

but still a fact of revelation ; and no creed which did not declare it more or less explicitly could lay claim to be an adequate representation of the teaching of Scripture on the subject, and therefore of the appointed measure of our faith.

MAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL

THE ANGELS

'Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam ; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit ; and therefore in every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea even in them that are regenerated : whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek " phronema sarkos," which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin' (Art. ix.). 'The condition of man after the fall is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will' (Art. x.). 'Item docent quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia ; quodque hic morbus seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque æternam mortem his qui non renascuntur per baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum' (Conf. Aug. p. i. 2). 'De libero arbitrio docent quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendæ justitiæ Dei seu justitiæ spiritualis, quia animalis homo non precipit ea quæ sunt Spiritus Dei (1 Cor. ii. 14) ; sed hæc fit in cordibus quum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur (*ibid.* 18). De causa peccati docent quod tametsi Deus creat et conservat naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum, videlicet diaboli et impiorum, quæ, non adjuvante Deo, avertit se a Deo' (*ibid.* 19). 'Assuunt (Pontificii) et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco dictum non reprehendimus ; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum peccatum originis' (Apol. Conf. 43). 'Damnamus Manichæos qui negant homini bono ex libero arbitrio fuisse initium mali. Damnamus etiam Pelagianos qui dicunt hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum præceptum bonum' (Conf. Helv. 1566, c. 9). 'Homo perfectissima Dei in terris imago, primasque creaturarum visibilibus habens, ex anima et corpore constans : quorum hoc mortale, illud immortale est : cum esset sancte a Deo conditus, sua culpa in vitium prolapsus, in eandem secum ruinam genus humanum totum traxit, ac eidem calamitati obnoxium reddidit. Atique hæc lues, quam originalem vocant, genus totum sic pervasit ut nulla ope iræ filius inimicusque Dei curari potuerit. . . . Unde sic homini liberum arbitrium tribuimus ut, qui scientes et volentes agere nos bona et mala experimur, mala quidem agere sponte nostra queamus, bona vero amplecti et persequi nisi gratia Christi illustrati, excitati

atque impulsus non queamus' (Conf. Helv. 1581). 'Deus nequaquam est auctor ullius peccati, sed fons et auctor omnis boni, osor vero et ultor mali. Peccatum originis non tantum justitiæ nuda carentia, sed etiam in pravitate, seu pronitate ad malum ex Adamo in omnes propagata consistit' (Decl. Thor. iii.). 'Etsi in renatis peccatum originis quoad culpam et reatum gratuita remissione deletur, et quoad privitatem magis magisque per Christi gratiam mortificatur, manent tamen in ipsis, quamdiu in carne vivunt, ejus privitatis reliquiæ, vid. pravæ inclinationes et motus concupiscentiæ, quæ proinde vere et proprie peccatum dicitur, non tantum quatenus est pœna et causa peccati, sed etiam quatenus et ipsa cum legi Dei tum Spiritui gratiæ repugnat' (*ibid.*).

§ 28. CREATION OF MAN

WITH the various interpretations of which the first chapter of the Book of Genesis has been the subject, dogmatic theology has little concern. Its sole interest is to secure the idea of a proper creation, an original act in the first instance whereby matter was created *ex nihilo*, and subsequent successive acts whereby the various species which exist were called into being.¹ The first verse of the chapter may refer to the former, or it may be understood of cosmical arrangements of unknown antiquity, fitting our world for a race of happy beings, amongst whom sin found an entrance and reduced their abode to the condition described in verse 2, when the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. On the latter supposition, the earth was restored by a succession of creative acts to be again a paradise of happy beings, no longer, however, of angelic nature, but of a nature 'a little lower' in itself 'than that of the angels' (Ps. viii. 5), though immeasurably superior to them in that it was to be eventually taken into union with the Divine.

When five days of creation (whatever the duration of a creative 'day' may have been) had thus restored the earth from the ruin in which it had become involved, man was formed on the last day to occupy the habitation prepared for him. There is a marked distinction between the language used in reference to his creation and that of the inferior species. A simple fiat of the Almighty gave them being, but man is the subject of a consultative or deliberative process (Gen. i. 26), whether with the older divines we are to conceive the three Persons of the Holy Trinity as uniting in the work, or, with later ones,² the elect angels, already bearing the image of God, as taken into the Divine counsels. In chapter i. man is described in his ethical and cosmical aspects; he is the head and lord of creation, and bears the image of God. In chapter ii. the subject is resumed, and material details are supplied. His body was formed of the dust of the ground (verse 7), thus connecting him with the visible universe,

¹ See § 19.

² As Delitzsch *Psychology, Creation, s. ii. Comp. Job xxxviii. 7.*

and especially that portion of it which was to be the theatre of his fall and his redemption ; formed not as the clay, or the marble, is fashioned into the likeness of a man, but organized from within by the assimilation of the earthly elements, which, under the plastic hand of God, lost their original forms and grew into that wonderful piece of mechanism which constitutes the human frame. Thus on its first page the Bible contradicts the Manichæan or Platonic theories, which consider the body either as like all matter, the production of an inferior deity, or as a clog and impediment to the aspirations of the soul. Man's material nature proceeded directly from God ; formed of dust and therefore capable of resolution into dust (Gen. iii. 19), but also capable of a future renovation (1 Cor. xv. 44) ; the first element of his being in order of creation, the last in order of restitution (Rom. viii. 23). Into this body God Himself breathed ' the breath of life,' the symbolical action representing, not as in a somewhat parallel instance (John xx. 22), the communication of the Holy Ghost in His hypostatical character, but the gift of a created spirit, the source and seat of all that distinguishes the human soul from that of the brutes, but which as yet was destitute of the principle of individuality. The spirit thus infused proceeded to ally itself with a distinct form of animal life, vegetative and sensitive, not essentially differing from that of the lower animals, and man became ' a living soul ' ;¹ but a self-conscious soul, possessing all that is comprised in the term personality. Adam being thus created, the process was not repeated in the case of the helpmeet provided for him : from man woman was formed, in the way of derivation, the spirit-soul passing with the material element ; and thus as the man is the image and glory of God, the woman is the glory of the man, and through him, or mediately, the image of God (1 Cor. xi. 7).

But this Scriptural account of the creation of man has been pronounced by high authorities incompatible with the discoveries of modern science. The antiquity of man, it is said, extends backwards far beyond the received chronology of 6,000 years ; the plurality of races contradicts the notion of the descent of mankind from a single pair ; and a special act of creation is rendered unnecessary by the theory of the transmutation of species. With respect to the first of these objections, it may be observed that the precise period of man's creation is a matter of little moment to the Christian faith. The

¹ נִפְשׁ חַיָּה. This term is applied in the Old Testament to the life of brutes, and does not of itself denote anything peculiar to man (Gen. ix. 4). It is otherwise with the expression נְשֵׁמַת חַיִּים 'breath of lives,' which is not interchangeable with the former. The soul of man, as distinguished from that of brutes, has a spiritual element which connects it with the Divine nature.

received chronology may, or may not, be erroneous ; man may have existed 20,000 years ago instead of 6,000 ; the difference would in nowise affect the religious aspect of the question. It might throw some doubt upon the accuracy of the Biblical narrative as regards matters of chronology, or rather perhaps of current interpretations of the narrative, but this is all. It is therefore unnecessary to inquire how far geological or other evidence tends to invalidate, or to establish, the apparent meaning of Scripture on this point. It is otherwise with the objections last named. If mankind did not spring from a single pair, the truth of the narrative is substantially affected ; the subsequent statements of the Old Testament (Gen. ix. 19 ; x. 32 ; Deut. xxxii. 8 ; Mal. ii. 10) are convicted of error ; S. Paul was mistaken when he declared that God ' made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth ' (Acts xvii. 26) ; the doctrine of original sin becomes involved in difficulties ; and the corresponding doctrine of restitution by One man, the Head of redeemed humanity, redeemed out of all nations and tongues (Rev. vii. 9), loses its significance. But when we examine the proofs alleged, they seem of no great stringency. It is chiefly the colour of the skin, or diversities in the shape or size of the skull, in the protuberance or depression of certain parts of the body, or in the degrees of mental and moral culture which different races of men exhibit, on which the stress is laid. There is, no doubt, a marked difference between the physical and mental characteristics of the negro or the bushman and the European ; but are they specific ? Are they such as it is impossible to account for by the gradual influence of climate or modes of living ; by variations in the type at first sight but afterwards more marked, as two diverging lines, however small the initial angle, soon place a great distance between each other ? Until ethnology is able to frame a positive answer to these questions, we must hesitate to accept its surmises as subversive of the express statements of Scripture. Amidst all the varieties of race the essential organs of the body are found the same, and so is the moral nature, though its voice may be silenced, or utter a perverted verdict. Everywhere men think, reason, feel alike. Under auspicious circumstances, the intellect of the negro has proved itself equal to that of the European. Everywhere, too, where the light of the Gospel has not penetrated, the moral state of man resembles the picture drawn in such sombre colours by the Apostle in Romans i. The objector may fairly be asked whether his hypothesis of several centres of creation, independent of each other, does not greatly augment the difficulty of accounting for this universal moral degradation of humanity. The entrance of sin into the world must always remain a mystery ; but

whereas Scripture deduces its prevalence from one act of disobedience on the part of the primeval pair, this theory has to admit a fall at every centre, the results of which unite all men in a common ruin. For distinct acts of creation are not denied ; the different races are not supposed, as of old, to have sprung out of the ground : and as each pair must be supposed to have been created, like Adam and Eve, in the image of God, each must have fallen from this original righteousness in order to account for the existing state of man. To say the least, the Scriptural account has the advantage in point of simplicity.

Still more opposed to revelation is the theory which has received the name of Evolutionism. According to it there is no need for the interposition of a creative fiat to account for the variety of existing species, with man at their head : all has proceeded by a natural law of development. From a dark abyss of life, a Miltonic chaos without form, gradually emerged, through vast periods of time, a few primitive types ; and these, through the instinct of self-preservation and the survival of the fittest, in the lapse of further vast periods, separated themselves into the species of plants and animals which we now see ; each ascending in the scale of complex organization until we reach the summit, the human race. We behold, therefore, in the ape, or the gorilla, our ancestors of a remote generation. The scientific merits, or validity, of this theory must be left to natural philosophers to estimate ; it cannot be said, in its grosser form at least, to have gained universal acceptance even amongst these. We may ask, How did life first come to be breathed at all into a germ of lifeless matter ? and we may remark that, as far as observation extends, while species have become extinct, no instance occurs of the transmutation of one into another.¹ The attempts to combine species have resulted, as is well known, in sterility. Its inconsistency with Scripture is our immediate concern. Scripture tells us, with marked emphasis, that God made everything on the earth after its kind (Gen. i. 24-5), but this theory leaves no room for the agency of a personal Creator after the first production of matter ; Scripture establishes a specific distinction between man and the inferior animals in that he was created in the image of God, and endowed with the capacity of knowing, loving, and serving God, but this theory makes the difference one only of degree, and the religious faculty an accident of human nature, not its distinguishing characteristic.

¹ Whatever diversity there may be, and there sometimes is great diversity, among the individuals of a species, this does not constitute a *new species*.

§ 29. DICHOTOMY OR TRICHOTOMY ?

From an early period it has been a subject of debate whether Scripture ascribes a dipartite or a tripartite nature to man. Plato, it is well known, considered the soul as consisting of three parts (*τὸ λογιστικὸν* the undying, *τὸ θυμοειδὲς* and *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν* the mortal); but as he did not consider the body an essential part of man, his division is a mere logical one, and has little bearing on the present subject. A nearer approach to Scripture appears in Plotinus, who made man to consist of *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and *νοῦς*. Probably the earlier Greek Fathers, especially those of Alexandria, were influenced by these philosophic speculations, and Clement, Justin Martyr, and others, drew a distinction between the soul and the spirit of man; and for some time Trichotomy was the prevailing doctrine of the Eastern Church. But the use made of it by Apollinaris, who substituted the Logos for the human spirit in Christ, led to a suspicion of its tendency, and the simpler view of a dipartite nature, body and soul, began to take its place. In the West this latter from the first prevailed. Tertullian rejected the tripartite division, and was followed by Augustine, whose authority in this, as in other points, became decisive.

According to the *usus loquendi* of Scripture, both in the Old and in the New Testament, the word 'soul' (*ψυχή*) signifies not merely the animal life, but the whole man, no doubt however with an especial reference to his inward nature. 'Let every soul,' S. Paul writes, 'be subject to the higher powers' (Rom. xiii. 1). It is also used of the immaterial part of man as distinguished from his corporeal, as when our Lord contrasts soul with body (Matt. x. 28), and speaks of His own soul as sorrowful even unto death (*ibid.* xxvi. 38). Soul and body is the usual division of man's nature in Scripture, which thus appears to favour dichotomy. But there are passages in which not only is the word 'spirit' (*πνεῦμα*) used for soul, but in which a trichotomy seems distinctly intimated. The former are easily explicable. When the dying Stephen commends his spirit (*πνεῦμα*) to Christ (Acts vii. 59), or when we read of the spirits (*πνεύμασι*) of just men made perfect (Heb. xii. 23), or of the spirits in prison (1 Pet. iii. 19), it is obvious that 'spirit' means in such passages the same as the more ordinary term 'soul,' viz., the immaterial part of man when separate from the body: the distinction, if any, seems to be that soul is spirit in union with the body, spirit is soul in a separate state of existence. Spirit expresses the essential nature of the soul, which it has in common with the angels and with God Himself who is described as spirit (John iv. 24); its immateriality therefore, and its power to survive the stroke of death. Soul is spirit embodied.

But from the interchange of the terms it is plain that no essential distinction is intended. The other passages present more difficulty. S. Paul prays for the Thessalonians that their 'whole body, soul, and spirit may be preserved blameless' unto the coming of Christ (1 Thess. v. 23); and by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews the Word of God is described as 'piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, joints and marrow' (Heb. iv. 12): in either case a trichotomy seems to be implied. But if, as even the advocates of this view admit, soul and spirit do not form distinct elements of man's immaterial nature—that is, are separable only in thought, so that we never can conceive of man's soul without spirit, or his spirit without soul—what after all do these Biblical expressions describe but the same essence under different aspects, and in different relations? It is to be noted that in the New Testament whenever the word 'spirit,' or 'spiritual,' is used in reference to Christians, there is an implied reference also to the Holy Ghost who dwells in them; as appears most plainly in the distinction which the Apostle draws between the mere 'natural' (unregenerate) man (*ψυχικός*) and the regenerate man (*πνευματικός*) (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). The natural man has a soul with all its essential faculties; but inasmuch as it is only active towards the world and self, while it is inactive towards God and spiritual things, the man himself takes his position accordingly. In this state the faculty of the soul which distinguishes it from that of the brutes, viz., of knowing and loving God, is not indeed lost or extinct, but it is dormant, and cannot be roused into activity without a special influence from above. As soon as this takes place, and the soul's relation to God becomes its governing one, the man assumes another name, and becomes a *πνευματικός*. But the name appears given him not to denote philosophical distinctions, or because there was originally implanted in him a *πνεῦμα* as well as a *ψυχή*, but because the author of the new spiritual life is no other than the Holy Ghost Himself. There is no objection to this faculty of the one indivisible soul, when thus quickened from above, being called the *πνεῦμα*; and in fact the inspired writers do so call it, and so far are trichotomic; but it may be doubted whether they mean to establish an essential tripartite nature of man. They write theologically, not as natural philosophers. When S. Jude describes certain persons as 'sensual' (*ψυχικοί*), 'having not the spirit' (*πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*) (verse 19), he can hardly have meant that they were lacking in an essential constituent of human nature, but rather (as our translators rightly perceived) that they had not the Spirit of God. S. Paul therefore in Thess. v. 23, prays that the whole Christian may be sanctified; his body in the connection of its members with the world,

his soul in its twofold relation, as related to the same world sensitively, morally, intellectually, and as related towards God spiritually (*σῶμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα*); and more seems hardly capable of being drawn from the passage. The Word of God (Heb. iv. 12), like a sharp sword, pierces to the discovering of sin in the inner man, not only as the latter is related to the world (*ψυχή*), but as it is related to God (*πνεῦμα*); dissects and judges the very new nature itself: both so keenly that it is as if a sword penetrated not merely up to the bone, but through it to the marrow. On the whole, it seems that the word 'soul' in Scripture means one spiritual essence, but endowed with diverse faculties, and capable of being viewed in different relations: technically (if we may so speak) this essence, so long as it is unrenewed, is called *ψυχή*; when born again of the Spirit it is called *πνεῦμα*; but the essence itself, or substratum, remains one and the same.

§ 30. IMAGE OF GOD—ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS

According to the inspired writer, man was created in the image and after the likeness of God (Gen. i. 26); what are we to understand by these expressions? Was the body, or the soul of man, or both together, the seat of this likeness? Those who, like Tertullian, invested God Himself with a certain corporeity, supposed that the body was framed thereafter; but this conception was too gross to hold its ground in the Church, though it was revived in the tenth century by the obscure sect of the Anthropomorphites. Others, with more reason, saw in the words a prophetic allusion to the Incarnation; Christ's body being the prototype after which man's was formed. But there are difficulties connected with this view. Our Lord's body while He was upon earth can hardly be called the pattern after which Adam's was created; and as regards His *glorified* body, the true ideal of humanity, S. Paul draws a distinction in this point between the first and the second Adam: the former, he tells us, was made 'a living soul,' the latter 'a quickening spirit'; the first man 'was of the earth, earthy,' the second man 'the Lord from heaven' (1 Cor. xv. 45-7). Even if this description be held to refer to Adam fallen, not to Adam as he came from the hand of the Creator, it seems to imply that the glorified body of Christ is something specifically different from that in which Adam was created, and that even if Adam had never fallen, some change must have taken place in his bodily organization in order to its becoming 'a spiritual body'; which, no doubt, may have been his final destination. Although, therefore, the body may have to some extent represented (as the heathen poets observed), or shared in (as e.g., in the matter of im-

mortality), this dignity, yet primarily the image of God must be supposed to have belonged to the soul, and to have consisted in those features in which the soul bore a resemblance to its Creator.

The first of these, and the foundation of all the rest, was the gift of personality, or self-consciousness—the consciousness of what we call ourselves, and of its unbroken continuity amidst the various changes, mental and bodily, which we undergo, and the power of making it a subject of reflection. The lower animals appear either to be wanting in this faculty, or to possess it only in a very limited measure. God is a Spirit—absolute Personality; man possesses derived and relative personality. But this cannot be supposed to exhaust the notion of the image of God, for the fallen angels have not lost the gift of personality though they have lost the image. The Protestant Confessions therefore, as we have seen, on the neutral basis of personality, build the further conclusion that the first man was created in a state of moral perfection, and, as this could not exist without fellowship with God, in a state in which the knowledge, fear, and love of God existed without any intervening cloud of sin. This doctrine was worked out in detail. The natural appetites were perfectly subject to the law of reason, so that no conflict could arise between them. Adam's knowledge of God was not like ours, partial and obscure (1 Cor. xiii. 12), but direct and full; his holiness had no stain; his will was coincident with the Divine. Secondary prerogatives were immortality, and dominion over the other creatures; to the latter of which exclusively the Socinians reduce the idea of the image of God.

Substantially the theologians were in the right; for it is impossible to conceive any positive imperfection in that which a God of infinite holiness pronounced, when He beheld it, very good (Gen. i. 31). But it may be a question whether they sufficiently distinguished between the perfection of an initial state and that of a final one: between virtue, as it were, in the crude material, and virtue confirmed through trial and victory over evil; between the natural impulse and the habit, the latter being usually formed by repeated acts of will. That Adam's original righteousness needed such a confirmation may be inferred from the trial to which he was actually subjected; and that it was not guaranteed from diminution or loss, is equally evident from the result of the trial. It was an inchoate righteousness, yet perfect of its kind; and had he withstood the temptation, it would have proceeded to a higher quality, until at length the probation being complete, the possibility of not sinning would have been exchanged for the impossibility of sinning. This relative imperfection of his original state no more implies a positive

defect than the essential sinlessness of Christ excluded the possibility of His being tempted, and not only so, but the necessity of it in order to His being 'perfected' in His capacity of Redeemer (Heb. ii. 10 ; v. 9).

All the Protestant Confessions agree in describing the original state of man as not one of indifference between good and evil, still less of actual sin and its concomitant death ; they agree too in denying the necessity of a fall, whether through the weakness of the nature thus created, or as a step towards the realizing its idea. And in the former point they dissent from the doctrine of the Romish Church, that original righteousness was not natural to Adam, but a super-added gift, *gratia gratum faciens*, which might be and was withdrawn at the fall, and yet leave man in no worse a position than Adam was in before he received the gift.

The source of this doctrine is to be sought in the Pelagian tendencies which prevailed in the Western Church in the Middle Ages, and which naturally aimed at extenuating the effects of the fall. It found a congenial home in the scholastic theology, and appears therein under a twofold form : some, as Duns Scotus and his followers, holding that the gift was conferred subsequently to man's creation ; others, as Aquinas and his school, making it coincident therewith. But both agreed in considering it a matter of 'grace,' *i.e.* not of nature, something added over and above to the nature considered in and by itself. The Council of Trent, having regard to this difference of view, avoided in its decree on the subject the use of the word 'created,' substituting for it constituted ; and indeed the real point in controversy can hardly be gathered from its decisions. The Catechism of the Council is more explicit : 'As for the soul of man, God formed it after His image and likeness, and conferred upon it the power of free-will ; the appetites and impulses of the soul He so attempered that they should always obey the dictates of reason. Then He added the excellent gift of original righteousness, etc.' The image of God in Adam is here described as something separable from his original righteousness ; and if so, it may remain in man after, through the fall, he has lost the latter gift. Bellarmine, as is his wont, expounds without reserve the doctrine of his Church, and pushes it to its consequences. Man, he observes, consists of flesh as well as spirit, and these are naturally opposed the one to the other ; consequently, from the very nature of matter, a strife must have arisen between the opposite inclinations, which could only be kept under by the 'golden rein' of the superadded gift of original righteousness. This lost by the fall, the strife which had been forcibly repressed immediately recommenced ; and this is now our present condition. But

as it could not have been called sin in Adam, but only the inevitable result of his compound nature, so it cannot be called sin in us ; and the Creator is no more accountable for it than the smith is accountable for the rust which accumulates on the sword he has made ; not he, but the material is in fault. (Bellarmine overlooks the fact that the smith does not create his material ; could he do so, he would make it proof against rust.) The conclusion is, that Adam, apart from the superadded gift, was precisely what fallen man now is, and fallen man what Adam would have been but for that gift ; if the image of God and free-will belonged to Adam *in puris naturalibus*, they equally belong now to his posterity.

Apart from the ulterior object of this doctrine, viz., to exalt unduly the spiritual powers of *fallen* man, it may seem to be more a question of words than anything else. For, on the one side, it is admitted that, though Adam may be conceived as created *in puris naturalibus*, his condition never was actually such ; the gift of original righteousness having been added at once to the morally indifferent substratum of nature. And on the other side, the Protestant, it is admitted that an image of God still in some respects, and partially, exists in man ; it is blurred, and in its chief characteristic obliterated, but there remain vestiges (*reliquiæ*) of it ; thus much must be conceded from Scripture itself, which, in Gen. ix. 6 and James iii. 9, presupposes even in fallen man an image, or remains of an image, of God. Personality and conscience have not been extinguished by the fall. Nevertheless, the doctrine must be pronounced both exegetically and dogmatically erroneous. Exegetically, for it is founded on a distinction between the words ' image ' and ' likeness ' ; the former, it is argued, signifying the abstract nature, the latter the more positive idea of resemblance ; which distinction is not borne out by the usage of Scripture. Dogmatically, for it represents God as creating an intelligent nature which needed a remedy for inherent defects, defects which *now*, when the remedy is removed, lead inevitably to sin ; which seems, not indirectly, to make God the author of sin. This difficulty cannot be evaded by alleging ' the condition of matter ' ; unless, indeed, it is held that matter existed independently of God, and He had to make the best of a bad material. If matter was created, on whom is the fault of its being able to resist and overcome the spirit to be laid ? But further, it seems an error at all to introduce the idea of ' grace,' or supernatural aid, into that of the original state of man, except in the sense in which all gifts of God, therefore creation itself, are of grace. This is an error from which Protestant divines themselves are not free, as, *e.g.*, when they speak of ' sacraments ' in paradise. Grace, in Scripture, means free

favour, or free aid, to the fallen ; the term is inapplicable to Adam's state before the fall. To apply it to Adam unfallen, is to transfer the religion of redemption into Paradise, a state with which it has nothing to do. Nor does there seem occasion to admit that, though the notion of a superadded gift is to be rejected, Adam may have been favoured with special gracious influences of the Holy Spirit ; nor does it seem safe to argue to Adam's original state from such passages as Ephes. iv. 24 and Col. iii. 10, in which the ' new man ' of the regenerate is said to be formed after the image of God. The work and the result of regenerating grace must be considered as of another and a higher quality than that of original righteousness : it is more than a mere restitution. The error of the Romish Church consists in transferring the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, which is strictly supernatural, to the natural creation of man, where it could have no place and must necessarily give rise to unfounded theories.

According to the Protestant view, original righteousness, in the sense of perfect conformity to the will and law of God, was natural to the first man before his fall ; natural, not as constituting the essence of his nature, for this remains in fallen man, but as belonging to the conception of it, which the Creator framed to Himself in intending to create it. Hence it is described as ' a debt to the nature ' ; it was due to it, regard being had to the archetype in the Divine mind, and to the end proposed, eternal felicity, which could not be attained without it. How otherwise, indeed, could it have been transmitted to Adam's posterity, as no doubt it would have been, had he not sinned ? Supernatural grace cannot be tied to such a law. The distinction, therefore, which Protestant theologians draw between the ' essential ' and the ' accidental ' image of God in man, must not be misunderstood as a concession to the Romish doctrine ; it is merely another mode of saying that man has not ceased to be man because he has lost original righteousness ; that this latter was not so much a right nature, as rectitude of nature. It was a quality, and so far accidental as all qualities must be ; but the same Word of power which said, ' Let us make man ' (Gen. i. 26), made him also in the moral image of God. Since the impossibility of sinning now comes to man first through Christ, to this extent Adam's original state may be admitted to have been an imperfect one.

§ 31. FREEDOM—IMMORTALITY

With personality, or the faculty of self-consciousness, free-will, or the power of self-determination, is necessarily connected ; and accordingly Adam must be supposed to have had this endowment conferred upon him. His obedience was neither that of external

compulsion, nor did it proceed from blind instinct as in the lower animals ; it was the result of choice. But, his nature being supposed to have remained in its integrity, the choice was a matter of moral necessity ; just as there is a moral necessity of the elect angels acting according to the will of God, while acting with perfect freedom. His freedom was a real, and not merely a formal, one ; not the equilibrium of a moral neutrality, but the freedom of the will from the bondage under which it now labours. Man still has will, but it is biassed by tendencies which he has no natural power to overcome ; in Adam's original condition there was no such impediment. Yet he was capable of temptation as Christ Himself was ; and as his righteousness was merely that of the first creation, it did not include the impossibility of his being overcome by the temptation ; it was a *posse non peccare*, not a *non posse peccare*. The former denotes his advantage over his posterity, the latter the prerogative of the future glorified Church.

Was Adam created free from the law of mortality ? It seems so. He was not created immortal, as the event proved ; immortality, in its absolute sense, belongs to God alone (1 Tim. vi. 16) ; but he was created with the possibility of not dying. To suppose that he was subject to death in the course of nature would be inconsistent with the whole spirit of the Mosaic narrative, and not less so with the Apostolic doctrine that death is the consequence and the penalty of sin (Rom. v. 12). Geology proves that death reigned over the inferior creation long before the appearance of man, but the extension of this reign to the human race must be considered as something abnormal. On the other hand, a so-called ' natural immortality ' can hardly be maintained, even when the phrase is applied, as it usually is, to the soul alone. Scripture supposes that the soul survives its separation from the body, but on the question of its inherent immortality it is silent ; the body too, in one sense, survives its separation from the soul, for no particle of matter is ever annihilated. Butler has done his best for the philosophical argument, but probably most readers of the ' Analogy ' have felt that the first chapter is the least satisfactory of that celebrated treatise. An uncompounded substance cannot indeed perish by dissolution, but this does not prove that it may not perish in some other way ; e.g. by the exhaustion of its vital forces. Surmises and probabilities on this subject are one thing, assurance is another ; and from no quarter does assurance come of immortality in the true sense but from the Gospel of Christ, and this includes that of the body as well as that of the soul. Adam was capable of death, but it was his destination not to die, as is clearly intimated by the appointment of the tree of life in Paradise.

Whatever we are to understand by it, it was plainly the symbol and means of immortality ; and from the prohibition to partake of it after the fall, it must be inferred that previously thereto it would have been a prophylactic against disease and death. On the future that awaited Adam and his posterity, if sin had not entered, Scripture throws a veil. The common opinion is that the paradisaical state would in due time have been exchanged for a heavenly ; that men would have put on, by a painless process, the spiritual body in which Adam was certainly not created (1 Cor. xv. 47), but which was intended for him ; and that successive generations would have been thus translated after their appointed sojourn on earth. It may, however, be doubted whether this is not an instance of the common tendency to confound creation with redemption, by adapting what the Apostle teaches respecting the change which those who shall be alive at Christ's coming must undergo (1 Cor. xv. 51), to the state of man before the fall.

§ 32. TRADUCIANISM OR CREATIONISM ?

An essential distinction between the original state of man and that of the redeemed in Christ is that in the former the bodily life was sustained by natural means, and the race propagated by natural descent (Gen. i. 28) ; while ' in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven ' (Matt. xxii. 30). In connection with the doctrine of original sin, which, as our Article declares, is an inherited defect, and not a mere imitation of Adam, and which has its primary seat in the soul, it became in early times a debated question whether the soul, like the body, is propagated from parent to child, or whether a special act of creation implants it in each individual. The former is Traducianist, the latter the Creationist theory.

Origen's theory of the pre-existence of souls, which he considered were created simultaneously with the angels, is well known ; it has been revived in modern times by such philosophers as Kant and Schelling, and such theologians as J. Müller, who applies it to explain the doctrine of original sin. But, on account of its foreign origin (the Platonic philosophy), and its lack of Scriptural foundation, it never obtained general recognition in the Church. Traducianism found a strong defender in Tertullian, as might have been expected, from his inability to conceive spiritual substance, not excluding God Himself, without corporeity of some sort ; and according to Jerome, it was the prevailing tenet of the Western Church, though he himself inclined to the other view. Augustine confesses that he could arrive at no certain conclusion on the subject ; and contents himself

with pointing out the difficulty of explaining the inherited taint of sin on the Creationist hypothesis. T. Aquinas makes a distinction between the 'sensitive' soul and the 'intellectual'; the former he holds to be propagated, the latter to be created. After the Reformation the Lutheran Church became almost exclusively Traducianist, while the Reformed, for the most part, adopted the Creationist theory.

The question must be cleared from the ambiguity which attaches to the word 'creation,' accordingly as it is used in its strict, or in a looser sense. In its strict sense it denotes production out of nothing (*creatio prima*), secondary causes being excluded; and this is what is intended in Creationism. But it is sometimes applied to the Divine co-operation with secondary causes in the propagation of existing species (*creatio mediata*), and in this lower sense it is not denied by the Traducianists. The Divine co-operation, they admit, is necessary to the act of propagation; but it exercises itself through that act, just as in other species of animals; the soul does not come into existence through a simple fiat of the Almighty. The Creationists, on the other hand, dispense in the matter with secondary agency. Both parties appeal to Scripture, but with no very certain result. On the Creationist side reference is made to Gen. ii. 7; which proves, indeed, that of the *first* man the soul was created *ex nihilo*; but, as one of the ablest defenders of the theory himself admits, decides nothing as to the souls of his descendants; for in like manner the body of Adam was formed directly by God out of the dust, and yet it is admitted on both sides that our present bodies come into existence by propagation. Also to Eccles. xii. 7 ('and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it'), which does not define *how* God gives it; and, above all, to Heb. xii. 9, which describes God as the 'Father of spirits,' as distinguished from the 'fathers of our flesh.' But it is doubtful whether this latter passage will bear such an interpretation. The fathers of our flesh are our earthly fathers, and by flesh is meant not the body alone, but the whole man: the 'Father of spirits' is God, so called because He is the Creator of purely spiritual beings (the angels) as well as of men, and especially because the regenerate man (*πνευματικός*) stands through Christ in a filial relation to God. It is very improbable that by the word 'spirits' should be meant souls as distinguished from bodies. Yet in a modified sense Creationism may find a support in the passage. Whatever is spiritual, whether in essence (as that of angels), or by the new birth (as in the regenerate), bears a special relation to God as its Author; who, therefore, in the case of the human soul, may be supposed as specially co-operating with the secondary instruments. But more than this does not seem to be

contained in it. To supply the place of Scripture-evidence recourse is had to philosophical considerations. If the soul is propagated, it must be from both parents or from one ; and again, in its totality or in part only. If from both, two souls would coalesce into one, which is absurd ; if from one, the other would be excluded from the process. If the soul is propagated in its totality, the parents would be left without one ; if in part, then it is divisible. It must be propagated either from the body or the soul (of the parents) ; if the former, it is material, if the latter, the difficulty just mentioned recurs. The soul is not immortal if it does not exist independently (*per se*) ; but it cannot thus exist if it is propagated. The Traducianists found little difficulty in replying to these arguments. Both parents, they said, are here considered as but one cause, for propagation cannot take place without both. Not the soul alone, or the body is propagated, but the whole man : it is a maxim in the schools of philosophy, *generationem esse totius compositi*. Neither does the soul of the parent, nor any part of it, pass into the child ; it is endowed with a prolific power by force of the Divine command and blessing, ' Be fruitful and multiply,' etc. The posterity of Adam, if he had stood, would have been immortal, even as regards their bodies, though there is no doubt these would have come into being by propagation : immortality, therefore, and being propagated are not incompatible. But they were less successful in explaining their own view ; and were compelled to fall back upon negations, or upon the incomprehensibility of the process, or, after all, upon physical conceptions. A favourite illustration was that of a torch communicating light to a torch ; but this involves physical separation.

Traducianism is most in accordance with the language of Scripture, as when Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness, after his image (Gen. v. 3) ; which can hardly refer to the body merely. It seems also to agree better with S. Paul's doctrine of the first and second Adam, as the respective heads of fallen and regenerate humanity. It may appeal to the creation of Eve, which was not like Adam's, *ex nihilo*, but by a derivative process ; and to the statement of Scripture that God rested on the seventh day from works of creation (Gen. ii. 2), which though it does not exclude the idea of *creatio mediata*, does seem to imply that creation in the strict sense then ceased ; not indeed as a power or idea inherent in the Godhead, but in reference to this world of ours. The reply that the creation of souls is not a *new* thing, because Adam's was created, seems hardly to deserve notice. But above all, the Traducianist may ask, as Augustine of old, how the transmission of a sinful nature is to be explained on the other hypothesis ? If God creates each

soul directly, it must be supposed pure as it comes from the Creator ; is it consistent with His goodness to allow it to become subsequently contaminated by union with an infected body, as pure water suffers defilement by being poured into a filthy vase ? Can we suppose that an immaterial substance is capable of being contaminated by a material ? If, as Romanists hold, original sin is merely a defect, the loss of original righteousness, the difficulty may be lessened, but is by no means removed ; for why should God implant a pure soul in a defective organization ? In short, it is difficult to see how a rigid Creationist theory can avoid making God the Author of sin. It may be added that the principal seat of sin surely is the soul, not the body ; but if, as all admit, sin is transmitted from the parents, it seems as if the subject in which sin inheres must, in some inexplicable manner, share in the transmission.

Neither hypothesis can claim either sure warranty of Scripture or ecclesiastical consent ; but as pious opinions they are an expression of facts which must in some way be combined, if we are to gain an adequate view of the subject. Creationism is opposed to the tendency to consider each individual as he comes into the world a mere repetition of the type of the species, without individual characteristics or a distinct personality ; or to merge the individual in the race. Our own consciousness, and the varieties of mental and moral endowment which men exhibit, testify against this notion. It is not without a ground of reason that popular language ascribes the genius of a Newton or a Shakespeare to a direct gift of heaven. Traducianism, on the other hand, represents the principle of organic connection of the whole race under one head, the first Adam, as the leaves of a tree proceed from one stem ; it refuses to consider mankind as a collection of atoms, without a common root : and it can claim not only its relative share of philosophical truth, but its agreement with the general tenor of Scripture. A modified hypothesis on either side may lead to a combination of both ; which perhaps is as near an approach to truth as the subject admits of.

§ 33. THE ANGELS

From Scripture we learn that the fall of man was occasioned by a temptation proceeding from a being not of his own rank in creation ; and this seems naturally to lead to the question, What does Scripture teach respecting the order of intelligent beings thus for the first time presented to our notice ? This topic is usually treated of under the head of Creation, or that of Divine Providence, inasmuch as the angels, not less than man, declare the glory of the Creator, and are represented as His ministers in the providential administration of the

world ; but as connected with the history of redemption it seems not inappropriately to claim a place between the original state of man and his fall.

In considering the nature and offices of angels, we may put aside the ethical distinction between them, as good and bad, as beneficent or malignant ; for this distinction was not an original one, but superinduced by events subsequent to their creation. As distinguished on the one hand from God, and on the other from man, both the good and the bad possess common characteristics. And it is important thus to consider them collectively, or as they were intended to be, in order to avoid the appearance of an original dualism in any department of the universe ; if there are evil angels they became such—whereas all were at first good. Moreover, the unfallen angels themselves are not in the same state as they were when created ; a change has passed over them for the better, as over the others for the worse. The question now before us is, What is an angelic nature, as such ?

We have first to ask whether a real personality is to be ascribed to the angels, or whether they are merely personifications of natural forces or phenomena, such as a rude or poetical age might invent. Our Lord and His Apostles, it is said, accommodated themselves to popular notions, but their language is not to be interpreted literally, any more than ours is when we speak of elves or fairies ? Now, it is true that the creation of the angels is rather presupposed in Scripture than expressly mentioned ; and it is also true, that in some instances they seem to be merely personifications of the power of nature, as when the Psalmist describes them as ' spirits ' (*i.e.*, winds) and as ' flames of fire ' (Ps. civ. 4) ; or when an angel is said to have endued the pool of Bethesda, at certain times, with healing powers (John v. 4). But to the majority of passages no such explanation applies, for they consist chiefly of plain historical narration. Angels appear on special errands : to the Virgin (Luke i. 26), to Joseph (Matt. i. 20), to Zacharias (Luke i. 11), to the shepherds (Luke ii. 9), to the keepers of the Lord's sepulchre (Matt. xxviii. 4), to the women at the same place (Luke xxiv. 4), to Cornelius (Acts x. 3). They are mentioned as ministering to our Lord (Matt. iv. 11), and as strengthening Him in His last temptation (Luke xxii. 43). They announce to the gazing disciples their Master's ascension (Acts i. 10) ; they release Peter from prison (*ibid.* xii. 7) ; they assure Paul of safety when in danger of shipwreck (*ibid.* xxvii. 23). In the Old Testament they appear more sparingly, and not so often under their proper denomination, but still very distinctly. They guard the way of the tree of life in Paradise (Gen. iii. 24) ; they conduct Lot out

of Sodom (*ibid.* xix. 15); they appear to Jacob on his journey (*ibid.* xxviii. 12). It is impossible to understand all this of mere poetical imagery, and the plain sense of Scripture is that they exist as a distinct order of intelligent beings. That Christ and the Apostles could have sanctioned a popular error without dropping a word of caution that they were not to be understood literally, is incredible.

The titles which these superior beings bear in Scripture are descriptive rather of their offices and qualities than of their nature. The word angel (מַלְאָכִים) signifies a messenger, or one who executes the Divine behests: poetically, they are called 'sons of God' (Job i. 6; xxxviii. 7), as, in the writer's view, specially related to God, and 'sons of the mighty' (Ps. lxxxix. 6), as excelling in strength. Cherubim and Seraphim are of the nature of proper names; the meaning and etymology are doubtful; but to judge from the material symbols under which they are represented (Ezek. x., Isa. vi.), they seem to signify dignity and might.

Angels are represented as assessors in the court of heaven (1 Kings xxii. 19), and as being very numerous (Ps. lxxviii. 17; Rev. v. 11). Gradations of rank appear to exist among them (Ephes. i. 21; Col. i. 16), though not worked out after the fanciful manner of Dionysius the Areopagite, who arrays them in nine orders, subdivided into three classes, with different functions. It is an archangel that rebuked Satan (Jude 9), and who is represented as with a host of subordinate angels waging a successful war with him (Apoc. xii. 7). In the later books of the Old Testament traces are found of the notion that nations have their respective tutelary archangels: thus Michael appears as the guardian angel of Israel (Dan. xii. 1).

On these notices of Scripture the statements of the theologians are founded, which it must be confessed in some instances exceed the limits of what is written. An angel is defined to be a spiritual substance, *i.e.* without body, finite, complete, and endowed with true personality. They are finite as created beings, and complete as distinguished from the soul of man, which, though a spiritual substance, is, if separate from the body, incomplete, *i.e.* needs the body as its complement. Opinions in the Early Church varied as to the incorporeity of angels; many taught that they had bodies, but of an ethereal nature; but it was generally held that they are incorporeal. When therefore they assumed a visible form, as in Gen. xviii., this was an accidental union, for a certain time and purpose, not part of their proper hypostasis, as the body of a man is an essential part of his nature. The properties common to both good and bad angels are partly negative, such as indivisibility,

invisibility, immutability, immortality, and illocality: as simple spiritual substances they are, like the human soul, indivisible, as such too they are invisible; they are not liable to changes which we undergo, *e.g.* they do not increase in size, nor do they grow old; they are not liable to death, nor are they confined in space like a material body. The positive properties are knowledge, freedom of will, power, endless duration, a definite whereabouts (*πρὸς*, *ubi*), and rapidity of movement. These definitions seem framed to give us the conception of a being inferior to God, as every creature must be, and yet superior to man. Their knowledge and power far exceed ours, yet they are neither omniscient nor omnipotent; they are not eternal, but *æviternal*, *i.e.* though they had a beginning they have no ending; they are not circumscribed in space as our bodies are, and yet they are not omnipresent, they must be spoken of as in a certain place and not elsewhere at the same time; their agility is inconceivable, and yet they cannot pass from one point of space to another except in an interval of time, however small. As spirits, that is persons in the highest sense of the word, they possess knowledge and free-will; the latter in common with man; the former of a kind and measure far transcending human. And as their faculties, compared with the Divine, are limited, so are the effects which they can produce; they cannot, *e.g.*, create or generate anything; nor can they change the essential nature of things; nor can they perform true miracles. In what manner, and to what extent they can operate on the minds of men—to us the most important point—cannot be certainly gathered from Scripture, and is not satisfactorily explained by writers on the subject. It is agreed that they have no immediate access to the rational soul, a prerogative which belongs to God, and can act upon it only mediately, by raising impressions or fomenting evil passions; nor can they exercise constraint on the will (*Jas. iv. 7*); but how they can operate through impressions (*phantasmata*), or by presenting objects of unlawful desire, is not explained, and perhaps is inexplicable. In our Lord's temptation the evil spirit is represented as appealing to sense, and in the way of direct colloquy.

Many subtle questions have been raised by the schoolmen on this subject, as, *e.g.*, At what particular time the angels were created? Whether more than one angel can be in the same place? Of what kind is their knowledge? How they communicate with each other? etc.: respecting which J. Gerhard well remarks, '*De his omnibus ita disserunt ut merito quis quærat quam nuper sint de cælo delapsi*' (*loc. vi. sq.*).

Nescire velle quæ Magister maximus
Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.

§ 34. CONTINUATION. GOOD AND BAD ANGELS. SATAN.

The angels collectively were created in the image of God, and perhaps in a higher sense than that in which Adam was ; not merely with an abstract power of will to choose and follow the good, but with a will directed towards the good, and furnished with all the moral and intellectual gifts which were sufficient in themselves to ensure their continuance in the favour of their Creator. Yet they were not, as the event proved in respect to some of their number, without the possibility of sinning ; not a proximate, but a remote possibility—one, that is, which might never have become fact. In short, all that goes to form our conception of Adam's original state, equally applies to that of the angels. Scripture declares that God, on a survey of creation, which must have included the angels, pronounced everything good ; and that the angels who fell did so by wilfully abandoning their first estate and own habitation (Jude 6).

From this presumed analogy between the original state of man and that of the angels the question arose whether as in the former a superadded gift of righteousness, so in the latter a special act of 'grace,' was necessary to its perfection. By the schoolmen this was generally affirmed, but the grace was supposed to be coincident with the act of creation, so that the angels were never actually in a state of moral indifference. T. Aquinas draws a distinction between the 'natural blessedness' of the angels, and the supernatural, which consists in the vision of God ; and confines the necessity of an act of grace to the latter. An angel, he argues, could not, any more than ourselves, attain to this vision, *i.e.* eternal life, without Divine grace ; according to the Apostle's statement (Rom. vi. 23), 'Gratia Dei, vita æterna.' Hence, he continues, the more probable opinion is that they were created 'in grace.' Being so created, they determined, by an act of choice, their future position ; and by this act in the right direction the good angels merited their ultimate blessedness. When did this act in either direction take place ? Directly after their creation ; that is, the good angels and the bad became so instantaneously, and remain for ever so ; so that, properly speaking, no state or condition of angels as such, and without reference to their choice and its consequent separation, actually existed. The whole of this theory, which was adopted by the Romish theologians, is open to the objections which lie against the corresponding one in reference to the creation of man : it has no foundation in Scripture, and it introduces the term 'grace' in a connection foreign from the proper idea thereof. Only so much of

it is retained by the Protestant writers as seems to have some Scriptural basis. The angels, like man, were created in positive righteousness ; but by an act of choice, when and how exercised we know not, a separation between them took place. By that act of choice, those whom the Scripture calls the ' elect ' angels (1 Tim. v. 21), or ' angels of light ' (2 Cor. xi. 14), were confirmed in their goodness : they were admitted to ' the vision of God,' which precludes the possibility of their falling away : their service is perfect freedom, but the highest kind of freedom, which consists in a moral impossibility of their choosing otherwise : nor can we say that other gifts and rewards were not, in the exuberance of the Divine goodness, conferred upon them. By a corresponding act, the rest excluded themselves for ever from participation in this blessedness. For when they chose evil, evil became their nature in a sense in which this cannot be predicated of man when he fell. Hence the common opinion is that they are beyond recovery. Not merely on account of the heinousness of their sin, whatever it may have been, in itself or from the circumstances accompanying it, such as that it was committed by a nature superior to that of man, and not at the prompting of another ; but because the depravation of nature which ensued was complete. If they could repent, they would no doubt find mercy ; but their state can only be paralleled by that described by our Lord in Matt. xii. 31, 32, which perhaps, as regards any man in this life, is to be considered rather as an hypothesis than as a fact. All their faculties have suffered correspondingly ; their intellect, *e.g.*, has become darkened, proofs of which are thought to be found in Satan's ignorance that Jesus was the Son of God, or, if he knew it, in his supposing that the Son of God could be tempted to commit sin (Matt. iv. 3-10) ; and his prompting Judas to betray Christ to death (John xiii. 2), which, in fact, proved the destruction of his own kingdom.

The employments of the good angels are described as partly contemplative and partly active. They are represented as surrounding the throne of God, and singing His praises (Ps. ciii. 20 ; Isa. vi. 3 ; Rev. v. 11) ; and also as ministering spirits (in what manner is not declared) to the heirs of salvation (Heb. i. 14). On all important occasions in the history of redemption, angels appear on the scene ; at the giving of the Mosaic law (Acts vii. 53), at the birth of Christ (Luke ii. 13), at His second coming (Matt. xxv. 31), and at the gathering in of His elect (*ibid.* xiii. 41). They share in the joy of the Redeemer over repentant sinners (Luke xv. 10) ; they are present in the assemblies of Christians (1 Cor. xi. 10) ; they convey the souls of the pious departed to their rest (Luke xvi. 21). Though not

interested in them as man is, they make the mysteries of redemption their earnest study (1 Pet. i. 12). That a guardian angel is assigned to each believer is a pious opinion which may derive some support from our Lord's words (Matt. xviii. 10); but whatever hints Scripture may furnish on this subject, it gives no prominence thereto, nor does it ever encourage us to look to angels for guidance or help in the emergencies of life. Why should it, when the Christian has a right to rely upon His over-ruling providence and ever-present succour, whom the angels themselves worship as their Creator? That the subject of angelic agency is wholly without dogmatical import for us is too much to say; but that it may be abused to superstitious practices Scripture itself intimates (Col. ii. 18), and experience proves.

The error of the Colossians has, in fact, often reappeared in the Church. S. Paul warns them, among other things, against 'angel-worship,' which he traces to the tendency of human nature to add to what is revealed, and to pry into mysteries placed beyond our ken. After the return of the Jews from Babylon, the doctrine of angels became more prominent in the popular belief, and the sect of the Essenes is particularly mentioned in connection with it. From Jewish converts it probably passed into the early Christian Churches, and in the Colossian Church, at least, in such a form as to imperil the simplicity of the Christian faith. But though many speculations on the subject are met with in the early Fathers, no further trace, if we except one ambiguous passage in J. Martyr, occurs of the existence of angel-worship, or invocation, in the Church. It was on the favourable soil of Gnosticism that these illicit doctrines chiefly flourished. The Church of Rome, therefore, can allege no patristic tradition for her decisions on this point: still less can she allege Scriptural authority. The angel whom Jacob invoked (Gen. xlviii. 16), and with whom he wrestled (*ibid.* xxxii. 26), was not a created angel; nor can any conclusions be founded on such ambiguous passages as Job v. 1, or Rev. i. 4. Rev. xix. 10 is not ambiguous, nor the corresponding passage, xxii. 8, 9, and in them the Apostle himself records the Divine warning which he received not to render worship save to God only. Nor will the distinction between *Latreia* and *Dulia* avail to justify the practice; the distinction is not in itself a Scriptural one, nor can there be an intermediate worship between that due to God (*cultus religiosus*), and the respect due to eminent, but created, dignity or virtue. All created distinctions vanish in presence of Deity; and as worship is the prerogative of Deity, there can be, if the word is used in its proper sense, no degrees in it.

The evil angels are represented in Scripture (*i.e.*, the New Testament) as endeavouring to the utmost of their power (which, however, is limited), to thwart the gracious purposes of God in the redemption of mankind ; and it contains not a few indistinct notices of their forming a kind of community under a supreme head, who bears the name of Satan. It is he who is said to have tempted Christ (Matt. iv. 10), to have prompted Judas in his sin (John xiii. 2), to have filled the heart of Ananias (Act v. 3), to have hindered the Apostle in a proposed journey (1 Thess. ii. 18), to have ' buffeted ' him with some unknown bodily ailment (2 Cor. xii. 7). He is described as tempting the saints (1 Thess. iii. 5), as going about like a roaring lion (1 Pet. v. 8), as counteracting the effect of the Word of God (Luke viii. 12), as sowing tares among the wheat (Matt. xiii. 39), as the instigator of persecution against the Church (Rev. ii. 10). To destroy his power was the special object of Christ's coming (Heb. ii. 14). He is the spirit who works in the disobedient (Ephes. ii. 2), and who blinds the minds of them that believe not (2 Cor. iv. 4). To the unbelieving world he stands in a special relation as its patron and prince (John xii. 31, xiv. 30). For him and his angels there is reserved the lake of fire and brimstone (Rev. xx. 10 ; Matt. xxv. 41). A description of better defined outline it is difficult to imagine. But, as we have said, Satan does not stand alone in his opposition to Christ : he is Beelzebub, ' the prince of the devils ' (Matt. xii. 24) ; he is ruler over ' a kingdom ' (*ibid.* 26) ; his angels are mentioned as well as himself ; Christians are warned against the wiles of the devil (Ephes. vi. 11), and also are enjoined to put on the armour of God if they would wage a successful war against ' principalities and powers, the rulers of the darkness of this world ' (*ibid.* 12, 13). In short, over against the Kingdom of God, of which Christ is the Head, and for the coming of which we are taught to pray (Matt. vi. 10), stands a kingdom of darkness, of which Satan is the head, and from which it is our privilege as Christians to be delivered.

And yet modern thought has very generally arrived at the conclusion that this whole doctrine of Satan, which, it is allowed, the *letter* of the New Testament seems to favour, has no foundation in fact ; that the Satan of Christ and the Apostles is a mythical personage, the offspring of Jewish superstition ; or a mere personification of the abstract principle of evil ; or the poetry of symbol, suitable for liturgical use, but not of any moment as a doctrine. It is urged that the Old Testament contains few traces of the doctrine ; that in the New Testament it is indeed presupposed, but not distinctly propounded ; that it is difficult to conceive the fall of a being created in

righteousness ; equally so to conceive how a being of supernatural powers of intellect can maintain a warfare against the Most High, in which he must know he will be defeated ; but if he does not know this, so foolish an antagonist is not to be dreaded by us ; that why some angels should have fallen and others not is inexplicable ; that inasmuch as Satan can do nothing without the Divine permission, and, in the event, without furthering the Divine designs, his enmity against God would be better gratified by his remaining inactive ; and that a kingdom, or community, of evil spirits cannot exist, for Satan must ever be divided against himself.

As regards the Old Testament, it must be admitted that it is not so explicit as the New on this subject. The doctrine of Satanic agency, in fact, passes through several stages in the inspired volume ; and so far from this being otherwise than natural, it is only what we should expect. As long as redemption was a matter of promise it was not proper that the power and malignity of him whose head the Saviour was to bruise (Gen. iii. 15) should be revealed ; there would be no use, and there might be harm, in inducing men to brood upon the spiritual dangers that surrounded them, while at the same time no clear revelation was given of the Almighty Redeemer in whom and by whom they were to be delivered. A veil, therefore, is drawn over this sombre subject until at the actual coming of the Seed of the woman it might be safely lifted. The Satan of the Old Testament does not appear as the irreconcilable enemy of the Most High, but rather as His instrument, in inflicting not undeserved chastisement on the people of God ; he is represented as in consultation with Jehovah respecting certain persons whom he is permitted to try, and as having limits assigned to his agency by a kind of pact or agreement (1 Kings xxii. 20, 21 ; Job i. 6-12). In Zech. iii. 1 he arraigns before the throne of Divine justice the sinful nation in the person of its High Priest Joshua ; and is silenced, not as having brought a false accusation, but as having overlooked the abounding grace of God (vers. 1-4). Notwithstanding this, his true nature is sufficiently disclosed to prevent us from ever confounding him with an angel of light. If such an angel inflicts, at the command of God, temporal chastisement (2 Sam. xxiv. 16 ; 2 Kings xix. 35), yet he never appears as tempting men to commit sin in order to have matter of accusation against them, or as taking a malignant satisfaction in proving, as in Job's case, how infirmity cleaves to the best of men ; which is the aspect under which Satan appears in the Old Testament narratives. In the New Testament this disposition deepens into a positive enmity towards God and man. Is this reserve in the Old Testament merely of an oeconomic character, or does it represent a fact,

viz., that the state of the fallen angels admitted, as that of fallen man does, of a progression from bad to worse, until a climax was reached, at which the possessed of devils, speaking in their name, could exclaim : ' What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God ? ' (Matt. viii. 29). It seems to be too hastily assumed that this law of progression (*nemo repente fuit turpissimus*) applies only to a being like man, composed of body and soul, and not to a pure spirit ; so that from the first the fallen angels, with Satan at their head, were as deeply imbued with evil as ever they could be. But they were, like man, *creatures*, and, like man, created in righteousness ; does the difference of their nature preclude the supposition of a growth in obliquity similar to that which Scripture supposes, and experience proves, to end, in the case of man, in a state in which the unhappy subject exclaims : ' Evil, be thou my good ' ? However this may be, the Satan of the New Testament is a different being from that of the Old ; though it is possible that not the nature, but the *revelation* of the nature has advanced *pari passu* with the revelation of Christ and His salvation.

There is no doubt a real difficulty in conceiving how a created being can embody in himself the abstract principle of evil, that is, be absolutely evil. As Augustine frequently reminds us, evil in a created nature is something rather privative than positive : the nature is in itself good, and never can be absolutely transformed into its opposite. Hence, when Satan is introduced on the scene by poets, when he appears as an actual creation, the impression conveyed is that of a vicious and mocking man, as in the Mephistopheles of Goethe ; an exaggerated Voltaire. The Satan of Milton is not without qualities which, in their way, command respect ; or at all events do not occasion loathing. It seems that if the abstract principle of evil were to become actually existent, it would not be easy to avoid the dualism of the Manichees. Relatively to his agents, viz. evil men, Satan may be considered as absolutely evil ; but we cannot say that he is so relatively to God.

The other objections seem of less weight. The fall of a righteous being presupposes, it is urged, that he was already fallen, for how otherwise could sin gain an admittance ? The objection equally applies to man's fall ; and in both cases it may be replied, that the character did not produce the act, but the free volition in the wrong direction produced the character—according to the law that the first sinful act draws after it an endless series of consequences. How can we reconcile Satan's intellectual perspicacity with his continued resistance to God ? In the same way in which we reconcile, in the case of evil men, vast abilities with moral blindness and what Scrip-

ture calls folly. These men display wonderful sagacity in the pursuit of their own selfish ends ; but of wisdom, in the true sense of the word, a comprehensive view of what is best for themselves and others, they show themselves destitute. If Satan possessed such wisdom, he would undoubtedly abandon his active resistance, and prefer inactivity ; he would repent if repentance is possible to him. If he perseveres in his antagonism, it is simply because of his lack of true perspicacity. But a kingdom of evil spirits, it is urged, could not hold together ; unless, we reply, there exists a bond of union which for a time at least is powerful enough to suppress individual obliquity. But such a bond does exist, viz., a common enmity towards God and His people, and it is sufficient to produce union as long as the conflict goes on. History supplies many such instances of a temporary combination amongst men, who but for the sinister tie that unites them would exterminate each other, or attempt to do so. What the state of Satan's kingdom may become, when at the consummation of all things there will remain no place for his opposition to Christ, and therefore no object superior to the gratification of individual licence, is another question.

The sacred history, as has been observed, discloses at the coming of Christ a greatly increased activity of Satan and his angels ; as is particularly to be seen in the instances of demoniacal possession in the Gospels, of which the Old Testament furnishes few or no examples. Demoniacal possession is divided into spiritual and corporeal ; the former consisting in a moral obliquity so great and so universal as to suggest the idea of an actual indwelling of Satan in the soul. Thus Satan is said to have entered into Judas (John xiii. 27), and to dwell in the swept and garnished chambers (Luke xi. 26). But in the absence of more direct Scripture evidence, it is hardly safe to press such passages to a more definite meaning than that—not without their own consent—some men seem to be specially under the influence of the evil one, and special instruments of his designs. Bodily possession stands on firmer ground ; it seems to have the letter of Scripture in its favour, and to be clearly recognized not only by the Apostles, but by Christ Himself (Matt. x. 8 ; xii. 28), and by Christ when explaining the matter to the inner circle of His followers (*ibid.* xvii. 19–21). The cases in the Gospels have peculiar features : on the one side they are allied to the forms of ordinary disease (epilepsy, dumbness and deafness, madness, even bodily weakness) (Luke xiii. 11), and the beneficent action of Christ is described as a 'cure,' and 'healing' (Matt. xii. 22 ; Acts. x. 38). On the other, they are ascribed to a supernatural origin, either to Satan, or more frequently to one or more of his subordinate angels (*δαιμόνια*) ; and the cure consists

in these being 'cast out.' Shall we say that they were really nothing but ordinary diseases, and that our Lord spoke in the language of the time without intending to endorse its accuracy? The subject is too serious, too closely connected with religion, to warrant such a supposition; and when we recollect the crimes which the perversion of the doctrine gave rise to in after ages, when it was believed that men and women could hold commerce with Satan for illicit purposes, it becomes impossible to believe that He to whom the future must have been known could have sanctioned an error so fruitful in evil consequences, if it had no foundation in fact. It is commonly held that the unhappy subjects of this possession brought the calamity on themselves by indulgence in sin, especially sins of the flesh; this is possible, but the only instance of healing in which our Lord insinuates that the sufferer's sin had been the cause of his malady does not belong to this class (John v. 14). And in another instance He warns His disciples against hasty judgments of this kind (John ix. 3). The opinion, however, may find some support from 1. Cor. v. 5, in which the Apostle speaks of delivering certain offenders 'unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh'; which seems something quite different from ordinary excommunication. The demoniacs of the New Testament were sinners, no doubt, but rather objects of pity than specimens of matured impiety; they were not possessed of Satan in the same sense in which Judas was, and therefore were not beyond the reach of the Saviour's healing power. They were fearful examples of the power of Satan, not only over the souls but the bodies of men; but great caution is needed in every age of the Church, lest the revealed fact be confounded with semblances of it, which may belong to the sphere of nature; as appears from some chapters of early Church history, and from the curious catalogues of the signs of possession to be found in some of the older theologians. We have reason to believe that since the coming of Christ this terrible malady has entirely or almost disappeared—at all events from within the pale of the Christian Church.

§ 35. THE FALL OF MAN

Sin, according to Scripture, is no necessary factor in the education of the human race, for it came into the world through a hostile agency. How this happened is described in the third chapter of the Book of Genesis.

The narrative opens with the temptation of man, or, as perhaps it should rather be called, his trial. It is not necessary to enter at length into the questions that have been raised respecting its details. Whether they are to be understood literally, or, as even orthodox

theologians have held, they are merely the symbolical clothing of a real fact, is of no more moment to the Christian than the issue of the geological speculations which have clustered round the account of creation. It is enough for us to learn that though there was something in unfallen man which rendered it possible for him to sin, this was roused into activity by an appeal from without ; nor does Scripture leave it doubtful from whom the solicitation proceeded. If the original narrative does not expressly say that it was Satan, this omission is supplied in the New Testament. Apoc. xii. 9 is express to the point. 2 Cor. xi. 3, compared with ver. 14 of the same chapter, makes it clear whom S. Paul understood by the serpent. By the majority of commentators our Lord's words in John viii. 44 are referred to the temptation of Adam. The tempter was a spirit already fallen, and the mystery of the origin of sin dates from a period anterior to the creation of man.

It seems to have been formerly a question of some interest, what the sinful affection was in our first parents which led to the actual transgression. Bellarmine, after Augustine, devotes two long chapters to prove that it was pride, in the prospect of becoming as gods, knowing good and evil ; the Protestant theologians (Calvin, Luther, etc.) prefer to think it was unbelief (of the Divine warning, ' In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die ') ; apparently because this supposition better corresponds to what may be called the opposite pole, the doctrine of justification by faith. The question is immaterial. The real source of the primal transgression must be sought deeper ; in the usurpation by the selfish principle of that place which supreme love to God was intended to, and did actually hitherto, occupy. Once the true centre of man's being was displaced, the whole periphery shifted itself ; and both pride and unbelief were only symptoms of the inner disorganization that had taken place. The senses became avenues of illicit desire (' when the woman saw that the tree was pleasant to the eye, ' etc.) ; doubts of God's goodness entered the heart ; impatience to snatch an advantage which would doubtless have come in its due time prevailed ; and—the sin was consummated.

' Earth felt the wound ; and Nature from her seat
Sighing, through all her works gave signs of woe,
That all was lost——'

The consequences of the first transgression are described in the narrative with sufficient distinctness. Shame and fear took possession of breasts which had hitherto been strangers to these emotions. ' They knew that they were naked ' ; they became conscious of the loss of the original righteousness in which they had been created, and

conscious of the result, in the emancipation of sensual desire from the control of reason and of the will ; which led them to place a covering over bodily organs now no longer obedient to these higher faculties. The Divine beneficence, recognizing the propriety of the sentiment, exchanged the poor original contrivance for a more complete and enduring investiture. And with shame was conjoined fear ; fear of the gracious Being whose approach had hitherto been the harbinger of holy and happy fellowship : ' Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of the garden.' In other words, the slumbering faculty of conscience, in this case accusing, awoke into energy ; that Divine faculty which assents to the law of God while protesting against the law of sin in the members (Rom. vii. 22, 23), and is the last to resign its authority, until finally stifled by continuance in sin. And so Adam came to the knowledge of good and evil by the bitter experience of an irreconcilable strife between the two in his inner man. And then followed the sentence. It has been subject of comment that there is no express allusion in it either to the corruption of our nature through the Fall, or to the eternal penalty of sin ; but as regards the former, our first parents were already conscious of it, and as regards the latter the poison and the antidote (Gen. iii. 15) are in such close juxtaposition that the latter already seems to efface the former by its superior efficacy. It is temporal penalties which appear on the surface ; on the woman the pains of childbearing, on the man incessant toil for his living, on both temporal death. The full meaning of this last penalty of sin was reserved for future revelations to disclose : here it is merely the dissolution of the body into its original dust that is specified. The penalty was not inflicted at once ; and therefore the commination in ch. ii. 17 must be understood to mean an inevitable subjection to death. The frame of man, sharing in the disorganization of his superior part, began to cherish in itself the seeds of his dissolution, and, however in those early ages postponed, the event came at last to all. From this law of a sinful nature, which he inherits, even the believer in Christ is not exempt, unless he be one of those who shall be alive when Christ comes again : ' the body is dead ' (or subject to death) ' because of sin ' (Rom. viii. 10) ; but since, in his case, death in its other and deeper significations has no existence, the dissolution of the body is but the mode of transition to a higher condition of humanity than Adam, even had he stood, would have enjoyed.

Speculation, as might be expected, has been busy with the question why, if its fearful consequences were foreseen as they must have been, the fall of man was permitted ? If it was foreseen that he would fall,

why was the tempter allowed to assail him ? or why was not strength given to resist the temptation ? But these difficulties equally apply to the earlier entrance of sin into creation ; and they have been met, as far as they can be, in a previous section (§ 22). The origin of evil is inexplicable ; but considered as *sin*, Scripture is express that God neither willed it nor needed it for the manifestation of His glory. If He elicited good out of evil, that does not diminish the guilt of the evil. Prevent it by an exercise of Almighty power perhaps He could not, without annihilating the free-will with which it pleased Him to endow the reasonable creature. And there was such ' a facility of standing ' in our first parents, as compared with us, that the blame of the catastrophe must be laid exclusively at their door.

§ 36. PREVALENCE OF ACTUAL SIN

The history of mankind, from the fall of Adam, is, as it is given in Scripture, emphatically the history of a sinful race. So prominent is this characteristic that it almost seems as if it was the main object of the writers to inculcate the lesson. Commencing with the fratricide of Cain, the antediluvian narrative terminates with such an excess of wickedness as could only be purged by the destruction, with a few exceptions, of the existing population of the world (Gen. vi.). Restored under a covenant of temporal mercies (Gen. ix.), mankind again commenced its downward career, and only the confusion of languages put a stop to a presumptuous attempt, like that of the Titans of profane mythology, to wrest the sceptre of supremacy from the Creator (Gen. xi.). Idolatry began to prevail to such an extent that the first actual step towards the accomplishment of the primeval prophecy was to sever the progenitor of the chosen people from the associations of home and kindred with which he was surrounded (Gen. xii.). Whole communities became notorious for hideous vices (Gen. xix.). The passage of the Israelites to the land of Canaan was marked at every stage by transgression. The moral state of the peoples then occupying Canaan was such that a sentence of extirpation, never, however, fully carried out, was necessary to prevent, as far as might be, their contaminating the new settlers, far removed as the latter were from perfection. The history of the chosen people for centuries is a record of anarchy and crime, together with repeated lapses into the impure and idolatrous worship of the surrounding nations. The constant theme of the prophets is the sin of their own people. The sins which the prophets denounced were exchanged, in our Lord's time, for others less gross in appearance, but not less dangerous in their spiritual effect. The picture which S. Paul presents of the heathen world as it then existed is drawn in the

darkest colours (Rom. i.) ; and his statements are confirmed by contemporary evidence of profane authors. No topic is more frequent in classical poetry than the corruption of later ages as compared with the (supposed) pristine sanctity of manners. Ancient philosophers deplore the untractableness of the material on which they had to work. Such is the account of Scripture, and such the confession of heathendom, as regards the moral condition of humanity.

The same lesson is taught us in Scripture in a more indirect manner. Hardly one even of the eminent characters whose biographies it contains—Abraham, Jacob, Moses, David, Peter, etc.—but breaks down in some point or other ; and although in a few instances, such as those of Joseph and Daniel, no failure is expressly mentioned, it can hardly be doubted that they came under the same law of imperfection. The Christian expiation for sin is declared to have been for the whole of mankind, who therefore must be supposed, without exception, to be implicated in transgression. The change from the natural to the Christian state is never represented otherwise than as a change from darkness to light, from the power of Satan unto God (Acts. xxvi. 18) ; with the Christian old things have passed away, and all things have become new (2 Cor. v. 17) ; he has emerged from a state of death in (actual) trespasses and sins to one in which the spiritual life is predominant (Ephes. ii. 1-3). In short, the sombre background of the edifice of redemption is nothing short of this : ‘ There is none righteous, no, not one : there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God : they are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable, there is none that doeth good, no, not one ’ (Rom. iii. 10-12).

Does experience confirm these statements ? or has the condition of humanity changed since the Scriptures were written ? The history of the world, ever since the introduction of Christianity, is its condemnation. No one sees Christian nations fully leavened with the influence of Christianity ; no one finds in modern heathenism other than a transcript of S. Paul’s experience. What is more, no one of mature age *expects* of human nature more than the most moderate attainments of virtue : the child confides implicitly, the youth is more wary, the man of experience, in his dealings with others, fences himself round with every expedient of precaution. The Christian himself is the first to disclaim perfection, and to set it down to blind self-ignorance or Pharisaical pride if any one, even the holiest of men, should venture to say that he has no sin (1 John i. 8). Nor can this verdict be retracted in favour of the unconscious age of infancy. Relatively to us the babe is called innocent ; but this amounts merely to the negative assertion that we do not know what is passing

in its mind, there being a physical incapability of such manifestation. The moment this incapacity begins to disappear the alleged innocence also disappears ; sinful passions make their appearance, which too clearly point to an ominous development should circumstances favour it ; the child, according to his faculties and opportunities, is a reproduction of what his parents are. But it is not necessary to dwell further on a fact which is not denied, however it may be explained away or extenuated. The Pantheist, while divesting sin of its proper character, and making it an essential factor in the constitution of the universe, does not contest its existence under the notion of a temporary discord in the great harmony into which he resolves it. The Pelagian still less denies the fact, and only differs from the Church as regards the source to which he traces it. What this source is forms the subject of the following section.

§ 37. ORIGINAL SIN AS THE ROOT OF ACTUAL

As every effect is supposed to have a cause, the actual sinfulness of man leads the mind beyond the outward phenomenon, and suggests the inquiry, ' Whence can it proceed ? ' The most elementary lessons of moral philosophy teach us that the essence of virtue or vice is to be sought, not in the mere act, but in what lies underneath it. If the tree is known by its fruits, the fruits also presuppose a tree. If it be replied, then, that it arises ' from the imitation of Adam ' (the Pelagian theory), several difficulties at once occur. How can it arise from the imitation of Adam in the case of those who never heard of Adam, or read the story of the Fall ; that is, the vast majority of mankind ? who yet, as we have seen, are in no way superior to those who possess this knowledge. If it be ascribed to the bad example of parents or of society, how did this bad example itself come into existence ? In the case of those who enjoy the light of revelation, and believe that sin marred the perfection of the universe before Adam was created, why should not the imitation ascend higher, until it reaches Satan himself ? Moreover, these latter possess another standard to frame themselves by, one of absolute sinlessness, and exhibited too in our nature ; why should not the imitation frame itself on this model as well as on that of Adam ? Why should it be uniformly of one character ? If it be replied again that every man is endowed with free-will, and that it is of the essence of free-will to be able to choose, and that the first step determines the future path, this no doubt is in a certain sense true. To fix the moment when the first deliberate act of sin takes place may be impossible ; the child himself is probably never aware of it : but whenever it does occur, it is a momentous epoch in the moral history of the individual. The

will has consented, and the moral state can never again be as if this act had not taken place. It may truly be said that in every depraved life a subordinate and relative fall of the man has preceded the formation of the habit. But if the will is really free, or in a state of equilibrium, how comes it that the choice is invariable? Why does not the will assert its freedom, in some instances at least, so as to resist temptation, and commence a career of holy obedience, which might issue in complete confirmation in holiness; as would have been the case with Adam had he stood? If, further, it be urged, with Schleiermacher,¹ that the explanation lies in the fact that, by the very conditions of infancy, our sensual nature steals a march upon our spiritual, which advantage is always afterwards maintained; we may ask how it is that when our spiritual nature comes to its maturity, it does not, as the stronger, assert its supremacy, and subjugate its weaker companion in turn? We are thus led to the conclusion that the actual sinfulness of mankind is but the visible symptom of a defect or depravation of nature, which is not any one sin, but the root of all sin; a constant quantity to be taken account of amidst the varieties of outward transgression; a preponderating inclination in one direction, impeding all effort in the other; not belonging to the original nature of man, but another nature in the sense in which we call habit a second nature; attaching itself to what is in itself good, but so interwoven with it as not to admit of perfect separation; and this is that 'corruption of the nature of every man' (Art. ix.) to which the Church has given the name of original sin.²

Such a depravation of nature is clearly recognized in Scripture. When it is said in Gen. viii. 21, that 'the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth,' it is implied that the existence of the evil is coeval with the existence of 'the heart'; *i.e.*, man's nature. David in Ps. li. 5 professes, not that his mother contracted sinfulness in the act of conception and birth (an idea, as J Müller remarks, wholly foreign to Jewish ideas³), but that he himself from that moment of his conception was affected with sin. The new birth which our Lord pronounces necessary to entrance into the kingdom of heaven (John iii. 3) seems to involve far more than merely renunciation of actual

¹ Glaubenslehre, § 67.

² Original sin may bear a twofold sense; either as distinguished from 'actual sins of men' (Art. ii.), or as connected with Adam's sin. In this part of the present section it is used in the former, in the latter part in the other sense. 'Dicitur originale (peccatum), et quidem non ratione originis mundi aut hominis, sed (1) quia ab Adamo, radice et principio generis humani derivatum; (2) quia cum origine Adamigenarum conjunctum; (3) quia origo et fons est peccatorum; actualium' (Hollaz, p. ii. c. 3, q. 12).

³ Lehre von der Sünde, ii. 378.

sins. S. Paul alludes to a kind of sin which was latent in him, and was only roused into activity, so that he became conscious of it, by being confronted with an external command (Rom. vii. 8). To the same effect are his statements respecting the opposition between the 'flesh' and the 'Spirit' (Gal. v. 17; Rom. viii. 9); for by 'the flesh' is meant not the material part of man as distinguished from the immaterial, but human nature in its unregenerate state, 'the *phronema sarkos*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, which is not subject to the law of God' (Art. ix.). The children of Christian parents, apart from the privileges which, as having been born within the pale of the Church, they enjoy, are pronounced by S. Paul to be of themselves unclean (*ἀκάθαρτα*), nor is there any point of time specified at which this disqualification commences (1 Cor. vii. 14).¹ Of himself and his fellow-converts from Judaism the same Apostle declares that, whatever advantages they may have enjoyed as Israelites (Rom. ix. 4), they were 'by nature children of wrath,' equally with Gentile believers (Ephes. ii. 3); of which the plain meaning is that by nature, and before the outbreaks of actual sin, there was something in them which God could not look upon without displeasure.

The testimony of Scripture confirms the conclusion to which we are led on grounds of reason, that, underneath the variety of sins which meet the eye, there exists in all men a natural propensity to sin, which is sure to bear its fruit—to some extent even where its power is broke by the operation of Divine grace. It is impossible otherwise to explain the fact that in no recorded instance, save that of Him whose birth was supernatural, is a human life found to have been exempt from actual sin.

Another exception is indeed claimed by the Church of Rome—that of the Virgin Mary. The history of the doctrine of the immaculate conception is soon told. At an early period vague notions prevailed respecting the prerogatives of the mother of our Lord, whom no Christian, any more than Scripture itself, hesitates to call 'blessed among women' (Luke i. 42); and an impulse was given in this direction by the ecclesiastical sanction of the epithet *θεοτόκος*, as against the Nestorians. But if the Virgin was 'the mother of God,' can she be conceived of as affected with original sin? If so, might not the taint be derived from the mother, as it would have been from an earthly father? or, in other words, to ensure our Lord's perfect sinlessness, was it not necessary to maintain, in the case of

¹ It is doubtful whether it is the children of Christian parents in general, or those of the mixed marriages specially mentioned in the passage, of whom the Apostle speaks. But either way, the argument stands. See Olshausen *in loc.*

the Virgin, an antecedent exemption from this taint ? The reasoning had an air of plausibility, and fell in with the general tendency of the age ; but it remained for a long time unsanctioned by the ecclesiastical authorities. When, about the year 1140, the canons of Lyons instituted a festival in honour of the immaculate conception, they drew upon themselves for this innovation the severe censure of Bernhard of Clairvaux. The dogma gradually, however, gathered strength, and became important enough to divide the opinions of the two great orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans ; the former maintaining, the latter denying it. The Franciscans could appeal to Duns Scotus, the Dominicans to Thomas Aquinas, as favouring their views respectively. The question led to so much dissension in the Church that in 1477 Sixtus IV. issued a Bull, in which he aimed at a compromise : he sanctioned the festival, and condemned those who called the doctrine heretical, but he forbore to pronounce an authoritative decision, and so far left the question open. The dissension, however, continued, and reached such a pitch that Leo X. contemplated taking steps to have the matter finally settled when the troubles of the Reformation broke out, and united all parties in the Romish Church against the common foe. This state of things accounts for the hesitation of the Council of Trent, as described by Sarpi and Pallavicini, to promulgate any positive decree on the subject ; and indeed the Fathers themselves were divided in opinion. The hesitation is reflected in the actual decisions of the Council. It is well known that the Pontificate of Pius IX. distinguished itself by a final decision, and the Immaculate Conception is now an article of faith in the Church of Rome.

It need hardly be observed that the doctrine has no foundation in Scripture. The impression which the latter leaves on the mind is that Mary was not without actual infirmity (Luke ii. 48 ; John ii. 4), which is incompatible with the notion of her being free from original sin. S. Paul makes no exception in her favour when he declares that all, save ONE, have sinned (Rom. v. 12). Moreover, if her conception was immaculate, it seems that that of her parents must have been so too, and their parents in turn ; and so on till we arrive at Adam, which subverts the received doctrine of original sin altogether. It has been already seen that there is no necessity for the dogma in order to secure the perfect sinlessness of Christ. In the practical system of the Romish Church, however, it has an appropriate, it may be said, a necessary, place. In that system the intercession of Christ in His priestly office has given place to the intercession of the Virgin ; it is to her that the worshipper is really directed to secure the acceptance of his prayers ; it is through her intervention that

spiritual blessings are expected. But the instinctive feeling of the heart is that whoever discharges this office—not typically, as the Jewish High Priest, but in reality and truth—must be without sin; whoever appears before God for us, in the court of heaven, cannot need supplication for himself. This feeling Scripture satisfies by revealing its appropriate object: ‘Such an High Priest became us who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners’ (Heb. vii. 26): when His functions are transferred to another, the latter naturally becomes invested with His prerogatives.

§ 38. ORIGINAL SIN AS THE TRANSMISSION OF GUILT—PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY

But how does this inherent tendency in man’s nature come into existence? Why is it found in all men? The explanation which Scripture gives, so far as it gives any, is that it is a transmitted evil, transmitted from father to son in the way of natural propagation; Adam after, and in consequence of, his fall, being the first link in the chain, the head and source of the universal depravation. And so we affirm that ‘it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam’ (Art. ix.).

The passages which add this element to our previous knowledge are not numerous; but they are sufficiently plain. When Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness and after his image (Gen. v. 3), the idea of propagation from father to son is prominent; and of what character the likeness propagated was we may infer from the circumstances that before Adam fell he had no son at all, and even from the form of expression; not in the image of God (chap. i. 27), but in his own image he begat Seth. David traces his inherent sinfulness to his having been born of human parents (Ps. li. 5). But the principal passage is Rom. v. 12: ‘By one man sin entered into the world.’ This can hardly mean merely that Adam was the first of human beings to sin, but rather that through him the noxious element found entrance into a world hitherto free from it; and having thus entered, it affected all his posterity; the proof of which is that death, the penalty of sin, ‘passed upon all men,’ whether actual sinners or not. If the effect were produced simply by the imitation of Adam, it would apply only to actual sinners, since they alone are capable of such imitation; and then death should have been confined to them. Since the fact is otherwise, as the case of infants proves, some other connection with Adam must be understood; and none other is conceivable but that of natural descent; which, in fact, embraces every individual of

the human race, the infant of a day old as well as the adult. To the same effect are our Lord's words, John iii. 6 : ' That which is born of the flesh is flesh ' ; that is, the unregenerate nature comes into being through natural birth. An indirect proof, but of a cogent character, is furnished by the miracle of the Incarnation : if Christ alone was to be without sin and yet born of woman, this could only be effected by interrupting the chain of propagation from an earthly father. More ought not to be extracted from these passages than they contain, but, on the other hand, not less. Taken by themselves they do not explain the precise nature of the taint transmitted ; nor whether the soul, the proper subject of sin, is the vehicle of transmission, or the body alone ; nor do they affirm that all men being in Adam were parties to his sin ; nor that the guilt of it is imputed to mankind : but they do imply that we are what we are by reason of our natural descent from Adam, or, in other words, that the depravation of our nature is hereditary.

As soon, however, as Christian speculation directed itself to this subject it was confronted with great difficulties. Can the corrupt tendency which we inherit from Adam be called sin in any proper sense of the word ? If guilt is to be connected with sin, it seems essential that it should be voluntary, the result of an act of the will ; but here this element seems wanting. Without his own consent an individual is born into the world, and finds himself impeded in his ascent heavenwards by a natural infirmity ; and he is told that this is in itself sinful, and ' deserving of God's wrath and condemnation,' (Art. ix.). Is it not rather a misfortune, like being born blind, or lame ? and does it not rather palliate, than the reverse, the actual sin which necessarily follows from it ; as congenital blindness or lameness is a valid excuse for omissions of duty which would be culpable if the organs or limbs were in a sound condition ? And this indeed is the mystery of original sin.

The Eastern Church, to whose taste theological questions, in the strict sense of the word, were more congenial, aimed at little preciseness of language on this subject. The general tendency of its teaching was to extenuate the effects of the Fall, and to make man the arbiter of his own destiny ; a partial truth, indeed, everywhere presupposed in Scripture, but when exclusively dwelt upon liable to lead to error. It is not surprising then to find expressions in many of the most distinguished Fathers of that Church, such as Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, and even Athanasius himself, which bear a Pelagian aspect, though it would be unjust to ascribe to them any deliberate approval of Pelagianism as a system. Origen attenuated the whole doctrine of an inherited taint from

Adam by his theory of the pre-existence of souls, which, according to him, were already sinful before they came into the world. J. Damascenus, in his systematic treatise, 'De Fide Orthodoxa,' avoids the subject altogether. It was to the Western Church that Providence assigned the task of supplying this omission; but even in it the doctrine only gradually assumed a definite shape. Tertullian, to whom we owe the phrase *vitium originis*, speaks of a 'corruption of nature' which is 'another nature'; yet the well-known passage of this author, dissuading from infant baptism, contrasts strongly with Augustine's doctrine, one of whose principal arguments for original sin is founded upon this practice. On the whole, however, the great writers of the Latin Church deliver a clear testimony on the real deterioration of man's nature, and its connection with the Fall. Augustine, in his work against Julian the Pelagian, was able to produce a long series of eminent Fathers—Irenæus, Cyprian, Ambrose, Hilary—of whose meaning there could be no doubt, and by whom he was himself anticipated in many of his favourite arguments. Whether he was equally successful in proving Chrysostom and Gregory to be on his side may admit of doubt. Things were in this state—the doctrine substantially held, but not yet reduced to form—when Pelagius, or Morgan, a native of Britain, and Cælestius, his disciple, about A.D. 404, put forth a series of propositions in which is contained the system known by the name of Pelagianism. According to Augustine they were as follows: that Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had fallen or not; that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not the human race; that the Law is a means of salvation as well as the Gospel; that before the coming of Christ there existed men without sin; that newly-born infants are in the same state in which Adam was before his fall; that neither through the death and sin of Adam does the race die, nor through the resurrection of Christ does it rise again. These opinions were condemned in several Councils (Carthage, Milevis, Ephesus); but no authoritative statements, such as those relating to the Godhead or the Person of Christ, were promulgated on the subject. But soon afterwards the controversy called Augustine into the field; that mighty champion of Divine truth, whose influence is to this day felt throughout the Christian Church, and to whom the Reformed Churches in particular look back as their spiritual progenitor.

Pelagianism was rather a tendency than a distinct heresy, and in fact it did not issue in any formal schism. It is simply the Christianity of human nature, or that reconstruction of the Gospel scheme which approves itself to natural reason and superficial worldly ob-

servation ; hence its constant reappearance in the Church, and its affinity with the Arminian and Unitarian systems. All that was mysterious and inexplicable in the actual state of man, and in the statements of Scripture respecting it, was eliminated : and nothing remained but what was trite, and met the eye, or what flattered the pride of the human heart. Of the propositions above stated, the second, fifth, and sixth were obviously directed against the Church-doctrine that in Adam mankind, in some sense, fell, and that infants are born with a corruption of nature which is the source of actual sin, and which renders them objects of God's displeasure. And from the remarks previously made it will be seen that these are precisely the features of the doctrine which are difficult to explain or defend.

The merits of Augustine as an opponent of these pernicious tenets—for pernicious they were, notwithstanding their apparent solicitude for the moral attributes of Deity—may be briefly summed up ; he exposes, with admirable force, their contrariety to Scripture, but seems less successful in reconciling his own explanations with our natural notions of equity. He insists upon the texts cited in the foregoing section, and especially on 2 Cor. v. 14 (from which it is doubtful whether he could extract the meaning he wishes) ; but when the Pelagian asks him to explain how sin can be properly ascribed to those (infants) who neither could actually sin, nor will to sin, he is obliged to fall back either upon a mystery, or upon the explanation that the voluntariness of *Adam's* sin supplies the lack of that element in original sin ; which is evidently in itself not a satisfactory explanation. The fact of an original deterioration of nature, not fully removed even in the regenerate, he rightly infers from Rom. vii. 14-25, but still fails to connect the idea of *guilt* with it. And his whole argument from the existence of 'concupiscence,' dominant in the natural, kept under but not extinct in the regenerate man, seems to labour under a defect. S. Paul affirms in that passage that sin was at one time 'dead' in him (verse 8), a mere latent potentiality, and this is properly original sin : the 'lust' or 'concupiscence' of which he proceeds to speak, and which he traces to the provocative operation of the law (verse 7), seems another thing, rather the effect of original sin than that sin itself. A slumbering concupiscence hardly conveys an intelligible meaning, any more than in philosophy a quiescent force. Augustine argues, with truth, that what even the regenerate have to struggle against must be sinful : that it did not, and could not, exist in Paradise ; with less discrimination perhaps, that the particular form of it which he has in view cannot now be disjoined from the commanded, and in itself holy, act of procreation ;

in short, that ' it hath of itself the nature of sin ' (Art. ix.) ; but the question still remains, Is he not rather explaining a fruit of original sin than this very sin itself ? Does he carry his analysis back far enough so as to reach the dark, quiescent ground of which all forms of concupiscence are but manifestations, intermediate between it and the actual sin ? The great theologian, in fact, dwells almost exclusively on the positive aspect of original sin, whereas its real character is rather negative : it acts like a weight, or a drag, rather than like a stimulant ; the operation of which is not felt at all in the unregenerate state, because the whole man moves under its influence, but of which the man immediately becomes conscious, as S. Paul did, when the law of the Spirit of life frees him from its uncontested mastery. He becomes conscious of it as being ' sore let and hindered ' in his upward aspirations, as clogged with a weight which impedes his free motions, and causes him to fall behind in the race (Heb. xii. 1) ; it is a pull downwards which, like gravity, acts steadily, even when conscious concupiscence may be absent. And in proportion as it is seen in this its true nature, it becomes difficult to connect with it the idea of voluntariness, which reason seems to make an essential element of sin. A defect which belongs to the *nature* as distinguished from individuals seems removed from the ground of personality and free choice : nature and necessity are convertible terms ; and it seems as if we can as little connect the idea of *guilt* with what belongs to the human race as such as we can deem a beast of prey culpable on account of the savage dispositions with which it came into the world.

It was obviously necessary, if the Pelagian was to be met effectively, that the doctrine of propagation should receive an extension of meaning, and mankind be brought into a still closer connection with the first man. And Scripture seems to warrant such an extension. For it not only declares, as we have seen, that by one man sin entered into the world, but further, that ' all men sinned ' (in him, as the context seems to require) ; that the ' judgment was by one to condemnation ' (of the whole) ; that ' by one man's disobedience many were made sinners ' ; that ' in Adam all die ' (Rom. v. 12, 16, 19 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22). It seems implied in such passages as these not merely that sin entered the world through Adam, but that when Adam sinned all mankind, in some sense, sinned in him, and thus contracted guilt. In fact they contain the rudiments of the theory of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, with which Augustine's name is especially associated, and which from him passed into the received teaching of the Western Church. This theory he had already virtually enunciated when he attempted to secure the

element of voluntariness in original sin by making Adam's will the will of the race ; but, in the progress of the Pelagian controversy his language became more definite, and the theory more complete. Not that he was really the originator of it, for it is found in the writings of many of his predecessors, and he takes care to appeal to them in support of his own statements ; but in his hands it first received systematic treatment, and a pointed application to the existing heresy. This latter considered mankind as an aggregate of independent atoms, affecting each other only in the way of teaching or example ; not as an organized whole, propagating itself along with its fundamental characteristics. Each man comes on the stage of life free to stand or fall ; and though placed in a disadvantageous position from the prevalence of evil in the world, a fact which cannot be denied, not otherwise incapacitated from working out his salvation. Such a doctrine is not only inconsistent with Scripture, but with the analogy of nature. No individual, at least in the case of civilized man, comes into the world otherwise than as a member of a community, which is distinguished from other communities by laws, customs, a national life, and a national temperament of its own ; in the weal or the woe of the community he necessarily bears a part ; its peculiarities are stamped upon him. Races, nations, thus propagate themselves, and maintain a corporate life while individuals come and go. No branch of a tree exists independently, or derives its nature from itself ; no tree is a mere collection of branches ; but an organized body, with a common nature or quality, which pervades the whole. The Augustinian theory is merely the same fact applied to the spiritual condition of mankind. We were all in Adam, Augustine says, as Levi was in the loins of his father Abraham (Heb. vii. 9), and we all sinned in Adam ; that is, his sin became, in some sense, ours, even as the righteousness of Christ is laid to the account of those who believe upon Him (Rom. v. 19). Not only Adam's sinful nature (the consequence of his fall), but Adam's guilt (*reatus*), is transmitted by natural propagation, or, as Augustine calls it 'contagion,' to his posterity. Mankind is viewed as a whole, of which Adam was both the physical head and the moral representative : if he had remained upright, the advantage would have redounded to the whole, and in like manner his fall was the fall of the whole. The actual transgression of Adam, Augustine argues, is indeed a bygone thing, but not its guilt, and the corruption of nature consequent upon it. A crime committed is past, but the effect of it may remain ; and though the crime could not have been committed without an exercise of will, the effect may continue apart from, and even against, the will, as in the remorse which the criminal

experiences. And, indeed, it is true that a sin once committed may perpetuate itself in many ways long after the act has become a thing of the past ; as bodily diseases, the result of a parent's sin, and even corrupt moral dispositions, often, as observation proves, becomes hereditary, and exist in the descendants long after the original author has passed away.

But Augustine does not stop even here. In order effectually to connect the idea of guilt with original sin, he holds the latter to be in a real sense the penalty of sin, according to the principle, *Peccatum pœna peccati* ; so that the newly-born infant not merely shares in Adam's guilt, but also in the punishment thereof ; which in Adam was the forfeiture of original righteousness, or original sin. In Adam the depravation of his nature was strictly a punishment, because he sinned voluntarily ; and in his posterity it bears the same character. The idea of imputation here reaches its climax : mankind is so identified with the first man that its spiritual condition is a positive and not merely a natural penalty of the fact of connection. When, however, Augustine attempts to establish this principle (*Peccatum pœna peccati*) from Scripture, he is compelled to confine himself to cases of actual sin, in which no doubt it holds good. He refers to the Apostle's statement that because the Gentiles worshipped idols, therefore God gave them up to uncleanness (Rom. i. 24) ; and so the latter was both a sin itself, and also the punishment for a previous sin. Saul, he observes, was both unrighteous himself, and also a token of God's displeasure against Israel (' I gave thee a king in my anger,' Hos. xiii. 11). Pharaoh's hardness of heart was the punishment of his previous impiety. And indeed, in the case of an adult, in whom original and actual sin are so intermingled that separation is impossible, the former may be conceived of as imbibing a quality which really belongs to the latter. Original sin, however, should never be considered apart from the case of infants, in whom its specific nature is primarily to be sought for ; and to affirm that infants, as vicarious criminals, inherit it as a punishment not for their own but for Adam's sin, was needlessly to complicate the question, and to put more into the statements of Scripture on the subject than they warrant.

The use which Augustine makes of the practice of infant baptism to establish his conclusions is well known. And as against the Pelagians it was an effective *argumentum ad hominem*. For they too approved of infant baptism ; and the argument was difficult to meet, Why do you baptize infants ? Since they have no actual sin, it can only be for the remission of original. The Pelagian replied that it was necessary to secure for them the highest measure of bliss, the

vision of God ; but he failed to dislodge his adversary from his position. As a general argument, however, it will hardly bear the stress placed upon it. The point was to prove that in a newly-born infant there is something which may be called sin ; the reasoning was not valid that because the Church, on however good general grounds, adopted a modification of the original ordinance of baptism, this proved the fact, or explained the mystery ; at best it was but a proof of the Church's belief on the subject. And this will appear plainer from the circumstance that Augustine argues from the accompaniments of infant baptism, common in that age but abandoned in our Church, as strongly as he does from the ordinance itself. What means, he asks the Pelagian, the ' exsufflation,' the ' exorcism,' which we perform over infants at their baptism, if not that they are thereby delivered from the powers of darkness ? To what extent infant baptism, and much more exsufflation and exorcism, can produce certain warranty of Scripture for their use, and still more for their alleged effects, so as to bear the weight laid upon them in this controversy, is a question which does not seem to have occurred to him.

It was not to be expected that Augustine's opponents would fail to charge him with Manicheism, probably with an oblique allusion to his early aberrations. If man is introduced into the world with sin, whence, asked the Pelagian, can that sin have proceeded ? Not from God, for He cannot be the author of sin ; not from baptized and regenerate parents, for how can an unclean thing come from a holy ? it remains that it must spring from a source independent of God, an evil principle co-eternal with God. But the answer was at hand. It rests upon the principle to which Augustine, as we have seen (§ 22), attaches so much importance, that evil has no independent existence, and is always found cleaving to something good, as the shadow to the substance. Every nature, and therefore man's nature, considered merely as such, comes from God, and is good ; but to a nature good in itself evil may become attached, as in the case of Satan, and of Adam in paradise. The faculty of will is a gift of God, and therefore good ; but it may become as in Satan and the unregenerate, an evil will, and bring forth corresponding fruits. In like manner, wedlock is a Divine institution and in itself holy ; but the procreation of children affected with an original taint is an evil, which in consequence of Adam's fall, has become connected with it : the parents transmit this evil, but they cannot transmit the gift of grace by which they themselves are regenerate, for such gift is not transmissible. If the Pelagian argument were valid, and evil can only spring from evil as an independent substance, then children born in adultery must, by reason of their evil origin, be themselves

evil; whereas the Pelagian himself exempts them, no less than children born in holy wedlock, from original sin. Augustine triumphantly retorts the objection on his opponent, and proves that the latter rather than he himself is a promoter of Manicheism. Evil exists; if it cannot attach itself to what is good so far as that good is a creature of God, it must spring^s from evil, evil which exists as an independent nature; which is exactly what the Manichean wishes to see admitted.

This may be the appropriate place to notice Augustine's judgment respecting infants who die in infancy. Since they bear the guilt of Adam's sin, and also derive from Adam an inherent corruption of nature, these disqualifications for the kingdom of heaven must be removed; and they can only be removed by baptism. Baptized infants then dying in infancy are certainly saved, but if they die unbaptized, it goes hard with them. Admitted into the kingdom of heaven they cannot be; the most we can hope for is that their punishment will be comparatively light. Such was the force of theory on a subject on which it is impossible to frame a theory; for Scripture is comparatively silent on the case of infants; how far the work of Christ affects them; what their regeneration is, if the word may be applied to them, and by what means it is effected; whether they will rise from the dead as infants, and other like questions which may be raised. The humanity of later ages allowed natural feeling to prevail over theory, and piously believed all infants who died in infancy, whether baptized or not, to be safe in the bosom of their Father and their God. It is to be noted, too, that though the Traducianist hypothesis evidently falls in better with his views, Augustine refrains from making use of it, deterred probably by the difficulties on either side of the question; on the one (Traducianism), of conceiving how an immaterial substance can be propagated, on the other (Creationism), of conceiving how God could create a soul pure, and then consign it to a defiled receptacle, sure to impart a taint to it.

Pelagianism, vanquished in argument, held its ground as a tendency, and the hierarchical spirit of the middle ages, as in later times, instinctively leant towards it in preference to the Augustinian system. It was rather, however, as regards the nature of original sin and its extent that Augustine's teaching was departed from, than on the point of imputation; which continued, with some modifications, to be the received doctrine. Anselm professes himself unable to understand how the sin of Adam can be so propagated as to render infants as liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves. His own theory is as follows: Adam sinned, in one point of view, as a person, in another as man (*i.e.*, as human nature which at that

time existed in him alone) ; but since Adam and humanity could not be separated, the sin of the person necessarily affected the nature. This nature is what Adam transmitted to his posterity, and transmitted it such as his sin had made it ; burdened with a debt which it could not pay, robbed of the righteousness, with which God had originally invested it ; and in every one of his descendants this impaired nature makes *the persons sinners*. Yet not in the same degree sinners as Adam was, for the latter sinned both as human nature, and as a person, while infants (newly born) sin only so far as they possess the nature ; in confirmation of which view he cites, according to his interpretation of it, Rom. v. 14 (' them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression '). The fiction of infants having the actual eating of the apple imputed to them (for Adam's human nature as distinguished from himself did not eat it) is thus avoided, and it is their own mutilated or depraved nature that shuts them out from the kingdom of heaven. The point on which he is not quite distinct is whether the defective nature in itself makes them sinners, or only because it necessarily (if they live) leads to actual sin. But probably the former is his meaning.

The works of this great theologian on this as on other points exercised a vast influence on his successors. Accordingly his view is substantially reproduced by T. Aquinas. ' All men,' he says, ' who are born of Adam may be considered as one man, so far forth as the nature which they inherit from their first parent is one : as in civil matters all the men who belong to a community are considered as one body, and the whole community as one man. So the many men derived from Adam are, as it were, members of one body. In the human body a crime which the hand perpetrates is not ascribed to the hand alone, but to the man of whom the hand is but a single member. Original sin, in like manner, is not the sin of this or that person, except so far forth as he inherits a nature from Adam, and therefore it is called a sin of nature, as *e.g.* in Ephes. ii. 3 (' We were by nature children of wrath ').' The bold realism by which the *nature* of man abstracted from the person is made both by Anselm and Thomas susceptible of guilt is apparent ; but so is the sagacity by which the weak point of the Augustinian theory is evaded, or concealed.

The Protestant Confessions, with one exception, content themselves with simply tracing the depravation of human nature to Adam's fall, and dwell principally on the nature and extent of that depravation ; as might be expected, for this latter was the real point of debate between the Reformers and their opponents. Our own Article (ix.) is an example of this reserve. We learn from

Sarpi that at the Council of Trent lively disputes arose on the question ; and particularly that Ambrose Catharinus delivered a long address in which he stated his objections to the decisions about to be promulgated, and propounded a theory of his own. Concupiscence and the privation of original righteousness, he contended, were in Adam rather the consequences of original sin than that sin itself ; and that only which was sin in Adam can be sin in us. How, then, do we derive sin from Adam ? A federal compact had been entered into between him as the head of the human race and God, by which his obedience was to be the obedience, and his transgression the transgression, of the whole ; and when he fell the whole consequently became involved in guilt. Original sin, therefore, consists merely in imputation. But this solution obviously fails : for the question at once occurs, Was Adam commissioned by his posterity to enter into this contract ? Was their consent previously obtained to it ? If not, it is difficult to see how the breach of it should involve them in guilt. Nevertheless, Catharinus's theory only represents the general tendency of Romanism, which is to limit the corruption of our nature as much as possible to a mere imputation. Yet the assembled Fathers hesitated to endorse it, Scripture and the main current of ecclesiastical tradition being in their way. The decree, as finally settled, admitted that original sin is not only such by imputation, but is something inherent, a *fomes*, or material, from which actual sin proceeds. And this appears to be the received doctrine of the Romish theologians.

What then, on the whole, is the result of these controversial discussions ? Pretty much, it must be confessed, to leave the matter where Scripture leaves it ; a mystery, which, though it may not be denied or concealed, remains such in spite of all attempts to explain it. The doctrine of imputation, in some sense, appears to be taught in Scripture ; and even they who contend against it as supposed to be commonly held are obliged to invent a substitute of their own. Thus Jeremy Taylor, who in his treatise on this subject perilously approaches the Tridentine teaching, after setting forth strongly the difficulties in the way of supposing that infants (dying in infancy) are condemned to perdition for a sin which they did not consent to, devotes a chapter to prove that ' Adam's sin is in us no more than an imputed sin.'¹ In what sense ? ' His sin is reckoned to us so as to bring evil upon us, because we were born of him, and consequently put into the same natural state where he was left after his sin.' But this is no imputation at all, but, as Taylor remarks, a law of

¹ Further Explic. § 2.

God's natural government, viz., that children often suffer for the faults of their parents, while no one would think of calling them guilty of those faults. The children of a spendthrift father do not enjoy the temporal advantages they otherwise might have done ; this is to them a misfortune ; but can their father's sin be said, in any proper sense, to be imputed to them ? Not unless some further and deeper connection is established between them and their father, which is the very thing which Scripture does seem to establish between Adam and mankind. In short, are not imputation and guilt correlative terms ? The difficulty does not seem removed by Taylor's modification of the doctrine ; perhaps is irremovable by any such expedient. Anselm is a safer guide ; and if his theory is accepted it may serve to explain, not indeed the mystery, but such statements on the subject as that of Art. ix., that what is in every infant by reason of his descent from Adam is 'deserving of God's wrath and damnation.' Is it not, in fact, the nature and not the person that is regarded in all such statements ? Sin may be considered abstractedly from the person in whom it resides : in its own nature it is ἀμαρτία, or a missing of the mark, and ἀνομία, or contrariety to the Divine law. In whomsoever, therefore, it is found, even as a latent potentiality, it must *in itself* be an object of God's displeasure ; but it does not follow that the person must be so, still less that the sentence on sin will in such a case be actually inflicted. The *fomes*, or tendency, which if the infant lives will assuredly give birth to actual sin, cannot in God's sight be a thing indifferent ; but as it is only an objective guiltiness (to which the will has not consented, because the subject is incapable of will), it may be covered from God's sight by an objective atonement (not appropriated by an act of will) ; so that the infant himself, if he dies as an infant, is not, and never has been, an object of God's wrath. But when the personality, as in adults, becomes developed, the case is different. The inherited taint inevitably produces its fruits ; in the language of Anselm, the nature corrupts the person ; it is no longer possible to distinguish between original and actual sin ; ' *Non invitè,*' says Augustine, ' *tales sumus* ' ; and the whole man is guilty. By the work of regeneration this acquiescence of the fettered will is broken up, and the man becomes conscious of the law of sin in his members (Rom. vii. 23), and successfully resists it ; it still remains, however, as a perpetual drag upon him, and will do so until redemption is complete. His consciousness of this tendency is not merely that of misfortune but of culpability, and he himself assents to the verdict of Scripture that even before original sin could issue in actual it was, in itself, properly sin (Rom. vii. 7-11). And yet it may fairly be maintained that in no case does original sin,

considered in and by itself, carry with it the penalty of eternal condemnation.

That all difficulties thus disappear would be too much to affirm ; and it is not surprising to find a theologian like J. Müller, dissatisfied with the traditionary explanations, resorting to others of his own. It may be doubted, however, whether the one he has chosen will find general acceptance. He can account for the combination of a natural, and therefore so far necessary, evil tendency in man with the sense of guilt on account of it—both of them facts which Scripture and experience establish—only on the hypothesis of a voluntary fall of souls before they came into their present state of existence.¹ Such a fall, he contends, and the faint recollection of it as a voluntary one—according to the Platonic notion that all knowledge is recollection—are sufficient to account for the facts. The speculation is ingenious ; but as Scripture is silent on any such pre-existent fall, it is but a speculation. It is better to confess our inability to explain or reconcile things which we are obliged to admit than to indulge in theories which merely float in the air.

§ 39. ORIGINAL SIN AS THE CORRUPTION OF NATURE—
PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

The *extent* of the depravation of man's nature through the Fall is a different question from that respecting the mode of its transmission or the guiltiness attaching to it ; and it was the one which occupied by far the larger space in the controversy on the subject between the Reformers and their opponents. It has been already observed that the tendency of the Eastern Church was to take a mild view of man's present condition ; and even Augustine, in controversy with the Pelagians, insisted rather upon the fact of original sin than upon the degree in which it affects our nature. The Pelagians held, as we have seen, that newly-born infants are in the same state in which Adam was before his fall, and that by the Law salvation may be obtained as well as by the Gospel ; in other words, that there is no real depravation of nature in man as he is. Augustine could not prove the existence of original sin without at the same time impugning these tenets ; but his line of argument did not lead him to make them a subject of special examination ; and whether as a consequence of this, or from the prevailing tendency of the Christianity of the middle ages, they survived, in a modified form, their author ; and one of the first tasks of Luther and his coadjutors was to rescue the truth on this point from the Pelagian glosses of the schoolmen, and to bring the doctrine of the Church into harmony with Scripture and experience.

¹ Lehre der Sünde, ii. c. 4.

It became an admitted doctrine of the schools, contrary to that of Augustine, that the original righteousness of Adam in Paradise consisted in certain supernatural gifts of grace, which were added to his essential nature, and which might be withdrawn, leaving that nature in no worse a position than it was when created. This doctrine appears in its least objectionable form in T. Aquinas, who so closely connects the superadded gift with the creation of man, that they can only be separated in idea, and thus secures to himself the power of making original sin something more than a mere imputation. But Duns Scotus, his rival, adopted it without reserve ; in which, indeed, he could plead the authority of Anselm, who reduces the notion of original sin to a mere privative one. The question came under discussion at the Council of Trent ; and the Dominicans and Franciscans, as was usually the case, took opposite sides. The former relied on Thomas, the latter on Anselm ; and the decree ultimately agreed upon seems of the nature of a compromise between the two. Original sin is declared to have passed, in some sense, from Adam to his posterity ; but it is also declared to be not merely forgiven but eradicated in and by baptism, and that the ' concupiscence,' which is admitted to remain in the baptized, is not properly sin, but is called so because it proceeds from, and leads to, sin. What is it then in the unbaptized ? The Council is prudently silent on this point ; for it is evident that a thing which is not sin in the baptized, and yet is common to them and the unbaptized, cannot be sin even in the latter ; which, in truth, is the doctrine of Bellarmine, who does not scruple to affirm that ' the state of man after the Fall differs from that of Adam *in puris naturalibus* (*i.e.* as created) only as deprivation differs from nakedness ; and that human nature is no worse, if original guilt be put out of view, nor does it labour under greater ignorance and infirmity, than when first created, and before the addition of the supernatural gift.' The utmost that can be allowed is that it suffers from a certain ' languor,' or debility, which, however, does not interfere with its power of meriting a bestowal of grace (grace of congruity). This was the doctrine, with its consequences in the practical system of the Church, which the Reformers found commonly accepted, and which led to the strong counter-statements which we find in the Protestant Confessions. Man, as in the Pelagian system, became practically his own Saviour ; the statements of Scripture respecting the radical nature of the disease were set aside, or explained away ; superficial distinctions were drawn between venial and mortal sin, while the deep root of all sin lay undisturbed ; and, as a consequence, the necessity of the atoning work of Christ was proportionably impaired, or its application made dependent on

the interposition of the Church in her sacramental ordinances. For it is evident that if man can save himself, the work of Christ assumes a casual character ; *i.e.* it may be necessary to one and not to another ; it is not necessary to the race.

The Confession of Augsburg declares that ' since the Fall, all men are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence ; and that this defect is truly sin, and issues in eternal death in the case of those who are not regenerated by baptism and the Holy Spirit.' The Papal confutation replied that to be without fear and trust in God is a description that applies only to actual sin ; which drew from Melancthon the further explanation that it is the innate power to love God, and not merely the act, which is denied to the natural man ; and that concupiscence forms part of the definition because when man is unable to rise to communion with God, he necessarily concentrates his affections on lower objects, himself and the world. Since original righteousness was natural to man and not an additional gift of grace, to be deprived of it necessarily involved a change, which the word ' corruption ' was chosen to describe. This word properly means not annihilation but alteration ; a deterioration of the form in which a nature reaches its ideal. In the present case it means that though the substance of man remains the same, his nature, through the Fall, has lost its original form, and become, in fact, another nature. And the property of this other nature is to be ignorant of God, to be averted from Him, to place self on the throne which God ought to occupy, to act, when it becomes active, in opposition to His holy law ; in short, to be in itself sinful, which is what the doctrine of Rome persistently denies. And it is evident from what has already been remarked (§ 37) that nothing short of this view of man's unregenerate state satisfies the statements of Scripture respecting it. The natural and the spiritual man ; the flesh and the Spirit ; the first Adam and his seed and the second Adam and his seed ; are contrasts which pervade the whole teaching of S. Paul, and to express which the ideals of ' debility ' or partial deterioration, are inadequate. The nature of man itself needs to be re-formed, its corruption to be reversed ; which is what Scripture means by the new birth, or the new creation. And thus are to be understood the strong expressions which occur in some of the Protestant Confessions. ' Even if man,' says the ' Lutheran Formula Concordiæ,' ' should never think, speak, or do anything wrong, nevertheless his nature and person are sinful ; that is, infected, tainted, and totally corrupt before God, with original sin, which, like a spiritual leprosy, lurks in the deepest recesses of the heart.' They represent the reaction from that type of doctrine

which would make original sin to consist merely in the imputation of Adam's transgression, or in the deprivation of a superadded righteousness (*carentia justitiæ originalis*). And no doubt the pendulum in its swing may have gone somewhat too far in the opposite direction.

They are certainly not to be understood, as Möhler would understand them, viz., as implying either that human nature has lost one of its essential faculties, the capability of knowing God, a positive quality of evil taking its place ; or that original sin has become of the essence of human nature. The word 'faculty' may be used in a twofold sense, to signify either capacity or power ; the brute has no capacity for religion, man in his worst estate has ; but the capacity may be in abeyance. Fallen man is still a reasonable creature, possesses conscience, retains, in some sense, the image of God (§ 30) ; nothing essential to human nature has been lost by the Fall. What is wanting is the proper direction of his faculties ; and every one of them suffers from this perversion. Like the word 'faculty,' the word 'integrity' admits of a double sense ; it may mean either that the sum-total of the parts is complete, or that each of the parts is in its normal condition. It is in the latter sense, not the former, that the Protestant doctrine of original sin denies the integrity of human nature. And thus is to be understood the *quam longissime* of our Art. ix. Man is gone from original righteousness as far as he possibly can consistently with his remaining, in all essential points, man. The spiritual leprosy has infected all his faculties, but destroyed none ; sin is an inseparable accident, but still an accident, of his nature. The Protestant Churches had occasion to insist upon this, for, in truth, some of their teachers had spoken incautiously on the subject. Flacius, about A.D. 1560, had maintained against Strigel and others that original sin has become of the substance of man, and in his 'Clavis Scripturæ,' a work otherwise of great merit, he openly defended this proposition. The question had been long ago fully discussed by Augustine, and determined as only it can be, that all evil, even in the devil, presupposes an originally good nature of which it is the depravation ; that it is a fault (*vitium*) not an essence, an accident not a substance ; and that fallen man is still, as regards the essential constituents of human nature, what he was when created. If sin has actually become the substance of man, how can man expect a future state of bliss wherein sin shall no longer exist ; that is, wherein he shall exist deprived of a part of his essence ? From such a doctrine the Lutheran Church took care to dissociate itself. 'Although,' says the Form. Conc., 'in our present state we cannot visibly separate between our nature in itself and original sin in itself,

yet the nature or substance of fallen man, the man himself in whom original sin dwells, and this sin, are not one and the same thing ; just as in a leper the man and his leprosy are distinct things. A distinction must be observed between our nature, as it is created and preserved by God, and the original sin which is an accident of it.' It remarks, very justly, that the opposite opinion interferes with the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation ; for if sin is of the essence of our nature, Christ either did not assume that nature, inasmuch as He had no sin, or if He did He must have had sin ; either alternative leading to error. But while this error is repudiated, all the Protestant Churches maintain, as against Rome, that original sin—the *fomes* as the Council of Trent calls it—is not merely privative in its nature, but positively evil ; issuing, unless regenerating grace destroys its dominion, in an alienation from God which is not the less real even where it does not exhibit itself in open violations of the Divine law.

This may be an appropriate place to consider what is the full import of the sentence pronounced upon Adam in Gen. iii. It has already been observed (§ 35) that, on the surface, the narrative seems only to speak of the death of the body (including the temporal infictions which culminate in it) ; but this is far from exhausting the meaning of the word ' death,' as it is applied in the later Scriptures. In the Old Testament it signifies very commonly *Scheol*, or the place of departed spirits, which even to the pious Hebrew conveyed the idea of desolateness and inactivity ; a shadowy existence, not unlike that which Homer assigns to his heroes after their departure from this life (Ps. vi. 5 ; Isa. xxxviii. 18). In the New Testament it is used in a spiritual sense, to denote the state of the unregenerate man ; as when the Apostle reminds the Ephesians and Colossians that they were once dead in sins (Ephes. ii. 1 ; Col. ii. 13) ; or, in the parable, the returning prodigal is represented as having been, in his unrepentant state, dead (Luke xv. 24). And this meaning is to be distinguished from that which the word bears in several passages of the Apocalypse ; in which ' the second death ' closes this dispensation, in the final condemnation of the wicked. Now what is the idea which the expression ' spiritual death ' suggests ? Not merely that this state is the consequence, or punishment, of sin ; but that in itself it is a state loathsome, and without power of self-recovery. Sin is the death of the soul, and so it must have been in Adam's case, but for the regenerating grace which the Church piously believes to have been immediately vouchsafed to our first parents. And what was the result of sin in him we must suppose is transmitted to those ' naturally engendered of his offspring ' ; so that they too, antecedently to the new birth, are dead in sin. What description could have

been chosen more calculated to convey to us the fearful depravation of nature and the spiritual helplessness of the natural man, consequent on Adam's sin? The nature is not merely 'wounded,' or debilitated, but in such a condition that it naturally engenders corruption; and it must remain in this condition, separated from the source of spiritual life as in natural death the soul is separated from the body, unless the quickening word of Divine power approaches, and the dead hear the voice of the Son of God, and hearing live (John v. 25). Yet this language of Scripture must not be pressed to its (apparently) logical conclusions, without taking into account other statements which modify, or perhaps it would be more correct to say restrict, its sphere. If unregenerate man is dead in sins, it may be argued, he must be supposed incapable of moral virtue, of either approving it in others, or striving after it himself; but to maintain this seems inconsistent with the facts of history, and the common judgment of mankind. Whence sprang the heroic deeds and sentiments of an Aristides, a Camillus, or a Scipio? whence the moral judgments and efforts of philosophers like Plato, or of practical reformers like Socrates? Whence, in short, the natural tendency of man to coalesce into communities which can only subsist as long as outward crime is restrained, and which, according to the ancient conception of a state, ought to be schools of virtue? These facts seem to prove not only that sin has not become of the essence of man, but that the corruption of his nature is by no means total.

Of the difficulty connected with the state of the virtuous heathen, a twofold explanation may be given. One is, that their good qualities, or the comparative absence of bad ones, did, in fact, proceed from an operation of Divine grace, but not saving grace; grace sufficient to restrain the outbreaks of sin, and to foster the moral virtues necessary to man's temporal well-being. Every good and perfect gift, we are told, natural therefore as well as spiritual, comes from above (James i. 17); and there is a divine light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John i. 9). Or it may be said that these virtues are the remains (reliquiæ) of the Divine image impressed upon Adam and not quite obliterated by the Fall; by reason of which man still has natural perceptions of right and wrong, and approves of what is right, though he may fail to practise it (*video meliora*, etc.). Practically they come to the same thing, viz., that there is a sphere of moral action and even sentiment which belongs even to fallen man, and in which he can display qualities which, in themselves, are deserving of admiration. This sphere is described in the Protestant Confessions as that of *res civiles*, or *justitia civilis*; that is, though of Divine appointment, and so far good, it is of the earth

earthy, and is different in *kind* from the spiritual. The State, no less than the Church, is an ordinance of God (Rom. xiii.); and by repressing crime, and giving scope to the moral virtues and affections, of which the heathen proved themselves not destitute, it was, and is, in a real sense, though not in the same sense as the Mosaic law, a schoolmaster to lead to higher things. There was a dispensation of heathendom as well as of revealed religion; and God never wholly severed the connection between Himself and man. And the difference between a Camillus and a Catiline was, in this lower sphere, immense. But none of these virtuous faculties, or instincts, or achievements, could, or did, raise man to the higher element of the spiritual life, love to God and true holiness. They were all vitiated in this point of view by self-love, or the desire of human approbation; they were not, in the specific sense of the words, the fruit of the Holy Spirit; they were *splendida vitia*, as they have been not inaptly termed. The tree, Augustine says, bears corresponding fruits: a corrupt tree (the unregenerate heart) may indeed produce the wild fruit of morality, but not the divine fruit of grace. The natural man possesses the *capacity* of knowing God—otherwise he would be incapable of redemption—and therefore moral faculties and instincts; and one natural man may be superior to another in moral perception and practice: but none of these things affects the whole condition of the natural man as such in reference to God; which, until regenerating grace transforms it, remains so far totally corrupt. Scripture by no means ignores the differences that exist on the lower level of moral disposition: of some of the Pharisees and Scribes Christ says that they would neither enter the kingdom of heaven themselves nor permit others to do so (Matt. xxiii. 13), and of another Scribe that he was not far from the kingdom of God (Mark xii. 34); yet all were equally outside the kingdom. In short, the natural moral faculties are active only in reference to the things of this world; they are dead in reference to the life of God in Christ. It is in a sense thus restricted that the statements of Scripture, and of the Protestant Confessions, on this point are to be taken; but in this restricted sense they only affirm what experience amply proves.

So deeply has original sin struck its roots in human nature that it continues to exist, and in its proper quality, even in the regenerate (Art. ix.). This is one of the principal points of difference between the Romish and the Protestant doctrine on this topic. The Council of Trent, as we have seen, declares that original sin is not merely forgiven, but extirpated in baptism; so that what remains in the baptized has not the nature of sin. The 'concupiscence' which, it is admitted, does remain is nothing but what Adam was affected

with before the Fall, when it was restrained by the bridle of super-added grace ; this restraining power is now replaced by the grace of baptism, and concupiscence is either brought under a necessary law of nature, or it is reduced to a mere deterioration of nature ¹ ; nay, it may assume a salutary character as supplying material for the exercise of virtue. How then does it come from sin ? as the Council asserts. It is not easy to see. What Adam, still upright, possessed, if transmitted by natural propagation, can hardly be transmitted sin ; nor can it well be regarded as the punishment of Adam's sin when it belongs to the constitution of human nature, and existed before actual sin. Nor is it less difficult to see why it should lead to sin, as the Council also admits. Let it be granted that as in Adam so in us it supplies the *fomes*, or material, out of which, in the absence of restraining grace, sin may spring ; still as in Adam it was kept in check by such grace, so it is in us by the restored gift in baptism. Such are the difficulties in which the Council involved itself in its attempts to transfer the seat of sin from the affections to the outward manifestation, and yet to avoid coming into open collision with Scripture and Christian feeling.

The Protestant Confessions, our own among the number, hold not only that concupiscence remains in the regenerate, but that in them not less than in the unregenerate it has the nature of sin. In the unregenerate it is not removed either as regards its guilt or its dominion ; and such a state is nothing but what Scripture describes under the terms, ' the carnal mind,' ' the flesh,' the ' old man,' the ' natural man.' In the regenerate the guilt is wholly removed through the merits of Christ, and the dominion broken, but the evil still remains, though no longer as the ruling principle ; the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit is experienced even by the Christian, and draws forth from him the daily prayer for forgiveness (Matt. vi. 12) ; the fallen nature is in process of being healed, but the complete cure is not to be expected in this life. It was the great merit of Augustine to have established this truth, against the Pelagians of his day, on irrefragable evidence of Scripture ; and of the Reformation to have recovered it primarily from Scripture, but also from the writings of the great Father, against the Pelagian tendencies of the schoolmen. There is indeed some little ambiguity in Augustine's language on the subject, and it may seem doubtful in sundry passages whether he considers concupiscence merely as a penalty of Adam's

¹ This relative deterioration of nature, of which concupiscence is the symptom, is not denied by Bellarmine : only he denies that it is, in itself, sin. ' Non est quæstio inter nos et adversarios, sine humana natura graviter depravata per Adæ peccatum. Id enim libenter fatemur' (De amiss. grat. lib. v. 5).

sin (*malum pœnæ*), or as sinful in itself (*malum culpæ*); but on the whole his meaning, as the subject unfolds itself to him, becomes clear. 'The concupiscence of the flesh,' he says, 'against which the good Spirit strives' (therefore in the regenerate), 'is sin, because it involves rebellion against the law of the mind; it is also the punishment of sin, because it was the fruit of one man's disobedience; and it is the cause of sin, in case it meets with no resistance.'¹ Still more distinctly, referring to his statement that though the guilt of concupiscence is remitted in baptism the thing itself remains,² 'You seem,' he says, 'to suppose me to have meant that the nature of concupiscence is in the baptized so changed that it is no longer culpable (*soluta reatu quo ipsa rea est*), whereas my meaning was that it no longer renders the *person* culpable; as in the case of homicide if you should hear that it was remitted you would not infer that the crime itself had been pronounced no crime, but that the person who had committed it was absolved.'³ That is, concupiscence even in the regenerate is sin, because its nature is to be contrary to the Divine law; but it does not, when resisted, affect the condition of the believer in the sight of God as a justified man. And this is precisely the doctrine of the Protestant Churches.

The great passage of Scripture on which Augustine and his followers relied was Rom. vii. 14-25. S. Paul therein, from his own experience, describes most graphically the conflict which goes on in the regenerate man. 'I am,' he says, 'so far as I am not wholly regenerate, carnal, sold under sin; my actual attainments fall short of my aim, and too often I do what I hate. I approve of the requirements of the law as holy, just, and good; I delight in it after the inward man, but though to will is present with me, how to render perfect obedience I find not, for in me, that is my flesh, or carnal nature not yet wholly crucified with Christ, dwells no good thing. I am conscious of a law, or tendency, in my members, or flesh, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to itself, so that I am compelled to cry out, Oh, wretched man, who shall deliver me from this body of death? I thank God, that though helpless in myself, I am delivered through the grace of Christ; delivered not from the existence, but from the dominion of the tyrant. It is therefore no longer I, the redeemed man, that do it, but the sin that dwells in me; it is this and not my emancipated will that produces the disorder. Nor does the conflict interfere with my position forensically in the sight of God. So far as I am flesh, indeed, I serve the law of sin, but with the mind, the inner man, I serve

¹ Cont. Jul. lib. v. 3.

² De Nup. i. 25.

³ Cont. Jul. lib. vi. 17.

the law of God ; and walking not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, there is no condemnation to me who am in Christ Jesus' (Rom. viii. 1). This interpretation of the passage being assumed to be the correct one (and there were few dissentient opinions on the subject in the early Church), it expresses the whole of what the Reformers contended for in their controversial statements as against Rome.¹

§ 40. FREEDOM OF THE WILL—PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY

From the extent of human corruption as described in the Protestant Confessions naturally follows the impossibility of man's passing from a state of nature to a state of grace by his own inherent strength, and apart from Divine assistance. One of the tenets of Pelagius, as Augustine tells us, was ' that that cannot be called free-will which is not self-sufficient (*i.e.*, self-determining), since each man is able to do, or to abstain from doing, what he pleases ; and that our victory (in the spiritual conflict) is not from Divine help, but from the exercise of free-will.' Pelagius did not deny that grace in some sense is necessary to a spiritual change, but Augustine charges him, and justly, with equivocation in the use of the word. By ' grace ' Pelagius understood every natural gift of God, *e.g.* free-will itself, and every external aid vouchsafed, such as the precepts of the Divine law ; only not a supernatural influence, operating on the heart to sway its affections. As a corollary, the exercise of free-will in a right direction constituted a claim on the Divine assistance, and, as the schoolmen afterwards taught, grace *de congruo* was its due reward.

↳ The answer of Augustine was substantially the same as that which has been given by Edwards and others, *viz.*, that Pelagius confounded the faculty of will with its power to act independently of any determining cause. Fallen man has the faculty of will, as he has other moral and intellectual faculties ; and if he is free from external

¹ It is a hopeful sign that Augustine's interpretation of this famous passage, so long considered as untenable, has been revived by commentators of some note, such as Philippi, Delitzsch (*Psych.* v. 6), Thomasius, and Von Hoffman, referred to by Delitzsch, *l.c.* The history of its exegesis would fill a volume ; a sketch of it may be found in Tholück's ' Commentary.' It was no superficial study of it that led to Augustine's final judgment : ' Ego prius eum aliter intellexeram, vel potius non intellexeram : quod mea quædam illius temporis etiam scripta testantur. Non mihi enim videbatur Apostolus de se ipso dicere potuisse, *ego autem carnalis sum*, cum esset spiritualis : et quod captivus duceretur sub lege peccati quæ in membris erat ejus. Ego enim putabam ista dici non posse nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnalis concupiscentia subjugatos. . . . Sed postea melioribus et intelligentioribus cessi, vel potius ipsi, quod fatendum est, veritati, ut viderem in illis Apostoli verbis gemitum esse sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimittantium ' (*Cont. Jul.* vi. 23).

compulsion, since he does not act (like irrational agents) from inward necessity, as, *e.g.*, the plant grows by the necessity of its nature, he must will what he pleases to do. In this sense every one possesses free-will. But this does not determine the question whether it is in his power to direct his will so that it shall embrace whatever objects may be presented to it ; for example, spiritual objects as contrasted with those of an inferior order. If he serves sin he does it willingly — *non inviti tales sumus* ; and if he serves God he does it willingly : but has he the power to do the one or the other, as he pleases ? Augustine replies in the negative : ‘ Which of us maintains that through the sin of the first man free-will has disappeared from the human race ? Liberty, indeed, has disappeared through sin, but that which belonged to Paradise, viz., the liberty of possessing perfect righteousness and with it immortality ; on which account human nature needs Divine grace, according to the Lord’s saying, “ If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be truly free,” that is, to live holily. For free-will is so far from being in abeyance in the sinner that the essence of his sin consists in his sinning voluntarily, and with a pleasure in it. It is by free-will that men refuse the yoke of righteousness ; by the grace of the Saviour alone they become free from that of sin. Since men, unless made sons of God, do not live a holy life, how can Pelagius ascribe to free-will what is not given except by the grace of God, as S. John says, “ As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become sons of God ” ? If they reply that they received Him by free-will, and then, as a reward, had the privilege of adoption conferred on them, let them say what else to receive Him is but to believe on Him, and what else is to believe on Him but to come to Him ; and then let them ponder Christ’s words, “ No man can come to Me except the Father draw Him.” He surely is drawn to Christ to whom it is given to believe on Him ; whence it follows that to receive the privilege of adoption, to receive Christ, to come to Him, and to believe on Him, are simultaneous ; and since to believe on Him is a gift of grace, adoption is so too. Free-will, therefore, cannot merit the privilege, because there is no freedom for good, where the Deliverer has not made free ; but in the other case free-will does operate, the sinner indulging his sin with a deceptive feeling of pleasure. In this passage, which may serve as a specimen of the numerous similar ones in his anti-Pelagian treatises, Augustine, as will be seen, draws a distinction between the abstract faculty of will, which he allows not to be extinct in fallen man, and the agent who wills ; and the direction in which the agent wills is determined by the presence, or the absence, of a previous gift of grace, or, in other words, by the answer to the question whether he is

regenerate or not. The unregenerate man is in a state of slavery as regards the *objects* of his will, and though he sins willingly, he enjoys no real freedom, which he first attains when he comes under the regenerating power of the Holy Ghost. His meaning will be clearly seen from another passage from the book 'De Gratia Christi': 'Pelagius holds that we have a possibility implanted in us by God which, like a fruitful root, may develop itself in either direction, and at the will of the possessor issue either in the blossoms of virtue or the thorns of vice. He does not perceive that in *making one and the same thing* the root both of good and evil, he teaches contrary to evangelical truth. For the Lord says that a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit. Whence, if the two trees, the good and the evil, are two men, a good and an evil one, what is a good man but a man of good will, that is, a tree of good root, and an evil man but a man of evil will, that is, a tree of evil root? But he becomes a good tree when he receives the grace of God, and an evil tree when he makes himself evil by falling away from the supreme good.' In other words, antecedently to any discussion respecting the nature or the freedom of the will, a prior question has to be determined, viz., What is the *man himself*, a *πνευματικός* or a *ψυχικός*? If the latter, however freely he may appear to act, he is an evil tree which can bear nothing but evil fruit; his carnal nature, as a *whole*, is still dominant, and as long as it is so his will acts accordingly, and they that are thus in the flesh cannot please God (Rom. viii. 8).

The Pelagian doctrine was not more offensive to Christian instinct, and destructive of true piety and indeed true morals, than it was opposed to the plain statements of Scripture. In reference to the 'superior hemisphere,' *i.e.* — the spiritual duties of loving and serving God, the intellect of man, in his natural state, is said to be darkened (Rom. i. 21; Ephes. iv. 18), nay, to be darkness itself (Ephes. v. 8); his mind is blinded by the god of this world (2 Cor. iv. 4); to the natural man the things of the Spirit are foolishness; he can neither receive nor know them (2 Cor. ii. 14); of himself and his brother ministers S. Paul declares that what they did know on these matters was to be ascribed exclusively to Divine teaching (2 Cor. iii. 5). The will likewise of the natural man, as a motive power, is described as spiritually inoperative. The heart is stony (Ezek. xxxvi. 26); the unregenerate man is a slave of sin (Rom. vi. 17), and the reason is because the carnal mind is not and cannot be subject to the law of God (Rom. viii. 7); no man can come to Christ except the Father draw him (John vi. 44); the natural man is dead in sins (Ephes. ii. 1). As long as this state prevails, how can the will co-operate with God in the work of regeneration?

Yet it must be confessed that triumphantly as Augustine refutes his opponent on this point, his own system hardly assigns due weight to other statements of Scripture which seem to imply the existence of some spiritual power in fallen man. He notices, as every candid controversialist must, the numerous passages in which invitations, exhortations, warnings, promises, are addressed to sinners, as if they had the power to comply with them, and as if the blame of their non-compliance must rest on themselves. 'Why will ye die, O house of Israel?' (Ezek. xviii. 31); 'Ye will not come to Me that ye might have life' (John v. 40). His explanation is correct as far as it goes, but not exhaustive. He observes that such passages are 'pædagogical,' *i.e.* are intended to convince the sinner of his helplessness, and by the exhibition of the Divine requirements to suggest what he ought to pray for; just as S. Paul describes the Law of Moses as a 'schoolmaster to lead men to Christ,' from its effect in awakening a sense of sin and the need of a Saviour. 'By the law of works God says, Do what I command. But the law commands in order that faith may know how to act; that is, that he to whom the commands are addressed, if he has no power, may know what to seek; but if he has power, and obeys, may know through whose gift it is that he has power.' 'Free-will avails nothing except for sinning, if the way of truth is not revealed; and even when man's duty and proper aim are set before him, no action follows unless the truth becomes loved; and that it does so is the fruit not of free-will, but of the Holy Spirit who is given to us.' 'The Pelagians think that there is some weight in their objection, "God would not command what He knows is not in man's power to accomplish"; but let them consider that these precepts, though we cannot fulfil them, teach us what we ought to seek from Him.' 'The Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. iii. 12), enjoins charity; blames them for their want of it; prays that they may abound in it. Learn, O man, by the commands what thou oughtest to have; by the reproof that it is thine own fault that thou hast it not; by the prayer whence thou mayest receive it.' But is nothing more than this to be inferred from the passages in question? They seem evidently to imply a measure of responsibility on man's part, at least when favoured with Divine revelation, for the choice he makes when the issues of life and death are plainly proposed to him.

We thus stand face to face with the great problem which, since Augustine's time, has never ceased to occupy the minds of thoughtful inquirers, and which seems no nearer its solution than it was a thousand years ago. How are we to reconcile the doctrine of grace as plainly taught in Scripture with what seems equally plainly

taught, the power of man to shape his spiritual destinies? Or, to put the question in another form, why is it that exhortations, invitations, etc., can be addressed to fallen man which we consider it would be improper and useless to address to the fallen angels?

The older theologians attempt an alleviation of the difficulty by a distinction between a passive and an active receptivity in reference to the Divine admonitions and invitations. By the former is meant what man can receive or do irrespectively of Divine aid. Thus he could not be addressed at all as Scripture addresses him if he were not a reasonable being, possessing understanding and conscience; he is not a stone nor a brute; the bare materials of human nature are still his, and it is on them that regenerating grace operates. An essential element of human nature has not, as Möhler charges Protestants with teaching, by the Fall been extinguished. Nor, again, can it be denied that, as regards the 'inferior hemisphere,' or the sphere of morality as distinguished from that of religion, he possesses a power to do what natural conscience dictates, and to abstain from what it condemns; though even this power exists only in a debilitated form, and is much impeded by sinful passions. Moreover, Scripture implies a power in man to *resist* the appeals of Divine grace though not to yield to them; he can keep the heart shut though he cannot open it. For he lies under no disability as regards sin, and is himself a free agent here as well as has the will free; which is not the case as regards the love and fear of God. Scripture everywhere recognizes a difference in the hearers of the Word, according as some suffer themselves to be drawn by grace—*trahit Deus sed trahit volentem*—while some refuse the voice of the charmer charm he never so wisely. Some are 'of the truth,' exhibit a candour and docility which predispose them to 'hear the voice of Christ' (John xviii. 37); others are of such an opposite spirit that they would even prevent inquirers from entering the kingdom (Matt. xxiii. 13). The soil on which the good seed falls varies in quality (Matt. xiii. 3-8), and there are characters which 'are not far from the kingdom of God' (Mark xii. 34), which certainly cannot be said of all sinners. Religion seems to root itself in some natures more easily than in others. To what is the difference to be ascribed? Some would reply that it springs from a prevenient act of grace, which is the source of these favourable dispositions themselves. This may be so; but it is important to note that in many of the cases in Scripture the better disposed were equally with the less outside the kingdom of God, though no doubt some of them were farther from it than others. In the visible Church, as in heathendom, these moral differences may exist in a high degree without passing the boundary which separates

nature and grace. They do, however, prove that the reaction of natural conscience against hereditary corruption never ceases until conscience itself is seared with a hot iron, and that grace has a natural ally even in fallen man ; which the preacher may reckon on as more or less active. The death of the soul is, after all, a sleep from which there may be an awakening (Ephes. v. 14). And perhaps this constitutes the essential distinction between fallen man and the fallen angels, as regards capacity of recovery. Until that sin, whatever it may be, by which the sinner places himself beyond the reach of mercy (Matt. xii. 32) is committed, the *capacity* for redemption, involving the religious faculty, the moral sense, and whatever else distinguishes man from brutes and devils, exists in every man, and it is in his power either to cherish or to extinguish it. He may attend the means of grace and hear the Word, he may keep himself from fleshly lusts which war against the soul (1 Pet. ii. 11), and so far assume a favourable attitude towards the summons to repent and believe ; but this is neither regeneration nor a co-efficient in the bringing about thereof : what is produced on this ground is but the wild fruit of nature until the creative power of grace sublimates it into another nature. It is, in the language of Augustine, the *adjutorium sine quo* the work of grace is not effected—the necessary material on which it works, but not the *adjutorium quo* it is effected ¹ ; the condition of the result but not the result itself. The radical change may still be wanting. There may be a great difference between a Socrates or a Marcus Aurelius and a Nero, as regards *justitia civilis*, and it must neither be denied nor undervalued ; but it is only a relative one, and sinks into nothing when compared with that between the natural and the spiritual man. And this is proved by the facility with which natural virtue may, and often does, pass into dispositions alien to Christianity. Patriotism becomes a narrow hatred and jealousy of other nations, generosity exhibits itself at the expense of justice. Above all, the stoical virtue of a Cato almost invariably terminates in self-complacency, a temper the furthest removed of all from that of the Christian. The taint of self-esteem infects all these *splendida vitia*, and renders them worthless as *religious* acts. Nor can unaided nature expel the taint, or, as Augustine says, make the tree good. It is only the regenerate man that is a real worker with God, and even he not as on a co-ordinate level, or as an independent source of good. The receptivity of the natural man is a reality, not a name ; God deals with the unconverted as *persons*, reasonable, reflecting, morally endowed persons ; but the receptivity itself needs to be quickened and purified by grace before

¹ See De Corrept. 34.

it can fully discharge its function. And this is the fact which Pelagian tendencies in every age deny, or overlook. Particular acts of will Pelagius was willing to admit might need Divine assistance to perfect them ; but that the carnal nature itself, the ' old man ' of S. Paul (Rom. vi. 6), must be exchanged for a new one he persistently denied.

The decisions of the Council of Trent on this subject cannot be acquitted of the charge of ambiguity ; as Sarpi insinuates not unintended, in order that all parties might be satisfied.¹ It anathematizes those who hold that grace is only given to make holiness and eternal life *easier* of attainment, as if free-will without grace could achieve the same result but with greater difficulty ; those, too, who maintain that without the help of the Holy Spirit man can believe, repent, or love, so as to receive the gift of justification² ; with all which Protestants fully agree. ' If any one,' it proceeds, ' shall say that free-will, when moved by God, does not co-operate with such motions in disposing and preparing man for the gift of justification, and that it cannot refuse assent to them if it will, but, like an inanimate object, is merely passive in the work ; or if any one shall say that free-will was lost by the Fall, and is extinct, or is only a name without reality, let him be anathema.' Certainly it cannot be said that the Fall has annihilated the faculty of will, for every one's consciousness tells him the contrary ; nor can the work of conversion take place without involving an exercise of the active principles of our nature, such as, fear, desire, hope, etc. But the question is whether man, apart from preventing grace, as he certainly has the capacity of religion, has also the power of evoking from himself an appetency towards God, which, as it were, reaches forth its hand to God, to be laid hold of by Him and drawn up to higher things ? If this is what the Council means by the co-operation of free-will with the Divine solicitations (and it must be suspected that this is its meaning), it approaches the Pelagian, or semi-Pelagian, error long ago exposed by Augustine. Such an appetency itself, that Father would say, is the fruit of grace, and no man has a desire to co-operate with God until God gives the will ; that is, breaks the chain of a sinful nature. ' Without our co-operation God produces in us a will towards good, but when we do will, and will to act, He co-operates with us.' Human nature, that is, left to itself, cannot will to turn to God, or make any advances in that direction ; if it does so, this is owing to a prevenient act of grace which gives the power to do what is commanded (*dat quod jubet*). The Protestant Confessions may and do recognize in the natural man a reaction of the original nature

¹ Histoire, lib. ii. 80. ² Sess. vi., Canons, 1-3.

against its corruption, which is more or less active under the means of grace ; and even in the heathen a feeling of the discrepancy between what they are and what they ought to be. But in *itself* this is not religion ; it is merely the protest of conscience against the dominant tendency ; and as in the visible Church so amongst the heathen, if ever this protest passed into the higher sphere of a new nature—and that there may be and have been saved even amongst the heathen no one is concerned to deny—it was the product not of unaided nature but of Divine grace. It is obvious that as regards this point there is no real distinction between the doctrine of Augustine and that of Calvin in subsequent times.

The same question gave rise to what has been called the Synergistic controversy in the Lutheran Church, and is substantially that at issue between the Calvinists and Arminians of a later age. Melanchthon appears, in his later years, to have modified his views, or at least his statements, on the inability of the natural man, and, in contrast with the strong expressions of Luther in his treatise ‘*De Servo Arbitrio*,’ to have taught that man had an independent power of meeting the approaches of Divine grace ; that is, bridging over, to some extent, the interval between the natural and the spiritual man. A school of Philippists, as they were called after Melanchthon, sprang up after his death, advocating this view ; and a lively controversy arose between its adherents (Pfeffinger, Strigel, etc.), and the more rigid interpreters of the Augsburg Confession. The latter obtained the ascendancy, and procured the promulgation of a confession of faith, called the *Formula Concordiæ*, A.D. 1579, which was largely subscribed by the Lutheran Churches, though not universally, and is the fullest and clearest exposition of the later orthodox Lutheran faith. What this was on the question of free-will may be judged from the following extracts : ‘ We condemn the doctrine of the Synergists, who pretend that human nature in reference to spiritual things is only grievously wounded, but not quite dead. And that, although free-will is too feeble to initiate conversion to God, or obey the law, yet if the Holy Spirit through the preaching of the Gospel offers us His grace, remission of sins, and eternal life, then the human will can by its own power, however enfeebled, meet God, and prepare itself for the reception of grace. We believe that in man’s nature since the Fall, and prior to regeneration, not even a spark of spiritual power remains, by which he can prepare himself for Divine grace, or contribute anything to his own conversion, and that his will is only free to do what is displeasing to God. Before he experiences the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit man can do no more towards procuring them than if he were a stock or a

stone. Nay, he is worse than a stock or a stone, because he can, and does, despise and resist the Divine commands.' In other words, he is *capable* of regeneration, which a stone is not, nor yet a brute, nor the fallen angels ; but the first movement towards it must come, not from himself, but from above ; which, as we have seen, is precisely the doctrine of Augustine. So unfounded is the notion sometimes, as it appears, entertained that the Lutheran doctrine on this subject is milder than that of the Churches supposed to have been under Calvin's influence. The contrary is the fact. Although there is no substantial difference between the two great Reformers in their view of fallen human nature, yet Calvin's statements on the subject are by no means so sweeping as those of Luther, and the Helvetic Confession of 1566 even contains expressions which seem directed against certain modes of speaking familiar to the German Protestants. It admits that the faculties of understanding and will still exist in man, so that he is very far from being a stone or a stock ; and contents itself with affirming that these faculties have been so impaired since the Fall that they are no longer capable of what they were previously to that event. And our own Confession is equally moderate in its statements. It adopts the Augustinian doctrine that ' works done before the inspiration of Christ '—the *splendida vitia* of the early Father—do not deserve grace *de congruo* (Art. xiii.) ; nay, ' have the nature of sin,' as not springing from the right motive, not being the genuine fruit of the new nature which comes through grace. They are not done as ' God hath willed and commanded them to be done,' with a single eye to His glory, but either from the mere promptings of the moral nature not extinct in man, or for selfish ends, or from a stoic temper of self-sufficiency ; they are defective, in scholastic language, *quoad substantiam actus*, in the form, if not the material of the act. What Augustine and the Reformers meant is that antecedently to *individual* differences in relation to the hearing and reception of the Word, which may be great and manifold, there is a disability which belongs not to each man as an individual with a history of his own, but to human nature as such, and which can be removed only by our being transplanted from the wild olive into the new stock. This fundamental truth of Scripture being secured, both Augustine and his successors might have safely admitted more than they have done as regards the power of natural conscience, and the moral differences of hearers of the Word ; things plainly implied in many parts of Scripture (Matt. xiii. 12 ; Acts vii. 51), and matters of daily experience. With the latter the pressing necessity of the time was to erect a barrier, as far as might be, against the rampant Pelagianism of the dominant Church,

which threatened to reduce the Gospel to little more than a system of natural religion : to future ages they left the task of attempting to harmonize the statements of Scripture on the subject.

Besides its dogmatical bearings, this subject has, as is well known, largely attracted the attention of the philosophical inquirer. According to Milton, these discussions date from a remote antiquity. Whatever corrections Calvin's own system may demand, Calvinism as compared with Arminianism has no need, on philosophical ground, to shrink from the contest. The principal point at issue, viz., whether the will is self-determining, or comes under the general law of causality—or, in other words, whether the will is ever in a state of equilibrium between opposite objects, so that contingency is essential to its real freedom—has been subjected to the keen analysis of Jonathan Edwards, and the Arminian tenet exposed in all its inconsistency. If the word ' will ' is used for the faculty of volition, to ask whether contingency attaches to it is to ask whether a man chooses to do what he does choose to do, or whether in the act of choosing a certain course of action he can choose another the opposite thereof. If will is used, as it probably is in this connection, for the agent willing, then it conveys no very exalted idea of a man that when good and evil are placed before him he is supposed to have no bias or tendency one way or the other, so that it is impossible to predict with any certainty what he will do or not do under given circumstances ; that his actions are the sport of chance, and himself ' like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed ' (James i. 6). It would follow, too, that men could not be pronounced either virtuous or vicious on account of settled dispositions of character ; whereas in common opinion and language these are the very things that enhance their virtue or vice. We do not think the less of a man of whom we say that, in our opinion, it is impossible that he should commit an unjust or a mean action ; nor do we mean to extenuate a man's viciousness when we say that it is just what we should have expected of him ; that he could not, according to his nature, have acted otherwise. On the contrary, it is the presumed *nature* prompting the action that determines our estimate ; and in proportion to the certainty we feel that they will act in one way or the other is the praise or blame which we attach to men. That is, a *moral* necessity is the condition of a perfectly virtuous state. We believe that the elect angels now, and the saints in future glory, will be incapable of sinning ; but that surely does not interfere with the perfect freedom of their service. Or to ascend higher still, it is morally impossible that God can act otherwise than with perfect holiness and wisdom ; but He is not the less absolutely free. As of

old in the Pelagian, so in the Arminian scheme, it is not remembered that prior to, and as it were behind, the will is *the nature* ; and that according as the nature is, the will, by a moral necessity, exerts itself : free in sinning if it is that of the old nature we derive from Adam ; free in holiness if it is that of the new one derived from Christ. And thus, though in strict propriety of language inability means a want of *power* to do what we have the *will* to do, and refers primarily to physical restraint or defect, yet when applied to fallen man it means the absence or inefficiency of the will itself, or moral inability consequent on the depravation of nature through the Fall ; the result of which is that man ' cannot turn and prepare himself to faith and calling upon God.'

If it be said that these objections only prove that the Arminian scheme involves self-contradiction while they leave the difficulties on the other side untouched, this no doubt is to some extent true. What is called Calvinism has also its own difficulties, and perhaps insoluble in our present state of knowledge. Either system, carried out to its logical consequences, lands us in conclusions which it is not easy to reconcile with the language of Scripture, in its apparently plain meaning. But the most unsatisfactory of all methods of adjustment is to explain away or attenuate passages which, if they do not imply the necessity of prevenient grace to sway the will by rectifying the nature, must be dismissed as having no certain meaning at all.

The subject of the preceding sections is of vital moment as regards our apprehensions of the nature and object of Christianity. No one who considers the tendencies of modern thought can fail to see that the question of the corruption of human nature lies at the root of the divergencies of opinion and statement which we meet with in the controversial discussions of the day. And it is equally evident that to extenuate, to ignore, or to deny the effects of the Fall, as they have been usually understood in the Church, is a prominent feature of certain aspects of Christianity which have attracted notice of late. Sometimes it is assumed that man has only to be placed under a system of external discipline, whether it be the natural providential history of the world, or a special dispensation like the Law of Moses, in order to reach the ideal of his nature ; and further that the moral gains of one age are taken up by another as the basis of still further improvement, until at length by a natural development the race attains ' the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ ' (Ephes. iv. 13)¹ ; on which hypothesis there ought, at this advanced period,

¹ ' Essays and Reviews ' : Essay i., ' On the Education of the World.'

to be little or no sin, at least in such nations as have enjoyed this spiritual education. The birth-taint which every man in every age, according to Scripture, brings with him into the world, and with no decreasing intensity of virulence, and which is as much proof now as ever it was against all engines of assault but one, is here ignored as a factor to be taken into account. Sometimes the example of Christ and the moral precepts of the Gospel are extolled as the wheat, while its mysterious doctrines are the chaff; as if example and instruction are all that man needs to enable him to emerge from the ruins of the Fall. Sometimes, at the opposite pole, the radical change which is admitted as necessary is described as a magical effect, not necessarily involving or leading to any *moral* renovation of the heart; a gift indeed of grace, but neutral in character and result, which may or may not consist with an habitually sinful state. Under the former system man never did need a new creation; under the latter, a member of the visible Church does not need it because, whatever be his moral condition, he once received it for good. Under either system Pelagianism finds a natural footing. Under either aspect Christianity sinks from being a Divine method of redemption from fearful evils to a system either of mere naturalism or of crass supernaturalism. And under either system, in different measure—much more it must be admitted under the former than under the latter—the atoning work of the Redeemer suffers a depreciation, and becomes obscured. The Person and work of this Redeemer will next engage our attention.

PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST

'The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance; so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and the manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man' (Art. ii.). 'As Christ died for us, and was buried, so also it is to be believed that He went down into hell' (Art. iii.). 'Christ did rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature; wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth, until He return to judge all men at the last day' (Art. iv.). 'Christ, in the truth of our nature, was made like unto us, sin only except, from which He was clearly void, both in His flesh and His spirit; sin, as S. John saith, was not in Him' (Art. xv.). 'Item docent quod Verbum, hoc est, Filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam in utero beatæ Mariæ Virginis, ut sint duæ naturæ, divina et humana, in unitate personæ inseparabiliter conjunctæ' (Conf. Aug. iii.). 'Agnoscimus ergo in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo duas naturas vel substantias, divinam et humanam, et has ita dicimus conjunctas et unitas esse ut absorptæ aut confusæ aut immixtæ non sint; sed salvæ potius et permanentibus naturarum