworthy that the first Commentary on the Articles, by Rogers, dated 1587-1607,

¹ "In baptism the guilt is pardoned" (Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 374).

² The Church Catechism is sometimes understood to mean that Baptism makes us the children of grace: "A death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness: for being by nature born in sin, and the children of wrath, we are hereby made the children of grace." It should be noted, however, that the Latin version of Dean Durel, 1671, renders "hereby" by *hac ratione*, which can only refer to "a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness," rendered by Durel *mori peccato et denuo nasci justitie*. To the same effect is an old paraphrase of the Catechism, 1674. By contrast, Bright and Medd in their modern Latin version render "hereby" by *per Baptismum*, which is, of course, the *ex opere operato* view.

³ Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 376. ⁴ Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 376. ⁵ Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 376.

clearly teaches that concupiscence is sin, and opposes those who teach otherwise.¹ There can be no doubt that our Article is clearly against the Council of Trent on this point, which declares that concupiscence is not of the nature of sin. In remission of sins there are two things: (a) guilt; (b) punishment, and in original sinfulness there are two elements: (a) penalty; (b) disposition. The sinful condition is twofold: negative in the absence of grace to maintain union with God; positive in the corruption of nature, and (throughout) the sinful characteristic. Nature and person in this connection are inseparable, because the nature involves the will, and the will is the most distinct personal characteristic and is disinclined to obey God. Remission affects the *person*, but not the *nature*. Men are forgiven personal punishments, but the *depravatio* and its effects remain and are still subject to such results as death. It is this positive habit and disposition which is concupiscence.

The important point of this statement is that it is directed towards the Roman Catholic theory of what is called sacramental justification. Whatever we may say about Baptism, if there still remains in our souls something that has "of itself the nature of sin" we must continually need the love and mercy of God to pardon our transgression, and His grace to overcome the power of inborn sinfulness. The distinction, therefore, which is made between that which "hath of itself the nature of sin" and that which is "sin" is really baseless, more particularly as the phrase, "nature of sin", comes directly from the Council of Trent, and is evidently intended to contradict the official Roman Catholic doctrine. In 1546 the Council said:—

"If any one denies, that through the grace of Jesus Christ which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that all of that which hath the true and proper nature of sin (*peccati rationem habet*) is not taken away, but only cut down and not imputed, let him be accursed."

It is hardly possible to doubt that the statement of our Article, *peccati tamen in sese rationem habere*, was intended to be a definite reply to Rome. Rome's view is really a recurrence to the erroneous view of original righteousness, which regards concupiscence as a consequence of nature, both in the unregenerate and the regenerate. Further, it should be remembered that the same phrase occurs in Article XIII, where there is practically no doubt that the meaning is something essentially sinful.

This question of the permanence of original sin in the regenerate is important on two grounds: (a) in its opposition to all forms of what is called "sinless perfection"; (b) on the other hand, against any yielding to defeat and accepting it as inevitable. Something must be said on each of these two points.

(a) It is important to consider the relation of sin to our nature. The ultimate capacity in human nature is the capacity for feeling, for vivid

¹ Rogers, *On the Articles*, pp. 101-103.

impressions of pain and pleasure. These are called the primary sensibilities and have been disordered through sin, and are never entirely rectified in this life, though the Atonement covers their defect. Then come secondary sensibilities, leading to desires on the one hand and aversions on the other. It is at this point that Divine grace comes in. If the will does not consent there is no personal sin, but there is a disorder below the will which is sinful and needs to be dealt with. Personal responsibility is concerned only with that which the will determines. Atonement covers the rest, including incapacity and defect. It is also important to note the distinction between Adam and ourselves. He had the liability, but not the tendency to sin. We have both, and the tendency is what the Article calls the "corruption of the nature," "infection of nature," "concupiscence." The weakness of what is known as the Methodist doctrine of "Perfect Love" is that it teaches that grace meets all the needs of human nature in the sense of eradication. But it does not. Scripture continually distinguishes between sin and sins, between the root and fruit, but though the root remains, as stated by the Article, there is no need for it to bring forth fruit.

(b) But the presence of inborn sinfulness in the regenerate, while real and powerful, is no excuse, still less justification for sinning. The Apostle clearly teaches that the redemptive work of Christ was intended to render inert or inoperative the evil principle within (Rom. vi. 6, Greek). And thus we may say that while Scripture teaches something that is very near eradication, in order that we may not be satisfied with anything less than the highest type of Christian living, on the other hand, it as clearly teaches that the evil principle has not been removed. It loses its power over the believer, though the believer does not lose its presence. To the same effect is the Apostle's word: "Reckon ye yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin" (Rom. vi. 11). He thereby teaches that while we are to be dead to it, it is not dead to us. Sin is not dead, but we are to keep on reckoning ourselves to be dead to it. Such language would have been impossible if sin had been entirely removed. It is impossible to avoid noticing at this point the striking affinity between the Roman Catholic and Methodist doctrines of making sinfulness inhere in the will only.¹ Our Article, in harmony with the Protestant Confessions of the sixteenth century goes much deeper, and shows that sin has affected the nature long before the will commences to act.

The question is vital to many of the most practical and important aspects of living, for if we are wrong here we are liable to be wrong everywhere. Superficial views of sin inevitably tend towards superficial views of the redemptive work of Christ. We must, therefore, be on our guard against the two extremes: on the one hand we must insist that

¹ "Such are the difficulties in which the Council involved itself in its attempts to transfer the seat of sin from the affections to the outward manifestation, and yet to avoid coming into open collision with Scripture and Christian feeling" (Litton, *ut supra*, p. 170).

even in the regenerate the evil principle remains and will remain to the end of this life ; on the other hand, we must be clear that this evil principle need not and ought not to produce evil results in practice, since the grace of God has been provided to meet and overcome it.¹

¹ More will be said on this subject in connection with Articles XV and XVI.

ARTICLE X

Of Free Will.

De libero Arbitrio.

The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.

Ea est hominis post lapsum Adæ conditio, ut sese, naturalibus suis viribus et bonis operibus, ad fidem et invocationem Dei convertere ac præparare non possit. Quare absque gratia Dei, quæ per Christum est, nos præveniente ut velimus; et co-operante dum volumus, ad pietatis opera facienda, quæ Deo grata sunt et accepta, nihil valemus.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

Of Adam	= <i>Adæ.</i>
By strength	= <i>viribus.</i>
By Christ	= <i>per Christum.</i>
That we may have a good will	= <i>ut velimus.</i>
When we have that good will	= <i>dum volumus.</i>
Good works	= <i>pietatis opera.</i>

THE title is not quite correct, and would be better as "The Limitations of Free Will," or "The Need of Grace." Free will is not mentioned at all, but only assumed, its limitations being the special subject of the Article. This is really a corollary of Article IX, an enlargement of that Article in regard to the "corruption of the nature." The first clause of the present Article was introduced in 1563 from the Wurtemberg Confession.¹ The latter clause is almost exactly from Augustine's work, *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*.² It would seem as though the teaching were directed against the extreme views of the Anabaptists on the subject of grace.³ But it is more than likely that Archbishop Parker's object in prefixing the clause from the Confession of Wurtemberg was intended to deal with the theory of *Meritum de congruo*, which, however, is to be specially considered under Article XIII.

¹ "Quod autem nonnulli affirmant homini post lapsum tantam animi integritatem relictam, ut possit sese naturalibus suis viribus et bonis operibus, ad fidem et invocationem Dei convertere ac præparare, haud obscure pugnat cum vero Ecclesiæ Catholicæ consensu" (*De Peccato*).

² "We have no power to do good works without God working that we may have a good will, and co-operating when we have that good will."

"Sine illo vel operante ut velimus vel co-operante cum volumus, ad bonæ pietatis opera nihil valemus."

³ "Similiter nobis contra illos progrediendum est, qui tantum in libero arbitrio roboris et nervorum ponunt, eo solo sine alia speciali Christi gratia recte ab hominibus vivi posse constituent" (*Reformatio Legum, De Hæresibus*, c. 7).

I.—THE TEACHING OF THE ARTICLE

It will help to understand the entire situation if we analyse the Article first of all and see precisely what it teaches.

1. The Spiritual Helplessness of Man.—“The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith, and calling upon God.” The Roman doctrine of Original Sin as merely a state of deprivation would naturally lead to the view that man can co-operate with Divine grace in preparation for Justification. The right exercise of free will was regarded as giving man a claim to Divine help, and this, as we shall see, was the scholastic doctrine of “congruous merit.” The view taken in the Article is that man is free, but powerless to do God’s will.¹

2. The Divine Provision against Human Helplessness.—“Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ.” Here the Article emphasises the need of grace, and when it speaks of good works as “pleasant and acceptable,” it obviously refers solely to those who, within the Christian revelation, are capable of considering the Divine requirements. All references to the heathen and any works of theirs are naturally ruled out in view of the historical circumstances that gave rise to the Article. The statement is concerned simply with an aspect of the spiritual life which was unduly and incorrectly emphasised in the Middle Ages.

3. The Primary Working of Divine Grace.—“The grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will.” The technical phrase implied here is “prevenient grace,” and was possibly suggested by the Latin of Psalm lix. 10: “The God of my mercy will prevent me.” The truth is also seen in St. Paul’s words: “It is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure” (Phil. ii. 13). The reason why grace is thus emphasised as necessary is “that we may have a good will,” and the truth is found very frequently in Holy Scripture (John vi. 44; Acts xvi. 14).

4. The Continuous Working of Divine Grace.—“And working with us, when we have that good will.” There was one slight alteration made in the English in 1571, when “working with us” was put for “working in us” as the equivalent of *co-operante*. The technical term for this is “co-operating grace,” and again we may refer to Holy Scripture: “The Lord also working with them” (Mark xvi. 20). The need of this grace is equally clear, for whether we consider the beginning, or the course, or the end of the Christian life, our Lord’s words are true:

¹ “And so likewise although there remain a certain freedom of will in those things which do pertain unto the desires and works of this present life (cf. Augsburg Confess., XVIII), yet to perform spiritual and heavenly things free will of itself is insufficient: and therefore the power of man’s free will, being thus wounded and decayed, hath need of a physician to heal it, and an help to repair it; that it may receive light and strength whereby it may see, and have power to do those godly and spiritual things, which before the fall of Adam it was able and might have done” (*Necessary Doctrine and Erudition*, “Article of Free Will,” pp. 360, 361).

“ Apart from Me ye can do nothing ” (John xv. 5); and St. Paul may be said to have delighted in referring everything in his life to the grace of God. “ By the grace of God I am what I am ” (1 Cor. xv. 10; Gal. ii. 20). Our Prayer Book has many similar references to this need of Divine grace. Thus, at Daily Prayer we ask: “ O God, make clean our hearts within us.” In the Collect for Easter Day: “ As by Thy special grace pre-venting us . . . so by Thy continual help.” The Collect for the Ninth Sunday after Trinity: “ We, who cannot do anything that is good without Thee.” Collect for the Fourteenth Sunday after Trinity: “ Make us to love that which Thou dost command.” Collect for the Fifteenth Sunday after Trinity: “ The frailty of man without Thee cannot but fall.” Collect for the Seventeenth Sunday after Trinity: “ Thy grace may always pre-vent and follow us.” Collect for the Nineteenth Sunday after Trinity: “ Without Thee we are not able to please Thee.” Collect after Communion Office: “ Pre-vent us . . . with Thy most gracious favour, and further us with Thy continual help.” The Homilies teach the same truth.

“ It is the Holy Ghost, and *no other thing*, that doth quicken the minds of men, stirring up good and godly motions in their hearts, which are agreeable to the will and commandment of God, such as otherwise of their own crooked and perverse nature they *should never have*.”

“ As for the good works of the Spirit, the fruits of faith, charitable and godly motions, if he have any at all in him, they proceed only of the Holy Ghost, who is the *only* worker of our sanctification, and maketh us new men in Christ Jesus.”¹

“ We are all become unclean, but we are not able to cleanse ourselves, nor to make one another of us clean. We are by nature the children of God’s wrath; but we are not able to make ourselves the children and inheritors of God’s glory. We are sheep that run astray, but we cannot of our own power come again to the sheepfold, so great is our imperfection and weakness.”²

II.—THE HISTORY

The question of the will was debated centuries before Christianity, and the subject was forced on the Church and could no longer remain a matter of mere philosophic discussion. A new element arose in connection with the Fall of man, and the problem was raised as to how far that affected the will. The subject is not clearly set forth in the Apostolic Fathers, mainly because there were no controversies to colour opinions, though the freedom of the will is definitely taught by Justin Martyr. Early heretics like the Gnostics were fatalists, but Origen emphasised human freedom. The Pelagians insisted upon absolute freedom of will, and Augustine was the first to face the problem fully. After him came the Semi-Pelagians, who taught that man had free will sufficient to enable him to turn to God, but not to persevere. The Semi-Pelagians taught

¹ Homily for Whitsunday.

² Homily on the Misery of Man. See also Third Homily for Rogation Week.

that so much good will remains as to wish to be healed, *velle sanari, querere medicum*, but later came the idea that even this *velle sanari* was the result of a general action of grace on mankind, God's Spirit giving the initial impulse.

In the Middle Ages there was a perpetual tendency towards Semi-Pelagianism, due to the erroneous idea of original righteousness, for if man is only deprived of superadded grace, the natural powers were capable of good motions of themselves. But thought divided itself into two schools. The Dominicans, as represented by Thomas Aquinas, 1274, were substantially Augustinian, and taught the need of grace before the will could incline towards God. On the other hand, the Franciscans, represented by Duns Scotus, 1308, taught entire freedom of will and were virtually Pelagian. It was in this connection that the doctrine of grace *de congruo* arose, which meant that man's endeavour to attain to godliness deserved this congruous grace. They thought that some element of goodness was to be attributed to man's unaided efforts towards the attainment of holiness, and that in some way this effort merited the bestowal of Divine grace. The Council of Trent was divided on the subject, though generally through the Jesuits the Church of Rome tended towards the Scotist view. It is well known that on these subjects the Roman view is essentially Pelagian, or at least semi-Pelagian.

On the other hand, Luther and Calvin favoured the Thomist view, and of course opposed the very idea of the doctrine of "congruous merit." Our Article meets these points without entering into the subtleties of controversy as to how far man's will has been affected by the Fall. It is sometimes said that the second clause of our Article, dating from 1553, was before the time when Calvin was known in England, and that therefore it represents our own independent view. This is true, but it is not the whole truth, since all our Reformers were what may be called Augustinians. In 1553 this Article was followed by one "Of Grace," to oppose the fatalism of the Anabaptists. This was omitted in 1563, probably because the error was no longer of serious importance, and also, it has been suggested, to make it easier for strong Calvinists to accept the Articles, since they believed in irresistible grace. During the Marian persecution many English Divines were brought into contact on the Continent with foreign Reformers, and afterwards came back strongly in favour of more extreme Calvinistic views.

Later on came the controversy at the beginning of the seventeenth century connected with the Dutch theologian, Arminius, who, by a natural rebound from the extreme Calvinism of his time, took the Scotist view. The result was the calling of the Synod of Dort, or Dordrecht, at which the Arminians were excommunicated and definite Calvinistic views were promulgated. After the Council of Trent the Church of Rome continued to be divided on the subject, the Jesuits maintaining a Pelagian view, while the followers of Jansenius, known as Jansenists, upheld the Augustinian and Dominican position. At length the Jansenists were

condemned and the Jesuits gained the upper hand in the Church of Rome.¹

III.—THE QUESTION STATED

There are few things on which clearness is more needed than on the subject of free will. For our present purpose it does not mean the absence of restraint from without, or perfect freedom of action, nor does it refer to the liberty of the believer, his freedom in Christ (Rom. viii. 2; Gal. v. 1). In the present connection it means the power of choice which enables a man to determine the course of his action. Man sees certain ends and chooses between them. Motives impel, but do not compel. The man selects what he desires, so that he is free to use his liberty aright, and the abuse of his freedom constitutes a sin. There are two functions of the will: (a) choice, and (b) volition. The former refers to selection, and by itself accomplishes nothing; the latter refers to energy, by which the thing selected is accomplished. Human freedom belongs primarily to choice, because volition may be impracticable, yet even so choice has its limitations and loss. Freedom does not mean ability to choose anything at any time. Free will therefore means the freedom of the soul in choosing, enabling it to determine conscious action. The doctrine of the will as to the choosing is equivalent to the doctrine of the man. In this sense our freedom is real and the Fall has not affected it. We are conscious of it by our sense of responsibility. All denial of free will in this meaning must lead either to fatalism, which ends in materialism, or to an extreme mysticism, which involves such a contemplation of God as to leave for self a sort of Christian pantheism, or absorption into God. Fallen man has the faculty of will, as he has other faculties, and if he is free from external compulsion he must will what he pleases to do. But this does not prove that he has the power to do anything and everything that comes before him. Man's receptivity is real, but it needs to be purified and quickened by grace before it can fully discharge its functions. We have a capacity for redemption, but not the capability to redeem ourselves. It is not the bare capacity to receive, but the positive desire to do so that is needed. Freedom is thus opposed to servitude and implies the apprehension of various courses of action. It consists in choosing between possible alternative acts. Reason is, therefore, at the root of liberty, and as far as the reason discerns the good (or what is thought good) the will by nature chooses it. *Volo ergo sum*, "I will, therefore I am," is decidedly truer than *cogito ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I am." Freedom is thus an ultimate fact.

"Freedom is a point upon which we can allow no shuffling or juggling in argument. It is unique, but it is self-evident; and every attempt to explain it away can be shown to involve a *petitio principii*."²

¹ For the history, of which the above is a brief outline, see Harold Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, pp. 252-264; the question will receive further attention under Article XVII.

² Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, p. 107.

Our full freedom is limited to a few cases. There seem to be three main choices: (1) ultimate choice, the selection of an end which becomes permanent for life; (2) subordinate choice, the choice of means towards ends; (3) supreme choice, the choice of the highest ultimate, either God or self. Freedom is exerted mainly in regard to the first and third of these. To the first belongs character, which introduces the element of fixity into human life. It is in our character that our sins are rooted.

And yet will is not self-originating, but only chooses what it thinks is *good* and *possible*. It only reflects the *το αὐτεξούσιον* of the Creator, and it was in this respect that the Reformers felt led to deny freedom. Free will is a mode, not a source of action.¹ Behind the will is the nature, and as is the nature so is the will. Moral inability is thus due to the corruption of nature. Yet even so, on these motives, the will has certain powers of self-determination, and it is this that makes corruption possible. This corruption may be (1) the obscuration of the reasonable apprehension of good; (2) the succession of acts which tend to establish habit.

It is, of course, a great mystery how God knows and orders everything and yet leaves man free. These, however, are the two facts which need to be emphasised and kept ever in view even though they cannot be reconciled. Meanwhile, because of the provision of Christ there is no moral injustice, since Divine grace more than meets human weakness and inability.

Grace is perhaps the greatest word of the New Testament and of God's revelation in Christ, because it is the most truly expressive of God's character and attitude in relation to man. The root seems to mean "to give pleasure," and then it branches out comprehensively in two directions: one in relation to the Giver; the other in relation to the receiver of the pleasure. Grace is, first, a quality of *graciousness* in the Giver, and then, a quality of *gratitude* in the recipient, which in turn makes him *gracious* to those around.

But the idea has two distinct yet connected aspects even when applied only to God the Giver.

1. It expresses the Divine *attitude* to man as guilty and condemned. Grace means God's favour and good will towards us (Luke i. 30). So the Mother of our Lord is described as "permanently favoured" ("graced," Luke i. 28). This favour is manifested without any regard to merit; indeed, grace and merit are entire opposites. Grace is thus spontaneous (not prompted from outside); free (no conditions are required); generous (no stint is shown); and abiding (no cessation is experienced). It is also (as favour) opposed to "wrath," which means judicial displeasure against sin. Further, it must be distinguished from

¹ "Since the Fall, man is free to choose, and for that reason is accountable. . . . He is free to choose, in so far as no foreign will can irresistibly constrain him to will against his own will. He is not free, in so far as within his own personality the sin which has been allowed by himself rules and enslaves his will (Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, p. 193).

mercy, even though mercy is one of the methods of its expression. Mercy is related to misery, and to those who are (negatively) non-deserving. Grace is related to redemption and to those who are (positively) undeserving.

2. It then expresses the Divine *action* to man as needy and helpless. Grace means not merely favour, but also help; not only benevolence, but also benefaction; not simply feeling, but also force; not solely good will, but also good work. It is Divine favour expressed in and proved by His gift; attitude shown by action. Thus from *grace* comes *gift*, which invariably implies a gift of or by grace (Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. iv. 6; Rom. xii. 6).

These two ideas are thus connected and united as Cause and Effect. They tell of God's Heart and God's Hand. Etymologically, therefore, Grace is a term that refers to the beautiful, which gives delight. Theologically, it means God's favour as seen in His gift. Practically, it implies God's presence and redemptive power in human life. Blending all these aspects we may think of Grace as God's *spontaneous gift*, which causes *pleasure* and produces *blessing*. Hort defines grace as "free bounty," and, as such, it produces "joy and is the cause of actual power in daily living."

In relation to the will, grace implies (1) the illumination of the moral nature; (2) a counteractive power against habit; (3) new motives; (4) by contact, healing, and strength. It is at this point that we may perhaps regret the omission of the Tenth Article of 1553, "Of Grace," which was omitted in 1563, as presumably not required. But it may be well, however, to quote it in order to see more definitely what grace does in relation to the human will.

Of Grace

The grace of Christ, or the Holy Ghost by Him given doth take away the stony heart, and giveth an heart of flesh. And although, those that have no will to good things, He maketh them to will, and those that would evil things, He maketh them not to will the same: yet nevertheless He enforceth not the will. And therefore no man when he sinneth can excuse himself, as not worthy to be blamed or condemned, by alleging that he sinned unwillingly or by compulsion.

De Gratia

Gratia Christi, seu Spiritus Sanctus qui per eundem datur, cor lapideum aufert, et dat cor carneum. Atque licet ex nolentibus quæ recta sunt volentes faciat, et ex volentibus prava, nolentes reddat, voluntati nihilominus violentiam nullam infert. Et nemo hac de causa cum peccaverit, seipsum excusare potest, quasi nolens aut coactus peccaverit, ut eam ob causam accusari non mereatur aut damnari.

The question of the relation of the human will to the Divine is one of great difficulty and profound mystery, but the following points seem to be fairly clear: (1) God at the beginning created man and endowed him with a will, so that although man acts as a "first cause" he is not one

absolutely, for he is a first cause only in a secondary way. (2) God created man a holy being and with a will inclined to Him only. Then the weakness of a finite nature rendered man fallible, and under the influence of temptation Adam fell from his estate of holiness, sinfulness thus entering the world as the perversion of a life originally upright. (3) While Divine grace never compels souls, it frequently changes them for the better, for God creates man anew in righteousness. Such a transformation is altogether consistent with free agency, because it does not destroy, but only renews and thereby aids man's will.

This question of grace in relation to human life is of particular importance to-day, because from two separate quarters its need and power tend to be questioned and even denied. On the one hand, science tends to deny the possibility of grace. On the other, fiction either idealises human life or else leads men to despair by emphasising the impossibility of forgiveness. So that emphasis on grace is of special value against science with its teaching of a gradual evolution and improvement of human nature, and also against fiction, which idealises human nature and thereby denies the need of grace. In reality modern thought can find no fault with the teaching of this Article, since everything tends to show the continuity of individual life and to lay stress on the importance of heredity. The Article is of particular value in opposition to the really shallow conception that "a man can reform himself at any time if he will only make up his mind." To say this is to ignore some of the plainest facts of human experience, and in particular the real power of habit. The statement sometimes made that a child just entering upon a vague sense of right and wrong is able to stem the current of his innate impulses is not worthy of serious consideration. Everything tends to show that the doctrine of original sin has a solid foundation in the facts of human nature. There is in every human being a tendency to sin antecedent to the act of the conscious and mature man. It is at this point that Christianity comes in with its message of grace, and it is that the Article emphasises both in regard to what is called "pre-venient grace" and "co-operating grace." Whatever mystery there may be in theories and philosophies, when we approach the subject through personal experience we see abundant evidence of the truth of those statements, already quoted from our Collects, that "we have no power of ourselves to help ourselves," and for this reason "without Thee we are not able to please Thee."

ARTICLE XI

Of the Justification of Man.

De Hominis Justificatione.

We are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.

Tantum propter meritum Domini ac Servatoris nostri Jesu Christi per fidem, non propter opera et merita nostra, justi coram Deo reputamur. Quare sola fide nos justificari, doctrina est saluberrima ac consolationis plenissima, ut in Homilia de Justificatione hominis fusius explicatur.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

Only for the merit	= <i>Tantum propter meritum.</i>
By faith	= <i>per fidem.</i>
And not for our own works	= <i>non propter opera nostra.</i>
Or deservings	= <i>et merita.</i>
By faith only	= <i>sola fide.</i>
Of Justification	= <i>de Justificatione hominis.</i>

IN the Forty-two Articles of 1553 this Article was as follows :—

Justification by only faith in Jesus Christ in that sense, as it is declared in the Homily of Justification, is a most certain and wholesome doctrine for Christian men.

Justificatio ex sola fide Jesu Christi eo sensu quo in Homelia de Justificatione explicatur, est certissima et saluberrima Christianorum doctrina.

But in 1563 the Article received its present form, and the alteration was a great advantage and improvement, for in 1553 it was necessary to study the Homily in order to learn what the Church of England meant by "Justification by faith only," while now we have a clear definition of the doctrine in the Article itself, the Homily being still referred to as providing a fuller expression of the same truth. It has sometimes been said that Archbishop Parker favoured mediæval views on Justification, but his devotion to Cranmer is a sufficient disproof of this, and, further, it is known that the Eleventh Article was drawn from the Wurtemberg Confession. The Augsburg Confession having defined the Evangelical faith, its teaching on Justification had been condemned by the Council of Trent in 1546-1547, and when the Council reassembled in 1551 the Protestant Princes presented Confessions of Faith reaffirming those points which the Council had condemned. The Wurtemberg Confession was one of these documents, and it is therefore not unnatural

that when our Articles were revised in 1563 they were thus definitely and purposely brought into clearer verbal agreement with this Confession, and at the same time shown to be in more thorough conflict with Rome than before.

The question of Justification was the theological and spiritual foundation of the Reformation Movement; indeed, it lies at the very foundation of all Christian life and service, for only when this is settled can there be any peace, power, and progress. The prominence given to it at the Reformation is a striking testimony to its importance as the primary question of the ages: "How should man be just with God?" This enquiry, found as far back as the Book of Job, is repeated throughout the history of the Jews, expressed in heathen sacrifices, and implied in all Oriental religions. The Bible alone gives the answer, and it was this beyond all else that led to the definite and constant emphasis on the Bible as the Rule of Faith at the time of the Reformation. Indeed, it may be said that the whole movement of the sixteenth century was bound up with the two great principles of the sufficiency and supremacy of the Bible, and Justification by Faith in the completeness and finality of our Lord's work on the Cross. The first hint on the latter subject comes in Genesis xv. 6; a little more light is afforded in Psalm xxxii.; still more in Habakkuk ii. 4; while in Acts xiii. 38, 39; Galatians iii.; Romans iii. and iv., we have the full revelation of God's answer to man's enquiry.

I.—THE MEANING OF JUSTIFICATION

Justification may be viewed from God's standpoint or from ours. In the former case it means the Divine act and gift; in the latter the human reception and result.

1. Justification is connected with our true relation to God. The Article shows this by defining it as our being "accounted righteous before God." Justification before men is only possible through good works, to be dealt with in Article XII. So that in the primary sense Justification is not concerned with our spiritual condition, but with our spiritual relation, not with actual state, but with judicial position. It is important to keep this in mind if confusion and difficulty are to be avoided.

2. This true relation was lost by sin. Sin, as we have seen, is rebellion against God's will and disobedience to His law, and as regards our true relation to God there are three results of sin: (*a*) guilt; (*b*) condemnation; (*c*) separation. We see all these in the Garden of Eden as the direct and immediate result of sin in connection with man's proper relation to God.

3. Justification is the restoration of this true relation to God. It includes (*a*) the removal of condemnation by the gift of forgiveness; (*b*) the removal of guilt by the reckoning (or imputation) of righteousness;

(c) the removal of separation by the restoration to fellowship.¹ Justification thus means to treat as just, or righteous, to account righteous, to regard as righteous, to declare righteous, to pronounce righteous in the eyes of the law (Psa. li. 4; Prov. xvii. 15; Ezek. xvi. 51, 52; Matt. xi. 19; xii. 37; Luke vii. 35).²

4. Justification is, therefore, much more than pardon, and the two are clearly distinguished by St. Paul (Acts xiii. 38, 39). A criminal is pardoned, but is not regarded as righteous. But Justification is that act of God whereby He accepts and accounts us righteous, though in ourselves unrighteous. The Christian is not merely a pardoned criminal, but a righteous man. Forgiveness is an act and a succession of acts; Justification is an act issuing in an attitude. Forgiveness is repeated throughout the life; Justification is complete and never repeated. It relates to our spiritual position in the sight of God and covers the whole of our life, past, present, and future.³ Forgiveness is only negative, the removal of condemnation; Justification is also positive, the removal of guilt and the bestowal of a perfect standing before God. In a word, Justification means reinstatement. Forgiveness is being stripped; Justification is being clothed. Day by day we approach God for forgiveness and grace on the footing of the relation of Justification that lasts throughout our life. In relation to the justified man, the believer, God is "faithful and righteous to forgive." Thus, Justification is the ground of our assurance, the reason why we know is because of what Christ has done for us and is to us.

5. Justification is also different from "making righteous," which is the usual interpretation of Sanctification. The two are inseparable in fact, but they are distinguishable in thought, and must be kept quite clear if we desire peace and blessing. Justification concerns our standing; Sanctification our state. The former affects our position; the latter

¹ It is at least a coincidence that St. Paul's three questions at the close of his great chapter in Romans deal with these three results of sin as seen in the story of the Fall: (a) "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect" (ver. 33)? No guilt. (b) "Who is he that condemneth" (ver. 34)? No condemnation. (c) "Who shall separate us" (ver. 35)? No separation.

² It is often pointed out that Greek verbs in *ow*, are factitive if physical, like *τυφλώω*, to make blind, but are not factitive if moral, as *ἀξιόω*, to account worthy. Plummer, *Lukes*, p. 208; Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, pp. 28-31; *Speakers' Commentary* on I Cor. xi. 6.

³ It is now generally acknowledged that the interpretation of this term, which was given by the mediævalists in the Reformation controversy, and which, though finding no support in the Anglican Articles and rejected by representative Anglican divines like Richard Hooker, has been revived by certain modern English theologians, as for instance Dr. Liddon, is inconsistent with Greek usage. The verb *δικαίωω* means 'to account righteous'; and no ingenuity will enable us to modify this interpretation. It does not mean 'to make righteous,' and all attempts to confuse it with sanctification must therefore be abandoned" (Simpson, *Fact and Faith*, p. 76).

See also Article "Justified," *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*.

⁴ "The proportions of the Pauline theology abundantly prove that justification is no mere preliminary act in the progression 'justified, sanctified, glorified,' but that it covers the whole career of the Christian as the essential condition" (Simpson, *ut sup a*, p. 85).

our condition. The first deals with relationship; the second with fellowship. And even though they are bestowed together we must never confuse them. The one is the foundation of peace, "Christ for us"; the other is the foundation of purity, "Christ in us." The one deals with acceptance; the other with attainment. Sanctification admits of degrees, we may be more or less sanctified; Justification has no degrees, but is complete, perfect, and eternal. "Justified from all things." Our Lord indicated this distinction (John xiii. 10) when He said, "He that has been bathed (Justification) needeth not, save to wash his feet (Sanctification)."¹

ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

At this point it is necessary to consider the Roman Catholic doctrine of Justification, more particularly as, owing to other prominent differences between us and Rome, it is apt to be overlooked that there is a fundamental difference between the two Churches on this subject as well. A brief reference to what happened at the Council of Trent will enable us to understand this difference. Dr. Lindsay describes the statement put forth at that Council as "a masterpiece of theological dexterity." This was doubtless due to the fact that there was not a little Evangelical doctrine in the Roman Church which had to be considered, and so much was this the case that at one time it had been thought possible to win over the Protestants. But that time, if it ever existed, had gone by, and the discussion in the Council revealed fundamental lines of difference. A small minority was ready to accept the Lutheran view of Justification by Faith alone, but the majority easily won the day on behalf of a view which was almost the exact opposite of the Lutheran doctrine. The definition adopted by the Council extends to sixteen chapters, and, as Lindsay says, "Almost every page includes grave ambiguities." At first there seems to be an agreement with Evangelical doctrine, but then a change commences, and "while some sentences seem to maintain the Evangelical ideas previously stated, room is distinctly made for Pelagian work-righteousness." The result was that Justification was no longer regarded as a change of position, but as the actual conversion of a sinner into a righteous man. Lindsay thus concludes:—

"It is scarcely necessary to pursue the definitions further. It is sufficient to say that the theologians of Trent do not seem to have the faintest idea of what the Reformers meant by faith, and never appear to see that there is such a thing as

¹ "The two are not the same, and they do not run into each other. When a bone is broken, it must be set before the process of healing can begin, and the setting is in order that the fragments may knit together and unite; but the setting and the healing are wholly distinct. Justification is the setting of the broken bone; it brings the soul into its true relation to God; it has sanctification for its object. Sanctification is the healing, a process wholly different and wholly distinct. Justification is God's work; sanctification is the united work of God and man" (Stearns, *Present Day Theology*, p. 474).

religious experience. . . . The result was that the Pope obtained what he wanted, a definition which made reconciliation with the Protestants impossible."¹

For our present purpose we may quote one of the Canons of the Council, which teaches that "Justification consists not in the mere remission of sins, but in the sanctification and renewal of the inner man by the voluntary reception of God's grace and gifts."

The fact is that Rome teaches Forgiveness through Sanctification, while Scripture teaches Sanctification through Forgiveness. Rome confuses Justification and Sanctification, and says that the former is by the infusion of grace and includes both remission and renovation. But this is really to rob the soul of the objective ground of righteousness and confuses spiritual acceptance with spiritual attainments. Not only so, it tends to base Justification on our own merit. Justification in the Scriptural sense is independent of and anterior to the spiritual state or condition, which, however, necessarily follows.² It must, therefore, be evident that between the doctrine of Justification as taught in our Article and that inculcated by Rome, there is "a great gulf fixed," as indeed, our great theologian Hooker clearly teaches.

"Wherein, then, do we disagree? We disagree about the nature of the very essence of the medicine whereby Christ cureth our disease; about the manner of applying it; about the number and the power of means which God requireth in us for the effectual applying thereof to our soul's comfort. . . . This is the mystery of the Man of sin. This maze the Church of Rome doth cause her followers to tread when they ask her the way of justification."³

It is of vital importance to keep clear this distinction between the doctrine of the two Churches because there is so much confusion to-day in regard to the basis and ground of our acceptance with God. Thus, a well-known preacher⁴ published a volume of sermons entitled *The Life of Justification*, but it is only possible to accept this expression with careful qualifications and safeguards; a more Scriptural idea would be "The Life of the Justified," or "The Life of Sanctification," since Justification is an act, not a process, and, as already pointed out, covers the whole of the Christian life from beginning to end. The confusion between the

¹ Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, Vol. II, p. 580. See also pp. 576-580.

² "Protestants claim that justification is complete from the first. The father of the parable does not leave his prodigal son outside the house until he has shown his repentance by his works; but he goes forth to meet him, and falls upon his neck and kisses him, and has the best robe put on him, and a ring on his finger, and shoes on his feet, and kills for him the fatted calf. The sinner is not taken back into the Divine favour by degrees, cautiously and grudgingly, but he is restored to all his privileges as a child of God. This is the only way to make the work of sanctification, which immediately begins, complete. It is a work which can go forward only after the relation of fatherhood and sonship is fully re-established. It is only by such love that the sinner's love can be made perfect. 'We love Him because He first loved us' (1 John iv. 19)," (Stearns, *ut supra*, p. 447).

³ Hooker, Sermon II, 5.

⁴ Canon Body.

Anglican and Roman doctrines of Justification may perhaps be said to date from the time of the Tractarian Movement, when Newman's sermons took up a position scarcely recognisable from that of the Church of Rome.¹

II.—THE FOUNDATION OF JUSTIFICATION

I. The Article teaches that we are accounted righteous before God "only for the merit of our Lord Jesus Christ." This, of course, refers to His atoning work by which He removed the alienation between God and the sinner, and brought about our reconciliation. As we have already seen, the New Testament doctrine of reconciliation implies a change of relationship and not a mere alteration of feeling on man's part.² This doctrine of Justification for the merit of our Lord is in harmony with St. Paul's words, "In Him all that believe are justified" (Acts xiii. 39). The ambiguity of the word "for" is entirely removed by a comparison of the Latin *propter*, "on account of."³

As already stated, the Article in its present form was due to Archbishop Parker's revision after the Confession of Wurtemberg, but there is one point of singular importance that should not be overlooked. In

¹ "In a most characteristic passage Cardinal Newman admits that *δικαιῶ* means only to declare righteous, but adds that the divine declaration is *creative*. 'It is not like some idle sound, or a vague rumour coming at random and tending no whither; but it is "the word which goeth forth out of his mouth"; it has a sacramental power, being the instrument as well as the sign of his will. It never can "return unto him void, but It accomplishes that which he pleases, and prospers in the thing whereto he sends it." Imputed righteousness is the coming in of actual righteousness. They whom God's sovereign voice pronounces just, forthwith become in their measure just.' How like Newman all this sounds; So original, so uplifting, and yet so empty of reality and so distant from Saint Paul! Through Newman's discussion one can seldom catch even the faintest and most flashing glimpse of the Apostle" (O. A. Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 362).

For a fuller treatment of the various truths connected with Justification, see Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*, Index, s.v. Justification; Wace, *The Principles of the Reformation*, pp. 50-64.

² "In Scripture, to reconcile one party to another means, to bring back the first party to the other's clemency, not to persuade the first party to lay aside prejudice against the other. 'Get reconciled to thy brother' (Matt. v. 24), means, 'Go to thy *offended* brother, and get his forgiveness.' 'Get reconciled to God' (2 Cor. v. 20), likewise means, 'Go to thy *offended* God and, in His own offered way, get His acceptance.' Reconciliation, studied in its Scriptural usage, is a word not in favour of a view which sees in the Atoning Sacrifice *primarily* an appeal to the heart of man to lay aside hard thoughts of God" (Moule, *Justification by Faith*, p. 29).

³ "Christ took on Him the consequences of our sins—that is, He made our responsibilities, as sin had fixed them, His own. He did so when He went to the Cross—*i.e.* in His death. . . . All the responsibilities in which sin has involved us—responsibilities which are summed up in that death which is the wages of sin—have been taken by Christ upon Himself. The Apostle does not raise the question whether it is possible for one to assume the responsibilities of others in this way; he assumes (and the assumption, as we shall see, is common to all the New Testament writers) that the responsibilities of sinful men have been taken on Himself by the sinless Lamb of God. This is not a theorem he is prepared to defend; it is the gospel he has to preach. . . . Whoever says, 'He bare our sins' says substitution" (Denney, *The Death of Christ*, pp. 98, 99).

"There is no doubt about the word (*λασμός*). It means an offering that makes the face of God propitious" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 97).

the Wurtemberg Confession Jesus Christ is only spoken of as "Our Lord," while our Article adds "and Saviour." The significance of this is that in opposition to the essentially legal view of Rome it was necessary to institute the clearest possible contrast between the law and the Gospel by declaring our Lord to be our Saviour. This was an aspect frequently and emphatically brought forward by the Reformers, especially in view of the teaching of the Council of Trent that Jesus Christ was a Law-giver and that the Gospel was the new "law." It is therefore clear that the introduction of these words, "and Saviour," were intended to emphasise still further the difference between the Roman and Anglican views of salvation. Our Lord's perfect obedience even unto death, His payment of the penalty due to our transgression, His spotless righteousness, the whole merit of His Divine Person and atoning work, form the ground of our justification. The merit is reckoned to us, put to our account. God looks at us in Him, not only as pardoned, but as righteous. "He who knew no sin was made sin for us that we might become God's righteousness in Him" (2 Cor. v. 21).¹ This is the great and satisfying doctrine of the imputed righteousness of Christ which is clearly taught by the Article as meritorious on our behalf. It is sometimes argued that this theory is not mentioned in the Article because of its association with what is sometimes called "legal fiction."² But in the light of the teaching of the Article on our Lord's merit by which we are accounted righteous before God, the doctrine of imputation is clear, and, indeed, has been taught plainly, as we have just seen, by so representative a man as Hooker.³

2. This reference to the merit of our Lord brings into greater contrast the negative aspect emphasised in the Article, "and not for our own works or deservings." Here, again, the ambiguity of "for" is made perfectly clear by *propter*, "on account of." At this point another significant change from the Wurtemberg Confession must be noted. In the German formulary the words are "on account of the merit of the works of the law" (*meritum operum legis*), but in our Article this is widened into "our own works and deservings" (*opera et merita nostra*).

¹ "Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in Him. In Him God findeth us if we be faithful, for by faith we are incorporated into Him . . . the man which in himself is impious, full of iniquity, full of sin, him being found in Christ through faith, and having his sin in hatred through repentance, him God beholdeth with a gracious eye, putteth away his sin by not imputing it; taketh quite away the punishment due thereunto by pardoning it, and accepteth him in Jesus Christ, as perfectly righteous as if he had fulfilled all that is commanded him in the law—shall I say more perfectly righteous than if himself had fulfilled the whole law? I must take heed what I say; but the Apostle saith (2 Cor. v. 21) 'God made Him which knew no sin, to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him.' Such we are in the sight of God the Father as the very Son of God Himself . . . we care for no knowledge in the world but this, that man hath sinned and God hath suffered; that God hath made Himself the sin of men, and that men are made the righteousness of God" (Hooker, Sermon II, 6).

² Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 406.

It is also curious that this very idea of the imputation of Christ's merit is vindicated on another page by Bishop Gibson, who argues strongly in favour of the reality involved in what is called "a sort of legal fiction" (p. 396).

It seems clear that the intention was to make our Article more definitely anti-Roman in view of the teaching of the Council of Trent. Then, too, the word "deservings" is much wider than "works," and this would tend to exclude everything human from the ground of our Justification. It is also significant that in the Council of Trent we find these very words, "good works and deservings" (*bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis*). It is absolutely impossible for human works or merits to form the basis of Justification, for our obedience to law could not bring this about. God requires perfect obedience (Gal. iii. 10), and this man cannot render. Human nature has ever been attempting to establish its own righteousness, but failure has always been the result. The Jews of old (Rom. x. 3) and mankind to-day alike fail because of a twofold inability; inability to blot out the past, and inability to guarantee the present and future.¹ Justifying righteousness must be by a perfect obedience, and only One ever rendered this. Nothing could be clearer than the Article in regard to the absolute impossibility of human merit in connection with Justification.

III.—THE MEANS OF JUSTIFICATION

1. The merit of our Lord becomes ours "by faith." "Through Him all that believe are justified" (Acts xiii. 39). Here, again, the Latin distinction is clear and significant. We are justified *propter meritum Christi*, but *per fidem*. Faith is never associated with the ground of Justification, but only as its means or channel. And all the New Testament references to faith indicate this in the clearest possible way.² Trust implies dependence upon another and the consequent cessation of dependence upon ourselves. Faith is, therefore, the acknowledgment of our own inability and the admission of our need of another's ability. Faith links us to Christ and is the means of our appropriation of His merit. The full meaning of faith in the New Testament is trust. (1) The primary idea is belief in a fact (*ἔστι*, 1 John v. 1); (2) the next is belief in a person's word (*μολι*, John iv. 21); (3) but the fullest is trust in a person (*ἐς*, John iii. 16). Thus, faith in its complete sense includes the assent of the mind and the consent of the will, the credence of the intellect and the confidence of the heart. As such, it is best understood as trust, the attitude of one person to another.³

2. The reason why faith is emphasised is that it is the only possible answer to God's revelation. From the earliest days this has been so. The word of the Lord came to Abraham and he at once responded by simple trust (Gen. xv. 1-6). To the same effect are the various illus-

¹ "There is no man's case so dangerous as his whom Satan hath persuaded that his own righteousness shall present him pure and blameless in the sight of God" (Hooker, Sermon II, 7).

² In Romans iii. 25, *διὰ*, and the genitive case; Romans i. 17, *ἐκ*, and the genitive case; Romans iii. 28, the dative.

³ For a thorough treatment see *Faith*, by Bishop Moule of Durham.

trations of faith in Hebrews xi., all implying response to a previous revelation. As between man and man the absence of faith is a barrier to communion, so it is in things spiritual. Faith in man answers to grace in God. Faith is the correlative of promise. Trust answers to truth; faith renounces self and emphasises God's free gift.¹ There is no merit in faith. It is self-assertion with a view to self-surrender. As Hooker has said, "God doth justify the believing man, yet not for the worthiness of his belief, but for His worthiness Who is believed."² We are not justified by belief in Christ, but by Christ in Whom we believe. Faith is nothing apart from its Object, and is only valuable as it leads us to Him who has wrought a perfect righteousness, and as it enables us to appropriate Him as the Lord our righteousness.³

The question of Baptism is often discussed in relation to faith, and it is sometimes argued that faith tends to make us dispense with Sacraments. But this is not the case. The Sacrament of Baptism is not a channel, which is the old *opus operatum* theory; it does not convey the germ of life, but only provides the sphere in which that germ may express itself and grow. The true idea of Baptism is, therefore, covenantal⁴ as the seal of an already existing faith (Rom. iv. 11), and as such it has its necessary place, but it is not that of reception.

IV.—THE VALUE OF JUSTIFICATION

The Article speaks of the doctrine of Justification by Faith as "most wholesome, and very full of comfort," and this is not surprising because every real revival of spiritual life has been associated with it as the true explanation of how the Atonement is appropriated by sinful men.

1. Justification in Christ through faith is a necessity for spiritual health ("most wholesome"). The Council of Trent clearly taught the meritoriousness of Good Works.⁵ But as long as this is emphasised there cannot possibly be that spiritual life which is found in the New Testa-

¹ "Faith is an activity of the whole soul, of the intellect, the sensibility, and the will. There is an intellectual element in it; in order to trust we must know the person whom we trust, and know something about him. This is where the assent to truth comes in, or rather begins to come in. Then there is an element of feeling in faith; we cannot stand in this relation to another person without experiencing certain emotions respecting him, such as love, reverence, admiration, or the like. Finally, there is an element of will in faith, and this is the distinctive element. This is what makes faith a moral activity. There is choice in it. We may exercise it or abstain from it. There is always in true faith, a laying of our will, to an extent greater or less, into the keeping of another will. These three elements are not always present in the same proportion. Now one is more prominent, now another. But always in its deepest essence faith is a matter of the will, of free choice" (Stearns, *ut supra*, p. 451).

² *Definition of Justification*, Ch. XXXIII.

³ "Christian faith is the faith of a transaction. It is not the committing of one's thought in assent to any proposition, but the trusting of one's being to a *being*, there to be rested, kept, guided, moulded, governed, and possessed for ever. It gives you God, fills you with God in immediate, experimental knowledge, puts you in possession of all there is in Him, and allows you to be invested with His character itself" (*Life of Bushnell*, p. 192, *seq.*).

⁴ See on Article XXVII.

⁵ Session 6, Ch. XVI.

ment. Justification by faith is the foundation of spiritual peace. The soul looks backward, outward, upward, onward, and even inward, and is able to say with the Apostle, "justified from all things," and as a result of "being justified by faith, we have peace with God" (Rom. v. 1). When this is realised then all questions of human merit disappear, and the fabric of Roman Catholicism falls to the ground. This Justification is immediate, certain, complete, and abiding.¹ If it should be said that such a doctrine is Lutheran only, it may be at once replied that the teaching is ages earlier than Luther because it is the very warp and woof of the New Testament itself.²

Justification by faith is really the only answer to the moral perplexities of the doctrine of original sin. It vindicates God's righteousness while manifesting His mercy (Acts xvii. 30, R. V. ; Rom. iii. 25, R. V.). Our deepest need is a right idea of the character of God with whom we have to do. How He can be just and yet justify the ungodly is insoluble apart from Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is the proof of God's capacity to forgive while remaining just (Rom. iii. 26).³ A sin-convicted soul demands at least as much righteous indignation of sin in God as it feels itself. This is seen in the Cross. It is characteristic of St. Paul's teaching in Romans that the Cross is the manifestation of God's righteousness rather than of His mercy (Rom. iii. 21-27).⁴ In all this it will never be forgotten that faith is not the ground, but only the means of our Justification, and the strength or weakness of our trust will not affect the fact, but only the enjoyment of our Justification.

This doctrine is also the secret of spiritual liberty. All the Reformers felt and declared this, and it was with sure spiritual insight that Luther spoke of it as "the Article of a standing or falling Church"; indeed, we may go further and say with a modern writer that it is "the Article of a standing or falling soul." It removes the bondage of the soul, sets the

¹ Dr. Simpson quotes an interesting extract from the *Life of Dr. R. W. Dale*, referring to the life of Pusey:

"The absence of joy in his religious life was only the inevitable effect of his conception of God's method of saving man; in parting with the Lutheran truth concerning justification he parted with the springs of gladness" (*ut supra*, p. 155).

² "What other thing was capable of covering our sins than His righteousness? By what other One was it possible that we, the wicked and the ungodly, could be justified than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable operation! O benefits surpassing all expectation! that the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors" (Epistle to Diognetus, c. 9, Clark's Ante-Nicene Library, Vol. I, p. 312).

³ In *Present Day Theology*, by S. L. Wilson, two quotations are found which bear directly on this Article: "'Plato, Plato,' said Socrates, 'perhaps God can forgive deliberate sin, but I do not see how'" (p. 133). Dr. Shedd tells of a visit to St. Margaret's Church, Westminster, where he heard a sermon from a young clergyman on the Atonement. Among other striking and truthful utterances this was one: "The Atonement of Jesus Christ is the *bold* which the sinner has upon God." This sentence is the Gospel in a nutshell. By pleading the merits of Christ's oblation, the sinful creature, utterly powerless in himself, becomes almighty with God. For in so doing he brings an argument to bear upon the infinite justice and the infinite mercy which is omnipotent (p. 145).

⁴ Simpson, *ut supra*, pp. 75, 77.

prisoner free, introduces him directly to God, and gives continual access to the Holiest. It therefore cuts at the root of all sacerdotal mediation as unnecessary and dangerous. As such, it is easy to understand the intense opposition shown to this doctrine on the part of the theologians of the Church of Rome.¹

2. This doctrine is also a necessity for spiritual power ("very full of comfort"). It is the foundation of holiness. The soul is introduced into the presence of God, receives the Holy Spirit, realises the indwelling presence of Christ, and in these finds the secret and guarantee of purity of heart and life. It brings the soul into relation with God, so that from imputed righteousness comes imparted righteousness. It is this that keeps the doctrine from the charge of mere intellectual orthodoxy without spiritual vitality. So far from the doctrine putting a premium upon carelessness, it is in reality one of the greatest safeguards of morality, because it is one of the springs of holiness. When St. Paul was charged with what is now called Antinomianism, he did not tone down his doctrine in the least, but declared it all the more fully as the very heart of the Gospel.²

It is also the secret of true spiritual service. The soul released from anxiety about itself is free to exercise concern about others. The heart is at leisure from itself to set forward the salvation of those around.³ When Christian workers obtain a clear insight into this doctrine and yield the life to its power and influence it becomes the means of liberty to spiritual captives, and the secret of peace and blessing to hearts in spiritual darkness and fear.

From all this it is easy to see what the Article teaches, the intense and immense spiritual blessing of the doctrine, and there are signs that the truth is being realised afresh by many who have been "tied and bound by the chain of" a purely legal view of Christianity.⁴ Certainly, if we

¹ "Nothing is more characteristic of Churches than their attitude to assurance, and the place they give it in their preaching and in their systems of doctrine. Speaking broadly, we may say that in the Romish Church it is regarded as essentially akin to presumption; in the Protestant Churches it is a privilege or a duty; but in the New Testament religion it is simply a fact. This explains the joy which, side by side with the sense of infinite obligation, is the characteristic note of Apostolic Christianity" (Denney, *ut supra*, p. 288).

² Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 134 f.

³ "It is only in the assured peace of being 'joyfully ready' to meet the ultimate issues of life that the man's whole personality is liberated to serve the Lord in that beauty of holiness which is not marred by the painful efforts of a scrupulous self-consciousness" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 153).

⁴ An able statement of this truth in modern form will be found in the *Church Missionary Review* for March 1910, in a paper by the Rev. H. G. Grey, of which the closing paragraph may be given: "Two or three years ago a student followed me home in the dark from our preaching-place in Lahore. On the way he said: 'I wish to ask you a question. You said just now in your preaching that according to Christianity a man can go to God by Jesus of Nazareth just as he is, before he has overcome his sins. Did you mean it?' I replied, 'Yes, if it were not so I should never be here myself.' 'Well,' he said, 'let me tell you about myself. I am a Mohammedan student at the Government College; and I often make resolutions to keep from sin, but I find that after a month or two I fall, and I pretty well despair of ever becoming better.

are to get back not merely to the joy, peace, liberty, and power of Reformation days, but still more to the primitive truth of the Christian life recorded in the New Testament, we must give the most definite prominence to this truth of Justification in Christ through faith.¹

Roman Catholics say that the doctrine of Justification by Faith involves an inadequate estimate of sin and its consequences, and, therefore, implies a too easy apprehension of forgiveness. But the doctrine really arose out of the very opposite cause, namely, that at the Reformation Rome, by her teaching and practice, maintained a most inadequate and degraded sense of sin and its consequences, and the conscience of the Reformers revolted at the immorality of such teaching. Rome said that Justification by Faith was attended by a low estimate of penitence, and that it depreciated the office of the Church. But it really sprang from a deep sense of the need of penitence and grew to full distinctness under a desire to vindicate for the ministry and sacraments a real operative power. If we read the Theology of the pre-Reformation period we can see the levity, and then in the Reformation period the depth, of conviction of sin and the need of grace.

The theses of Luther commenced the subject by saying that our Lord wished our life to be one long penitence, and this obviously opposed the mediæval Indulgences. He said that the discipline of punishment for sin rested solely with God, and the Church could not dispense with it. He distinguished between *pœna* and *culpa*, punishment and guilt, a distinction which is always needed when personality is apt to be forgotten. Faith and forgiveness are essentially personal and imply a personal relation to God just as they do to man. Remission of guilt and remission of consequences are, of course, totally different.

But the notion being annihilated that the Church had power to remit punishment for sin, what do the ordinances do? Now while maintaining their office as means of grace, the controversy brought out their

But if what you say is true, it would give me courage and hope.' This led to many interesting talks with him, which I need not now detail. The point I would draw out is that both at home and abroad, both for Christians and non-Christians, the old fundamental truth of Justification by Faith—that God 'justifieth the ungodly' *freely*, in order to make him afterwards godly—is the attractive 'power of God unto salvation!'" (J. G. Simpson, *What is the Gospel?*, Ch. V). For other modern presentations see Falconer, *The Unfinished Symphony*, Chs. V, VI.

¹ "The doctrine of justification by faith is the reassertion, in theological language, of the truth put more simply by Jesus in His teaching concerning the childlike spirit. It describes the substitution of the attitude of personal trust which is characteristic of sonship for the legal relationship which is expressed in terms of good works, merit and reward. It has its psychological basis in the insight, won by Luther from a painful experience, that any attempt to earn or to deserve forgiveness by good works does but lead to deeper self-condemnation and distrust. Historically the way was prepared for it by the revival of Biblical scholarship, with its resulting rediscovery of the Pauline theology. From Paul Luther learned that the only sure way to find assurance and peace is to abandon all hope of self-righteousness, and to seek in personal commitment of the soul to God the spring of a higher life. Catholicism had recognized the legitimacy of this course in the case of exceptional individuals. Protestantism laid it down as the law of normal Christian living" (W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, p. 313).

primary force as authorised witnesses from God to man to forgiveness and reconciliation. When man is struggling with a sense of guilt his supreme need is a comfort which comes from God with a positive authenticated assurance. It is, of course, true that assurance is conveyed by the Holy Spirit, but He has appointed the Church, the ministers and the ordinances to be His authorised witnesses to the soul for the forgiveness craved. So that we are not left alone to search, but God commands ministers to go and offer forgiveness.

The necessity of this doctrine thus arose out of these circumstances. The personal relation of God being obscured, the teaching of the later Middle Ages had exaggerated all forms of dread of consequences of sin hereafter. This is abundantly illustrated in Dante's great works. But when the real relation of God was brought out, and when it was proclaimed that God had reconciled man in Christ, the penitent sinner was enabled to grasp the promises of the Gospel with the result that heart and conscience were immediately and fully emancipated.

V.—THE CONFIRMATION OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH

1. The Article is unique in the fact that it refers to one of the Homilies for a fuller expression of the doctrine here stated: "As more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification." The issue of the First Book of Homilies in 1547 is generally regarded as the first step towards doctrinal reformation. As long as Henry VIII lived any substantial doctrinal change in the direction of the Reformation was practically impossible, and even when the First Book of the Homilies was issued Roman doctrines and practices were still the religion of the nation as a whole. The Council of Trent had stated its position in regard to the Rule of Faith, Original Sin, Justification, and the Sacraments in relation to Justification in 1546-1547, and it is not without point to observe that the first three Homilies referred respectively to Holy Scripture, Sin and its Results, and the Salvation of Mankind, so that the First Book of Homilies may rightly be said to constitute the Anglican answer to Trent on the three great questions of the Rule of Faith, Original Sin, and Justification. It is, of course, frequently pointed out that there is no Homily with the exact title mentioned in the Article, "The Homily of Justification," but there can be no doubt that the reference is to what is known as "The Homily of Salvation." It is the Third Homily in the First Book, and is entitled "A Sermon of the Salvation of Mankind by only Christ our Saviour from sin and death Everlasting." This is immediately followed by "A short Declaration of the True and Lively Christian Faith," and "A Sermon of Good Works annexed unto Faith," both of which were apparently intended to be read in connection with that "Of the Salvation of Mankind" in order that the various points might be treated more fully. This Homily is known to have been peculiarly objectionable to the parties of the mediæval religion in England, because the battle of the

Reformation was already beginning when Gardiner opposed what he called "My Lord of Canterbury's Homily of Salvation." It is more than possible that the Homily originally written preceded the Council of Trent by five years.¹ If, on the other hand, it was not actually written till 1547, it may have been revised before publication to meet still more definitely the error of Rome promulgated at Trent. But this question of date is of very little significance, since in any case the Homily is fundamentally different from the teaching of the Church of Rome, and a careful comparison of the Tridentine definition with the wording of the Article shows that, as it has been well said, the rival Churches hit upon a closely similar language independently, with this difference, however, that Rome accepted, while the Church of England rejected the mediæval doctrine of Justification.

2. The precise authority of the Homily as a whole is frequently discussed. Bishop Harold Browne speaks of it as "a Homily which has unusual authority, as being virtually assented to by everyone who signs the Articles."² To the same effect, Boulton says, "The Article so distinctly refers us to this Homily for a further explanation of the doctrine in question, that it becomes of almost equal authority with the Article itself."³ In accordance with this view most works on the Articles quote freely from the Homily in illustration and confirmation of its teaching. Almost every point of the Homily is in direct opposition to the plainest teaching of Trent. Thus, instead of Divine grace making our works meritorious in the sight of God, the Homily ascribes all merit and glory to the Lamb of God Who is "best worthy to have it," adding that, "man cannot make himself righteous by his own works, neither in part nor in the whole."

A careful consideration of the Homily will show beyond all question (1) the emphatic teaching that faith alone has the office of justifying; (2) that while works are necessary, they are so not for the purpose of justifying, but as the fruits of Justification;⁴ (3) that faith is no mere intellectual acceptance of truth but a personal trust in God's mercy and Christ's sacrifice.⁵

¹ Tomlinson, *Prayer Book, Articles, and Homilies*, p. 238.

² *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 293.

³ *The Theology of the Church of England*, p. 100; see also Tomlinson, *ut supra*, p. 232: "This Homily, it will be remembered, has an authority greater than any other, being especially referred to and incorporated in Article XI."

⁴ "Faith does not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, to be joined with faith in every man that is justified; but it shutteth them out from the office of justifying."

⁵ For those who are unable to read the Homily itself, reference may be made to Harold Browne, Gibson, and Boulton, where full extracts are given. It is curious to notice in certain quarters the nervous dread apparently shown lest there should be any slight set upon good works, which, as we shall see in the next Article, was never done. All that was essential, as the Article and Homily show, was to exclude altogether the thought of good works from the province of justification. This caution is apparently as necessary to-day as ever, especially where there is a tendency somehow or other to reintroduce works wrought by grace as part of the element of justification.

One point remains for special notice, though it has been implied already and will call for further attention under the next Article. The doctrine of our Church is sometimes stated as "Justification by faith alone," though as this precise phrase does not occur in our formularies it is liable to misconstruction, and is often misrepresented both inside and outside our Church as "Solifidianism," as though it meant some purely intellectual acceptance of truth by which alone a man is justified. But in the first place, as we have seen, faith in the proper sense of the term is personal trust, and as this links on the soul to God in Christ we see at once that all that is intended by "faith only" is the avoidance of anything like works for the purpose of Justification. The quotation already made from the Homily suffices to show this, and in exact agreement with it are other statements:—

"Faith putteth us from itself, and remitteth or appointeth us unto Christ for to have only by Him remission of our sins or justification. So that our faith in Christ (as it were) saith unto us thus : It is not I that take away your sins, but it is Christ only, and to Him only I send you for that purpose, forsaking therein all your good virtues, words, thoughts and works, and only putting your trust in Christ."¹

¹ Homily of Salvation. For further study of this subject, see Westcott, *St. Paul's Teaching on Justification*; Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* (Second Edition). p. 264 ff. Articles on "Justification"; "Righteousness," *Protestant Dictionary*.

ARTICLE XII

Of Good Works.

Albeit that good works, which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's judgment; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a lively Faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.

De bonis Operibus.

Bona opera, quæ sunt fructus Fidei, et Justificatos sequuntur, quanquam peccata nostra expiare, et divini judicii severitatem ferre non possunt; Deo tamen grata sunt, et accepta in Christo, atque ex vera et viva fide necessario profluunt; ut plane ex illis æque fides viva cognosci possit, atque arbor ex fructu judicari.

IMPORTANT EQUIVALENTS.

Follow after justification	= <i>justificatos sequuntur.</i>
To put away	= <i>expiare.</i>
To endure the severity	= <i>severitatem ferre.</i>
Of God's judgment	= <i>Divini judicii.</i>
Acceptable to God in Christ	= <i>accepta in Christo.</i>
Out of a lively faith	= <i>ex viva fide.</i>
[May be] discerned	= [<i>possit</i>] <i>judicari.</i>

THIS and the next Article appropriately deal with the relation of works to Justification. Article XII shows their value when put in the right place; Article XIII shows their worthlessness when put in the wrong place. There was no Article corresponding to this in the Forty-two Articles of 1553, and it is thought that this was suggested by the Confession of Wurtemberg, and may have been intended against both Anabaptism and Rome. It is certain that there was no idea of opposing the teaching of Article XI, which was made so much clearer and more definitely anti-Roman in 1563, because there was an Article on Good Works in thorough harmony with this Article as early as the Confession of Augsburg, 1530, and Good Works is the subject of one of the Homilies of the First Book, dated 1547. The Article is the natural and necessary corollary of the teaching of Article XI on Justification by Faith.

I.—THE TEACHING OF THE ARTICLE

Before going into the subject in general it will be useful to look carefully at what the Article states concerning Good Works, for in the light of its teaching we shall be better able to appreciate the controversies connected with the subject.

1. The meaning of Good Works.—They are described as “the fruits of faith.” The phrase “Good Works” corresponds to two distinct yet

connected terms in the Greek descriptive of the life of the Christian believer. Sometimes the reference is to works that are intrinsically good (*ἀγαθά*, Eph. ii. 10; cf. Phil. i. 6; 1 Tim. ii. 10). At other times the phrase refers to works which are also outwardly attractive (*καλά*, 1 Tim. iii. 1; v. 10; v. 25). So that the Christian is to produce in his life actions that are good in themselves and outwardly beautiful. Good works are in this respect contrasted with works that spring from law (Rom. ix. 32; Gal. ii. 16); unfruitful works of darkness (Eph. v. 11); dead works (Heb. vi. 1; ix. 14); evil works (1 John iii. 12).

2. The proper place of Good Works.—They “follow after Justification.” Thus the Article briefly but clearly harmonises with the teaching of the preceding Article in regard to justification.

3. The imperfection of Good Works.—They “cannot put away our sins and endure the severity of God’s judgment.” Another emphasis on the Reformation doctrine, which was entirely opposed to the meritoriousness of works, and in this sense was in the strongest contrast with the teaching of the Council of Trent.

4. The Divine Regard for Good Works.—Although they are imperfect in the way the Article states, “yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith.” It is thus seen that good works have their proper and essential place. When a man is “in Christ” and is exercising faith in Him, works necessarily and inevitably follow.

5. The relation of faith to Good Works.—“Insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.”

These statements of the Article give in outline form a true Scriptural view of the place and power of good works in the Christian life. There was no idea of stating a complete doctrine of Sanctification, but only of dealing with those points connected with the controversies of the sixteenth century in relation to excess or defect.¹

II.—THE HISTORY OF THE ARTICLE ²

Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism necessarily involved the question of the value of good works. There was a tendency to semi-Pelagianism in the Greek Fathers, but it is difficult to quote accurately on this point, since the East was mainly speculative rather than moral, and was compelled to emphasise human freedom against Gnosticism. The question had not really been raised at that time, though speaking generally, the sense of sin and with it the consciousness of redemption and its expression in life cannot be found so deeply experienced and expressed in Eastern writers. It was St. Augustine who necessarily raised this question in all

¹ For the Christian doctrine of Sanctification see Moule, *Outlines of Christian Doctrine*, p. 190 ff.; Paterson, *The Rule of Faith*, Index, s.v. Sanctification; Hopkins, *The Law of Liberty in the Spiritual Life*; Walter Marshall, *The Gospel Mystery of Sanctification*; Macgregor, *The Holy Life and How to Live it*; Griffith Thomas, *The Catholic Faith*, p. 92 ff.; *Grace and Power*.

² See more fully, Moule, *ut supra*, p. 190.

its force and importance in his controversy with Pelagius, and his main position was that *gratia prævenit voluntatem*. Semi-Pelagianism, as we have seen,¹ maintained that some good will remained in man sufficient to wish to be healed, but more orthodox writers of the fifth century argued that even this "wish" was the result of Divine grace. It is not surprising that in the Middle Ages the tendency to semi-Pelagianism is found, because the leading writers were wrong on original sin, for if original sin meant only the deprivation of super-added grace, then man is necessarily capable of exercising primary good motions. Thomas Aquinas took substantially the Augustinian view and urged that God is the *primum movens*. On the other side, Duns Scotus took the semi-Pelagian view, and said: *Liberum arbitrium sic confitemur ut dicamus non semper indigere Dei auxilio tamen sine gratia non sufficit homini ad salutem*. This developed into the doctrine of man's capability of *bonum morale*, and of loving God *ex propriis viribus*. The Council of Trent was divided on this subject, but said: *Liberum arbitrium minime extinctum viribus licet attenuatum*. It was also virtually semi-Pelagian as to man's co-operation with Divine grace, and it anathematised those who denied merit to good works. This was the point at which the controversy became acute in the sixteenth century, and the whole question was raised in connection with man's Justification.

III.—THE QUESTION STATED

The Pauline doctrine of redemption clearly separates works from all part in Justification (Rom. iii. 27; iv. 1-5). This was one of the fundamental issues at stake between St. Paul and the Jews, and both Galatians and Romans were written almost entirely for the express purpose of repudiating all idea of works as having any share in man's Justification. On the other hand, the Apostle is equally clear as to works being the essential and necessary outcome of faith (Rom. vi. 18-22; viii. 4). Justification is a means to an end. It removes the penalty in order that by the grace of God the pollution and power of sin may also be met. And so the pardon, acceptance, and peace are intended to lead on to purity and progress. Following the Apostle, our Church makes it abundantly clear that works are in no sense included in or with faith as the condition of Justification, but spring from faith as the fruit of Justification. This is not only clear from the Article, but from the Homily on Good Works.

"Of this faith three things are specially to be noted. First, that this faith doth not lie dead in the heart, but is lively and fruitful in bringing forth good works. Second, that without it can no good works be done, that shall be acceptable and pleasant to God. Third, what manner of good works they be that this faith doth bring forth."²

¹ See above, Article X, pp. 178-9.

² *The Homilies*.

The way in which the third of these points is elaborated in the Article proves what our Church means by Good Works. After showing how the Jews set their own traditions as high as, or above God's commandments, the Homily goes on to speak of what happened in the sixteenth century to the same effect, including a number of superstitious beliefs and customs, and even pretence of fulfilment of the chief vows of religion, all of which is spoken of as "ungodly and counterfeit religion," and "other kinds of papistical superstitions and abuses." The Homily then closes with an earnest and forceful exhortation to keep God's commandments, emphasising the necessity of having "an assured faith in God," and then "for His sake love to all men." To the same effect is the teaching of the greatest of the Reformed theologians. Thus, Hooker says:—

"Wherefore, we acknowledge a dutiful necessity of doing well, but the meritorious dignity of well-doing we utterly renounce."¹

"Christ came not to abrogate and to take away good works. . . . We ourselves do not teach Christ alone, excluding our own faith, unto justification; Christ alone, excluding our own works, unto sanctification; Christ alone, excluding the one or the other as unnecessary unto salvation . . . because we teach that faith alone justifieth, we, by this speech, never meant to exclude either hope or charity from being always joined as inseparable mates with faith in the man that is justified; or *works from being added as necessary duties, required at the hands of every justified man.*"²

And the last reviser of the Articles, Bishop Jewel, emphasises the same salutary and essential doctrine:—

"Because we say that justification standeth only upon the free grace and mercy of God, the adversaries report that we forbid good works. This is God's holy will, that for our exercise, whatsoever we do or say, be it never so well, it shall be ill taken."

At this point it seems necessary to notice several modern attempts to distinguish between Lutheran and Anglican doctrine on Justification.³ Thus, one writer says that Luther "reduced faith to the level of mere belief. He made it that on account of (*propter*) which, instead of that through (*per*) which, we are justified; or, in other words, treated it as the meritorious cause, rather than the condition, of our justification."⁴ To the same effect are statements that "the peculiar symbol of Lutheranism is that a man is justified when he believes himself to be justified."⁵ The curious thing is that this view of Luther should be held in the face of the admission that he "dreaded anything that savoured of human

¹ Hooker, Sermon II, 30, 31.

² *Ibid.*

³ B. J. Kidd, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 137; Forbes, *Explanation of the Thirty-nine Articles*, pp. 171, 179.

⁴ Kidd, *ut supra*, p. 137.

⁵ Forbes, *ut supra*, p. 182; Gibson, *ut supra*, p. 389.

merit."¹ If, therefore, Luther held that faith is the meritorious cause of salvation and yet dreaded "anything savouring of human merit" he is not the vigorous, masculine common-sense thinker that he has been supposed to be. The fact is that these writers fail to realise that the doctrine of Justification by faith was the key to Luther's teaching, and the means of his redemption from spiritual bondage, and while he may at times have been led to express himself incautiously in regard to good works, no one in reality was more insistent upon the importance of works in their proper place than he was. It is almost unnecessary to illustrate this from any of his writings, but in view of the opposition raised to him on this point it seems essential to dwell upon the matter. Thus, he says :—

"By faith alone in Christ and not by the works of the law or love are we declared righteous. Not that we reject works or love, as the adversaries accuse us, but that we do not allow ourselves to be diverted from the state of the present case."²

It may be safely said that Luther never speaks of man as justified on account of the merit of our faith (*propter fidem*), for faith is never declared to be the meritorious cause of Justification, but only as the means whereby we are enabled to produce good works after Justification. It is noteworthy that in the Augsburg Confession the statement is made that men "are justified for the sake of Christ by faith," where the Latin exactly corresponds to our Eleventh Article with its distinction between *propter* and *per*. There are several other proofs confirming this position which go to show beyond all question that our Church is in entire harmony with Luther on Justification and good works; indeed, we may say that Article XI has utilised the Lutheran distinction of *propter* and *per* as against the errors of Rome. The confusion about Luther's views of Justification and works is only possible when a view of Justification is held³ which is virtually identical with that of Rome, against which Luther and our Article took their stand. There was no desire or intention on the part of Luther or our English Reformers to neglect good works, but only to put them in their proper place and to insist upon their being of the character and quality laid down. Those who have any doubt on the subject should give careful attention to the Homilies on Faith and Good Works, which, as already mentioned, accompany the Homily of Salvation.

This doctrine of Luther, as embodied in our Articles, was held practically by all leading Anglicans for over a century. Bishop Bull himself bears witness to this when he speaks of "the same error as Luther and

¹ Kidd, *ut supra*, p. 137.

² Luther on Galatians; see other extracts in Boulton, *The Theology of the Church of England*, p. 97 f.

³ Forbes, *ut supra*, pp. 171-179.

most of our divines after his time." But the Bishop in 1669 published a work endeavouring to show the harmony between St. Paul and St. James on Justification, and, followed by some modern writers,¹ distinguished between a first justification here in the present life and a second justification hereafter when we stand before the Throne of God. But neither Scripture nor the Articles give any ground for this distinction; indeed, it is only another way of bringing back the Roman confusion between Justification and Sanctification.²

A certain aspect of Bull's view has been revived in modern times in what is known as the "germ theory of Justification." This means that God sees in faith the germ of what we shall become, and therefore justifies us by anticipation.³ But this view tends to divert attention from the truth of Christ's work for us as the objective ground of Justification independent of and anterior to His work in us which is the subjective result of the objective Justification.⁴ It also tends to confuse, as Rome does, between judicial position and spiritual condition, between relationship and character, between attitude and experience. On this theory the imputation of righteousness is not in order to our acceptance, but is a contemplation and anticipation of the results of acceptance in us. Further, this view tends more and more to make faith the ground of righteousness, the very point which Luther and our Reformers opposed with all their strength.⁵ The view is based upon a misconception of what the Apostle means. The sinner is not reckoned *as if* he was righteous, but because

¹ e.g. Forbes, *ut supra*, p. 175.

² "Justification, in the mind of St. Paul, is not only preliminary and tentative but ultimate and final, and that in relation to this verdict of God he is looking at the sinner, as we say, *sub specie eternitatis*, not in connection with his progressive development under the influence of the Spirit" (Simpson, *Fact and Faith*, p. 136. See also Boulton, *ut supra*, pp. 108-119; Litton, *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* (Second Edition), p. 289 ff.).

³ "Justification by Anticipation" is the title of a pamphlet written by Bishop Gore when he was a member of the Oxford Mission to Calcutta, and was engaged in controversy with a missionary of the C.M.S., the late Rev. Henry Williams of Krishnagar. The pamphlet is now out of print, but the doctrine is identical with that found in the Bishop's work on *The Epistle to the Romans*. It is also held by Dr. Kidd (*ut supra*, p. 133), and from a different standpoint, by Archbishop Temple (*The Universality of Christ*, p. 106).

⁴ "It is a fundamental misconception of Pauline theology to assert that final acquittal can only take place on the basis of a realised holiness. On the contrary, sanctification is part of the glory, which shall only be fully realised with the redemption of the body. It is part of the gift of God, the inheritance of the saints in light, an anticipation of that body which shall be, an earnest, a first-fruits of the Spirit. Any other teaching, as the Reformers of the sixteenth century clearly perceived, leads us back by a circuitous route to the bondage of dead works, and that in the more deceptive form of those 'voluntary works' which were roundly denounced by Hugh Latimer" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 87).

"That God looks at us not as we are but as we are tending to become is a formula which, while it throws a man back upon himself, only obscures the fulness of St. Paul's meaning" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 88).

"The transformation of character through the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ he describes quite differently as sanctification or holiness" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 89. See also p. 134 ff.).

⁵ "To identify faith with incipient holiness is to convert faith into what the Reformers would have regarded as a work" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 143).

he is righteous in Christ. It is impossible to make the preposition εἰς in Rom. iv. 3 equivalent to ἀντί or ὡς. Then, too, the objection to the Pauline doctrine dealt with in Rom. vi. 1 shows the error of this germ theory, for on such a view the Apostle's doctrine would not have been open to question.¹ The verb "to justify," δικαιῶω, is to treat a man as one whose account is clear, and it is quite inaccurate to speak of this as a "legal fiction"; on the contrary, it is a spiritual fact from a judicial standpoint.² The justification has to do with God as the Judge, and if we may use the legal illustration, the Judge on the Bench has to do with the question of innocence or guilt, not with the transformation of a prisoner's character. When, therefore, God justifies us, He deals with us as the Judge, and although it is easy to speak of this action as "forensic," it is none the less expressive of an absolute spiritual fact.³

The question of the harmony between St. Paul and St. James is one of great importance, and must, of course, be studied in all discussions of Justification, but there is no real difficulty if the two situations are made perfectly clear.

(a) St. Paul in Rom. iv is dealing with Abraham as recorded in Gen. xv. 6 (cf. Gal. iii. 6), and in that story Abraham is regarded as a man "justified by faith."

(b) St. James in ch. ii is dealing with Abraham in regard to the story of Genesis xxii which happened twenty-five years afterwards.

(c) If, then, Abraham in Gen. xv was living by faith, his standing during those twenty-five years must have been in accordance therewith, and this we know was the case (Heb. xi. 8-19).

So that the two Apostles are dealing with different though related standpoints in the life of Abraham; the former referring to the instrument and the latter to the proof of Justification. St. Paul is writing about non-Christians (Rom. iii. 28); St. James is writing about professing Christians (ch. ii. 24). St. Paul uses Gen. xv to prove the necessity of faith; St. James uses Gen. xxii to prove the necessity of works. St. Paul teaches that works must spring from faith; St. James teaches that faith must be proved by works. St. Paul is thus dealing with the error of legalism; St. James with the error of Antinomianism. St. Paul is warning against merit; St. James against a mere intellectual orthodoxy.

Like every truth of the New Testament, Justification has various

¹ "It would have been easy for him to explain that in the last resort there could be no righteousness which was not actual, if he had meant no more by his emphatic statements concerning imputation than to express a preliminary Divine healing which is content for the time being to view men as they are tending to become and to anticipate the final verdict on their perfected characters. But St. Paul never attempts any such explanation. His reply, whenever the obvious objections to his doctrine are placed before his readers, is always an indignant appeal to the primal moral instincts" (Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 135).

² It is this that makes the statement in Sanday and Headlam on *Romans* (p. 36), that "the Christian life is made to have its beginning in a fiction" gravely wrong, or at any rate seriously unfortunate. The imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer through faith is not a fiction, but a blessed and eternal fact of the spiritual realm.

³ Simpson, *ut supra*, p. 74; Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 464.

aspects. Thus, we are justified by God the Author (Rom. iv. 5); by grace the reason (Rom. iii. 24); by blood the ground (Rom. v. 9); by resurrection the acknowledgment (Rom. iv. 25); by faith the means (Rom. v. 1); by words the evidence (Matt. xii. 37); by works the fruit (Jas. ii. 24). It has been aptly said, and the words sum up the whole contention, that St. Paul and St. James are not two soldiers of different armies fighting each other, but two of the same army fighting back to back against enemies coming from different directions. All this gives point to the well-known words of Calvin, "It is faith alone which justifies, and yet the faith which justifies is not alone."

The importance of the relation of faith and good works is not so prominent to-day in regard to controversy, but it is probably as essentially vital as ever, because the teaching of the Church of Rome continues the same, and the Council of Trent said:—

"Whosoever shall affirm that the good works of a justified man are in such sense the gifts of God, that they are not *also his worthy merits*, or that he *being justified by his good works, which are wrought by him through the grace of God, and the merits of Jesus Christ*, of whom he is a living member, does not *really deserve* increase of grace, eternal life, the enjoyment of that eternal life if he dies in a state of grace, *and even an increase of glory*—let him be accursed."

In harmony with this Bellarmine says:—

"For the work of Christ hath not only deserved of God that we should obtain salvation, *but also that we should obtain it by our own merits.*"

"The Catholic Church pursues a middle course, teaching that our *chief hope* and confidence must be placed in God, yet *some* also in our own merits."¹

From these statements it is clear that the necessity of the teaching of the Articles is as great to-day as ever. Then, too, the mediæval distinction between *fides informis* and *fides formata* has always been held to be impossible. According to the teaching of the Middle Ages *fides informis* was a purely speculative faith involving intellectual thought, but including neither love nor holiness, while *fides formata* meant faith perfected by the love and good works which spring from it. It was this latter faith to which was attributed the office of justifying. On the one hand, Luther and the English Reformers never taught that the *fides informis* was the true Christian faith involving trust, and on the other, they as clearly denied that *fides formata* had any part whatever in justification, though emphasising it as the fruit of faith. It is, therefore, altogether wrong to assume that the Lutheran teaching on justification by Faith, which is identical with the Anglican, is antinomian in its tendency. This charge, though often repeated, is unfounded, as the Confession of Augsburg clearly shows. Similarly, Luther in his Commentary on Galatians, takes the same line, when he said, "When we are out of

¹ Quoted in Caley, *Justification*, p. 61.

the matter of Justification we cannot enough praise and extol these works which God has commanded, for who can enough commend the profit and fruit of only one work which a Christian does in and through faith ? ”¹ There is nothing antinomian here. Faith and good works are exactly in the same relation to Justification as they are in the English Article. It is another point of similarity between the Lutheran and Anglican teaching that both have been accused of antinomianism, as may be seen from the defences made by Hooker and Jewel, but it is the bare truth to say that the centuries which have elapsed since the Confession of Augsburg have not shown that the moral standard of Protestant nations is lower than that of those which are not Protestant.

But if the matter is not so prominent or so important in the controversial sphere, yet spiritually it is essential to keep the true relation between faith and good works. It may help us to understand this if we bear in mind the twofold righteousness found in the New Testament.

1. God's Righteousness.—Romans is mainly taken up with the question, How God can be righteous and yet pardon the sinner. This righteousness of God is apart from all law-keeping (Rom. iii. 21), since it is not on the principle of human works that man can be made acceptable to God (Gal. ii. 21). Righteousness is based on the atoning work of Christ, and is intended for all without exception who are willing to receive Him by faith. And thus the work of Christ on the Cross gives God an eternal basis on which to declare a sinner righteous at and from the moment that he believes in the Lord Jesus Christ (Rom. iii. 21-26). This is our standing in righteousness before God.

2. The Believer's Righteousness.—Then comes the practical walk in righteousness of the man who believes, a subject clearly brought out in Rom. vi. These two aspects of righteousness, while distinct, always go together, so that while none are saved by their own practical righteousness, yet God has declared that those who have accepted the Lord Jesus Christ as their righteousness are to live “soberly, righteously, and godly.” We see something of this in the records of faith in Heb. xi, where men are regarded as at once standing in righteousness and yet exhibiting practical righteousness in daily life. Scripture has much to say on this latter aspect. We are to “follow after righteousness” (1 Tim. vi. 11). It is the first of three things of which the Kingdom of God consists (Rom. xiv. 17). This practical righteousness is “the fruit of the light” (Eph. v. 9); Christ is the standard of it (1 John iii. 10); and if a man “doeth not righteousness” it proves that he is “not of God” (1 John iii. 10). This righteousness, therefore, is the uprightness of the Christian in his daily walk, his integrity in small matters as well as great. The truth of the Lord Jesus Christ as our righteousness before God (Article XI), and also as our practical righteousness in dwelling in us and producing good works (Article XII) is one that we have to keep at once distinct and united.

¹ On Galatians, iii. 22.

The same twofold aspect of truth is seen in the various references to Sanctification, and although, as we have seen, the Article does not deal with this subject in general, it is important to have clearly before us the New Testament revelation in order that we may see controversially and spiritually the true relation between faith and good works.

1. Sanctification is sometimes considered from the judicial standpoint. Just as Romans deals with righteousness from the standpoint of law, so Hebrews is concerned with the sanctuary and deals with defilement, not with guilt. The same work of Christ on the Cross that puts away our sins sanctifies us perfectly and forever, thereby fitting us eternally for God's presence (Heb. x. 10). Sanctification in the sense of judicial standing is, of course, absolutely independent of our feelings and actions. The moment we accept Christ for salvation He becomes not only our Righteousness, but our Sanctification (Acts xxvi. 18; Heb. x. 14), and it is for this reason that Christians can be described as "sanctified in Christ Jesus," even though some of them were living in sad defilement (1 Cor. i. 2). It is noteworthy, too, that the Three Persons of the Trinity are all occupied in our sanctification: the Father (Heb. x. 10), the Son (Heb. x. 10), the Spirit (2 Thess. ii. 13). So that the moment we are "begotten again" we are also sanctified judicially, set apart for God by the work of Christ, to be owned and used for the Divine glory.

2. Sanctification is also considered from the practical standpoint. Soon after entering into the peace and joy of God's favour the believer is conscious of the power of sin within him, since Justification still leaves the sinful nature open to the power of sin. It is at this point that instruction is needed to show that not only was a work done for us on the Cross centuries ago, but that a work is being done in us now by the Holy Spirit, and at this point comes the life-long progressive Sanctification, or walking in purity and practical holiness, which follows necessarily from our judicial position in Christ. This is the meaning of the well-known words of Hooker:—

"There is a glorifying righteousness of men in the world to come: and there is a justifying and a sanctifying righteousness here. *The righteousness wherewith we shall be clothed in the world to come is both perfect and inherent; that whereby here we are justified is perfect but not inherent; that whereby we are sanctified, inherent, but not perfect.* . . .¹ We have already shewed that there are two kinds of Christian righteousness: the one *without us*, which we have by imputation; the other *in us*, which consisteth of faith, hope, charity, and other Christian virtues. . . . God giveth us both the one justice and the other: the one by accepting us for righteous in Christ; the other by working Christian righteousness in us."²

This practical sanctification will show itself in holiness (1 Pet. i. 16) and obedience (2 Cor. x. 5). And thus, whether we think of the past or the present, there is grace sufficient for us that we may be righteous in all

¹ Sermon II, 3.

² Sermon II, 21.

our ways, holy in all our life, and producing fruit which will show beyond all question that we possess true faith in Christ and are bringing glory to our Lord and Saviour.

There is one further consideration before the subject can be left. What is the best way of promoting Christian holiness and guaranteeing the true fruits of faith in our lives? The supreme spiritual danger of the Christian life is that of legalism, for there is an inevitable tendency to assume that although Justification is by faith, Sanctification is somehow by struggle, that although the sinner is powerless in regard to salvation he is not so in the matter of holiness. The result of this view is frequently to cause trouble in the Christian life, making the believer feel that though he is unable to become justified apart from himself he cannot possibly be sanctified unless largely aided by his own efforts. But in reality there is one great principle of faith, covering the whole of the Christian life, which shows beyond all question that those who are fullest, freest, and frankest in their proclamation of Justification by faith are thereby enabled to show that Sanctification is likewise to be received in Christ by faith, and that there is one dominating principle throughout. We receive Christ Jesus by faith, and we are to walk in Him by the same principle (Col. ii. 6), and when this is fully realised and properly emphasised in relation both to Justification and Sanctification the outcome is liberty, joy, and practical holiness, which answer fully to the New Testament requirement of the Christian life.¹

¹ "We come far short of our ministry if our hearts be not intently fixed upon the promotion of personal holiness in the lives of our people; we fail entirely in the effect of our ministry if our doctrine be not successful in securing it. But how is this blessed result to be secured? How shall we preach the way of a sinner's justification by faith, so as the most successfully to promote in him 'the sanctification of the spirit unto obedience'? I conceive, not by any *reserve* on the subject of Justification, exhibiting that doctrine only partially and fearfully in reduced terms and in a background position, as if afraid of the fulness in which the Scriptures declare it to all who read or hear them. Reserve here is reserve in preaching 'Christ and Him crucified.' Our grand message everywhere is, 'be it known unto you, men and brethren, that through this Man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins, and by Him all that believe are justified from all things, from which they could not be justified by the law of Moses.' St. Paul waited not till men were well initiated into Christian mysteries before he unveiled the grand object of Atonement and Justification through the blood of Christ. No, the gospel plan of promoting sanctification is just the opposite of holding in obscurity any feature of the doctrine of Justification. It is simply to preach that doctrine most fully in all its principles and connections; in all its grace and all its works; in its utmost plainness and simplicity; so that whatever leads to it, whatever is contained in it, whether it be sin and condemnation as needing an imputed righteousness; the love of God as providing that righteousness in His only begotten Son; the blessed Redeemer as offering up Himself a sacrifice to obtain it; faith, as embracing it freely; hope, as resting upon it joyfully; the sacraments, as signing and sealing them effectually to those who duly receive them; a new heart, as the essential companion of loving faith; unreserved obedience, as the necessary expression of a new heart; obedience springing from the love of God in Christ, keeping its eye of faith for motive, strength, and acceptance upon the Cross, and embracing in its walk all departments of duty; all this, as coming legitimately within the embrace of the full preaching of Justification by faith, is the way to promote, through the effectual working of the Spirit of God upon the conscience and heart of the sinner, *his sanctification through the truth*" (McIlvaine, *Righteousness by Faith*).