to be little or no sin, at least in such nations as have enjoyed this spiritual education. The birth-taint which every man in every age, according to Scripture, brings with him into the world, and with no decreasing intensity of virulence, and which is as much proof now as ever it was against all engines of assault but one, is here ignored as a factor to be taken into account. Sometimes the example of Christ and the moral precepts of the Gospel are extolled as the wheat, while its mysterious doctrines are the chaff; as if example and instruction are all that man needs to enable him to emerge from the ruins of the Fall. Sometimes, at the opposite pole, the radical change which is admitted as necessary is described as a magical effect, not necessarily involving or leading to any *moral* renovation of the heart; a gift indeed of grace, but neutral in character and result, which may or may not consist with an habitually sinful state. Under the former system man never did need a new creation; under the latter, a member of the visible Church does not need it because, whatever be his moral condition, he once received it for good. Under either system Pelagianism finds a natural footing. Under either aspect Christianity sinks from being a Divine method of redemption from fearful evils to a system either of mere naturalism or of crass supernaturalism. And under either system, in different measure—much more it must be admitted under the former than under the latter—the atoning work of the Redeemer suffers a depreciation, and becomes obscured. The Person and work of this Redeemer will next engage our attention.

PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST

'The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance; so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and the manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man' (Art. ii.). 'As Christ died for us, and was buried, so also it is to be believed that He went down into hell' (Art. iii.). 'Christ did rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature; wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth, until He return to judge all men at the last day' (Art. iv.). 'Christ, in the truth of our nature, was made like unto us, sin only except, from which He was clearly void, both in His flesh and His spirit; sin, as S. John saith, was not in Him' (Art. xv.). 'Item docent quod Verbum, hoc est, Filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam in utero beatæ Mariæ Virginis, ut sint duæ naturæ, divina et humana, in unitate personæ inseparabiliter conjunctæ' (Conf. Aug. iii.). 'Agnoscimus ergo in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo duas naturas vel substantias, divinam et humanam, et has ita dicimus conjunctas et unitas esse ut absorptæ aut confusæ aut immixtæ non sint; sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum

proprietatibus, in una persona unitæ vel conjunctæ, ita ut unum Christum Dominum non duos veneremur: unum, inquam, verum Deum et hominem, juxta divinam Patri, juxta humanam vero nobis hominibus consubstantialem, et per omnia similem, peccato excepto' (Conf. Helv. xi.). 'Who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile His Father to us, and to be a sacrifice not only for original guilt, but also for actual sins of men' (Art. ii.). 'Vere passus, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus, ut reconciliaret nobis Patrem, et hostia esset non tantum pro culpa originis, sed etiam pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis' (Conf. Aug. iii.). 'Qui, ut solus est Mediator, Intercessor, Hostia, idemque et Pontifex, Dominusque et Rex noster, ita hunc solum agnoscimus, et toto corde credimus redemptionem, expiationem, protectionem' (Conf. Helv., A.D. 1536, xi.). 'Quid deinde valet nomen Christi? Hoc epitheto melius etiamnum exprimitur ejus officium. Significat enim unctum esse a Patre in Regem, Sacerdotem, ac Prophetam' (Cat. Genev.).

PART I.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST

§ 41. INCARNATION OF THE LOGOS

IT is not necessary here to recapitulate the arguments by which the Deity of the Son is established.[1] But the Word became flesh (John i. 14); forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself took part of the same (Heb. ii. 14); He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh (Rom. i. 3), made of a woman (Gal. iv. 4); so truly that if any confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh he is a deceiver and an antichrist (2 John, 7); in a word, in the Person of Jesus Christ the Son of God) became incarnate.

The idea of an incarnation is not foreign to the history of religion. Communion with the Deity, which is the essence of all religion, leads to the conception of union with Him, which, accordingly, appears under various guise in many of the forms of religion which preceded Christianity. Sometimes, as in the Nirvana of Buddhism, under the notion of final absorption into the Deity; sometimes, as in the Greek mythology, under that of the Apotheosis of heroes and sages, who after death were supposed to be promoted to the ranks of the gods. The second person of the Hindoo trimurti, Vischnu, assumes many material forms, and among them (as Krishna) that of humanity. The distinctions, however, between the forms which this vague instinct assumed in heathenism, and the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, are great. Either, as in Hindooism, the incarnation is not permanent, Krishna on his return to heaven laying aside his humanity, and the Nirvana extinguishing humanity altogether; or, as in the West, it is not God that stoops to man, but man that is exalted to God.

[1] § 25.

It may seem as if the Old Testament not only did not reveal a proper incarnation (the mere Theophanies are not such), but rather, in its ritual and prophetic teaching, insists upon the barrier which sin had raised between fallen man and his Creator. And consistently with its ethical and pædagogical character it could not do otherwise. The ancient Hebrew was perpetually reminded that only by a special interposition of Jehovah could this barrier be removed. But in reality the Mosaic dispensation supplied the true basis of the idea of an Incarnation, in that it was a religion of revelation to prepare the way for redemption. Under it God entered into covenant with the chosen people, made Himself their tutelary God and their King, gave them an elaborate ritual, and a moral law which is the transcript of His own moral nature; and placed on record, through the instrumentality of the Jewish lawgiver, the primitive history of the human race and of the Divine communications which had from time to time been made to it. Thenceforward, in the history of Israel and in prophecy, the designs of God towards fallen man become more and more unfolded, until the prophetic voice, having fulfilled its office, ceases, and a period of silent expectation ensues. All this is something very different from the revelation of God in nature, in which, though reason may discern the foosteps of Deity (Rom. i. 19), the Deity Himself retires from view behind the laws which He has impressed on matter; here, on the contrary, we have God revealing Himself in history, under type and prophecy, by signs and wonders, through appointed organs; manifesting Himself to man as the latter was capable of receiving it, and becoming in a sense incarnate before the incarnation itself. But only in a fragmentary and imperfect manner—πολυμέρως καὶ πολυτρόπως (Heb. i. 1)—not by the union of Himself with man in the person of a Redeemer. This consummation, however, was thus foreshadowed, and when it did arrive it was seen to be nothing but what the prophetic intimations had been long preparing the way for. In the person of Christ all previous manifestations of God are summed as in an epitome; the scattered rays are here concentrated in a focus; and for this reason we can expect no further, or more complete, revelation of God (John i. 18). It may be observed that it was only on theocratical ground that the true conception of an Incarnation could take root and grow up. Philosophical Judaism never attained to it. The Wisdom of the Apocryphal books, and the Logos of Philo, are nothing but personifications of a Divine attribute or emanation; not the personal indwelling of God in man. Matter is with Philo, as with the Gnostic sects, the source of evil, and to attain the end of his being man must be unclothed of his body. To such a habit of thought it was quite

repugnant that God should condescend to assume a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.[1]

In the prologue of S. John's Gospel (i. 3), as in other passages of Scripture (Heb. i. 2), the Logos appears as a Mediator between God, in His abstract essence, and creation : through Him the worlds were made. And it is the same Logos that communed with the Patriarchs, led the Israelites through the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 4), spoke through the prophets (1 Pet. i. 11), and presided over the fortunes of the nation ; so that when the final crisis was at hand, He could say of Jerusalem, ' How often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not ' (Matt. xxiii. 37). We can see how fitting it was that the Mediator between fallen man and God should be the same who had been Mediator in a lower sense ; that the Alpha should be the Omega (Rev. i. 8) ; the actual creator of nature its actual restorer (Rom. viii. 21) ; the first Adam have for his counterpart the second man, the Lord from heaven (1 Cor. xv. 47).

Was the first Adam, or the second, the prototype of humanity ? The latter opinion has been held by some who by the ' image of God ' in which Adam is said to have been created (Gen. i. 26), understand the foreseen Incarnation of the second Person of the Holy Trinity. The question is involved in a more general one, viz., would the Incarnation have taken place if man had not sinned ? Was it a necessary factor in the consummation of man's destiny, or a remedy for the effects of the Fall ? If regarded in the latter light, it is urged, it assumes the character of a mere contingent provision, for sin itself cannot, except on the supralapsarian hypothesis,[2] be supposed a necessary element in the Divine counsels. We should be compelled, too, to believe that the entrance of sin into the world procured for man a greater blessing than could have been attained without it ; according to the old saying, ' *O felix culpa quæ talem et tantum meruit habere redemptorem !* ' And when the purposes of redemption are accomplished, why should not the Incarnate Son revert to His previous condition, and become once more a λόγος ἄσαρκος, on the principle that *cessante causâ cessat effectus* ? which, however, is not the orthodox belief. These considerations have led some distinguished writers to the conclusion, *Etiamsi homo non peccasset Deus tamen incarnatus fuisset, licet non crucifixus.*[3]

[1] On Philo's theories, see Dorner, Ent. Gesch., P. i. pp. 21, etc.

[2] Calvin. Instit. lib. iii. 7. So Schleiermacher, though from another point of view, maintains that the original plan of the world comprised the necessity of sin for the sake of redemption (Glaubenslehre, s. 81).

[3] Martensen, Dog. ss. 89, 131.

The contrary opinion, however, has prevailed,[1] and, as it should seem, on good grounds. Scripture seldom, if ever, assigns any other ground for the Incarnation than to carry out the purposes of redemption: though it may be thought to extend the benefits thereof to other orders of creatures than man (Ephes. i. 10; Col. i. 20). But independently of this, the theory itself is of suspicious tendency. If Christ, irrespectively of redemption, is to be considered as the ideal Man, the head of humanity, the 'King of men' as the phrase sometimes runs, there seems a danger of the distinction between nature and grace becoming obliterated, and a door being opened for the doctrine of the restitution of all men. Adam, as he was created, was the head of unfallen humanity, and if he had continued in his uprightness, would doubtless both himself have advanced in holiness, and propagated a race of sinless beings, to whose spiritual progress no limits can be assigned. But would humanity thus unfallen ever have attained the perfection which humanity *restored* does in Christ? According to Scripture, Christ, the second Adam, is the head of *redeemed* humanity (Ephes. i. 22), and the gifts of regeneration and resurrection in the likeness of His glorified body are described as the fruit of His sufferings unto death, and of His subsequent exaltation. And we cannot suppose that these blessings are not in their nature superior to what would have, under any circumstances, accrued to man through an incarnation, even if man had never fallen, and Christ had never suffered and risen again. Regeneration is something more than creation, and the future glory of the saints a higher condition than that of Paradise.[2] The body, in short, of which Christ the Redeemer is the Head is not humanity in general, but the Church which He purchased with His own blood (Acts xx. 28).

§ 42. TWOFOLD STATE (HUMILITATIONIS ET EXALTATIONIS)

Whatever view may be taken of the question just mentioned, when Christ is considered as a Redeemer, His incarnation assumes a special character. For as a Redeemer He must be made in the likeness of *sinful* flesh (Rom. viii. 3), though without sin, and identify Himself with all the conditions of human existence as it is. He must be born of woman, be subject to the innocent infirmities of our nature, to suffering, temptation, and death; and, further, He must be born in a particular nation, be 'of the seed of David,' and, as a Jew,

[1] 'Quamquam Deus peccato non existente potuerit incarnari; convenientius tamen dicitur quod si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus non fuisset, cum in sacra Scriptura ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur' (Thos. Aqui. p. iii. q. 1, art. 3).

[2] See preceding section.

submit to the ordinances of the law (Gal. iv. 4). Only by thus 'taking hold'[1] of fallen humanity in the points in which it contrasts with humanity before the Fall, could He be its Redeemer, according to the maxim, What is not assumed cannot be healed.[2] He not only emptied Himself by becoming incarnate (Phil. ii. 7), but His human nature was in the form of a servant, and it was not until He had become obedient to the death of the cross, after a life of suffering, that God exalted Him and gave Him a name above every name (*ibid.* 8, 9).

Thus the doctrine of the twofold state, which occupies so large a space in later Protestant theology, though comparatively unnoticed by the earlier writers, has Scriptural foundation, and indeed suggests itself to the most cursory reader of Scripture. Briefly, it expresses the distinction between our Lord's life upon earth and His present life at the right hand of God; the former was one of humiliation, the latter is one of glory. It is usual, in describing each state, to assign to them respectively certain events—on the one hand, conception, birth, suffering, and death; on the other, resurrection, descent into hell, ascension; but it has not been sufficiently noted that the true ground of the distinction is the change which it implies in the human nature of the Saviour. The body of Christ before His resurrection was similar in all essential points to ours, subject to natural infirmities and sustained by the usual means; the body with which He rose was, as S. Paul calls it, a spiritual and glorified body, whatever may be the precise conception we form of it (1 Cor. xv. 44; Phil. iii. 21), and as such exempt from the defects incident to the 'body of our humiliation.' The topic is concerned exclusively with what took place after the incarnation, and has nothing to do with the exinanition, or kenosis, of the Logos in assuming human nature; which is a point that must be considered by itself. Christ, the incarnate Logos, as He appears in the sacred history, advanced from that portion of His mediatorial work which consisted in suffering and death to that portion of it which consists in the application of His merits and the exercise of priestly and royal functions; in the execution of which latter He is in a state of glory as compared with the preceding humiliation. But it is a mediatorial office which He is still discharging, and does not this imply, even at present, a certain exinanition of the Logos? and that this is to last until the number of the elect is accomplished? This, certainly, may be thought implied in the remarkable passage 1 Cor. xv. 28; from which, however, on account of its great obscurity, no positive conclusion can be

[1] According to one rendering of ἐπιλαμβάνεται (Heb. ii. 16).
[2] Τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον.

hastily drawn. The humiliation therefore of the incarnate Logos must not be confounded with His exinanition ; the latter is an act of the Holy Trinity terminating, in scholastic language, in the Person of the Son, the former belongs to the man Christ Jesus. And the resurrection, or, as the Lutherans hold, the descent into hell, forms the point of transition from the one state of the mediator Christ to the other ; the radical distinction, however, being the exchange of an earthly for a glorified spiritual body.

(Status Humiliationis.)

§ 43. BORN OF A WOMAN—GROWTH IN WISDOM AND STATURE

The birth of Christ, including His conception in the womb, was in the way of nature. He did not, as the Valentinians held, merely pass through the Virgin like water through a canal. And as His birth was natural, so was His human nature a real one, and not the phantom of the Docetics. The Word of life incarnate could be seen and handled (1 John i. 1) ; could suffer hunger, thirst, and weariness (Luke iv. ; John iv. 6) ; His flesh could be torn with stripes and pierced by the nails and the spear ; and He could die on the cross. His soul could experience joy and sorrow (Luke x. 21 ; Matt. xxvi. 38) ; He loved and was grieved (Mark x. 21 ; iii. 5) ; He could reason out of the Scriptures, and refute the cavils of the Pharisees and Sadducees (Matt. xxii. 15–46). He passed too through the ordinary stages of growth and development, both bodily and mental. So Scripture declares, in the very few notices it contains of His private life. As an unconscious babe He lay in the manger ; He grew, like other children, in stature as in wisdom (Luke ii. 52) ; at twelve years of age He astonished the doctors of the law with His precocious remarks (*ibid.* 46). With the exception of His visit to the temple, Scripture passes over in silence the interval between His birth and His public appearance ; and we can only conjecture that He lived with His parents, and, as tradition runs, followed His reputed father's occupation. It was, no doubt, so appointed, in order that no place might be left for the legends which usually attach themselves to the infancy and childhood of remarkable men ; and of which the Apocryphal Gospels are full. From the insipid and grotesque incidents with which these productions abound we may gather what the Canonical writers would probably have indulged in had they not written under a special Divine superintendence. Scripture draws a holy veil over the life of our Lord, until the time came for His manifestation in Israel. Another reason may be given for this reticence, viz., that the Saviour's own consciousness of His mission

advanced by gradual stages, and was not fully possessed by Him until He received the unction of the Holy Ghost (Matt. iii. 16). If Christ's manhood was a reality, and subject to the ordinary laws of humanity, it could hardly be otherwise than that the knowledge of His Divine origin, and of His appointed work, should keep pace with the expansion of His human intelligence, which, as we know, is dependent on the growth of the animal frame. As a babe He lay unconscious in the manger, like other babes; as a child the only visible distinction between Him and other children must have been His freedom from childish faults; at the age of twelve the consciousness of a peculiar relation to the Father begins to appear, 'Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business?' (Luke ii. 49). But not sufficiently distinct, any more than His mental faculties were mature, for His public ministry; and accordingly He passes again into retirement until He had attained the fulness of manhood. During these years, no doubt, the ceremonial law and prophecy, both pointing to Himself, and now illuminated by the power of the indwelling Logos, were His study; so that when He began to teach publicly it excited surprise that 'this man should know letters, having never learned' (John vii. 15). When His recognition of Himself as the Messiah was at length complete, but not until then, He emerged from the privacy of the home at Nazareth. Thus did the Logos submit to the conditions of ordinary human development, permitting, so to speak, the human nature a certain power over Himself, to limit the full exhibition of the Divine glory in accordance with natural laws. Nor did the process stop with His baptism at Jordan. It was not, *e.g.*, until the close of His ministry that the necessity and imminence of His death appear to have become distinctly perceived, and were foretold to His disciples (Matt. xvi. 21). Every natural stage of humanity, in short, infancy, childhood, youth, and manhood, was hallowed by the Saviour Himself passing through it; and under the same law of natural progress to which we are subjected.

§ 44. TEMPTED, YET WITHOUT SIN

Christ not only grew in wisdom and stature like other men, but underwent the ordinary process of discipline by which virtue is matured and attains its due reward; He grew ethically as well as physically and intellectually. He rendered meritorious obedience, and *earned* the crown by enduring the cross (Heb. xii. 2). The τελείωσις of which the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks (v. 9) implies a previous state of relative imperfection: what can this be in One whom we believe to have been sinless? It must be considered as negative, not positive; as analogous to the imperfection of the first

Adam before he underwent his trial. Virtue, to prove itself such, must be tried; and the severer the trial the greater the result if resistance to sin is successful. The second Adam, like the first, must pass through the furnace. He must be tempted and overcome the temptation, endure sufferings which culminated in death, 'learn obedience by the things which He suffered' (Heb. v. 8), and so become 'perfect' (Heb. ii. 10) in a different sense from that in which He was before. He attained the perfection of a proved and triumphant virtue as distinguished from a state of untried innocence. And thus He became fitted, from His own personal experience, to be 'a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God.'

The sufferings which our Lord underwent from sympathy with the condition of fallen man ('In all their affliction He was afflicted,' Isa. lxiii. 9) must be distinguished from those which He encountered in the exercise of His mission, and, so to speak, brought upon Himself. These latter are what properly formed His probation. And they may be classed under the two heads of direct temptation to evil, and indirect temptation to forsake the path of duty. With the former the Saviour came into conflict immediately after the anointing of the Holy Ghost (Matt. iv. 1). Must we not suppose that the temptation daily presented itself to Him to abandon the task He had undertaken; or can we wonder if the struggle at the last was almost more than His human nature could bear? (Luke xxii. 44). It would be idle to contend that the Saviour was not in both ways tempted, that He did not really experience solicitations to sin. He must have done so if He was capable of appeals through the senses and the understanding, and if He felt a natural shrinking from pain and death; and how otherwise could He have been a man like unto us? But whether we are to consider this liability to temptation as affecting His sinlessness depends upon the view we take of the proper seat of sin. The essence of sin lies in the consent of the will to what conscience pronounces wrong, and if this consent is withheld, felt solicitations, *coming from without*, do not of themselves partake of the nature of sin. Our first parents could not avoid seeing the fruit, and hearing the arguments of the tempter; perhaps experiencing a momentary inclination to disobedience; but had the will been sufficiently strong in its union with the Divine will to repel the temptation at once, they would not have fallen. So it actually was in our Lord's case. Relief from bodily hunger, reliance on Divine protection, even temporal dignity, are not in themselves improper objects of desire: whether they become so depends on the circumstances under which they present themselves to the mind. In our Lord's temptation they would have been sinful, both as suggested

by Satan, and as inconsistent with the Divine plan of a suffering and crucified Messiah. A momentary attraction towards these things may have been felt by Him, but it was instantly repelled through the power of the indwelling Logos. In like manner the prospect of an ignominious death must have been unspeakably painful, and the temptation to decline it equally strong ; but not the less perfect was His submission to the Divine will : ' if it be possible,' expresses the conflict ; ' not My will, but Thine be done,' the victory (Matt. xxvi. 39).

Liability, then, to temptation is not in itself sinful ; and it was indispensable to the attainment of that moral perfection (τελείωσις) by which the Saviour merited His crown of glory. In pouring out His soul ' with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him ' (Heb. v. 7), He learned what it was to be tempted, and so gained a fellow-feeling with those that are tempted, as well as furnished a real example to them. But though the outworks were assaulted, the citadel itself remained intact. In each moment of trial the Divine will in unity with the human asserted its supremacy ; and the *potuit non peccare* of the first Adam came, in the case of the second, to be eventually exchanged for the *non potuit peccare*.

But can we feel sure that, under these temptations, Christ was actually without sin ? Such is the faith of the Church ; but is it well founded ? The question is of vital moment, for however He might still be an example, a Redeemer from sin, He could not be if He had sins of His own to atone for. A moral elevation never before attained by man the unbeliever is willing to concede to Him, but to the Christian a sinless Saviour can alone be a real one. The Gospel history furnishes ample materials for our arriving at a conclusion on this momentous question. The testimony of enemies naturally first claims our attention. No charge against the moral character of Jesus was ever substantiated by them. The witnesses suborned could not agree (Mark xiv. 56) ; Pilate appealed to the people to say what evil He had done, but received no reply (Matt. xxvii. 23) ; Pilate himself was convinced of His innocence (*ibid.* 24). The thief on the cross bore similar testimony (Luke xxiii. 41). The impression produced by Him on those who for nearly three years had been in constant intercourse with Him comes next to be considered ; and here the confession of Judas the traitor that he had betrayed ' the innocent blood ' (Matt. xxvii. 4) carries peculiar weight. Had this man been able to allege any obliquity of aim or conduct in his Master, he would doubtless have pleaded it as a palliation of his crime, but he was unable to do so. The disciple most intimate with Him declares that in Him was no sin (1 John iii. 5). Another de-

scribes Him as the Holy One and the Just (Acts iii. 14), as the Lamb of God 'without blemish and without spot' (1 Pet. i. 19, ii. 22). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews pronounces Him 'holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners' (Heb. vii. 26, 27). And such, surely, is the impression which every unprejudiced reader of the Gospels receives. The character of Christ, as portrayed in them, stands alone in the annals of history. It is not merely that He propounded a pure system of morals; He was Himself the living transcript of it, a perfect example of what He taught. Where else shall we find such a union of majesty and humility, of hatred of sin and love to the sinner, of strength of purpose and boundless tenderness, of patience under suffering and active benevolence of patriotism and the widest human sympathies? In the greatest saints of the Old Testament, even in the most eminent of Christ's Apostles, we find an alloy of human infirmity; not so in Christ Himself. For the first time in history we behold in its perfection that combination of morality and religion which constitutes *holiness*; a term which has no proper counterpart in heathen antiquity.[1]

But it may be objected that the contemporaries of Christ could see only His outer life, and only a fragment of that, the greater part having been passed in obscurity; His sinlessness in the sight of God, and before He appeared in public, may yet admit of question. With respect to the former point, His inner purity, His own testimony is of the greatest moment. If bystanders could not read His heart, He Himself must be supposed acquainted with it. It is to be observed then that Christ, while reproving sin in all its forms, and insisting upon the duty and the efficacy of confession of sin, is never found confessing His own sins, or praying for forgiveness. In the prayer which He taught His disciples, and which contains a petition for forgiveness, He does not rank Himself with them: 'After this manner pray *ye*.' He challenges His enemies to lay any sin to His charge (John viii. 46); and this is not to be understood merely of the outward act, but of sin in the abstract (ἁμαρτία), the sinful impulse.[2] But no even ordinarily religious man, who knew himself to be a sinner, would claim a prerogative which to claim would in that case be itself a sin (1 John i. 8), or argue gross spiritual blindness. His coming to John's baptism has been alleged as a proof that, like other Jews, He needed repentance; but in truth the narrative points the other way. To say nothing of the Baptist's indirect testimony to His having no sin to repent of ('Comest Thou to me?')—a testi-

[1] This topic is fully discussed in Ullmann's beautiful work, 'Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu,' Zweiter Abschnitt.

[2] See Lücke's Commentary on this passage.

mony doubly valuable as coming from one who had probably been intimate with Jesus from His childhood—Jesus in His reply does not ground His request on the consciousness of sin, but on the duty of complying with divinely appointed ordinances (Matt. iii. 15). Made under the law, He was circumcised, though the symbol in His case lost its proper meaning ; and similarly He submitted to John's baptism, which to Him was only the inauguration of His public ministry (Matt. iii. 16). With respect to the other point, our ignorance of His previous life, it is enough to remark that moral perfection such as that which the Gospels exhibit could not, without a special miracle, appear all of a sudden, and *per saltum*. Each stage of advancement presupposes a former one, and the final result is always founded upon a previous history. As is the seed sown, such is the harvest. And if it be further urged that Christ may have attained the moral eminence which all ascribe to Him as He appears in the Gospels in the same way as ordinary men, viz., through inward conflict, sometimes overcome by sin, but on the whole overcoming, until the measure of holiness of which He was capable was attained, we reply that, apart altogether from original sin, one actual sin consented to leaves indelible traces behind it : the wound may be healed, but the scar remains. No man who, even for a moment, consents to an act of sin, inward or outward, can be the same man as he was before ; and hence in the case of ordinary Christians sinlessness in this life is impossible. If Christ had not been without sin in His private life He could not have been what He was in His public.

Christ, it is said, Himself disclaims the title of good (' Why callest thou Me good ? ' Mark x. 18). But the meaning of His reply depends upon that of the inquirer in his use of the word ' good '; and nothing is plainer than that the ruler used it without any true perception of what it implies, in a superficial manner, and as a mere compliment ; corresponding to his imperfect apprehension of his own sinfulness. In *that* sense our Lord refused the epithet, intimating further that if it was to be applied to Him at all, it must be so in the highest sense, even as it is applicable to God : which far from implying a consciousness of sin rather implies the reverse.[1]

The result of the inquiry is that if Jesus was not sinless, He not only fell below the saints of the Old Covenant, a David or a Daniel, and even heathen sages, in self-knowledge and humility, but instead of being what He claimed to be, the Light of the World, the way, the truth, and the life, born to bear witness to the truth (John xviii.

[1] The approved reading in S. Matthew removes all difficulty ; but there is no reason to question the authenticity of S. Mark's and S. Luke's version. See Alford on Matt. xix. 16.

37), in short an infallible teacher and guide, He must be pronounced a blind leader of the blind, even if we acquit Him of conscious deception. In short, the Christ of the Gospels must either be what they describe Him to be, or forfeit all claims to our attention.

There seems to be no escape from this dilemma except in impugning the historical value of the Gospels, which accordingly is what the mythical theory of Strauss and his followers attempts to do. The enthusiasm of the first converts, we are told, threw a halo round the central personage, and invested Him with ideal qualities which had only a scanty basis of fact. But what can be more preposterous than to suppose that on Jewish soil and in the age of Christ a mythical system could have arisen? Myth is intimately connected with polytheism, and the religion of Moses, monotheistic and severely ethical, could never have been favourable to such growths. And in the age of Christ, when prophecy and inspired song had long ceased, and in place of them the didactic service of the synagogue had arisen, presided over by Rabbis whose literary activity was confined to the interpretation of the sacred books, and under the chilling pressure of a foreign yoke, what place was there for mythical formations? The early legends of Rome might as well be supposed to have arisen in the age of Livy or Tacitus. But further, nothing that we know of the culture or moral elevation of the Apostles, or the first converts, leads us to suppose that they could have imagined a character so original, and so consistent with itself throughout as that of Christ; that is, drawn it from their unaided resources. This would be as great a miracle as the sinlessness of Christ itself. In short, if the Gospel history be rejected, the appearance of such a character on the stage of life is simply inexplicable. But the Gospel history gives us more information on the subject than merely a narrative of Christ's ministry.

§ 45. MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION

The sinlessness claimed for Christ seems to some minds incompatible with the doctrine of original sin, according to which every man naturally born, engendered of the offspring of Adam, comes into the world with sinful tendencies, which are sure in some form or other to manifest themselves. Hence, it is argued, such perfection as is attainable by man cannot be exemplified in an individual; it is the property of the race. The objection certainly would be strong, if Scripture did not give such an account of Christ's birth as renders His sinlessness, far from being an inexplicable phenomenon, the natural result of the circumstances of the case. The miraculous conception removes all difficulty.

The title 'Second Adam,' which in Scripture is applied to our Lord, implies not only His headship as regards the Church, but a peculiarity of origin as regards Himself. As the first Adam came into existence by a direct exercise of miraculous power, while his descendants are propagated by a natural law, so we naturally expect something analogous in the case of the second Adam. But this was not only appropriate; it was necessary. For if the effects of sin were to be reversed in the new spiritual creation, it is evident that He who was to be the first link of the series must Himself be free from the common taint; and this could not be the case, except by a miracle, had He come into the world in the ordinary way. That which is born of the flesh is, and must remain, flesh (John iii. 6). It was necessary, therefore, that as regards the person of the Redeemer an interruption should take place of the law of nature, and that though born of woman He should Himself inherit no original taint of sin.

For a human being to come into the world without sin requires that his birth should be, in whatever sense, supernatural.[1] This end, however, might, as a celebrated theologian (Schleiermacher) suggests, have been attained, even if Christ had had an earthly father, by a miraculous agency on the embryo in the womb, purging it from the taint of original sin. But this suggestion, which is thrown out in order to dispense with the doctrine of the Church that the Second Person of the Holy Trinity became incarnate in Christ, is precluded by the expressed statement of Scripture that Christ had no earthly father, that, as prophecy had intimated, a virgin conceived and brought forth a son (Matt. i. 18, 23). There is no reason to call in question the authenticity of the narrative—substantially the same in S. Matt. and S. Luke[2]; and the information was no doubt furnished by the Virgin herself, who survived the Ascension for some time. And its dogmatical import is obvious. If an embryo had been formed in Mary's womb in the usual manner, previously to the union of the Logos with it, there would have been in existence potentially, if not actually, a human person with whom the Logos formed a union, which would lead to Nestorianism, or the doctrine of two persons in Christ; whereas the doctrine of the Church is that the Logos took not an existing man but human nature in the abstract

[1] So much as this is granted by Schleiermacher himself (Glaubenslehre, s. 97, 2).

[2] It has been objected that neither by Christ nor by the Apostles is allusion made to these events. But all the passages in which our Lord describes Himself, and the Apostles describe Him, as sent into the world from the Father, presuppose them. Especially is the miraculous agency of Christ in His public life a natural result of this unseen miracle of miracles; it is in accordance with the mode of His birth. Nor can we suppose the Apostle's expression 'born of a woman' (Gal. iv. 4) to be without emphasis.

into union with Himself.[1] It may be, as the theologian above mentioned adds, that the mere absence of earthly paternity is 'insufficient' of itself to establish the Incarnation of the Logos, but at any rate it leaves room for it, which his hypothesis does not; and the question is simply, What does Scripture teach on the subject? It tells us, then, that a Divine overshadowing Power took the place of earthly paternity;[2] in consequence of which the Word became flesh. This is a very different thing from the mere fact of a sinless man appearing in the world, begotten as well as born like other men. Nor is the objection valid that the absence of earthly paternity does not, after all, secure the desired end, since original sin must be supposed to descend from the mother as well as the father; and therefore, to complete the theory, we must hold the immaculate conception of the Virgin, and of her ancestors up to Adam.[3] For in this case the mother was merely passive, merely supplied the necessary materials for an Incarnation; and the object of the miraculous conception was that these materials should be purged of all taint of sin, so as to form a fit temple for the indwelling of Deity.[4] But on other grounds also, viz., that the Word who assumed flesh could not be begotten in time, only be born of woman, and that paternity cannot be predicated of the operation, whatever it was, of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb,[5] the idea of generation must be dissociated from the birth of Christ. Thus do the miraculous conception and the sinlessness of Christ furnish support, the one to the other; and though it might seem as if the former were of minor importance, for a sinless being in the midst of sinful humanity would itself be a miracle, leading to conclusions beyond itself, yet when the explanation is added it is seen to be an adequate one. On the other hand, if any admixture of actual sin could have been discovered in our Lord, it would have been of little moment that the mode of the Incarnation had been revealed; the foundation would be not merely without a superstructure, but out of harmony with the actual one.

[1] Οὐ γὰρ προϋποστάτῃ καθ' ἑαυτὴν σαρκὶ ἡνώθη ὁ Θεῖος Λόγος, ἀλλ' ἐνοικήσας τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς ἁγιάς Παρθένου, ἀπεριγράπτως ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσει ἐκ τῶν ἁλνῶν τῆς Ἀειπαρθένου αἱμάτων, σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ ὑπεστήσατο, ἀπαρχὴν προσλαβόμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου φυράματος, αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος γενόμενος τῇ σάρκι ὑπόστασις (J. Damasc. De F. O. lib. iii. c. 2).

[2] Luke i. 35. Πνεῦμα ἅγιον in this passage probably means, not the third person of the Holy Trinity, but, as in Rom. i. 4, the Divine nature itself, considered as holy and the source of all holiness.

[3] Schleiermacher, *l.c.*

[4] See J. Damasc. in the passage above quoted. 'Idem Spiritus singularissima præsentia et virtute Mariam semper virginem ad concipiendum mundi Salvatorem fæcundam reddidit, semen prolificum ex castis ejus sanguinibus elicuit, ab omni adhærente peccato purgavit, ipsi que Mariæ virtutem præbuit quâ conciperet ipsum Dei Filium' (Quenstedt, p. iii. c. 3, Memb. th. 12).

[5] See the note from Pearson, p. 187.

(Status Exaltationis.)

§ 46. DESCENT INTO HELL

The clause on this subject in the Apostles' Creed is not, as is well known, found in the earlier forms thereof, and appears to have been first admitted about A.D. 400. From its being placed between Christ's burial and His resurrection, there can be little doubt that in the Creed it means the temporary sojourn of our Saviour's soul in Hades, or the intermediate state. To this effect is the Article of Edward VI.: 'The body of Christ lay in the grave until His resurrection: but His spirit, which He gave up, was with the spirits which were detained in prison, or in hell, and preached unto them, as the place of S. Peter testifieth.' And by most of our writers no other descent seems to be understood.[1] There is no doubt that the soul of Christ, when He expired on the cross, did pass into hell; *i.e.*, not the final place of torment, but Scheol, or the intermediate state of the Old Testament. If such passages as Ephes. iv. 9 are of doubtful meaning, this cannot be said of S. Peter's exposition of Ps. xvi. 10 (Acts ii. 31); if Christ's soul was not left in hell, it must have gone thither. And with this agree our Lord's words to the thief on the cross, 'Today thou shalt be with Me in Paradise' (Luke xxiii. 43), or that division of Scheol which is assigned to the spirits of the just. Thus having submitted to death, He was made like unto His brethren in this point also, and fulfilled the ordinary law of humanity, viz., that they on whom death passes are not at once transferred to their final destiny, but await in an intermediate state Christ's second coming. And it is supposed that the fact was made an Article of the Creed against the Apollinarian heresy which denied that our Lord had a proper human soul.

It is open, however, to doubt whether this descent can properly form a part of our present subject, which is concerned with the twofold state through which Christ, in His whole proper person, passed to His final glory. The soul of Christ, though never separated from the Logos, can hardly be said to be Christ Himself while apart from His body. We must inquire then whether in Scripture any other descent is spoken of or implied. And this appears to be the case. In truth, the two famous passages 1 Pet. iii. 19 and iv. 6 seem to have been too hastily applied, as in the Article of Edward VI., to the Article in the Creed, whereas they may well bear a different meaning. It is not as in Acts ii. 31, the separate state of souls, but the resurrection of Christ, that the Apostle is principally referring to. The Saviour, he tells us, was put to death 'in the flesh' (in the body of

[1] Pearson, Art. v. See also Horsley's sermon on the subject.

His humiliation), but 'quickened in spirit'; in which 'He went and preached to the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, in the days of Noah.' The passage, in its obvious meaning, seems to refer to some migration of Christ subsequent to His resurrection, but whether at the moment of that event and before He came forth from the tomb, or at some other time during His forty days' sojourn on earth is not specified. A common interpretation of the passage makes it mean merely that the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ, inspired Noah to preach to the antediluvians while the ark was a preparing. Noah, no doubt, was 'a preacher of righteousness' (2 Pet. ii. 5), but it is not easy to see what connection the death and resurrection of Christ have with Noah's warnings. But there are grammatical objections also to this interpretation. The word 'went' of our English version is not in the original a mere expletive, but a principal term and significant: πορευθεὶς, having set forth on His journey, He preached, etc.: and the word 'sometime' (ποτὲ) is, as our version has it, connected with 'disobedient,' not with 'preached.' On the whole, the passage seems to allude to an event which took place at the moment of, or after the resurrection, and which, therefore, is not identical with the descent into hell of the Creed.

The object for which Christ is said to have thus appeared in Scheol was to preach to the antediluvian sinners, who in the days of Noah gave no heed to the patriarch's warnings. We can hardly suppose that our Lord visited them merely to confirm their sentence of condemnation; and indeed the word used (ἐκήρυξεν) does not usually bear that meaning. If we may apply the passage, 1 Peter iv. 6, to the same event, it declares that 'the Gospel was preached' (εὐηγγελίσθη) to the dead. But why to the antediluvians more than others? This the real difficulty of the passage hardly admits of a satisfactory solution. If they were penitents at the eleventh hour, it may have been to assure them of forgiveness; if they were not penitents, it may have been to offer them forgiveness on repentance. Perhaps to the Apostle's mind the human race presented itself under two great divisions, those who lived before the flood and those who lived after it. When the world was repeopled by the descendants of Noah, they were placed under a covenant of temporal mercies (Gen. ix. 15). The antediluvian sinners thus seemed to lie under a disadvantage as compared with their successors: to rectify the inequality by announcing to them the greater mercies of the Christian covenant may seem not inconsistent with the Divine justice and goodness.

If this exposition of the passage be allowed, it may lead to a modification of the doctrine that the redeeming power of Christ is

absolutely confined to this life, not only in reference to those who have enjoyed and misused spiritual advantages, but also in reference to the countless multitudes who, through no fault of their own, have lived and died without ever having had an opportunity of hearing of the Saviour. Dogmatical statements are on such a question out of place; but any hints of Scripture that under other conditions of existence a work of probation may still be going on, and the inequalities of this life rectified, are not to be summarily set aside. If one visit of the Saviour to the abodes of the dead is recorded, there seems no reason why it should be considered a solitary instance, and not rather a specimen; at any rate, what occurred once may have occurred, and may occur, again.

If the foregoing view of the descent into hell is correct, the Lutheran theologians are in the right in making it the first stage in the state of exaltation, whereas the Reformed usually reckon it to that of humiliation. In fact, if the event took place at the moment of His resuscitation, the body in which He visited Scheol must have been a glorified one; a change which, as we have seen, marks the passing from one state to the other. But the doctrine of the Lutherans that He went thither in order to triumph over Satan rests on no warranty of Scripture.

§ 47. RESURRECTION, ASCENSION, SESSION AT THE RIGHT HAND OF GOD

The resurrection of Christ is as well attested as any fact of history. The testimony is the more valuable, inasmuch as it is that of persons who, instead of being predisposed to imagine or believe the fact. showed great reluctance to receive it even when the clearest proofs were offered (Mark xvi. 11; Luke xxiv. 36–46). But what our Article principally insists on is that our Lord, when He rose, did so with 'body, flesh, and bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature' (Art. iv.).

The materials which we possess for forming a conception of the risen Saviour's body are scanty, and not easy of adjustment. All the accounts convey the impression that He rose not only with a real, but with the same body which had been laid in the grave. With a real body, for on His first appearance to His disciples He set at rest their doubts as to His being a spirit by tangible proof of His possessing 'flesh and bones' (Luke xxiv. 39–43). With the same body, for He showed them the print of the nails and of the spear (John xx. 27). Yet it is also evident that the resurrection-body possessed a dominion over space and matter which did not previously belong to it, or which Jesus did not choose to exercise. He passed through

closed doors (John xx. 19), and though He partook of food it does not appear that He was compelled to do so by the necessities of nature. The miracle of the Ascension was an infringement of the law of gravity. The resurrection-body, in short, was not a natural, but a spiritual one (1 Cor. xv. 44). Was this change accomplished at once in all its perfection when He rose; or did it advance by gradual stages until the time when He was taken up? The latter supposition seems the more probable. The Saviour rose with an essentially glorified body; but this is not inconsistent with His having passed from one degree of glory to another until, the process being complete, He ascended to heaven.

§ 48. COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON

The elements, so far as Scripture furnishes them, of the great problem are now before us. They are, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and the Holy Ghost, His Incarnation in time, His real manhood, His sinlessness, and His Ascension to heaven in a real but glorified body. Christ is God and Christ is man; this is the substance of the Christian faith, and perhaps in this state of being we shall never know much more. But, as in the case of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, heresies soon made their appearance on the subject, and these gave rise to controversies and Councils which occupy a large space in Church history.

The statements of the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, which is understood to have fixed the orthodox doctrine on the Person of Christ, are as follows: 'We acknowledge one and the same Christ to be perfect God and perfect man; of the same substance with the Father as regards His Godhead, and of the same substance with us as regards His manhood—in all things like unto us, sin only excepted: begotten of the Father from everlasting, but in the last days born of the Virgin (*τῆς θεοτόκου*): subsisting in (*al.* of) two natures, without confusion, conversion, division, or separation (*ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως*): the distinction between the natures not being destroyed by the union, but each preserving its own properties and both culminating in one Person and Hypostasis (*ἕν πρόσωπον καὶ ὑπόστασις*): one and the same Christ, not divided into two Persons. To the same effect is the language of the Athanasian Creed: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ is God and man, God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; man of the substance of His mother, born in the world: perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting: who although He be God and man is not two, but one Christ: one not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God: one

altogether not by confusion of substance but by unity of Person : for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.' Such definitions as these are obviously the result of protracted theological controversy.

At the Council of Nice the Church finally severed itself not only from the Ebionite theories [1] which, under various forms, taught that Jesus of Nazareth was a mere man, the natural son of Joseph and Mary, but from the Arian heresy which denied his eternal Godhead. The homoousios of the Nicene Creed secured the proper Deity of Christ. His proper manhood had been sufficiently declared in the Apostles' Creed. But the further questions respecting the mode of union of the two natures in one Person, and of their relation to the Person, had been left in the undetermined state in which, for the most part, they are found in the writings of the early Fathers. These questions now came to the front. How could a unity of Person be secured with a duality of natures ? How could a singleness of nature be made consistent with the doctrine that the Word became flesh ?

Early in the fourth century Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea, a man of piety and ability, and highly esteemed even by those who differed from him, propounded the theory which bears his name, and which has not by any means received the attention which it deserves. Apollinaris was a strong opponent of Arius, but each, from different points of view, arrived at a similar conclusion. Arius appears to have held that the human nature of Christ consisted merely of His body, with which the Word entered into union, so that He had no human soul.[2] And to this he was driven by the exigency of his position. For since the Logos of Arius was a created being, and the soul of Christ, if He had one, must also have been created, the absurdity would arise of two created intelligences in one Person, a thing which is inconceivable. But if the manhood of Christ consists merely of a body, this difficulty is evaded. Apollinaris borrowed a part of his antagonist's theory, but with the view of effectually guarding against his conclusions. He assumed the trichotomic view of man's nature, according to which he is composed of body, soul, and spirit,[3] and allowing Christ the possession of an animal soul, he made the Logos take the place of the spirit, or rational faculty.[4] His

[1] A good account of these will be found in Dorner's work ' On the Person of Christ,' i. 296, etc.

[2] Pearson on Creed, note 1 on Art. iii. Under the term ' soul ' Arius understood what the trichotomists would call ' soul and spirit.'

[3] See § 29.

[4] Apollinaris appears not to have been the first to broach this theory. It is attributed to Justin Martyr. See Hagenbach, D, G, s, 66,

motive was to obviate the Arian conception of Christ by investing the rational nature with the attribute of unchangeableness, and consequent sinlessness. And no doubt his theory does this effectually. But it stands or falls with the validity of the trichotomic division. And independently of this, a body with a mere sensitive soul is not a man: such a being is incapable of temptation, and of moral and intellectual development. The problem, in fact, was simplified by ignoring one of its main factors. After some years of controversy, Apollinarianism was condemned at the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, and its author deposed from his bishopric. Nevertheless, the theory, however indefensible as it came from its author, remained as a leaven in the Church, reappearing in another form in the Eutychian and Monophysite controversies. Had Apollinaris perceived that the object he had in view, viz., the *non potuit peccare* of the Saviour, might have been attained without robbing the human soul of its rational faculty, inasmuch as this faculty, the νοῦς or πνεῦμα of man's nature, has in itself an affinity with the Logos, he would probably have occupied a more important place in the history of this dogma than he does.[1]

About A.D. 428 Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, a Syrian by birth and a disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia, took occasion to side with one of his presbyters, Anastasius by name, who in his discourses had condemned the use of the word Θεοτόκος as applied to the Virgin Mary. To Nestorius this term seemed to imply that the Virgin had given birth to Deity, thereby introducing into Christianity an idea proper to heathen mythology; in his opinion Χριστοτόκος was the fitting word to use. He found a vehement opponent in Cyril of Alexandria, and painful recriminations ensued. Cyril assembled a council at Alexandria A.D. 430, and anathematized Nestorius. Nestorius retorted by anathematizing Cyril. The Emperor, in the hope of allaying the strife, summoned a general Council at Ephesus A.D. 431; which, presided over by Cyril, and in the absence of the Syrian bishops, condemned Nestorius and deposed him. The sentence was carried into effect, and Nestorius ended his days in exile. There is some difficulty in ascertaining the exact views of this unfortunate prelate; for we have to rely on the statements of opponents, who not unfrequently attributed to him what were merely their own inferences from his teaching. Thus he was accused of holding a duality of Persons in Christ, whereas he constantly disavowed any such doctrine, and even, towards the close of the contest, expressed his willingness to admit the term Θεοτόκος if accompanied with suitable explanations. But whatever may have

[1] See Dorner, i. p. 1074.

been the private views of its author, the essence of Nestorianism as a system consists in holding that the Logos, in becoming incarnate, united Himself to an existing human being ; which necessarily leads to a double personality. ' The Word did not assume a man into union with Himself, but became man ; the incarnation and the existence of the human factor were coincident in time. The Logos did not either find a man, or create one, and then as a secondary act unite Himself to this man ; but in the very act of incarnation a man came into being who was both Divine and human. Apart from this particular controversy, the schools of Antioch and Alexandria did really represent different tendencies. The former insisted especially on the reality of the manhood, and its likeness to ours ; the latter on the Godhead and the distinction between Christ and us. The teaching of the former might issue in a double personality, that of the latter in Monophysitism. Had Nestorius asked himself what he meant by the word Χριστοτόκος, which he wished to substitute for Θεοτόκος, he might have seen that either the change was needless, or that the word Χρίστος with him signified the manhood alone, not the whole Person, which it properly denotes. On the same principle he ascribed the sufferings of Christ to the manhood alone, excluding the Logos from all participation therein. He cannot, therefore, be acquitted of making, as Cyril remarks, the union a mere juncture (συνάφεια) of natures, otherwise wholly distinct, an inhabitation of the Logos in humanity, not a true incarnation. Against such a mechanical union Cyril maintains a ' physical ' one (ἕνωσις φυσική) ; *i.e.* that in the act of incarnation the Logos so assumed the complex of predicates which constitute a human nature as that they cannot be applied to the manhood without at the same time being applied to the Godhead ; which, of course, effectually precludes a double personality. Yet it may be doubted whether Cyril's own doctrine advances beyond making the humanity a complex of predicates, or a mere ὄργανον of the Logos, without a will of its own and a relatively independent mental and moral history. The complex of predicates is held together only by the Logos, who forms the true personality and bond of union. His favourite illustrations are physical ; as the mixture of water and wine, or a piece of red-hot iron ; which latter, as Dorner remarks,[1] makes for the Nestorian as much as for the Alexandrian doctrine, since, though the fire and the metal are in union, the qualities of the one are not imparted to the other. The difficulties on either side probably led the Council to hesitate to endorse the anathema of Cyril, or to frame a new Creed ; and on the arrival of John of Antioch with his attendant bishops, a formulary of

[1] ii. 80.

a milder type which he had brought with him was proposed, which both Cyril and the Syrian bishops subscribed, though Nestorius was left out of the compromise. In this formulary the title Θεοτόκος was retained; Christ was pronounced to be 'perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul, and with a body begotten of the Father according to His Godhead, and of the Virgin Mary according to His manhood: as regards the former, of the same substance with the Father; as regards the latter, of the same substance with us; for of the two natures a union took place.'[1] Notwithstanding the condemnation of Nestorius, his followers multiplied and formed independent churches in the East, some of which still exist. It was, as Dorner observes, the first schism which the Church proved herself unable to overcome; and this because she did not fully assimilate into her own system the element of truth which the doctrine contained, viz., the proper personality of the human nature.[2]

Each party continuing to propagate its views, the dispute broke out afresh, and from the opposite quarter. Eutyches, the head of a monastery in Constantinople, was charged with teaching that after the incarnation there was but one nature in Christ. This might, as in Cyril's writings, be capable of a good interpretation; but Eutyches proceeded to explain the union of the two natures in a manner which was a virtual revival of Apollinarianism. He does not seem to have held, as is commonly supposed, that the human nature was absorbed into the Divine; or that from the union of the two a third nature, neither the one nor the other, proceeded; but that the human nature became so altered in its qualities as to be no longer our nature, that is, not a true human nature. He was condemned at a particular Synod held under Flavian, Patriarch of Constantinople, and deposed. His cause, however, was warmly taken up by Dioscurus, the successor of Cyril, a man of violent and unscrupulous temper, who persuaded the Emperor to allow a Synod to be convened at Ephesus A.D. 449, which from the proceedings of Dioscurus at it has received the name of the 'Robber-Synod.' This Synod reversed the condemnation of Eutyches. The passions of the contending parties rose to such a pitch that had it not been for the influence of Leo the Great of Rome the Eastern Church would probably have been rent in twain. That sagacious prelate, who had allowed himself not unwillingly to be appealed to by Flavian, persuaded the Emperor Marcian to summon another Synod at Chalcedon, which formed the fourth

[1] Δυὸ γὰρ φύσεων ἕνωσις γέγονεν. The Council evidently shrank from a more definite statement.

[2] ii. 86.

General Council. He had previously addressed to Flavian an epistle in which, with admirable dialectical and rhetorical skill, he expounded his views of the Person of Christ. When the Council assembled, Leo's epistle was publicly read and received with acclamation; Dioscurus was deposed; and the celebrated Confession of Faith which derives its name from the Council was promulgated.

It would be neither pleasant nor profitable to attempt to unravel at length the tangled web of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies; the last of importance which on this subject agitated the ancient Church, and, like the Nestorian, led to a permanent schism. The Alexandrian school adhered to the traditions of Cyril, and Monophysitism had struck its roots deep in many other Churches of the East. Peter, Patriarch of Antioch, surnamed Fullo, from his original ocupation, took occasion from the sanction of the epithet Θεοτόκος by the Council of Ephesus to endeavour to introduce its counterpart 'God was crucified for us' into the Trisagion of the Church. Hence arose a controversy which, under the name of Theopaschitism, continued for some years. The more moderate Monophysites contented themselves with maintaining that after the union the natures could be distinguished only in thought (ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ), since, in fact, they coalesced into one nature, which however is not a simple, but a compound one. But, in truth, it was rather the practical tendencies of Monophysitism than its theoretical errors which led to its final rejection. The Council of Chalcedon had insisted upon the duplicity of the natures; the Monophysites seemed to disavow its authority; this was one ground of contention. The other, a more legitimate one, was that, at least in its extreme form, Monophysitism did really obscure the humanity of Christ to such an extent as to imperil its reality: the 'one nature' of Dioscurus and his followers was the Divine nature with a semblance of humanity attached to it. After vain attempts by the Emperors Zeno and Justinian I. to find a middle ground on which both parties could meet, the more decided Monophysites separated themselves, choosing as their leader a monk named Jacob Baradæus. This remarkable man, after procuring for himself episcopal consecration, travelled through the East in the garb of a beggar, ordaining Monophysite bishops and presbyters, and founding Churches; and at his death left the sect in a flourishing condition in Syria and Mesopotamia. From him they received the name of Jacobites. The favour which the Saracen invaders naturally showed to the Monophysite tenets widened the breach between them and the Church; and independent Churches, still existing, were founded in Egypt, Abyssinia, and Armenia. Those of the two former countries acknowledge the juris-

diction of the Patriarch of Alexandria; the Armenian Church is entirely independent.

The controversy, under the form of Monothelitism, broke out again in the seventh century. Sophronius, a monk of Alexandria, taking exception to the phrase 'one energy' (μία ἐνέργεια) as applied to the miracles of Christ, signalized his accession to the patriarchate of Jerusalem by a confession of faith in which he strenuously maintained a duplicity of energy, corresponding to the duplicity of the natures. Cyrus of Alexandria, his opponent, had the matter referred to Honorius of Rome, who counselled the avoiding altogether of the terms in debate, but incidentally remarked that the real point in dispute was not whether there was a singleness of energy, but whether there was a singleness of will in Christ. He himself inclined to the latter opinion. This gave rise to the Monothelite controversy, which ran through the usual stages of theological rancour. Scripture appears plainly to ascribe two wills to Christ ('not My will, but Thine be done'); but the Monothelites were ready with a reply which is used by J. Damasc. himself in another connection, viz., that Christ in such passages did not speak in His own person but in ours, by way of instruction and example. After the death of Honorius mutual excommunications and depositions took place, until at length Constantinus Pogonatus summoned a Council at Constantinople A.D. 680 (the sixth general one), at which, after the reading of an epistle from Pope Agathon, it was determined that as there are two natures in Christ so there are two wills, not opposed to each other, but the human subject to and always in harmony with the Divine. Monothelitism, thus condemned, lingered for a time in the Syrian sect of the Maronites, but it died away in the Church.

There is no more uninviting chapter of Church history, in its external aspects, than that which relates to this controversy. The rancour of the disputants, their mutual anathemas, the unconcealed rivalry of the Sees of Rome and Constantinople, the political influences at work, leave a painful impression on the mind of the student, who on reading the account of some of the proceedings feels how true the statement is that even General Councils are 'an assembly of men whereof all are not governed with the Spirit and Word of God' (Art. xxi.). These reflections, however, will probably give place to others when the matter is considered on its own merits, and apart from the infirmities of the human agents. The questions at issue were really of vital importance, which cannot be said of all ecclesiastical movements; and the decisions ultimately arrived at display a sobriety of judgment and a consistency with Scripture which lead to the conviction that in forming them the

Church at large enjoyed the promised presence and assistance of her Divine Head (Matt. xviii. 20; xxviii. 20). It is important, however, to note the character of these decisions. They were negative rather than positive, repellent of error rather than explanatory of the truth. There were not two Persons in Christ, there was not one nature, nor one will and energy; the union took place without change, admixture, etc. The Church laid down certain landmarks, or, to vary the image, buoys, beyond which it was not safe for speculation to venture; but wisely forebore to attempt a positive explanation of the mystery. Within the channel marked out varieties of exposition are admissible; but they probably will only issue in disappointment. For, in truth, the problem of the incarnation, like the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, is beset with difficulties which the finite mind of man seems incapable of grappling with. We see here, emphatically, through a glass darkly. An attentive reader of the history of the dogma will probably perceive that it involves three main questions: 1. That relating to the kenosis, or exinanition, of the Logos. 2. That relating to the hypostatical union. 3. That relating to the perichoresis, or interpenetration of the natures.

§ 49. KENOSIS, OR EXINANITION, OF THE LOGOS

This point did not specially engage the attention of the early Church, which was occupied rather with the notions to be formed of the Person of Christ *after* the incarnation. It came into greater prominence in the disputes between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in the seventeenth century; and in more recent times, but principally in Germany, it has drawn to itself the attention of many distinguished theologians.

S. Paul tells us (Phil. ii. 7) that Christ when He was in the form of God thought it not a thing to be snatched at or retained to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε); and on the meaning of these last words the controversy mainly turns. By the Lutheran theologians they are understood of the Logos incarnate, and of the earthly life of Christ. Being by virtue of the communication of Divine properties to the manhood, which took place from the moment of the conception, in the form of God, He yet laid aside His native dignity, and took upon Him the form of a servant; *i.e.*, as it is explained, while retaining the *possession* of the Divine attributes (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.) He forbore the *use* of them, hid them as it were under a veil, and only occasionally permitted glimpses of them to appear. But the difficulties connected with this interpretation are very great. It imposes on us the belief

that Christ as a babe in the womb possessed omniscience without using it, which seems a contradiction, and exercised omnipotence while unconscious, as man, of His own personality. Thus an air of unreality becomes attached to the manhood in that stage, and the same, to some extent, may be said of all the subsequent stages till the ascension. Moreover, deliberately to renounce the exercise of powers latently possessed implies a conscious act of will; and the difficulty recurs, how are we to conceive Christ as a babe exerting such an act of will? There seems, further, no room left for a real human development, for the Logos from the first absorbs the manhood into Himself, and the latter becomes a mere instrument, a Theophany, a dramatic representation. In short, the theory is plainly of Docetic tendency. But a still more formidable difficulty remains. The conception in the womb is itself assigned to the kenosis; but if so, where is the manhood which laid aside its inherent majesty? It must be one antecedent to the conception, *i.e.* it must be a pre-existent manhood, sharer of the Divine glory and attributes, which it abdicated in order to enter the Virgin's womb. And thus, in its natural result, the Lutheran doctrine seems to lead to the notion of a double manhood, one before time, the other in it.

The preference then must be given to the interpretation generally adopted by the Reformed theologians, according to which the words 'being in the form of God' refer to the Logos ἄσαρκος, or the second Person of the Holy Trinity before He became man [1]; and the passage will then be to the effect that the Logos submitted to a self-limitation whereby it became possible for Him to enter into union with the manhood, without annihilating its natural properties, or interfering with its relatively independent development. In other words, the act of incarnation itself, and irrespectively of the subsequent humiliations endured by the Saviour, was a kenosis. What conception are we to form of this?

There appear to be only two ways in which we can imagine such a kenosis to have taken place. We may suppose that the Logos, in order to adapt Himself to the state of the embryo in the womb and the babe in the manger, a state devoid of self-consciousness, suspended for the time His own Divine self-consciousness, gradually recovering it as the babe grew according to the ordinary laws of humanity; a theory which has been maintained by distinguished names abroad.[2] By a free act of omnipotence and unbounded love, the Logos extinguished for the time being His personality, and became unconscious in the unconscious infant, partially conscious

[1] But see Dr. Gifford on the Incarnation, on the force of ὑπάρχων.—ED.
[2] Thomasius and his followers.

in the child, fully so in the man. The first objection to this hypothesis is that it seems inconsistent with the ἀτρέπτως of the Council of Chalcedon, and tends to a temporary eclipse of the Holy Trinity; the personality of the second Person, which cannot really be separated from His nature, suffering *pro tempore* an extinction. Moreover, instead of the Logos being Himself the active animating principle of the incarnation (which is the doctrine of the Church), He here becomes a mere impersonal nature on a level with the impersonal embryo;[1] and in order to obtain such an active principle presiding over the union of the natures, the Holy Ghost takes the place of the Logos. This latter, indeed, is a characteristic of the Reformed theology as compared with the Lutheran. It is plain that the union of two unconscious natures, neither of them exercising the functions of a true personality, seems hardly to come up to the idea of the incarnation, as it is represented in Scripture. But if this theory is rejected, the only other conceivable mode of self-limitation is that which leaves the Logos in full possession of His active personality, but supposes that the fulness of the Divine nature was not at once communicated to the human, but gradually, according to the receptivity of the latter.[2] That is, the union was not, as the Lutheran divines teach, complete from the first, but was itself a *process*, involving successive acts; a continual efflux of the Divine nature into the human, not an act perfected at once. The union kept pace with the growth of the manhood; being different in the babe from what it was in the man, and in the earthly life from what it is in the heavenly, and in the present heavenly life from what it will be when the time spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. 28 arrives. The Logos *intra carnem* was never during the earthly life present in His fulness as He is *extra carnem*; not because He had abdicated His essential Godhead, but because He had not communicated it to the manhood in all its fulness, nor could do so until the manhood was *capax infiniti*.[3] There was a kenosis therefore of the Logos, so far as the man Christ Jesus was concerned, but none of His own essential nature. The knowledge, *e.g.*, which Christ possessed was Divine; not merely such a knowledge as Christians also possess, but Divine through the indwelling of the Logos: it was a knowledge

[1] The embryo is called ἅγιον, in the neuter gender (Luke i. 35). Compare τὸ γεννηθὲν, Matt. i. 20. See Martensen, Dog. s. 132.

[2] The theory of Dorner and others. See Dorner, Theil ii. 1272.

[3] This capacity, according to Dorner and those of his way of thinking, was actually attained at the Ascension: so that Christ's human nature is now fully partaker of the Divine attributes (Theil ii. 1200–64). Dorner alleges the possibility of death, or the separation of soul and body, as a proof that the hypostatical union was not, during our Lord's earthly sojourn, complete.

sui generis, and absolutely free from error: but it was not omniscience as an attribute of Deity. The Logos exercised, so to speak, a measure of self-restraint in communicating this and the other Divine attributes, in tender condescension to the weakness for the time being of the human factor. And thus Christ could and did say, 'My Father is greater than I,' as well as 'I and the Father are one' (John xiv. 28, x. 30); He could be, and was, ignorant of the day when the end should come (Mark xiii. 32). This notion of the kenosis certainly avoids the difficulties connected with the former, but it involves one of its own hardly less formidable. It involves the idea of a *double consciousness* in the Logos, viz., that belonging to Himself as a Divine Person and that belonging to Him as incarnate in Christ, which plainly, according to the theory, are not, or at least were not for a time, coincident. And is such a double consciousness consistent with the unity of the Person, or rather of the personality, of Christ? In truth this is a difficulty which meets us, more or less, in every attempt to explain the mystery. Even if we suppose that this duality of consciousness is now at an end, the human nature having become capable of receiving the Godhead in all its fulness, must it not have existed during the state of humiliation?

§ 50. HYPOSTATICAL UNION (ἕνωσις ὑποστατική—unio personalis)

The doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon is that the Divine and the human natures are united in one Person, viz., the Person of the Logos; hence the term *Unio personalis*. This union is distinguished from several other kinds. It is not, says Hollaz, *notionalis sive rationis*, as when genus and difference make the species; not *respectivè* (σχετική), as when two friends are said to have one soul; not accidental, of which whiteness and sweetness in milk, honey and water in mead (κατὰ σύγχρασιν), two beams in juxtaposition (κατὰ παράστασιν), the matter and grace of the sacraments, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the faithful, are examples; not *essential*, as when two imperfect substances go to make one nature, *e.g.*, the soul and body in man, whereas in Christ two perfect natures are in union; but altogether singular and wonderful, a union of natures but not a natural one, a personal one, but not of persons. It is called perichoristica, *i.e.*, intimate and most perfect, denoting a mutual interpenetration of the things united. He adds, very properly, that such a union can only be of substances in themselves, *i.e.*, abstractedly, diverse in nature. J. Damasc. mentions other kinds of union not to be confounded with this;—κατὰ ταυτοβουλίαν as when there is a unity of will between two persons, καθ' ὁμοτιμίαν as when God is

said to have exalted the man Christ Jesus to like honour with Himself, καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν merely nominal and κατ' εὐδοκίαν of goodwill. The Council attempted no positive explanation of the manner in which the union of the natures in the Person took place.

The technical words employed in these discussions, 'Nature,' and 'Person,' labour under an ambiguity which has led to much fruitless controversy. The Logos must be held to have assumed not indeed *a* man but still *a* human nature; the totality of our nature but individualized in His person. And this is what the Council means by affirming that Christ is a 'perfect man,' for a complex of predicates, without will and intelligence, and a central Ego, would not be such. By the two natures then we must understand *concrete* natures, God Himself subsisting in an individual man.

Then with respect to the word 'Person,' which the Council distinguishes from the 'natures,' when it declares that two natures are combined in one Person, we may ask, What is the Person of the Logos apart from His nature, *i.e.* the Divine essence? A mere mode of subsistence in the Godhead; not what we usually mean by the word, viz., an individual with an independent will, and real subsistence. God the Son is God with the personal property of filiation, which is a mere relation in which He stands to the Father. What we mean by personality belongs to the One God, the common 'substance' or essence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not to the immanent relations of the Holy Trinity considered by themselves; just as in the case of an earthly father personality belongs to him as a man, not to his paternity, or the relation in which he stands towards his son. Hence it will be seen that such a question as T. Aquinas has proposed, whether the union took place in the Person, or in the natures, has no proper meaning.

The trinitarian hypostasis, or Person, of the Logos, without the connotation of His nature, *i.e.* the Godhead itself, does not seem capable of assuming a human nature. The union was effected neither in the Person alone, nor in the nature alone, but in both; *i.e.*, the incarnation was the work of the Holy Trinity so far as it was God who became flesh, but it terminated, in scholastic language, in the Person of the Son: in which latter sense it cannot be said that the Father, or the Holy Ghost, became incarnate. Does it not seem to follow that if the Person of the Son is severed from His nature, while the two natures are to be considered as abstractions, not living realities, little place is left for a true personal subject, a thinking and willing agent, in the incarnate Logos?

These remarks may serve to point out the difficulties that beset the subject. The question the Church had to deal with was this:

the true meaning of the words ' Person ' and ' nature,' as used in this connection, being borne in mind, how were the natures to be brought into union so as to form the One Christ as He appears on the page of Scripture ? The illustration of the Athanasian Creed, from the compound nature of man, is not to the point. The soul, the animating principle of the body, and which corresponds to the Divine nature in Christ, is not, like the Godhead, a complete nature in itself, but only a part of man's nature ; whereas the Divine nature is no part of any other, it exists *a se*, in the plenitude of its personality and attributes. Shall we suppose the two natures so to combine as to form a mixed one ? But then Christ is neither God nor man, but a *tertium quid*. Shall we suppose a process of absorption to take place ? But if the human nature is absorbed in the Divine, Christ has no real manhood : if the Divine in the human, He has no real Godhead, to say nothing of the impropriety of ascribing a change to what is absolutely unchangeable. If, as we have seen, the natures are not mere abstractions, and this Scylla is to be avoided, how are we to keep clear of the Charybdis of a double personality in Christ ? If the natures are supposed to be united in the Person (*unio personalis*), which is in fact the received mode of explanation, is a Trinitarian Person, in its proper meaning, capable of such a function ? But it may be well to let one of the orthodox writers of the Church, a standard authority both in the East and West, John of Damascus, speak for himself in his attempt to frame a consistent theory.

In his treatise on the Incarnation this writer, after speaking of the miraculous conception, thus proceeds : The Logos was not united to a human body already in existence, but dwelling in the womb of the Virgin while in his own person uncircumscribed he formed the subsistence (ὑπεστήσατο) of a body and a rational soul, the Logos Himself becoming the hypostasis of the human nature : so that there was simultaneously flesh—the flesh of the Logos—and flesh animated by a soul.[1] Wherefore we do not say that man was deified, but that God became man ; for God perfect in nature became man perfect in nature, yet without coalescing into one. If this latter were maintained Christ would be of the same substance neither with the Father, whose nature is simple, nor yet with His mother, whose nature was not compounded of Deity and humanity. The errors of heretics proceed from their confounding the nature with the hypostasis. When we speak of one nature of man, we mean that which is common to many hypostases (*i.e.* persons), viz. having a body and soul, each hypostasis possessing these two natures (or substances). But as regards our Lord, since

[1] Ἅμα σὰρξ ἅμα Θεοῦ Λόγου σὰρξ, ἅμα σὰρξ ἔμψυχος (De F. O. lib. iii. c. 2).

there never was, or can be, more than one Christ, there can be no such thing as a common Christ-nature, a Χριστότης; but we have one Hypostasis in two perfect natures, the Hypostasis being on this account a compouud one (σύνθετος). As in the Holy Trinity the subsistence of three Persons does not affect the unity of the Godhead, nor is the Unity of the Godhead inconsistent with the subsistence of the three Persons, so a duplicity of natures is not inconsistent with the one Christ, *for they are united in the Person* (καθ' ὑπόστασιν). We do not affirm that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to all the persons of humanity, but that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to the whole nature of the manhood, ὅλος ὅλῳ. The peculiar property of the Person of Christ, that wherein He differs from the Father and the Holy Ghost, from His mother and from us, is that He is at the same time God and man. By the terms ' perfect God ' and ' perfect man ' we signify the fulness and completeness of the natures; in saying ' wholly God ' and ' wholly man ' we signify the individual singularity of the Person. In the Holy Trinity the proper phrase is not ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, but ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος; but as regards the Person of Christ it is ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, not ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος.[1] The following is of importance: ' Although no nature is without an hypostasis, or essence without a person in whom it inheres, it does not follow that natures united to each other in an hypostasis should have each its own hypostasis; for they can unite into one hypostasis, both having one and the same. The hypostasis of the Logos, being that of both natures, occasions the human nature neither to be without an hypostasis nor yet to have one of its own; both natures possess it in its totality, without division or separation. The human nature was not made an hypostasis alongside the hypostasis of the Logos, but subsisting in the latter it may be called ἐνυπόστατος, *i.e.* owing its hypostasis to another, whereas ἀνυπόστατος would mean that it has no hypostasis at all, neither one of its own nor a borrowed one.' [2]

The substance of this exposition is that the prime movement, towards the incarnation came from the Logos, *i.e.* God under the hypostatical character of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, not from the manhood; the former being the active, the latter the passive agent: that the two natures even after the union remain distinct: that there is, however, but one Christ, the unity of the Christ being secured by the union of the natures in the hypostasis of the Logos. Thus far it is merely an expansion of the statements of the Council of Chalcedon, and no doubt fairly represents the accepted doctrine of the Church. But when it is examined care-

[1] De F. O. lib. iii. cc. 2–8. [2] De F. O. iii. c. 9.

fully, and with a view to its inner consistency, it is less satisfactory. The natures remain distinct, *i.e.* as the writer explains it, Deity is not humanity, nor humanity Deity : this indeed is self-evident ; but is he not attaching to the word ' nature ' that self-same abstract sense which, as we have seen, is quite inapplicable to the Divine nature, *i.e.* making it a complex of predicates instead of God Himself in His full personality ? Deity (Θεότης) did not unite itself to humanity, but the Logos became man in the actual man Christ Jesus. The natures in the abstract sense appear in Christ as living realities ; God, not Deity ; an individual man, not humanity. But if this be so, how can the natures thus understood be said to remain distinct after the union ? Do they not rather seem to unite so as to form the one God-man, as He actually appears on the sacred page ? It seems as if the ἀτρέπτως, ἀσυγχύτως, etc., of the Council refer not so much to the *result* of the union as to the *mode* in which it was effected ; it was not effected by conversion, fusion, etc., but by the hypostatical assumption. But this does not determine what view of Christ's Person we are to take *after* the assumption ; and if even then we are to consider the natures, in their proper sense, as distinct, it is not easy to see how we are to avoid the notion of a mere juxtaposition of the Logos and the man Christ, the συνάφεια which Cyril contends against, whereas S. John says that the Logos became flesh. This is one difficulty that meets us. And another is connected with the Damascene's statement that the human nature has no proper hypostasis, or personality, of its own ; that of the Logos fulfilling this function. But a humanity without a central ego, the source of will and determination, seems a mutilated one ; it seems at best but a mere instrument, or ὄργανον, of the Logos. That is not the conception we form of the Christ of the Gospels. According to this theory we seem to have in Christ a human nature defective in the property of personality, on the summit of which, to supply the defect, is placed the Divine personality of the Logos ; apart from which common bond of union the natures would have a tendency to fly asunder. But a human nature distinct from the Divine, and in order to keep it in union therewith, deprived of its own independent hypostasis, which is replaced by a Divine hypostasis, is a conception certainly not without its peculiar difficulties. And these were felt, and attempts made to obviate them. The assumption was made that personality did not in fact appertain to the perfection of a human nature. T. Aquinas supposes an opponent to urge that the human nature in Christ cannot be supposed of less dignity than ours ; and that to a perfect humanity it certainly does appertain to possess a proper personality, *i.e.* whenever the nature becomes individualized

as it did in Christ. His reply does not seem very satisfactory. Personality, he says, only belongs to the perfection of a thing in so far as it belongs to its perfection to subsist by itself. But this condition disappears if it subsists in another more exalted than itself; which is the case as regards the human nature in Christ. The absence of its own personality is compensated by that of the Logos; it gains by the loss. The human nature in Christ is more excellent than ours, just as the sensitive soul, which is common to man and the brute, is more excellent in the former by reason of its conjunction with an intelligent nature. But the question relates not to the excellence of what a thing is joined to, but to the perfection of the thing itself which is joined; and the illustration does not determine whether an individualized human nature without a personality of its own can be considered a perfect one. Another illustration which Aquinas uses betrays the weakness of his position. Not every individual substance, he says, is a person, but only that which subsists by itself; the hand of Socrates, *e.g.*, though an individual substance, is not a person, because it subsists only in something more perfect than itself, viz. Socrates. If the human nature bears only the same relation to the Person which the hand of a man does to the man, it plainly occupies a very subordinate position in our conception of Christ. In later times, after the Adoptionist controversy, the theory was fully carried out, and the general doctrine of Church writers was that the manhood in Christ is impersonal. What J. Damasc. means by a 'compound hypostasis' is not quite clear. If it is only that the hypostasis of Christ is that of both natures, it is but repeating what he had already said; if that the human nature had, after all, a personality of its own, but that it was, in some sense, united to that of the Logos, the union of a Divine and a human personality into a compound one seems as difficult of comprehension as the union of a Divine and human nature into a compound nature.

The same line of reasoning is pursued in reference to the duplicity of wills in Christ, and occasions the same difficulty. Against the Monothelites J. Damasc. remarks that the faculty of will is a property not of the person but of the nature. What we possess without learning it belongs to the nature, but we all possess the faculty of willing without learning it. Man was created in the image of God, who is absolutely free, and therefore he must have a will. If will were a matter of the person and not of the nature there would be three wills in the Holy Trinity, for there are three Persons; but inasmuch as there is but one Divine will, it must belong to the nature (*i.e.* the common essence) of the Godhead.

But since in Christ there is confessedly a duplicity of natures, it follows that there is also in Him a duplicity of wills. Scripture attributes a real human will to Christ. And the same may be said of the 'energies' of Christ, which are twofold, corresponding to the natures. It will be seen that throughout this reasoning the 'nature' is not regarded as an abstraction, such as Deity or humanity, which as such can have no will, but as individualized in a person; and then arises the question, How are the wills to be held in union so as that the unity of the Person shall not be impaired? The answer is, as before, that the wills are held together in the hypostasis, or Person, of the Logos. 'It is impossible to combine two wills into a compound one, any more than two natures; what name could we give it? It would neither be Divine nor human.' But how can the person of the Logos, a mere relation, operate apart from His nature, which is the real source of His will? And if under His Person we include His nature, is not the whole tantamount to saying that the will of the Logos holds the will of the manhood in union? which, whether it be true or not, seems inconsistent with what J. Damasc. elsewhere says respecting the independence of Christ's human will. For the Divine will holding the human one in union must plainly be the dominant principle, and the human will can only exercise itself so far as that of the Logos permits. And thus it seems deprived of the characteristic of a really free will, viz., self-originating power. The Logos makes use of the human will much as the soul makes use of the body.

It cannot be disguised that the general effect of the theory that the Trinitarian Person is the bond of union between the natures and the wills otherwise distinct, is to leave the natures without a real union and to assign an undue preponderance to the Divine aspect of the Redeemer's person. And since the mediatorial office of Christ as our High Priest rests on the truth of His human nature (Heb. ii. 17), it cannot be matter of surprise that there should have been a tendency in mediæval Christianity to lose sight of the Saviour as our advocate with the Father, and to set up other mediators in His place. It may be doubted, too, whether such a manhood is capable of ethical development. Could Christ be really tempted, resist the temptation, submit His will to that of the Father, learn obedience by what He suffered, become perfect through suffering, earn His crown of glory as a reward—all which Scripture attributes to Him—without a human personality, the seat of self-determining energy? Or could He be an example and an encouragement to us? The Councils and theologians have negatively guarded the essentials of the faith, but it can hardly be said that they have given us the full portraiture of God

manifest in the flesh. The difference of the natures *in the abstract* it is no doubt essential to maintain, but what we want to realize is the unity of the Person including the natures, the Person of the one Christ, God and man.

As Nitzsch remarks, Syst. § 131 : perhaps the point of departure has been taken too much from physical analogies, such as the soul and body, or the heated iron, which after all explain nothing ; and too little from the descriptions which Scripture gives of the Christian life. In Scripture the nature of God and the nature of man do not repel each other, like the opposite poles of a magnet, but rather have a mutual affinity. Man was created in the image of God, and God from the beginning was actuated by a φιλανθρωπία (Tit. iii. 4). The union restored between fallen man and God, in and through Christ, is ethical rather than physical. But very strong expressions are used concerning it. ' I live,' says S. Paul, ' yet not I, but Christ liveth in me ' (Gal. ii. 20) ; ' Christ is our life ' (Col. iii. 4) ; ' he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit ' (1 Cor. vi. 17). The Holy Spirit bears witness with their spirits that Christians are sons of God (Rom. viii. 14–16). Prayer is the voice of the Spirit Himself in their heart (*ibid.* 26). Yet Paul's individuality stands out distinct on the inspired page, and is not interfered with by the presence of Christ in him. He lived with the consciousness of perfect freedom, and yet his human life was continually taken up into the life of God. Here is a union of God and man entirely removed from physical conceptions, and yet surely not the less real. And it may aid us in our attempts to explain the incarnation, so far as it can be explained. Christ stands out on the inspired page as a man like ourselves, with a human will, and human energies ; tempted, resisting, suffering, victorious ; but His human will, though real, yet being free from any taint of sin, was evermore, and immediately in each crisis, taken up into perfect union with that of the indwelling Logos. From one point of view He is altogether Divine, and from another He is altogether human ; and this probably is the mode in which most simple-minded Christians receive the mystery.

§ 51. PERSONAL PROPOSITIONS. COMMUNICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTES (Propositiones personales. Perichoresis. Communicatio idiomatum)

The natures, however abstractedly distinct, cannot be supposed to be in mere juxtaposition, united by a Divine hypostasis which like a ring contains them within its circumference. A communion between them of some sort there must be. Leo had attempted to satisfy this requirement by his well-known Canon, ' Each nature acts according to its own properties, but with the participation of the

other; *e.g.*, Christ walked on the lake by virtue of His human nature to which alone walking belongs, but that He did not sink was owing to the participation of the Divine nature in the act. But even this left the natures too far apart, and it was felt necessary to bring them into some closer relation. The explanation of J. Damasc. is as follows:

'The Logos made human properties His own, inasmuch as what belongs to His flesh belongs to Him, and imparts to His flesh (*i.e.* His human nature) Divine properties; according to the method of mutual communication (ἀντίδοσις), and by virtue of the interpenetration of the natures (περιχώρησις). Thus the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified (1 Cor. ii. 8), although His Divine nature could not suffer; and the Son of Man is said to be in heaven while upon earth in his human nature. For it was one and the same that was Lord of glory and Son of Man. And we acknowledge that to the same Person both the miracles and the sufferings belong; though by virtue of one nature (κατ' ἄλλο) He performed the miracles, and by virtue of the other endured the sufferings. When we contemplate the natures we call them Deity and humanity; but the one compound hypostasis we sometimes name Christ, *i.e.* both God and man, or God incarnate; sometimes, from one of its parts, God only or the Son of God, and man only or the Son of Man. When we speak of the Deity (*i.e.* in the abstract) we do not attribute to it human properties; we cannot say it was created, or capable of suffering: nor, again, do we attribute to the humanity (in the abstract) Divine attributes, *e.g.* to have been uncreated. But when we speak of the Person we attribute both the one and the other to Him: Christ died, Christ is in heaven (while upon earth); this Man is uncreated, and uncircumcised, etc. This is what we mean by antidosis; either nature imparting to the other its own properties, by virtue of the unity of the Person and the Perichoresis.'[1] He speaks also of a certain deification (θέωσις) of the human nature, through its union with the Divine; which he explains as being 'enriched with Divine energies'; as, *e.g.*, in the miracles, it did not perform them by virtue of its own properties, but through its union with the Logos in His hypostasis, the Logos exerting His Divine power through the human nature.[2] But this adds little to what he had previously said concerning the antidosis and the perichoresis.

[1] De F. O. lib. iii. cc. 3, 4.

[2] De F. O. lib. iii. c. 17. He extends this deification to the human will in Christ, from its union with the 'Divine and omnipotent' will of the Logos. But can a human will deified by union with an Omnipotent will be said to remain a human will in any proper sense?

It may be doubted whether in all this J. Damasc. arrives at any real perichoresis of the natures. At least, the examples he gives are merely those which were afterwards called 'Personal propositions,' from their belonging rather to the Person which holds the natures in union than to the natures themselves.

T. Aquinas does little more than reproduce the reasoning of his predecessor. 'Since the Person,' he says, 'of the Son of God, which is correctly expressed by the Word "Deus," is the sustaining principle (*suppositum*) of the human nature which the word "Homo" in the concrete denotes, it is plain that this proposition, *Deus est homo*, is true and proper, not only on account of the truth of the terms, but on account of the truth of the predication.'[1] That is, in reference to this particular Man, the proposition holds good, *Deus est homo*; but, as he explains afterwards,[2] the natures in the abstract, Deity and humanity, exclude each other.

The question concerning the adoration of Christ is treated in the same way by both writers. 'In what hypostasis,' asks J. Damasc., 'dost thou worship the Son of God? One incarnate nature in the hypostasis of the Logos; worshipped with one worship since the Person (*πρόσωπον*), though of two natures, is one.'[3] So T. Aquinas.[4] In other words, the human nature in the abstract is not an object of adoration, but the whole Person is; and this person is man as well as God; so that we may say, not that humanity but that this Man is to be worshipped.

Shortly after the Reformation the differences between the Reformed and the Lutheran branches of the Protestant Church brought the question of the union of the natures into prominence. Luther taught that Christ in His glorified body is present in the consecrated elements; Zwingli, and the Swiss churches in general, allowed only a spiritual presence. Among the arguments employed by the latter against the Lutherans, a principal one was that ubiquity must thus be ascribed to the human nature, and this re-opened the whole

[1] De Incarn. q. xvi. art. 1. The truth of the terms. *i.e.*, the same Christ is truly God and truly man, therefore God is man; the truth of the predication, *i.e.* man may be truly predicated of God. This may be the place to notice an ambiguity in the use of the word 'hypostasis,' or 'persona,' which J. Damasc. not infrequently falls into. Sometimes he uses it, as T. Aquinas does here, to signify the *suppositum*, or sustaining principle (*ὑπόστασις*), of the human nature; that the human nature has the ground of its subsistence in the Logos. At other times he seems to mean by it the central ego, the personality, of an individual; that is, of the Logos, so far as He can be considered an individual. The former sense may be consistent with a true ego, or personality, of the human nature, hardly the latter.

[2] De Incarn. q. xvi. art. 5.

[3] De Sanct. Trin. q. 5.

[4] De. Inc. q. xxv. art. 1.

controversy respecting the communion of the natures. The Reformed Confessions touch lightly on the subject. We do not hold, says the Helv. Confession 1566, that the Divine nature in Christ suffered, or that Christ according to His human nature is omnipresent. For the body of Christ, though glorified, has not laid aside its properties, or become absorbed in the Divine nature.[1] So the Heidelberg Cathechism : ' Christ is true God and true man ; therefore according to the human nature He is not on earth, but according to His Deity, majesty, grace, and Spirit, He is never absent from us.'[2] The Lutheran Confessions are more distinct. We teach, says the ' Formula Concordiæ,' that though each nature retains its essential properties, so that, *e.g.*, to be omnipotent, omnipresent, etc., are not properties of human nature essentially, and to be circumscribed, to suffer, to die, etc., are not properties of the Divine nature essentially (that is, that the one nature is not formally changed into the other), yet on account of the hypostatical union that of the natures is much more than a mere nominal one,[3] otherwise it would be impossible to say, This man is God. After the incarnation the human nature belongs to the Person not less than the Divine ; therefore wherever Christ is, there He must be in His human nature. But in His Divine Nature He is omnipresent ; unless, therefore, we rend the Person asunder so must He be in His human nature. Yet this does not mean that the human nature is *locally* expanded, so as to fill all places in heaven and earth ; this cannot be said even of the Divine nature. That the humanity is not receptive of Divine properties cannot be proved : does not Christ Himself say, ' All power is given unto Me,' etc., and ' Where two or three are gathered, etc., there am I ' ? If the union of the natures were merely nominal, of what value would the atonement be ? Whereas it was the participation of the Divine nature in Christ's sufferings that rendered them efficacious to take away sin ?

Here then is a difference of no small moment amongst Protestants themselves. On the Lutheran side it may be said, ' You admit that the Person of the Logos constitutes that of the manhood ; does, then, the nature pass with the Person or not ? If it does, the Divine attributes must sooner or later pass with it, for in God the attributes cannot be *in re* separated from the nature. If it does not, the Person of the Logos apart from His nature is, as already explained, a mere relation. Nor must we argue to the capacities of human

[1] Augusti, Lib. Symb. Eccl. Ref. p. 27.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 549.
[3] The antidosis of J. Damasc., and ἀλλοίωσις of Zwingli, against which Luther inveighs so vehemently.

nature from the actual condition of man born in sin and subject to death, but from human nature as it appears in the second Adam, and in its glorified state; of *this* manhood, though not of our present empirical one, it may be true that *Finitum capax infiniti est.*' Had the Lutherans stopped here, it might not have been so easy to dislodge them from their position. But they took up other ground hardly tenable, *e.g.* that the communication of the properties was complete from the moment of the incarnation, so that the babe Christ even in the womb was omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. Only He forbore the *use* of these attributes. It has already been observed how in the crucial instance of omniscience this theory *must* be modified, the possession and the use being here inseparable. The Logos, in short, according to the Lutherans, is not and cannot be *extra carnem.* Wherever He is, there is also the manhood which is now inseparable from the Person. And in order to make this consistent with the nature of a real body, which must, if it become visible, be circumscribed in space, they invented the curious notion of an ' illocal ' presence (*illocalis præsentia*); *i.e.* a presence which, like the Divine omnipresence, is disconnected from the ideas of space and visibility. When Christ, *e.g.*, shall appear at the last day, it will be a *manifestation* in space of the illocal Presence, and as such come under the laws which govern a visible and tangible body. Thus they hoped to obviate the absurd idea, attempted to be fastened on them by their opponents, of Christ's body filling all space; which, even if it were conceivable, would be a very different thing from the Divine attribute of ubiquity. If Christ becomes visible in space, it can only be as He was visible to the Apostles after His resurrection, viz., in a circumscribed body like ours.

The doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* was worked out by the Lutheran divines with scholastic precision. It is defined to be not merely *Verbalis* or *Intellectualis* (as when genus communicates its properties to the species), but *Realis* (*i.e.* between two substances really distinct); nor, again *exæquativa* (*i.e.* the difference of the natures *per se*, or essentially, remains): nor *multiplicativa* (as when a man communicates according to the traducian theory, his soul to his son); nor *transfusiva* (as when wine is poured from one vessel into another, leaving the former empty); but συνδυαστική, *i.e.* between two natures perfectly and intimately united; yet not *commixtiva* (*i.e.* the properties of the natures are not commingled); nor *essentialis* (as between the three Persons of the Holy Trinity); but *personalis et supernaturalis.* There are three kinds of it. The first, when the properties either of the Divine or the human nature are attributed to the whole Person; *e.g.* Christ is begotten of the Father

from everlasting, Christ was born of the Virgin Mary (*genus idiomaticum*). The second, when the Son of God is said to have communicated the properties of His Divine nature to the human, really and truly, to be possessed and used in common (*genus majestaticum*). The third, when in the work of Christ (atonement, etc.) either nature is said to operate according to its own properties but to a common result (*genus Apotelesmaticum, θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια*); *e.g.* when Christ is said to have died for sin, the dying properly belongs to the human nature, but the efficacy of the sacrifice is derived from the Divine ; and they both combine to the result, viz. satisfaction for sin, and are ascribed to the one concrete Person, Christ.

It was the *genus majestaticum* to which the Reformed theologians principally took exception, and not without reason. They argued that no created being, which the human nature of Christ was admitted to be, however exalted and glorified, could be receptive of the infinite Being in all His fulness, that *finitum* never can be *capax infiniti*. The Logos, therefore, in the Person of Christ must be supposed to be, more or less, in a state of self-limitation. That if some Divine attributes, *e.g.* Omnipresence, were communicated, all must have been, for we cannot, except in thought, separate one class from another ; and consequently eternity must be predicated of the incarnation, which yet we know, as a fact, took place in time. That a real antidosis implies a communication of human properties to the Divine nature as well as of Divine to the human, which yet is incompatible with just views of the Divine nature, which being infinite, can admit of no additions.

It will be seen that the Reformed type of doctrine is formed rather on the lines of the Council of Chalcedon and J. Damascenus, while the Lutheran aims at bringing the natures into union in themselves, and not merely through the connecting link of the Person. And in order to secure some real communion between the natures, the Swiss theologians were compelled to introduce the Holy Ghost between the Logos and His human nature. What the *communicatio idiomatum* is in the Lutheran theology the excellent gifts of the Holy Ghost are in the Reformed. Such are, the power of working miracles, a knowledge far transcending ours, a *relative* independence of the ordinary laws of humanity, such as passing through closed doors, vanishing out of sight, etc. ; which, however, are to be carefully distinguished from the Divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, or omnipresence. The possession of these gifts was not denied by the Lutherans, but they asked whether the singularity of Christ's Person could be secured by the impartation of spiritual gifts which, at least as regards their ordinary manfestations, are the

property of every good man. The result of the controversy may be briefly summed up: that neither type of doctrine succeeds in giving us a fully adequate representation of what we want—a Divine-human personality, a Theanthropus, one Christ both God and man.

PART II.—THE WORK OF CHRIST

§ 52. THE THREEFOLD OFFICE

THE Person of Christ is the foundation of His work, but the work itself consists in the restoration of the normal relations between man and God. As such it is properly described as a mediatorial work. The word 'Mediator' is used in the New Testament in a twofold sense—that of a peacemaker between two parties at variance (1 Tim. ii. 5), and that of the founder of a religious polity, as when the Mosaic dispensation is said to have been given by the hand of a Mediator (Gal. iii. 19); and in both it is applicable to Christ. He came to effect a reconciliation between man and God separated by sin, and to establish a new spiritual polity, of which Himself should be the Head, and His Church the visible manifestation (Heb. xii. 24; Phil. iii. 20). Everything connected with this mediatorial work belongs neither to the one nature nor to the other singly, but to both in conjunction, or to the Person of the Redeemer. And it is described under a threefold aspect, as consisting of prophetical, sacerdotal, and kingly functions; a division which, though assailed by some modern writers, is of ancient date, and is founded not only on express statements of the New Testament, but on the typical appointments of the Old, in which the offices of the prophet, priest, and king formed the main pillars of the institution. Since part of the ceremony by which persons were set apart to these offices was anointing with oil, the title Messiah, or Christ, was applied to the Saviour; the antitype being the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Ghost and with power (Acts x. 38), which event formed the point of transition from His private to His public life (Matt. iii. 16). Although these offices must not be exclusively assigned to particular periods of the life of Christ, as if, *e.g.*, the work of atonement did not commence until the close; indeed the typical ones were, in the later times of the Jewish commonwealth, sometimes found united in the same person at the same time; yet in their main features they naturally fall into the order which they usually occupy in works on theology.

§ 53. PROPHETICAL OFFICE

Although Christ does not give Himself the name of prophet, yet He is so called in the New Testament; and this in accordance with

ancient prophecy itself (Deut. xviii. 15). And if His kingdom was to be founded, not, as that of Mahomet, on physical force, nor, as the Mosaic dispensation, on a typical and ceremonial law with its visible priesthood, nor yet on a magical effect of external ordinances, but on free conviction and the obedience of faith—if it was to be in its essence 'righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost' (Rom. xiv. 17)—it must rely on the spiritual weapons of instruction and persuasion. By these methods Christ must win His way to the conscience, unfold the nature of true religion, sever from connection with Himself and His religion superstitious or merely political accretions, gain for Himself the title of teacher (ὁ διδάσκαλος); all which in fact formed also the main functions of the Jewish prophet.

The prophetic ministry of Christ has been divided into immediate and mediate; or that which He exercised on earth in His own Person, and that which He continues to exercise through human ministers. But since the latter is rather the office of the Holy Ghost, to whom also the inspiration of Holy Scripture is properly ascribed, it seems better to consider the prophetical office as commencing with the baptism in Jordan and ending with the Ascension. As regards the New Testament gift of prophecy, it is manifestly part of the dispensation of the Spirit (1 Cor. xii. 10). The matter of Christ's teaching corresponded to the well known division of ancient prophecy into didactive and predictive matter. To expound the meaning and comprehensiveness of the moral law; to insist on its superiority to ceremonial enactments; to expose the immoral casuistry by which its spirit had been superseded—this formed a large part of Christ's teaching, as it had done that of the ancient prophets. Thus far from destroying, He fulfilled (Matt. v. 17) and promulgated not a new law, but the meaning of the old. But there is, withal, a marked peculiarity in the *manner* of His teaching. While the prophets disclaim an independent mission, and speak of themselves as mere interpreters (προφῆται), and unworthy, too, of the office (Isa. vi. 5), Christ taught with authority, and from Himself; He spake what He knew, and testified what He had seen (John iii. 11). The predictive element, though not wanting, occupies a subordinate place; and necessarily so, for He who was the subject of ancient prophecy had come, and type and prediction had given place to the reality. It was not to a future Messiah, but to Himself, as the way, the truth, and the life, that He directed the minds of His disciples. His predictions relate chiefly to the establishment and progress of His Kingdom on earth, and partake, like ancient prophecy, rather of the character of intuition than of specific vaticination. The curtain of time, as in

the Apocalypse, when lifted, discloses the fortunes of the Church under symbolical representations, which refuse to be tied to the literal interpretation. Or He speaks in parables, which contain in themselves a germinant fulfilment, by no means as yet exhausted. And as Christ is the fulfilment, so He is the end of prophecy. We expect no essential additions to revelation; even inspired Apostles only expanded the germs found in His discourses. The prophetic gift in the Church is confined to exposition; and he who professes either to improve, or to add to, what Christ has delivered occupies a place outside the pale of Christianity.

Although it is not stated of all the prophets of the Old Testament that they performed miracles as an evidence of their mission, it was a usual accompaniment of the prophetic function. And in our Lord's case this sign was very conspicuous. But His miracles, like His teaching, had a character of their own. They were not merely marvels, but works of beneficence, and of an eminently symbolical character; having their counterpart in the miracles of Divine grace, and naturally leading the mind from the cure of bodily ailment to that of spiritual. They were performed, too, without effort; He spake the word and it was done, as if all nature confessed its Lord, and bowed to His will. Miraculous powers of a similar kind continued in the Church for some time after the Ascension, but gradually disappeared as the new faith consolidated itself. Miracles are the proper accompaniments of the introduction of a religion, but are out of place in its progress. Christianity promulgated under miraculous attestation, and furnished with an inspired standard, is left to work out its history and its problems under the ordinary operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church.

§ 54. SACERDOTAL OFFICE

The sacerdotal office naturally follows the prophetical, for conviction of sin, which the prophets especially aimed at producing, is the first step towards a hearty reception of the atonement provided in the Gospel. It has been matter of debate whether Christ was a Priest while upon earth, or first exercised the office after the Ascension. The doubt seems to have arisen from the circumstance that to slay the victim was not on common occasions a necessary part of the priest's office under the old covenant (Lev. iv. 29), and the offering Himself as a sacrifice for sin was the main work of Christ in His state of humiliation. But the doubt will disappear if it is remembered that in Scripture it is the sin-offering on the great day of atonement, with which that of Christ is almost exclusively compared, and on that day the High Priest not only carried the blood into the most

holy place, but himself slew the sin-offering (Lev. xvi.). This part of the High Priest's office our Lord did unquestionably perform while on earth, what followed in the Jewish ritual being appropriated to Him in His glorified state. His priesthood, then, is one and undivided, but partly fulfilled on earth, partly in heaven. And it is usually considered under the two heads, corresponding to the functions of the Levitical High Priest, of offering atonement for sin, and making intercession for His people.

The Levitical ritual first claims our notice. If indeed the judgment of a modern writer, that 'Jewish sacrifices rather show us what the sacrifice of Christ was not than what it was,' [1] is correct, the subject could have no interest for us. This, however, is not the view which Scripture gives of them, and especially that great Epistle in which the subject is formally discussed. The ceremonial law, we learn from the Epistle to the Hebrews, was both symbolical and prophetical. As a system of symbol, or as Warburton calls it, 'representation by action,' [2] it conveyed present lessons of instruction. The devout worshipper was constantly reminded of the Divine holiness, his own sinfulness, and the need of atonement. But a mere symbol may terminate in itself, without prospective reference; and though suitable to the infancy of religion it naturally gives place, later on, to a more spiritual mode of instruction. But Scripture describes this ritual as typical also (Heb. x.), ordained with reference to a more perfect dispensation in which it was to find its fulfilment; it was a prophetic symbol. And this more particularly as regards its ordinances of sacrifice and priesthood. Its use, therefore, towards an understanding of the atoning work of Christ must be very great.

The rite of sacrifice appears in all nations as the earliest mode of Divine worship, and in Scripture is represented as coeval with the human race (Gen. iv. 4). Whether it was of human origin, dictated by the natural feelings of sinful man, or of express Divine appointment, may be doubtful; in the Mosaic law, at any rate, it receives Divine sanction, and appears under a new aspect. It is in the ritual of the great day of atonement that the distinguishing features of the Mosaic institute are found concentrated. On this occasion, when atonement was made for the nation in its corporate capacity, the High Priest as the representative of the priesthood, and through it of the whole people (for all Israel was in one sense 'a kingdom of priests,' Exod. xix. 6), alone entered the holy of holies with the blood of the sacrifices which he had offered, and which he sprinkled on the mercy-seat, thus symbolically covering, or removing from God's

[1] Jowett, Com. vol. ii. 479.

[2] Div. Leg. bk. iv. s. 4.

sight, the sins of the people. The sin-offering for the people contained special features. In consisted of two goats, one of which was offered in sacrifice, and the other, after the imposition of the hands of the High Priest, was sent away alive into the wilderness, laden, as it is described (Lev. xvi. 22), with the iniquities of the children of Israel. Of this expressive transaction the following seem to be the leading ideas. In the first place, a power of expiation. To no sacrifices previously mentioned in Scripture—not to that of Abel (Gen. iv. 4), nor to that of Noah (Gen. viii. 20), nor to that of Abraham (Gen. xv. 9)—is this efficacy attached. In the Mosaic sacrifices generally, and especially in this one, it is the declared object of the institution. 'On that day the priest shall make an atonement for you to cleanse you, that ye may be clean from all your sins before the Lord' (Lev. xvi. 30): the blood sprinkled on the mercy-seat covered or removed from the eye of God the impurity which rendered the people, and even the vessels of the tabernacle, unfit for His service. Secondly, the atonement was the appointment of God Himself. Not only was the declared expiatory power, but the whole ritual of the institution, in its minutest details, matter of revelation; so that no room was left for the unauthorized suggestions even of real piety, and the worshipper was reminded that the covering of sin was a mystery which reposed in the bosom of God. He could not entertain the idea of propitiating an offended Deity, though the LXX. usually render the Hebrew word by ἱλάσκομαι or its derivative ἵλασμος; for the ritual represented Jehovah as taking the initiative, and Himself devising means whereby the barrier which intercepted the exercise of His mercy might be removed. Thirdly, the atonement was effected through suffering, viz., the death of the victim. That is, it was founded not merely on the announcement of the willingness of Jehovah to pardon on repentance, but on an expiatory act which He was pleased to accept; and expiation always involves the idea of suffering, and moreover of suffering as the punishment of sin. It has been argued indeed that not the death, but the blood of the victim possessed the atoning virtue; and it is true that the sprinkling of the blood was the culminating point of the whole transaction. But the blood was obtained only in one way, viz., through the death of the victim, and the two acts cannot be severed from each other. The true view seems to be, that the expiation of sin was effected by the death, the covering of sin by the application of the blood, or as it is termed 'the life' (the life being in the blood); which blood, or life, was no longer unclean, but fit to be presented to Jehovah. Fourthly, the ceremony exhibited a vicarious element. The sinner,

excluded from theocratical privileges and condemned by the moral law, was permitted to substitute for himself an animal sacrifice, by which he recovered his theocratical standing. And the details are not less significant. In all cases of the sin-offering the offerer (or the priest) was to lay his hand on the head of the victim, which forthwith became unclean because identified with the sinner, and as such was slain. That is, a spotless victim, spotless physically, and morally so far as an animal is incapable of guilt, took the place of the sinner, and that spotless life presented at the mercy-seat availed to hide sin from the eye of God.

In most of the religions of antiquity we find priests as well as sacrifices, and both sprang from the same feeling, that of an existing barrier between sinful man and God, which called for a mediator if communication was to be restored. And in order to confer permanency and dignity on the order, the principle of caste was commonly adopted; that is, the priestly function was attached to a certain tribe, or family, and passed from father to son irrespectively of moral or intellectual qualifications. Such was the Jewish priesthood, though in this instance the tenure was subject to revocation in case of moral delinquency (1 Sam. iii.). At the head of the order stood the High Priest. On his breast the names of the twelve tribes were borne; he only could enter the most holy place on their behalf; and yet he was one of themselves, encompassed with the same infirmities, and capable of feeling 'compassion for the ignorant and those out of the way' (Heb. v. 2).

Such are the impressions which any unprejudiced reader would gather from a study of the Levitical ritual. And the question now is, Is the teaching of the New Testament accordant therewith, or of an opposite character? The statements of Christ Himself first demand attention. We are not, of course, to expect any systematic exposition of His atoning work when the atonement itself was not effected; this was reserved for the fuller revelation vouchsafed to his chosen ministers. In our Lord's discourses the atonement is either presupposed (as in the Lord's prayer); or it is implied in casual sayings; or it is veiled under parable and allegory. Yet His teaching contains the germ of what was afterwards more fully explained. He describes Himself as the good shepherd who gives his life for the sheep (John x. 15); as having come to give His life a ransom (λύτρον=כֹּפֶר) for many (Matt. xx. 28); as about to be lifted up (on the cross) in order to accomplish a spiritual deliverance analogous to the temporal wrought by the brazen serpent (John iii. 14). And above all, on the most solemn occasion conceivable, the last supper with His disciples, He compares the import of His death with that of the expiatory sacri-

fices of the Mosaic covenant : ' This is My blood which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins ' (Matt. xxvi. 28).

The Book of Acts does not add much to our information on the point before us. Not so with the Epistles. S. Paul, after having proved the whole world under sin, declares that redemption from this state is by Jesus Christ, whom God hath openly proposed as a sin-offering, or propitiation ; thus vindicating His righteousness, which had seemed to be somewhat obscured by the passing over, without due retribution, of the sins of the ancient world. And again, that One died for all, *i.e.* vicariously, and in Him all died (2 Cor. v. 14) ; that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, *i.e.*, removing the impediment that existed to the exhibition of His mercy, and this by making Him who knew no sin, not a sin-offering, nor a sinner, but a partaker of the very element of sin itself *in its penalty* (*ibid.* 21). Christ is said to have purchased us out of the curse of the law, as slaves regained their liberty by payment of a ransom, by becoming a curse for us (Gal. iii. 13). In corresponding language S. Peter affirms that ' Christ bare our sins in His own body on the tree,' and that with His precious blood we are redeemed (1 Pet. i. 18 ; ii. 24). Nor does S. John teach otherwise when he writes that the blood of Christ cleanseth (*καθαρίζει*, the proper term for legal cleansing, see Heb. ix. 14) from all sin (1 John i. 7 ; iv. 10).

The Epistle to the Hebrews is a formal treatise on the subject, designed to show that the type must disappear now that the Antitype is come. The Levitical sacrifices could never take away sin, but Christ in the end of the world has appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself (Heb. ix. 26). The Levitical priests came and went, but Christ is a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek, that mysterious personage who appears suddenly on the page of history, without notice of his birth or his death, or the register of his family. He entered into the Holy of holies above with His own blood, having obtained eternal redemption for us, and to appear for us in the presence of God (chaps. vii. ix.). The perfection of His sacrifice forbids its being ever repeated, for by one offering He has perfected for ever them that are sanctified, or cleansed (Heb. x. 14).

With this plainly-declared correspondence between the type and the Antitype, it is impossible to suppose that the language of the New Testament was framed merely in accommodation to Jewish habits of thought. The contrary is evident, that the work of Christ was the original plan in the Divine mind, and the Jewish ritual was framed as a preparation for it. If the Apostles, from their natural associations, wrote erroneously on this subject, the grave question arises, why was it ordered that Christianity should spring from a Jewish

stock, and not from some religion free from such misleading associations? Why were the first heralds of Christianity almost necessitated to give a false portraiture of it? This is a difficulty which the Socinian has to meet, and it does not appear how it can be met. On this hypothesis, too, neither can the Divine origin of the Jewish dispensation, nor the inspiration of the writers of the New Testament, be maintained.

§ 55. CONTINUATION—THEORY OF ANSELM

Unlike the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, that of the atoning work of Christ did not form a prominent subject of controversy in the ancient Church: whence it arises that the three Creeds only declare in general terms that Christ suffered and was crucified for us. Nor do the early Fathers enter very deeply into the subject. The first speculations on it are connected with the Scriptural figures under which the atonement is described as the payment of a price, or a ransom. 'To whom,' it was asked, 'was the price paid?' A common answer was, 'To the devil'; who through the Fall had acquired rights over man which he could not, without an equivalent, be fairly called on to surrender. This curious theory was afterwards modified to signify, not payment to the devil, but still, as if he had some equitable claim, the overcoming of him by a crafty device. By Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory the Great the human nature of Christ is compared to a bait concealing the hook of the Divine nature, which the devil swallowed, but to his own destruction. Thus was he overreached in his subtlety. It does not seem to have occurred to them that such a notion seems making the end justify the means, and that to allow the devil independent rights, which by some means must be satisfied, is to sanction a kind of Manichee or Gnostic dualism. Yet this notion held its place for a long time both in the Eastern and the Western Churches. 'Since the enemy,' says J. Damascenus,' had tempted man by promising him equality with God, he in turn is tempted by the presentation of the flesh (of Christ). It was only just that whereas man was overcome by the tyrant, the latter should be overcome by man, and that not by mere force (but on grounds of equity) man should be rescued from the power of death.' In the eleventh century the treatise of Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, entitled 'Cur Deus Homo?' appeared, and formed an epoch in the history of the dogma.

This great theologian, whose theory became the accepted one in the Western Church, introduces his pupil as professing himself unable to understand why an Omnipotent God should, in order to restore fallen man, have assumed our nature with its natural infirmities

and died on the cross as a malefactor. If it be said, to redeem us from sin, from wrath, and from the power of Satan, why could not all this have been effected by a simple fiat of the Almighty? Among men, to attain an end through toil and suffering which might have been attained directly, is deemed inconsistent with wisdom. To remove these doubts it must be proved that the end could be attained in no other way. And this is the problem which Anselm proposes to himself.

He sets out with rejecting, in the person of the inquirer, the notion that anything is due to the devil (L. i. c. vii.); a sentiment which in his own person he emphatically repeats at the end of the treatise. God, he continues, claims from man perfect obedience; sin consists in not rendering it, *i.e.* in robbing God of His due, and dishonouring Him. The sinner, therefore, is a debtor, and a contumelious one; and it would be inconsistent with the attribute of Justice to cancel the debt without satisfaction: it must either be paid in full, or the penalty for non-payment be inflicted (c. xi.). The alternative is demanded by the moral order of the universe (c. xii.). The mercy of God cannot be exhibited at the expense of His holiness. The question then is, Who is to pay the debt? For that a restoration of man, to some extent, at least, is intended we may infer from the improbability that the end of his creation should be wholly frustrated, and especially from the consideration that the elect are intended to fill up the gap which sin made in the ranks of the angels. If it be pleaded that the debt may be paid by repentance and good works, the answer is that we owe these to God already; but how is *past* sin to be atoned for? (c. xx.). The greatness of sin must be estimated not by the mere act, but by the circumstances under which, and the Person against whom, it is committed (cc. xxi. xxii.). To render an adequate satisfaction it would be necessary that man, as he allowed himself to be overcome by Satan, should overcome Satan in turn; and further should undo the damage he brought upon the race by working out a means of justification and life for the elect: neither of which, from his inherent weakness, he can do (cc. xxii. xxiii.). This inability is no excuse, for man brought it on himself (c. xxiv.). The case then would be hopeless if Christ be put out of view. But matters assume another aspect, in the Scripture doctrine of redemption. It has been shown that man's debt never can be paid except by one who can render to God something greater than everything else except God; and He who can do this must be God. But it must be rendered by man also, for it was man that sinned. Therefore it must be rendered by One who is both God and man. And such is Christ. The Redeemer, being miraculously conceived, though born of

woman, was without sin; and therefore not naturally liable to death. But He voluntarily underwent death for our sakes, and thereby rendered to God the 'something' which is of greater value than everything else except God. The value of the death is to be measured by the preciousness of the life, than which nothing was more precious. God could not justly demand a life from Christ; therefore the free-will offering in our stead redounds to our advantage. In Christ man is sinless, overcomes Satan, is obedient unto death, gives up his spotless life to God; here is what we have been seeking for—full satisfaction for sin. For the sinless sufferer justly claims a reward for what He thus, in obedience to the will of God, undeservedly underwent, and the reward which He receives is the salvation of the elect (L. ii.).

Such in substance is the argument of the 'Cur Deus Homo?' and such in substance must be every theory on the subject which aims at being Scriptural. Not that any theory can be pronounced quite satisfactory, for the atonement is one of those subjects which human reason must ever fail fully to fathom. The key-note of Anselm's doctrine is the idea of 'satisfaction,' and against the idea expressed by this word it is that Socinian and rationalist objections are principally directed. The word itself does not occur in Scripture, and appears to have been first used by Tertullian and not in connection with the work of Christ [1]; but the terms 'ransom,' 'price,' 'redemption,' and the like, involve the idea, and cannot be supposed to have been adopted without reason. When a slave was bought out of captivity, the price paid was a satisfaction to the owner for his loss; when sin, in consequence of what Christ did and suffered, was remitted, satisfaction may be said to have been made to Divine justice. All such terms are analogical: they do not pretend to explain the mystery as it is *in itself*, but so far as it can be explained *to us*, by figures with which we are familiar. No price, or ransom, was really paid to God, but something analogous to what we understand by such a transaction took place when Christ died. In like manner anger finds no place in God, but He is said to view sin in a manner analogous to what we feel when we receive an injury or insult; and He is propitiated as we should be if due reparation were made. If the deep things of God, which only the Spirit of God knows as they are (1 Cor. ii. 11), are to be in some measure brought down to our comprehension it can only be by analogical language, which, however differs from merely figurative in that it expresses *facts* in the Divine economy.

[1] De Pœn. cc. 5–10. The 'satisfaction' of Tertullian is what the sinner himself (by penitence, etc.) renders (Hagenbach, § 68, 5).

The real point at issue is, Does the Atonement involve a change in *God's* attitude towards man, or merely in man's attitude towards God? God is love, and immutability is part of our conception of Him; but the idea of the Divine wrath against sin does not necessarily trench upon these Scriptural representations. For wrath in this connection is but holy love; love sorrowing and indignant at the perverted relation between the creature and his Creator; love not resting until the true relation is restored. A God indifferent to moral obliquity and the misery it produces would indeed be an ominous conception: disguised as it might be under the mask of pure mercy or benevolence, it would in reality differ little from that of a malignant Deity. A parent who feels indignant against the sin of a child, and shows it, does not the less love the child in so feeling and acting. Now the whole tenor of Scripture is to the effect that through the vicarious sacrifice of Christ a change was wrought in God Himself of this nature, that whereas previously He could not, consistently with the perfection of His attributes, grant forgiveness on repentance, now He can. The blood of the sin-offering, covering the sin of Israel, symbolically represented this change, the blood of Christ effects the reality. God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, *i.e.* expiating its sin (2 Cor. v. 19); and not until this was done could there be any preaching of an atonement or invitation to men to be reconciled to God (*ibid.* v. 20). What men needed to be told was not that they should repent and turn to God, but that if they did so, God could be just and yet forgive. Here, too, the language is analogical. How the Atonement could have affected the mind of God towards man is a profound mystery; but we know thus much, that if an offender against us has expiated his offence by great suffering, this is a consideration which changes wrath into pity, and paves the way for our favourably receiving his overtures of reconciliation. It was the sufferings of the prodigal son no less than his repentance that moved the father to grant forgiveness. Something analogous to this Scripture declares to have been produced in the attitude of God towards man by the sacifice of Christ. It is true that redemption, in its full sense, involves the sinner's also being reconciled to God; but the accepted expiation of the Redeemer, 'while we were yet sinners' (Rom. v. 8), is the necessary condition of Christ's saving work in us. This is substantially what Anselm means by the term 'satisfaction,' and the figure of a debt which has been paid. And surely it is nothing more than the doctrine of the Apostle when he declares that the 'handwriting of ordinances that was against us,' *i.e.* the law with its demands, was taken out of the way, being nailed to the cross, nailed in token of the debt's having been cancelled (Col.

ii. 14). In the case of the believer, the eye of God cannot rest on the requirements of the law without at the same time resting on the cross, which is the evidence of their having been satisfied.

In Anselm's mode of stating the argument, no doubt imperfections may be perceived, which, however, do not impair the essential solidity of the structure. He is careful, for example, to impress upon us that to the Divine honour, so far as it relates to God Himself, nothing can be added, and nothing taken from it (c. xv.). When the creature refuses obedience, he does what in him lies to dishonour God, but the sin and shame of the action terminates with the sinner himself. But if God never can be dishonoured in *Himself*, how, it may be asked, can we speak of a debt as being due to Him? The answer is not given by Anselm, but it is obvious. It is due to God not merely as a Person, but as the Author and Upholder of the moral order of the universe, as a Lawgiver and a Judge. The distinction holds good in common life. A crime committed may not and does not dishonour the magistrate as a man, but it does dishonour the law of which he is the visible representative, and the penalty may be considered a debt due to him under this particular point of view. It has been objected, too, that his reasoning wears too much of a commercial, or forensic, aspect, and does not assign sufficient prominence to the Divine love which prompted the sacrifice of the Son. But the treatise was intended to be an answer to the particular question, *Cur Deus homo?* or why was the Incarnation necessary? and the author must be judged accordingly. Yet it is a real defect that, in examining wherein the value of Christ's work consists, he does not sufficiently insist on its *ethical* aspect, as the work of One who earned by obedience a crown for Himself and the salvation of His Church. It is true that he points out that, unlike the legal sacrifices in which the victim was not a free agent, Christ was under no compulsion to suffer and die (c. ix.): He might have called down more than twelve legions of angels to rescue Him (Matt. xxvi. 53): He offered Himself, a willing sacrifice, to God (Heb. ix. 14). But the interval between the Saviour's birth and His death is passed over in silence, as if the life of Christ had little or no bearing on the work of atonement, whereas by S. Paul His obedience up to the culminating point of His death is made an important element (Phil. ii. 8). It may have been on account of these defects that Anselm's doctrine was far from being at once accepted by the Church, and indeed seems to have made but little impression on his contemporaries and immediate successors. Abelard opposed it, and made the essence of the Atonement to consist in its moral effect, the love of God therein exhibited drawing forth our love towards Him; in which he was

followed by Peter Lombard and others. Duns Scotus denied that the value of Christ's sacrifice was infinite, as having been offered only by the human nature; consequently the debt was not fully paid, but God *accepted* it as an equivalent; thus anticipating the theory of Grotius in after times, commonly called that of *Acceptilatio*, a legal term signifying the creditor's giving a discharge for the whole on receiving part of his debt. But T. Aquinas, after expressing hesitation on some points, accepts the theory of Anselm as a whole, and from his authority, as well as from its intrinsic merits, it gradually prevailed, and forms the basis of the theology of the Reformation on this subject.

The question debated by the older theologians, and commonly answered by them in the affirmative, whether Christ suffered exactly what we should have had to suffer but for His interference, *e.g.* the pains of hell, is an instance both of the influence and of the abuse of the theory of Anselm. It was occasioned by the absence of the ethical element from this theory, and which is its great defect. A mere debt is satisfied by being paid, no matter by whom or from what motives; but the value of Christ's sacrifice depends upon other considerations than that of the *lex talionis*. Scripture gives no countenance to the doctrine. The consciousness of guilt which forms a necessary ingredient of the pains of hell could not in the case of Christ exist. The exclamation on the cross, 'My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' so much insisted on, does not bear out the inference; for the very form of it, 'My God,' proves that whatever anguish the soul of Jesus at that moment experienced, total separation from God did not form part of it. If what we had to suffer was literally exacted from Christ, and in our stead, why should most Christians be still subject even to temporal death? Quantitative measurements are not applicable to this case.

§ 56. CONTINUATION.—ACTIVE AND PASSIVE OBEDIENCE

According to Anselm, Christ might seem to have been born only that He might die. There is no doubt, indeed, that Scripture speaks of His death as the special act by which expiation was made for sin. Had His expiatory sufferings stopped short of this, He would not have drained the cup which His Father had given Him to drink. But previously to it He had lived above thirty years in the world, partly in private and partly in the exercise of His public ministry; and the question might, and did, arise, whether a connection existed between that spotless life and the work of atonement? We need, it has been argued, a vicarious fulfilling of the law as well as a suffering of the penalty, and Christ rendered the former for us as well as

endured the latter. By His death we obtain pardon, by His righteousness eternal life. A king may pardon a rebel, but it does not follow that the latter should be reinstated in more than his former position of favour and dignity. The father in the parable not only forgave his repentant son, but put a new robe on him, a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet.

It may be questioned whether, as commonly stated, this doctrine is either Scriptural or safe. Scripture nowhere treats of the *atoning* work of Christ under two distinct heads of suffering and righteousness, with two distinct benefits resulting therefrom ; but rather of one great act by which sin was expiated. But neither does it seem safe. Redemption, in its full meaning, implies deliverance from the power as well as the penalty of sin ; and to maintain that Christ's work was vicarious for us in the former sense might lead to dangerous practical consequences. At least, the statement needs to be carefully guarded. It may possibly be so by discriminating between the mere sinlessness and the sinless sufferings of the Redeemer. What rendered these sufferings of infinite value in the eye of God was the dignity of the sufferer, His perfect submission, and His absolute sinlessness : but the expiatory effect belonged to the sufferings themselves, not to the circumstances which rendered them altogether peculiar. And thus though the whole life of Christ must be reckoned to His atoning work, and not any particular scene or act as the agony in the garden or the crucifixion, yet primarily it was as a life of unmerited suffering, as one of passive obedience, that it merited the power of expiation.

Is, then, the imputation of the active obedience, the righteousness of Christ, an unscriptural idea ? By no means. Only it belongs not to the article of atonement, but to that of justification ; it is the privilege of the Church, not of the world. To have Christ's righteousness imputed to us, or what is equivalent in sense to be counted righteous for His sake, is far more than a mere expiation for sin : it involves the gifts of repentance, of faith, of adoption into the family of God, it corresponds to the robe and the ring with which the prodigal son was invested as tokens of reinstatement in his former privileges. So far as it is not our own but counted to us it is vicarious, but not in the sense of being wrought for us irrespectively of our actual condition, as the atonement was wrought for us. Christ's righteousness is imputed only to those in whose hearts He dwells by faith. And hence the remark is not without foundation that between the forgiveness of sin and the imputation of righteousness there is no real distinction. Undoubtedly to him whose transgression is forgiven the Lord imputes not iniquity (Ps. xxxii. 1, 2), but then

forgiveness of sin is more than atonement for it. Forgiveness implies the actual conversion of the sinner, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit assuring him of his adoption (Rom. viii. 15), the process of sanctification begun. It is merely a question of words whether we say that such a person has received forgiveness of sin or has the righteousness of Christ imputed to him ; the thing meant is the same. But we cannot say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to those who have no vital union with Christ, or make this privilege co-extensive with atonement or expiation. To do so would indeed be to open the door to Antinomian tendencies. It seems hardly correct therefore to apportion the satisfaction, in Anselm's sense of the word, between Christ's active obedience to the law and His passive obedience in suffering the penalty. He ' died for our sins '—this is one thing ; He ' rose again for our justification ' (Rom. iv. 25)—this is another. ' If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by His life ' (*ibid.* v. 10).

§ 57. CONTINUATION.—EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT

This question is not by any means so simple as is commonly supposed. Numerous passages of Scripture can be cited in which what is called, though not very accurately, universal redemption appears to be plainly taught. Thus the Baptist bare witness to Christ that He is the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world (John i. 29) ; God is said to have so loved the world as to have sent His Son that through Him it might be saved (*ibid.* iii. 17) ; to have been in Christ reconciling the world to Himself (2 Cor. v. 19) ; to will that all men should be saved by coming to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. ii. 4) ; Christ gives His flesh for the life of the world (John vi. 51) ; it was appointed that by the grace of God He should taste death for every man (Heb. ii. 9) ; One died for all (2 Cor. v. 14). At first such passages seem decisive of the point at issue. On a more careful examination, however, they will not appear so clear.

That *some* limitation must be imposed on their meaning is obvious. If they are to be taken as literally asserting that Christ purchased the salvation of all men, the doctrine of universal restitution seems to follow ; for, it may be argued, how can He be conceived as failing to receive the reward for which He paid the price ? But further ; the advocates of what is called particular redemption allege that the passages are all perfectly susceptible of a limited interpretation. It is argued that they need mean no more than that, in contrast to the Jewish religion which was intended only for one nation, God under

the Gospel dispensation proposed to Himself to gather a church out of all nations, kindreds, people, and tongues (Rev. vii. 9), 'the other sheep not of this fold' of whom Christ speaks in John x. 16. That they sometimes contain their own limitation; as in John iii. 16 the 'world' is explained by the clause immediately following 'whosoever believeth on Him,' viz., out of the world; in 1 Tim. ii. 2, the mention of 'kings and those in authority' makes it probable that by 'all men' the Apostle meant of every class; and in 2 Cor. v. 14, 'one died for all' must be understood by reference to the next words, 'all died,' which do not apply to the whole world but only to those who by union with Christ in His death die to sin, *i.e.*, to true believers. That it is customary with the Apostle to use the word 'all' when the context proves it cannot be taken literally. Thus he says, 'As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive' (1 Cor. xv. 22); and again, 'As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life' (Rom. v. 18); in both passages the context proves that it is believers in Christ whom he has in view. That where this mode of explanation fails, we must compare passages, and not enforce a construction on one which we cannot possibly apply to another. Thus if Heb. ii. 9, 'That He should taste death for every man,' is cited, Cor. xii. 7 must not be overlooked, in which S. Paul says that 'the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal,' which plainly means to every believer. Such are the arguments used in favour of the doctrine of particular redemption, as that term is understood by writers on the subject.[1]

The impression, however, after all remains, that the passages in question cannot be fully explained on this hypothesis, and that Scripture does seem to connect benefits with Christ's death which extend beyond the salvation of His elect, and affect the race. If the holy angels are interested in it (Col. i. 20; Ephes. iii. 15), why not mankind as a whole? Perhaps some ambiguity has arisen from the use of the word 'redemption' in this connection. There is no doubt that this word, as used in Scripture, signifies salvation in all its fulness, and, like the words 'elect' and 'saints,' belongs to the Church, not to the world.[2] To be redeemed by Christ is to be

[1] See Owen's very able treatise, 'The Death of Death in the Death of Christ,' vol. x., Johnston and Hunter's edition. If it were urged that in the typical dispensation the covering blood was applied to all Israel, the answer might be that this makes rather for 'particular redemption,' since Israel, the elect nation, was a type not of the world but of the Church, the heavenly Jerusalem (Gal. iv. 26; Heb. xii. 23).

[2] When S. Paul declares of himself and his fellow-Christians that they had 'redemption through His' (Christ's) 'blood, even the forgiveness of sins

delivered from the captivity of sin and Satan, to be made a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven. And the question is, had Christ in dying for sin no special reference to, or foresight of, His Church to be redeemed, as compared with the whole race of mankind? It is difficult to think so. In dying for His Church He not only procured for it the general blessing of Atonement, but also all other spiritual blessings necessary to its salvation, *e.g.* effectual calling, forgiveness, and adoption (Art. xvii.). He earned for Himself by His death the right and the power to send the Holy Spirit, without whose efficacious influence, even if the prison-doors should be thrown open, the paralysed inmates, who have learned to love their prison rather than liberty, would not and could not come forth, and the Saviour might be left without a Church, the reward of His sufferings and death. In this sense, the term 'particular redemption' only expresses an unquestionable truth; redemption in its fulness must be particular. And in fact, the statement does not occur in Scripture that Christ died for the sins of the world. The Arminian doctrine that the effect of the Atonement is merely that God was thereby enabled to *offer* to man a new covenant, viz., salvation on believing, is only half the truth, for it ignores what the Redeemer purchased for His *Church*, the mystical body of all faithful people, or true believers. But if for the word 'redemption' we substitute 'atonement,' or 'expiation,' this doctrine does contain a fragment of truth, which is overlooked by its opponents. For if redemption is particular, it does not follow that atonement or expiation for sin should not be a universal benefit. And this distinction, in truth, seems the only method of reconciling the various statements of Scripture on the subject. The death of Christ placed mankind as a whole in a new and favourable position as regards God, though by many this position may never be realized or made their own; it was a propitiation not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world (1 John ii. 2). A public advantage was thereby secured, which however may become a savour of death unto death or of life unto life according as it is used (2 Cor. ii. 16). And is not this substantially the meaning of the assertors of particular redemption when they admit, as they do, the *sufficiency* of the Atonement for the sins of the world, or ten thousand worlds? [1] And on that sufficiency

(Ephes. i. 7), can he be supposed to speak merely of a benefit which equally appertained to Herod, Pontius Pilate, or Judas Iscariot?

[1] As, for instance, Bellarmine, who will not be supposed a partial witness: 'Illæ promissiones quæ absolutæ reperiuntur in Scripturis testantur sufficientiam pretii nostri, id est, meritorum Christi. Fuit enim Christi passio, quoad sufficientiam, propitiatio pro peccatis, non solum nostris sed etiam totius mundi' (De Justif. lib. i. c. xi.).

ground the right and the duty of ministers or missionaries to proclaim to all men that if they repent and believe they will be saved? This proclamation could not be made if there had not been effected by the death of Christ a general expiation for our fallen race. And thus the combatants may not be in reality so much at variance as they had supposed. The most extreme Calvinist may grant that there is room for all if they will come in; the most extreme Arminian must grant that redemption, in its full Scriptural meaning, is not the privilege of all men. And thus, too, some light may be thrown on the vexed question respecting the state of the heathen. How can redemption be described as universal when it has never even been made known to countless millions? Redemption cannot in any circumstances be described as universal; but if the death of Christ placed the race in a new relation towards God, it may, in some manner unknown to us, benefit those who never heard of Him. And it were unduly to limit the most High to suppose that He has no other means of bringing men to Himself than by *explicit* faith in a preached Gospel.

It has been questioned whether the intercession of Christ, as distinguished from His oblation of Himself, does not belong rather to the regal than to the sacerdotal office.[1] Formally, no doubt, it is part of the latter, and a sublime instance of it though anticipatory, as it could not otherwise be, occurs in John xvii., while the Saviour was yet on earth. Yet, as it consists in virtually presenting His finished atonement before God, in His glorified state, it seems to be more appropriately considered in connection with the assumption of the regal office, the exercise of which more especially belongs to that state.

§ 58. REGAL OFFICE

Under the typical dispensation there were kings, as well as prophets and priests, and prophecy pointed not only to a suffering, but to a conquering and triumphant Messiah. God in His secret counsels had set His King upon His holy hill of Zion (Ps. ii. 6); a King was to reign and prosper in whose days Judah was to be saved and Israel dwell safely (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6); David (who had long before been gathered to his fathers) should be Prince over God's people for ever (Ezek. xxxvii. 25). Whatever might be the primary application of these prophecies, the image of a righteous theocratical King, as it presented itself to the mind of the seer, was too lofty to be satisfied even by the splendour of Solomon's kingdom; and the faith of the pious Jew, especially in the later times of national decadence, must have been sustained by the hope of a further fulfilment.

[1] Schleiermacher, Glaubenslehre, ss. 104, 105; Martensen, s. 169.

Christ did not decline the title of King when it was applied to Him in irony (John xviii. 37), and only explained that His kingdom was not of this world. Even in the state of humiliation He exercised royal functions. He called unto Him whom He would, and they came (Mark iii. 13); and as it was the office of the Jewish King to represent and maintain the unity of the body politic, so Christ, before He ascended, laid the foundations of the visible Church, choosing Apostles, ordaining outward tokens of Church-membership (Matt. xxviii. 19; xxvi. 27–29), conferring powers for the exercise of discipline (Matt. xviii. 15–19), and promising His presence with such societies to the end of time. But with His ascension the plenary exercise of the regal office commenced. It must not be confounded with the dominion which, as the Logos, He exercises over all creatures: the power which is now given unto Him in heaven and in earth is for mediatorial purposes, and dates from the ascension. But as Mediator He reigns and must reign until all enemies shall be put under His feet (1 Cor. xv. 25). Against sin, the world, and Satan, He wages incessant warfare; not with the carnal weapons of temporal power, but with the spiritual ones befitting such a religion, and day by day His kingdom extends its boundaries. In His Church He reigns by His Word and His Spirit, gathering in His elect from age to age, and conducting them to the end when He shall present them to Himself a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle (Ephes. v. 27). At the end He will resign His mediatorial sceptre as being no longer needed (1 Cor. xv. 28); the present means of grace will be superseded by His immediate presence (Rev. xxi. 22); but the union of God and man, by virtue of which He is the Head of His Church, will remain indissoluble throughout eternity.

The intercession of Christ may properly be considered under this head because it is not a mere deprecation on behalf of His people, but an efficacious pleading of His finished and accepted sacrifice. Hence it is, that, in S. Paul's view, the resurrection, which was a necessary condition of the ascension, is of vital moment (1 Cor. xv. 17). Had Christ merely died for our sin, what warrant should we have that the atonement was accepted, or that those sins, as well as 'the accuser of the brethren,' might not rise up against us in the court of heaven, and demand satisfaction? But the Saviour appears perpetually before God for us, opposing the virtue of His sacrifice to the accusations of the law and Satan, and claiming the just recompense of what He suffered on our behalf. And with Him the Father is always well pleased. Regarding Him in this capacity, the challenge of the Church throughout the ages is, 'Who is He that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who

is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.' (Rom. viii. 34).

ORDER OF SALVATION (INDIVIDUAL)

' Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) He hath constantly decreed, by His counsel secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God be called according to God's purpose by His Spirit working in due season : they through grace obey the calling : they be justified freely : they be made sons of God by adoption : they be made like the image of His only-begotten Son Jesus Christ : they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity. . . . We must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in Holy Scripture ; and, in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God' (Art. xvii.). ' Æterna electio seu prædestinatio Dei ad salutem non simul ad bonos et ad malos pertinet sed tantum ad filios Dei, qui ad æternam vitam consequendam electi et ordinati sunt, priusquam mundi fundamenta jacerentur ' (Sol. Decl. xi. Lutheran). ' Credo Filium Dei, ab initio mundi ad finem usque, sibi ex universo genere humano cœtum ad vitam æternam electum, per spiritum suum et verbum, in vera fide consentientem, colligere, tueri, ac servare, meque vivum ejus cœtus membrum esse, et perpetuo mansurum' (Cat. Heidel. liv. Reformed). ' Constituimus duas partes pœnitentiæ, vid. contritionem et fidem. Si quis valet addere tertiam, vid. dignos fructus pœnitentiæ, hoc est, mutationem totius vitæ et morum in melius, non refragabimur ' (Apol. Conf. Aug. v.). ' Per pœnitentiam intelligimus mentis in homine peccatore resipiscentiam verbo evangelii et Spiritu S. excitatam fideque vera acceptam, qua homo agnatam sibi corruptionem peccataque omnia sua . . . agnoscit, ac de his ex corde dolet ' (Expos. Simpl., c. xiv.). ' Quapropter loquimur in hac causa . . . de fide viva vivificanteque, quæ propter. Christum quem comprehendit viva est ' (*Ibid.* xv.). ' We are accounted righteous before God only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine ' (Art. xi.). ' Albeit that good works which are the fruits of faith, and follow after justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's judgment ; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith ' (Art. xii.). ' Voluntary works, besides, over and above, God's commandments, which they call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety ' (Art. xiv.). ' Not every deadly sin willingly committed after Baptism is sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable. Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after baptism ' (Art. xvi.). ' Item docent quod homines non possint justificari coram Deo propriis vivibus, meritis aut operibus, sed gratis justificentur propter Christum per fidem, quum credunt se in gratiam recipi, et peccata remitti propter Christum. . . . Hanc fidem imputat Deus pro justitia coram ipso ' (Conf. Nug. iv.). ' Item docent quod fides illa debeat bonos fructus parere ' (*Ibid.* vi.). ' Interim proprie loquendo nequaquam intelligimus ipsam fidem esse quæ nos justificat, ut quæ sit duntaxat instrumentum, quo Christum justitiam nostram apprehendimus ' (Conf. Belg. xxii.).

IT was the Saviour's command, after His ascension, that the Apostles should remain at Jerusalem, refraining from the active dis-