

ARTICLES XXXVII-XXXIX

CHURCH AND STATE

ARTICLE XXXVII

Of the Civil Magistrates

The Queen's Majesty hath the chief power in this Realm of *England*, and over her dominions, unto whom the chief government of all estates of this Realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Civil, in all causes doth appertain, and is not, nor ought to be, subject to any foreign jurisdiction.

Where we attribute to the Queen's Majesty the chief government, by which titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folk to be offended; we give not to our princes the ministering either of God's Word, or of Sacraments, the which thing the Injunctions also lately set forth by *Elizabeth* our Queen doth most plainly testify: But that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scriptures by God himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil-doers.

The Bishop of *Rome* hath no jurisdiction in this Realm of *England*.

De civilibus Magistratibus

Regia Majestas in hoc Angliae regno, ac caeteris ejus dominiis, summam habet potestatem, ad quam omnium statuum hujus regni, sive illi ecclesiastici sint, sive civiles, in omnibus causis, suprema gubernatio pertinet, et nulli externae jurisdictioni est subjecta, nec esse debet.

Cum Regiae Majestati summam gubernationem tribuimus, quibus titulis intelligimus animos quorundam calumniatorum offendi, non damus Regibus nostris, aut verbi Dei, aut Sacramentorum administrationem, quod etiam Injunctiones ab *Elizabetha Regina* nostra, nuper editae, apertissime testantur: sed eam tantum praerogativam, quam in sacris Scripturis a Deo ipso, omnibus piis Principibus, videmus semper fuisse attributam: hoc est, ut omnes status atque ordines fidei suae a Deo commissos, sive illi ecclesiastici sint, sive civiles, in officio contineant et contumaces ac delinquentes gladio civili coerceant.

Romanus pontifex nullam habet jurisdictionem in hoc regno Angliae.

The laws of the Realm may punish Christian men with death, for heinous and grievous offences.

It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the Magistrate, to wear weapons, and serve in the wars.

Leges regni possunt Christianos propter capitalia, et gravia crimina, morte punire.

Christianis licet, ex mandato magistratus, arma portare, et justa bella administrare.

The history is important. In 1563 the whole of the opening paragraph was rewritten and the second paragraph added for the first time. Its objects were:

- (i) To explain and defend 'The Royal supremacy';
- (ii) To repudiate all papal jurisdiction;
- (iii) To condemn Anabaptist attacks on the authority of the State.

§ 1. The relations between Church and State

(a) We find in Scripture no formal discussion of the relations between Church and State. As we have seen, the Church is there pictured as a society with a life of its own, drawing a sharp distinction between those within and those without, exercising over its own members judicial authority in its own courts according to its own laws. Nothing is clearer than that the rules of the Church in no way depended upon the authority of the State. For instance, the Roman Empire had its own laws of marriage binding upon all its subjects alike. But the Church had her own far stricter laws of marriage based upon the teaching of Christ. These S. Paul claimed to enforce upon Christians. At the Council of Jerusalem definite rules were made on subjects about which the laws of the Empire had no concern, e.g. fornication and eating certain kinds of meat. On all questions of discipline and order the Church claimed to interpret the will of Christ under the guidance of the Spirit and demanded from her members obedience to her interpretation. She acted upon her own authority.

But since the Church existed within the Roman Empire she could not escape all relationship with it. In the very early days Christians would be regarded simply as a new Jewish sect. They shared the toleration accorded to Judaism. But it soon became apparent that Christianity was more than a reformed Judaism. As the Church developed an independent existence and a vigorous life of her own, conflict with the State became inevitable. The Roman Empire had a great suspicion of all smaller societies within itself. Christianity was a religion not sanctioned by law. The Church's very existence might at any time lay her open to the hostility of the State. Further, the State required of all who were not Jews a willingness to participate in idolatrous worship, especially the worship of the Emperor. Such commands Christians, out of loyalty to Christ, could not obey. Their refusal appeared an act of disloyalty to the Emperor. Again, civil and social life were so bound up with idolatry that it was almost impossible for Christians to take part in it. They were made to appear

unsocial and unpatriotic. Hence arose persecution and the attempts to compel Christians to do sacrifice. Even the most reluctant witness must confess that under such circumstances obedience to Christ was inconsistent with obedience to the State.¹

At the same time, the Church had no hostility to the State as such. By His example and teaching Christ Himself had inculcated loyalty to the civil power in its own sphere. He showed that Caesar's head on the coinage implied the duty of paying taxes to Caesar. There was no necessary conflict between the claims of Caesar and the claims of God (Mk 12¹³ ff.). He submitted Himself to the authority of Pilate as being given to him from above (Jn 19¹¹), so long as he acted within the limits of his office (Jn 18³³ ff.). S. Paul commands whole-hearted obedience to the civil authority. 'The powers that be are ordained of God' (Rom 13¹⁻⁷). S. Peter ends a long exhortation on the respect due to the State with the injunction (1 Pet 2¹³⁻¹⁷), 'Honour the king'—a hard duty when Nero was on the throne. It is true that in the Apocalypse we find denunciation of Rome as the persecutor of Christians (Rev 13 and 17). Pergamum, the centre of the cult of the Emperor in Asia Minor, is 'where Satan's throne is' (2¹³). But this was hostility not towards the Empire as such, but towards the Empire as persecuting Christians. In early Christian writers we find side by side professions of loyalty to Emperor and bitter denunciation of persecutors.²

(b) The accession of Constantine ushered in a new era. The State had failed to suppress the Church. Constantine saw that the only course was to make an alliance with the Church. Relations became openly friendly. By the Edict of Milan universal toleration of all religions was proclaimed. The laws of Constantine were tinged by Christian morality, but they were not specifically Christian. The clergy were given equal privileges with pagan priests. The Church was allowed to receive gifts. During the lifetime of Constantine paganism was discouraged and immoral worship put down, but it was left for his successor to issue definite edicts against heathenism as heathenism. But very soon we find evidence of a tendency to be content no longer with a mere alliance of Church and State, but to aim at something like identification. The State was ready to purchase the support of the Church by lending the support of the secular arm for the suppression of heretics or heathen. Before the close of the fourth century heresy and paganism had become offences against the civil law. Further, the State began to find in bishops valuable civil servants and to assign to them a share in the civil administration. The Church had in time to pay the price. If the Church's laws were enforced by the power of the State upon those who defied them, the State might not

¹ Cp. Hobhouse, *The Church and the World*, p. 41, 'Christians were . . . persecuted not so much for individual beliefs, as for being members of a Church and of a Church which acknowledged no divided allegiance.'

² E.g. Tertullian, *ad Scap.* 2.

unreasonably claim a voice in the making and amending of such laws. If a bishop was an important government official, the State might not unreasonably expect to be consulted in his selection and appointment. Above all the Emperor assumed a position of supreme importance in the Church. If a heathen Emperor was a minister of God, a Christian Emperor was 'the Lord's anointed', endowed with an almost priestly office. Even Constantine could say 'You are bishops of matters within the Church: I also am the bishop ordained by God of matters without the Church.' The line of distinction between the Church and the State became more and more obliterated. A new ideal grew up of a great Christian commonwealth, at once State and Church, like Israel of old. Heresy was regarded not only as disloyalty to the Church but as treason to the State. Old Testament notions were freely applied. The State and the Church were regarded as two aspects of one visible Christian society, 'the City of God.' So far as the old conflict between State and Church survived, it passed into a conflict between the civil authorities and the spiritual authorities, regarded as different classes of officials in one and the same society. Since we are still suffering from the effects of this fusion of Church and State, it may be well to pause and consider some of the features of the change.

(i) The first result was a confusion between the principles of civil and the principles of ecclesiastical authority. The State has not only the right but the duty of compelling obedience to its laws, if need be, by methods of force. Such laws are binding upon all its subjects alike. On the other hand the Church, if she is loyal to the teaching of Christ, can only enforce obedience to her laws by spiritual penalties, in the last resort by expulsion from her fellowship. Further, she can only claim such obedience from her own children. Persecution and the employment of force to compel men to come into the Church or to submit to her laws is wrong and contrary to the spirit of the Gospel.¹ The source of all the Church's life and order is loyalty to Christ, and personal adhesion to Christ cannot be brought about by compulsion. If by persecution the Church could make men Christians, the Church would be right to persecute. But methods of force can only make nominal Christians: they cannot create a lively faith. The immediate result of the identification of Church and State was to flood the Church with nominal Christians. It cost less to profess to be a Christian than to make no profession.

(ii) Further, the authority of the Church should go deeper than that of the State. Civil legislation can never go very far in advance of public opinion. The State should indeed enforce the principles of universal morality. It has been well called 'the armed conscience of the community': but just because the community contains many who are not prepared to accept the full Christian standard of living, the

¹ For certain qualifications, see W. Temple, *Church and Nation*, pp. 16-19.

State cannot go beyond the public conscience of the day. The Church, on the other hand, is bound to enforce upon her members the full moral teaching of Christ: she asserts not only those laws of morality that the State asserts, but others which it would not be reasonable to expect any who are not Christians to accept. The confusion between the laws of the Church and the laws of the State inevitably resulted in a lowering of the Christian standard. The attempt to enforce full Christian morality could only end in failure. In popular practice the moral demands of Christ were identified with the average morality of the day—the morality of a world that had become Christian only in name. A double standard of Christian practice was set up. Full Christian morality was expected at most from the clergy. The laity were to be content with something less exacting.

(c) In mediaeval times the relations between Church and State were dominated by ideas that were inherited from earlier days. In theory the Emperor and the Pope were the two heads of one 'Holy Roman Empire'. In England the same ideal was reproduced in miniature. In Saxon times there was very considerable confusion between Church and State. There were no separate Church courts and no clear distinction between national and ecclesiastical assemblies. The fellowship between Church and State was so intimate and their mutual understanding so complete that there arose no necessity for any exact definition of their relationship. With the coming of the Normans England was brought into closer connexion with the Continent and the papacy. A separation was effected between civil and ecclesiastical courts. A distinction was recognized between the canon law which was administered in the Church courts and the common law which was administered in the civil courts. But Church and State were none the less identified. Every Englishman was regarded as *ipso facto* a member of the national Church. Whatever laws existed were enforced upon all Englishmen alike. Breaches of the Church's law were punished by civil penalties and breaches of civil law by ecclesiastical penalties. Excommunication involved not only loss of Church privileges but loss of civil rights.¹ When the Church claimed to withdraw her officers from the jurisdiction of the civil courts and to try them in her own courts, there was no idea of any rebellion against the State. The claim is rather to be viewed as a dispute between two sets of officials of one single Church-State as to the limits of their respective jurisdiction. Church and State were not even regarded as two distinct societies composed of the same people, but as one great all-

¹ It is from this point of view that we must consider persecution, namely, as the lending to the Church by the State of the force of secular authority in order to compel obedience to the Church's authority on questions of doctrine or practice. So in 1400 Parliament supported the Church by passing a statute for the burning of heretics, and fourteen years later by a supplementary Act put at the disposal of the Church the organization of the State for hunting out the Lollards. Heresy was regarded not only as disloyalty to the Church but as disloyalty to the State.

embracing divine society. The quarrels between kings and bishops were quarrels between heads of two departments in one community.¹

This mediaeval point of view was destined to be shattered by the Reformation, but it explains many of the features of that troubled time. All parties persecuted because all parties could have no conception of a state of society in which more than one religion was tolerated. Catholics and Protestants agreed that Church and State must remain co-extensive. They differed as to the nature of the Church that they desired. Even the Puritans for a long time did not wish to separate from the Church of England: they wished to change the Church of England into the kind of Church that they preferred and to make all Englishmen submit to it. Hooker can still write: 'There is not any man of the Church of England but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth; nor any man a member of the commonwealth, who is not also of the Church of England.'² Hooker did not suppose that the Church's spiritual authority was derived from the State or that the Church was simply a Government department for dealing with religion. But his eyes were blinded by the traditional thought and customs of centuries. He could not conceive of a day when Church and State should no longer be coextensive. Moreover, in Elizabeth's day it was easy to confuse the desire for national unity against external foes with the desire for the religious unity of the English nation. But even while Hooker wrote, his theory was breaking down. Elizabeth was, in practice, compelled to tolerate nonconformists even though they had to endure severe restrictions. Since her day the idea that the Church of England is simply the 'nation on its religious side' has become more and more contrary to the facts. The spread of toleration has wrecked any identification of Church and State. Quite rightly we enjoy the fullest toleration of all religious beliefs. With a very few exceptions the fullest rights of citizenship are granted to men of every creed or none. Accordingly a new situation has arisen, demanding a fresh consideration of the relations between Church and State.

§ 2. We may now turn to the changes in the relations between Church and State made at the Reformation.

(a) As we saw, the Church assigned to the Christian Emperor a

¹ 'The word Churchman means to-day one who belongs to the Church as against others. In the Middle Ages there were no others, or if there were they were occupied in being burnt. A Churchman meant one who belonged to the Church in the narrower sense of its governing body—an ecclesiastic, as the word implies; just as statesman to-day means not a member but an officer actual or potential of the State' (Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, p. 189). There were, of course, the Jews, who carried on a precarious existence without any assured rights, dependent upon the caprice or the poverty of the ruling classes. But no mediaeval Christian would have taken much account of the Jews.

² *Ecl. Pol.* viii.

unique position. He was regarded as the Lord's anointed, the successor of the sacred kings of Judah. In mediaeval theory the Emperor was the coequal head with the Pope of the City of God. So, too, in England there has been from the first a very real Royal Supremacy. It was in no sense created at the Reformation. Our Article asserts no new doctrine when it claims for Elizabeth '*that . . . prerogative which we see to have been given to all godly princes in Holy Scriptures by God Himself, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evildoers.*' In practice the Royal supremacy was exercised in the following directions:

(i) The King regarded himself as the guardian of justice within his realm. It was his duty to see to the safety of the bodies and property of his subjects. Their souls were in the care of the Church. As such he claimed to prevent any external power, such as the Pope, from exercising authority over persons or property within his kingdom, except by permission.¹ Further, he saw that the Church obeyed her own laws and did not encroach upon the authority of the State. New canons could only be made subject to the King's approval. The Supremacy 'was essentially, therefore, a regulating force, the function of which was to decide in what spheres and under what conditions the spiritual power which it recognized as independent in origin and authority should act.'² The King did not claim any spiritual authority. Rather he supervised the administration of the Church from outside.

(ii) But the King was no less the first layman of the Church and her champion. As such it was his duty to protect the Church and see that she had free scope for her work.

(b) We must consider the changes made by Henry VIII in the light of such ideas as these. What changes were actually made?

(i) The authority of the Pope was disallowed. In theory the jurisdiction claimed by the Pope was purely spiritual. The term 'papal supremacy' came to be used only after his power in England had come to an end. 'From the point of view of the King it was simply a part of the Church system which he allowed or disallowed so far as it seemed harmless or harmful to the realm at large.'³ No doubt there were times, especially between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, when the Pope claimed temporal authority in England. A weak King was not above purchasing the support of the Pope by allowing his claim to bestow the crown of England on whom he would. But any such recognition of papal authority was vigorously repudiated, e.g. in the statute of Praemunire, and was never generally allowed. So the relation of the Pope towards the English Church was a spiritual rela-

¹ In theory, at least, no appeal might be made from the Church courts to Rome without the royal permission. Papal legates needed the King's consent before landing in England. English bishops could only act as papal legates with the King's sanction.

² Wakeman, *History of the Church of England*, note D.

³ Collins, *C.H.S. Lectures*, III, p. 34.

tion. There is no denying that, especially at certain times, he exercised very considerable authority over the English Church. It became customary for archbishops to receive from him the gift of the Pallium and to take an oath of obedience to him on receiving it. He often filled vacant sees. Appeals of all kinds were made to him. The theory came to be held that canon law derived its authority from the Pope, and hence the Pope and the Pope alone could dispense from it. Accordingly, we find an exceedingly strict and logical system of Church law which was in practice never observed, because it could be evaded by dispensations. Its strictness was only a source of profit to the papal officials. When we consider the very wide field that this system covered, we can see that the power of dispensation gave to the Pope immense political importance, e.g. in the matter of marriages. The immediate cause of Henry's breach with Rome was the refusal of the Pope to declare his marriage with Catherine null and void, and that refusal was based on purely political calculations. But England was tired of papal exactions. The loyalty of the Church to the Holy Father had expired under the burdens that he had laid upon her. In 1534 Convocation declared that 'The Pope of Rome hath no greater jurisdiction conferred on him by God in Holy Scripture, in this kingdom of England, than any other foreign Bishop.' The Church of England claimed that such jurisdiction over her as he had enjoyed had only been by her free consent. He had proved himself unworthy to exercise it, and therefore, since she was in no way bound to bestow it, it was taken away. This repudiation of papal authority was accepted by the whole Church under pressure from the Crown. 'The civil power forbade, under penalties, any recourse to the authority which, as a matter of fact, the Church of England had just repudiated.'

(ii) In 1531 Henry, in order to ensure the submission of the clergy, demanded the consent of Convocation to a new form of title. He claimed to be 'Supreme Head of the English Church and Clergy'. The title was accepted by Convocation, with the important qualification, 'so far as the law of Christ allows.' In a letter addressed to the Northern Convocation, Henry expressly disclaimed any new authority in spiritual matters. In 1534 he was recognized by Parliament as 'only supreme head on earth of the Church of England'. Further, in the same year the act for the submission of the clergy gave the authority of Parliament to arrangements already agreed to by Convocation in 1532. Convocation had consented that it should only meet by the King's writ and that new canons might only be promulgated by the King's license. On the other hand, the King's assent to the meeting and the promulgation of canons was not to be withheld arbitrarily. So far nothing revolutionary had been done. The novel title 'Supreme head' was capable of a good interpretation.¹ The control claimed by

¹ Cranmer, indeed, in his examination shortly before his death gave a very mild interpretation of the title: 'Every king in his own realm is supreme head. . . . Nero was

the Crown over ecclesiastical legislation was no greater than had been claimed by earlier kings: it was only made more positive and definite. On the other hand, 'Although it is true that nothing had been done except to define and formulate rights of the Crown in relation to the Church which had been frequently insisted upon and exercised in past ages, still it was equally true that their revival and exercise by a King of the character of Henry VIII at a time in the history of England when kingly authority was exceptionally strong, practically introduced a new state of things. There was no new principle involved in the relations of Church and State, but the mutual influence of the two bodies upon each other was altered.'¹

(iii) But the use by Henry VIII of his supremacy did not stay here. The Supremacy Act in 1534 included among his powers 'full power and authority . . . to visit, repress, redress, reform, order, correct, restrain and amend all such errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities, whatsoever they be, which by any manner spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be reformed . . . or amended.' This implied a claim not only to supervise the fulfilment of their proper duties by spiritual authorities but also himself to exercise spiritual jurisdiction. This new claim was exercised without any hesitation or scruple. After being dropped by Mary, it was revived by Elizabeth in the form of the Court of High Commission, which was only finally abolished in 1641. Further, in 1535 Henry delegated his powers to Cromwell, who carried out a visitation in the King's name. This was only one act that showed that the Crown claimed to govern the Church just in the same manner as it governed the State. There is no need to enter into details. It was a period of constitutional anarchy in Church and State alike. The Church was powerless in Henry's hands. He was restrained by no scruples from carrying out his will. No precedents for the use of the Royal Supremacy can fairly be quoted from such a time.

(c) The use of the title 'Supreme Head' was continued by Edward VI and by Mary up to the time of her marriage with Philip in 1554. It was then dropped and has never since been revived. When Elizabeth came to the throne in 1558 she only claimed the title 'Supreme Governor'. The 'Supreme Head' statute was never re-enacted. She was unwilling to be addressed as the head of the Church of England, maintaining 'that this honour is due to Christ alone, and cannot belong to any human being soever.' Accordingly the old Article was very largely rewritten, and our present Article simply explains the title 'Supreme Governor'—'*We attribute to the Queen's Majesty the chief*

head of the Church, that is in worldly respect of the temporal bodies of men, of whom the Church consisteth: for so he beheaded Peter and the Apostles. And the Turk, too, is head of the Church of Turkey. . . . The king is head and governor of his people which are the visible Church . . . wherein he was named supreme head of the Church, there was never other thing meant.'

¹ Wakeman, *History of the Church of England*, p. 215.

government.' Elizabeth took the greatest pains to define and limit the constitutional meaning of her supremacy. In 1559 she appended the Injunctions, 'An admonition to simple men deceived by the malicious,' referred to in our Article. This, in very similar language to the Article, insisted that she only claimed the authority 'of ancient time due to the Imperial Crown of this realm, that is, under God to have the sovereignty and rule over all manner of persons born within these, her realms, dominions and countries, of what estate, either ecclesiastical or temporal they be, so as no other foreign power shall, or ought to have, any superiority over them.' Further, the Queen wrote with her own hand the addition to Article XX stating that '*The Church*' (not the Crown) '*hath power to decree rites and ceremonies and authority in controversies of faith.*' In the Royal Supremacy, as defined in our present Article, there is nothing to which the Church can reasonably object. In practice it includes the following claims:

(i) No Englishman can claim to be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Crown in virtue of any office that he may hold in the Church. The Crown is to rule '*all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal.*'

(ii) The King is to be the guardian of all forms of justice. In the civil courts judges act in the King's name. They receive authority not to make but to interpret and administer laws. So in the enforcement of the Church's laws, the King, in virtue of his sacred office as first layman, is to dispense justice. That does not mean that he makes the laws of the Church or can alter them, but that he undertakes to see that the Church observes her own laws and that justice is meted out in accordance with them.

(iii) It is his duty to keep the balance between Church and State and to see that each side faithfully observes its side of the compact. Thus Queen Elizabeth in 1572 forbade Parliament to discuss bills concerning religion 'unless the same should be first considered and liked by the clergy'. Again, in 1593 she wrote to the Speaker: 'If you perceive any idle heads . . . which will meddle with reforming the Church or transforming the commonwealth and do exhibit any Bills to such purpose, that you receive them not, until they be viewed and considered of those who it is fitter should consider of such things and can better judge of them.'

§ 3. The relation of the Church of England to the State to-day can only be understood in the light of previous history. It is not the result of the consistent working out of any theory, but of gradual growth and development. Much that appears at first sight illogical and absurd is a survival from past days when conditions were very different from the present.

(a) We find the Crown in possession of considerable authority in Church matters. We saw how from the time of Constantine such a position was given to the Christian King. This position was a personal

one. It was given to him as a loyal son of the Church, 'a godly prince,' at a time when princes governed in person. Further, it was no arbitrary or unlimited power that was bestowed, but it was assumed that the King would exercise it subject to certain limitations and with due respect to the Church's own rights and laws, according to precedent and custom.¹ To-day the personal position of the King has completely changed. The real power has been transferred to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Parliament. The King no longer governs in person. As Churchmen we maintain that this has made all the difference. The King has no moral right to delegate the authority given by the Church to him personally, as the 'eldest son of the Church', to some secular official or body, whose relation to the Church in no way resembles his own. The Prime Minister is not bound to be a Christian. The Cabinet or Parliament may contain at any time a majority of Jews or agnostics. Further, there is a tendency to regard the authority of Parliament as absolutely unlimited, even in dealing with the Church. The respect for the Church's independence which was tacitly implied and acted on in the original relationship to the Crown is in danger of being ignored.²

(b) A clear instance of the fruits of this change is seen in the appointment of bishops and the exercise of Crown patronage. It was one thing for the King as first layman of the Church to nominate bishops. It is quite another thing for a Prime Minister who may not be a churchman to do so. No doubt this implies no claim on the part of the Crown to bestow spiritual authority. The man nominated receives his spiritual authority solely through consecration.³ But logically the system is quite indefensible. It can only be urged that on the whole it works very well. Prime Ministers of all parties have of late years conscientiously tried to find the best men. It avoids the creation of anything like parties in a diocese supporting rival candidates. But we must remember it may cause trouble at any time. An unscrupulous

¹ 'No one would probably deny that, as a matter of fact, when the Church admitted the Crown to a share in her concerns, whether it was in Constantine's day or Charlemagne's, or at the Reformation or under Louis XIV, it was to a real King understood to be both a Christian and a Churchman that she consented to yield this power' (Dean Church, *On the Relations between Church and State*, p. 17).

² 'Legally the position of the Crown in the civil government is not much changed from the days of Edward the Confessor: politically and constitutionally it is altogether changed. As a power it is a ministry or a Parliament: as a person, the Crown stands at the head of a nation, like all other nations broken up into recognized and tolerated parties, and is bound to neutrality. . . . Statesmen cling with inconsistent tenacity to a notion of ecclesiastical supremacy entirely different from that which they entertain of temporal: and are taken aback at the idea of limitations in the one, which they have all their lives assumed as first principles in the other' (*op. cit.* p. 51).

³ The actual process is this. The Crown nominates a man and issues a writ commanding the chapter of the diocese to elect him and the archbishop to confirm the election. Disobedience would legally incur severe penalties. But resistance has more than once been threatened, and the possibility of it is a certain safeguard. In 1733 the appointment of Rundle to the bishopric of Gloucester was successfully opposed on the ground of Deism. He was consoled with a bishopric in Ireland!

Prime Minister might force a conflict upon the Church by a series of political choices or the deliberate selection of an unorthodox candidate.

(c) A more serious grievance increasingly felt in the early years of this century is the inability of the Church to legislate for herself. All new legislation requires the consent of the Crown, of Convocation representing the clergy, and of Parliament. In old days Parliament was in a real sense a 'House of Laymen'. All members were churchmen and were elected by churchmen. As representing the laity they could rightly claim a voice in Church legislation. To-day, as the result of toleration, there are quite rightly no religious tests either for members of Parliament or for electors. Under present conditions there is nothing to prevent the majority of members from being Roman Catholics, Nonconformists, Jews or atheists. Yet all fresh Church legislation, on however sacred or domestic a subject, requires their consent before it can be enforced.¹ We may fairly claim that men who do not profess the Christian religion or who belong to bodies that have deliberately separated themselves from the Church and organized themselves in opposition to her, have no moral right to interfere in matters that belong to her own internal life and organization. The whole situation is a relic of the days when every citizen was a member of the Church.

This grievance has been alleviated by the passing of the Enabling Act in 1919. By this Act a National Assembly of the Church of England has been set up with the power of initiating legislation under conditions that give it a reasonable chance of receiving the sanction of Parliament. The Assembly consists of three Houses. The House of Bishops is composed of the members of the Upper Houses of Convocation, the House of Clergy of the members of the Lower House of Convocation, and the House of Laity of representatives elected by the representative electors in the several Diocesan Conferences. The method of procedure is as follows. The Assembly resolves that legislation on some matter relating to the Church is desirable. In order to give practical effect to the resolution, it is embodied in a 'measure'. The measure in the form that it is passed after discussion by the Assembly is passed on to a Legislative Committee of the Assembly, which forwards the measure to a special Ecclesiastical Committee of both Houses of Parliament, with any comments or explanations that it thinks desirable. The Ecclesiastical Committee then drafts a report on the measure containing its views on its expediency and its relation to the constitutional rights of all His Majesty's subjects. This report before being presented to Parliament must be shown to the Legisla-

¹ 'The understanding never was that the ecclesiastical power should be transferred to a body of men, neither representing the Church nor identified with her in feeling, in purpose, in belief, into whose hands by the effect of political changes, had passed in reality the old civil and temporal functions of the Crown' (*op. cit.* p. 52).

tive Committee of the Assembly and the two committees may if they desire confer together. The next step lies with the Legislative Committee. If it so desires, the measure and report together are presented to Parliament, but it has the power of withdrawing the measure at this stage, so as to avoid a direct conflict between the Assembly and Parliament in the case of an unfavourable report. After the report has once been presented, any member of either House of Parliament may propose a resolution that the measure be submitted to the King for his assent. A resolution of both Houses is necessary, and, after receiving the Royal Assent, the measure has all the force of an Act of Parliament. It is to be noticed that Parliament may approve or reject but cannot alter the measure.

By this Act the possibility of new legislation receiving the consent of Parliament has been considerably increased. Under the old conditions time was grudged for Church measures and as they were in no way a source of party profit, the Government was unwilling to grant special facilities. This gave opportunity for an individual member who was hostile to the Church to block the motion. The enemies of the Church deliberately opposed all proposals which would increase her efficiency. Since the Enabling Act came into operation, many useful measures of the Assembly have passed through Parliament and received the Royal Assent. With the pressure on the time of Parliament arising from the troubled events of the period since 1919 the legislation demanded by the changing circumstances of the Church could hardly have received proper attention in any other way. The rejection of the proposed Revised Prayer-Book by Parliament in 1927 and again in 1928 brought disappointment and dismay to many church people. A serious point of principle was no doubt involved in Parliament's decision to reject a Book officially proposed by the Convocations and the Assembly, but since 1928 general opinion in the Church has become much less disposed to regard the decision as a disaster.¹ A fresh and more promising approach to the revision of the ordering of the Church's life and worship is now being made by the discussion of a new body of Canons. If in this way the ecclesiastical law is clarified and adapted to present conditions and the system of Church Courts is revised so as to command general confidence, the Church will be in a better position to undertake the work of liturgical revision with an orderly and united purpose.†

Until new Canons are made it remains by no means easy to determine what the law of the Church is on many points. During the Middle Ages the Church of England accepted the canon law of the Western Church with a certain amount of local canon law. In origin this canon law was partly the customary law of the Church, partly

¹ There was a strong minority opinion in the Church against some features of the new Book; Parliament probably rightly judged that if sanctioned it would not have brought about a real settlement.

the decisions of councils, partly the decrees of Popes either genuine or forged. At first it simply represented the mind of the Church as declared in her decisions on particular cases with references to particular circumstances and was observed only in so far as it was enforced by the bishops, and thus continued to represent the mind of the Church. In time this was systematized and came to be viewed as resting not on the mind of the Church but on the authority of the Pope and was administered as a legal system. When the authority of the Pope was repudiated, the system was shattered. A return was made to earlier principles. Much of the old canon law no longer represented the mind of the Church and was therefore rightly abolished. A revision was needed, and a committee was appointed to make such a revision with a view to giving it the authority of statute law. Till then the old canon law was declared still binding on the clergy 'so far as it be not contrary to the statutes of the realm'. An attempt at revision was made, the '*Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*', but it never received authority, so that we are theoretically bound to what was left of the old canon law. This position is, however, modified by three considerations: (i) Much of the old law was deliberately abrogated by the Church's own acts during the Reformation and the laying down of new rules of worship, e.g. the restoration of communion in both kinds and the abolition of compulsory confession. (ii) It is a principle of canon law that it is abrogated by 'desuetude', i.e. by the deliberate giving up of a practice or by the adoption of a definite practice to the contrary. This is evidence that the law abrogated no longer represents the mind of the Church. Much of the old law has in this way ceased to be authoritative. In other words, the present canon law of the English Church is that which the English Church to-day as a matter of fact uses. (iii) From time to time the Church of England has made new canons, e.g. those of 1603, and changes have been made in the Prayer-Book.

The Report of the Archbishop's Commission on Canon Law, issued in 1947, under the title '*The Canon Law of the Church of England*', contains a draft of a complete body of new Canons to take the place of the Canons of 1603. Such a new body of Canons, together with the Book of Common Prayer and Statutory Provisions, will, it is hoped, 'give the Church a body of law, simple, up-to-date, and sufficient for its needs, without either being too detailed or revolutionizing the characteristics of our law, and will, at the same time, leave the ancient Canon Law as the source of the principles of our ecclesiastical jurisprudence'.^{1†}

(d) Yet another disturbing result of the transference of authority from the King to a secular body is seen when we turn to the disciplinary system of the Church. In the Middle Ages the Church had her own system of courts, the archdeacon's, the bishop's, the arch-

¹ See Report, p. 86.

bishop's.¹ Appeals could be made from a lower to a higher court. In practice appeals were carried from the archbishop's court to the Pope, in spite of many efforts to check this by legislation. In fact, in order to save time and trouble appeals were often made to the Pope in the first instance. The result of this custom and of the centralization of authority in the Pope was to weaken the Church courts. They naturally tended to fall into disuse, being superseded by papal jurisdiction. At the Reformation appeals to Rome were forbidden. It was laid down in the statute of the Submission of the Clergy that they should be made to the Crown instead, and that the King should on each occasion appoint a court of commissioners to try the particular case. This was only intended as a temporary measure, until the reformation of canon law was completed and the system of Church courts reconstituted. As we have seen, this reform was never carried through, and the Crown by repeated use of its powers acquired the right of appointing the members of a final court of appeal for ecclesiastical cases known as the Court of Delegates. The position of such a court, so long as ecclesiastics were appointed, might be perfectly satisfactory, though there was no guarantee that it would be so. But in 1833 by Act of Parliament, without the consent of the Church, as the result not of any deliberate policy, but of a series of accidents, muddles and misadventures, the jurisdiction of the Court of Delegates was transferred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This committee is a purely civil body, originally called into being for purely civil purposes. It may consist entirely of lawyers who are not even Christians and may possess no sympathy with the life of the Church and no qualifications for deciding on questions of doctrine, which call for more than a merely legal knowledge. So by an Act of very doubtful authority the judicial supremacy granted to the King personally as a churchman has been transferred to a purely secular court. Its unspiritual nature is sufficiently shown by the fact that it cannot inflict those spiritual punishments which are the only fitting penalty for grave cases of spiritual disobedience, such as excommunication or deprivation of orders. The appointment of two bishops to act as assessors since 1876 cannot turn a civil court into a spiritual court. Hence churchmen have as a matter of conscience widely refused to recognize the authority of this court. They hold that, 'The Crown being supreme over all causes has the right to appoint such a court' (i.e. a court of final appeal). 'But this right must be exercised in accordance with the Church constitution, otherwise the court will lack spiritual authority, which can only be derived from the Church, and therefore its decision cannot be accepted as valid.'² The Church

¹ We must remember that Church courts dealt with a very wide range of cases. They included not only questions of Church discipline and property, but e.g. marriages and wills.

² Crosse, *Church and State*, p. 100.

of England is placed in the unhappy position of having no final court of appeal for questions of Church order and discipline whose decisions are binding on the conscience of all her members. The result is disciplinary chaos tempered by episcopal good advice and a practical disuse of ecclesiastical courts. Much is said about 'clerical lawlessness'. Such lawlessness can only be remedied by a revival of a proper system of Church courts.¹ It is well also to remember that lay members should equally be subject to Church discipline. Our present unhappy condition is partly a legacy from days when civil and ecclesiastical courts were looked on as parts of the judicial system of one single Church-State, partly the result of the transference to the Crown of powers that had been seized by the Pope, partly the result of sheer dullness of imagination. But the Church of England can never do her work satisfactorily until it is remedied.^{2†}

(e) It may be perhaps urged that these conditions are the inevitable result of Establishment. The reply is that they are not the result of Establishment as such, but of the unfortunate terms on which the Church of England is established. We have only to turn to Scotland to see a Church there established on very different terms. The Established Church of Scotland appoints its own chief ministers: it is free to legislate for itself, and such legislation is recognized as valid by the civil courts: it possesses a complete system of Church courts, with a final court of appeal possessed of due spiritual authority. It combines establishment with spiritual autonomy. Further, there has been much confusion about the meaning of 'established'. The Church of England 'as by law established' in the original use of the phrase, e.g. in the canons of 1604, means 'not as by law founded, but as by law settled: it refers not to the origin of the Church but to its control.'³ There was no idea of drawing any contrast between Churches that are established and Churches that are not; the reference rather was to the actual terms of the relationship to the State. Nor does the word imply that the State claims to have founded the Church. In itself there need be nothing in State recognition to limit the liberty of the Church.

The State might bestow privileges upon the ministers of the Church, give special facilities for Church worship and teaching and even make grants of land or money because it considered Christianity a

¹ Cp. *The Report of the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline*, c. x., esp. the following sentences: 'A court dealing with matters of conscience and religion must, above all others, rest on moral authority if its judgments are to be effective. As thousands of clergy, with strong lay support, refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee, its judgments cannot practically be enforced. Those who most desire to repress irregularities are those who have most to gain by the substitution of an effective tribunal for a court which, because it is powerless, encourages rather than represses disorder. The establishment of a court, the authority of which could not be disputed, would destroy any foundation for the claim now in fact made by a section of the clergy to decide for themselves the limits of canonical obedience' (p. 67).

² The proposed new Canons include a revised system of Church Courts.

³ Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, p. 9.

desirable religion for its subjects, without affecting the discipline of the Church at all. Whether the State decides to give to the Church any such privileged position, the State alone can determine. 'Establishment is in its nature a political fact: the adoption or maintenance of a national relation towards the Church.'¹ The Church cannot either establish or disestablish herself.

Further, from the nature of things the Church cannot at any time be entirely free from all relation to the State. The Church is called to work in the world. She avails herself of all the resources of civilized society. The safety of her gatherings depends upon the strong arm of the civil law. Again, the tenure of all property depends upon the State for its security. If it is given for a certain purpose it is the duty of the State to see that it is used for that purpose. As early as A.D. 269 we find the Church appealing to the heathen Emperor Aurelian in order to recover Church property which Paul of Samosata refused to give up after his deposition by the Council of Antioch. So the Free Churches are in varying degrees bound down by the possession of property. If, say, a minister preached doctrine not in accordance with the trust-deed of his chapel and an action were brought to eject him, that action, involving questions of doctrine, would be tried by a civil court. Some years ago the majority of the Wesleyan Methodist body desired to extend the number of years during which a minister could remain at one chapel. To effect this they were compelled to apply to Parliament for leave to alter the terms of the trust on which their property was held. A minority within the body threatened opposition, so that there was no chance of Parliamentary support. Accordingly the reform was dropped. Again, the same principle can be seen in the famous case of the Free Church of Scotland. This body by a very large majority decided to amalgamate with a smaller Presbyterian body, the United Presbyterians. The union was effected in face of the resistance of a small minority. But this minority brought an action in the civil courts claiming the whole of the property on the ground that this union involved a change of doctrine, since the formularies of the United Presbyterians were looser than those of the Free Church. Before the House of Lords the action was finally decided in favour of the minority, and it needed a special Act of Parliament to make possible an equitable apportionment of the property. These examples are enough to show that the present limitations of self-government in the Church of England are not due simply to the Royal Supremacy or to Establishment. If the Church were disestablished to-morrow the amount of liberty she possessed would depend upon the terms of disestablishment, that is, on the conditions on which she held whatever property she retained.

Accordingly, behind any question of establishment, and in reality distinct from it, there lies the further and greater question: how far

¹ Moberly, *Problems and Principles*, p. 160.

is the State ready to recognize the independent life of smaller societies within itself, to regard them as containing within themselves powers of development and growth, and to allow them to adapt their rules and constitutions to fresh circumstances? That is one of the big problems of the future. It affects not only the Church, but many other societies, such as trade-unions. We can only consider it here so far as it affects the Church. Let us take one divergence which has already arisen between Church and State. The State has by Act of Parliament seriously relaxed its laws of marriage. It allows, for instance, the re-marriage of divorced persons, innocent and guilty alike. The man in the street cannot understand that the Church has not changed her law too. Hence he cannot see why, when two persons are married according to the law of the land, they may be repelled from communion in church, on the ground that they are not married according to the Church's law. In other words, he cannot imagine that the Church can have a law of her own resting on other authority than that of the State. The question may be obscured by establishment, but is at bottom independent of it. Again, the case of the Free Church of Scotland suggests that the State is unwilling to allow a religious body the right to make new rules for itself. It is quite possible that if we were disestablished we might be bound down, with very little power, say, to alter our Prayer-Book or make new canons.

(f) In the face of present difficulties we are being thrown back upon first principles. There exists to-day in Europe a greater variety of belief and practice than can be found at any time probably since the Empire became Christian. We must face facts. It is both useless and impertinent to pretend that a Theosophist or a Buddhist, or a votary of the 'New Thought' or an agnostic is a Christian or a churchman because he is an English citizen. It is not that such men interpret the will of Christ in one way and the Church in another way. They do not recognize the authority of Christ at all, and do not even wish to discover what His will is, still less to submit to it. More and more men are rejecting not simply Christian doctrine, but the whole Christian standard of morality. It is becoming clear that the two in the long run stand or fall together. The present age is impatient of mere convention. Open disbelief is taking the place of secret indifference. A bored acquiescence in Christianity, as the correct thing, is changing into a calculated rejection of Christ. It is doubtful how long the current relations between Church and State will bear the strain. Pressure of fact compels us to look for guidance to Scripture and the early Church. We may find help, too, in a study of the mission field, where the essential principles of Church life stand out more clearly than at home. The following lines of thought may be suggested as an outline of practical policy.

(i) Perhaps the greatest danger that besets the English Church in its relation to the State is Erastianism. On this view the supreme author-

ity over religion rests with the State. The Church is simply the Government department for dealing with religion and the clergy are a class of civil servants. Hence it rests with the State to decide questions of doctrine, worship and discipline. There is a good deal of Erastian thought current, all the more dangerous because it has not been put into words. It is shown in the idea that all Englishmen have a right to be admitted to communion or that the law of the State concerning marriage binds the Church. Against this we must insist that the authority of the Church, her rule of life and her ministry, depend not on the State but on Christ.¹ Were the Church disestablished tomorrow she would still be the Body of Christ: she would still preach God's word and minister His sacraments. Christ Himself gave authority to His Church to 'bind and loose': to submit to the commands of the State when they conflict with the law of Christ would be disloyalty to Him. It would be to give to Caesar what belongs to God. It is always possible that the Church may be faced with the alternative of consenting to the usurpation of authority by the State in deciding matters of doctrine and ordaining rites and ceremonies or else of going out into the wilderness naked and bleeding and stripped of all her possessions.

(ii) Positively, we must work for Church reform, not necessarily disestablishment at all. We believe as English citizens that we have a duty to the nation and that every opportunity should be given to the Church to influence the national life. We must be prepared to sacrifice our own preferences on matters that are not vital in order to meet the needs and desires and even the prejudices of the nation (cp. 1 Cor 9²²). On the other hand, in order that the Church may be her best self she needs greater power of action. What is required is some means by which the Church may express her mind and alter or amend her rules. It may be claimed that some improvement in this respect has taken place since the end of the first great war. Certain reforms in the representation of the clergy in the Convocations were carried through by new Canons which received the Royal Assent in 1921. The preponderance of the official element is now diminished, and more adequate representation is given to the parochial clergy, including the unbeneficed. The setting up of the Church Assembly with a House of Laity has provided a statutory central organ for the expression of lay opinion, and, more locally, Diocesan Conferences and Parochial Church Councils have helped to bring the laity into active participation in the affairs of the Church. But it cannot be said that the problem of forming, expressing, and giving effect to a corporate mind in the Church on important matters concerning her life and witness has

¹ The taunt that we wish to reduce the Church to the level of a sect loses its force when we remember that the word 'sect' comes from '*secur*', not '*seco*'. The Church as a whole must be in the strict sense of the term a 'sect' since it consists of those who follow Christ and are thereby distinguished from all others. It is more important that the Church should consist of true Christians than that it should include all Englishmen.

yet been completely solved. Again, we must strive for the restoration of an efficient system of Church courts leading up to a final court of appeal, such as will bind the consciences of all Church people. Only when this has been attained can we hope for any efficient exercise of Church discipline over all who claim to be her members.¹ In short, the Church of England must demand from the State a fuller recognition of the independence of her own life, even if a price has to be paid for such recognition.

(iii) On the other hand, the Church must fairly recognize the independence of the State. Just as she no longer expects the State to compel all citizens to attend her services, so she must not expect the State to enforce on all its citizens the full Christian standard of morality. Probably there never was a time when all the members of any State were at heart Christian. To-day it is unreasonable to expect men who reject the authority of Christ to accept, say, a strict law of marriage that is based on His authority. The Church must be content to be able to enforce the Christian standard of life upon those who voluntarily are her members. Those without we must leave to God's judgment. To attempt to enforce upon the world at large the full Christian standard can only end in degrading that standard. What will in practice be enforced will be something lower than Christian which will at the same time be supposed to be Christian.

Let us in conclusion recall the true work of the Church. The Church exists to forward the Kingdom of God on earth, to lead all men to Christ, that in Him they may find their truest life. She is to be 'in the world but not of the world'. She recognizes to the full the authority of the State as coming from God. If she desires to preserve her own life from worldliness and from the intrusion of secular authority, it is not from any selfish motive, but because only so can she preserve within herself that salt of Christian living which is to be her gift to the world. What is best for the Church will be best for the State in the long run.

§ 4. As we saw, the discipline of the State differs from that of the Church, in that the State has the right of employing force to compel obedience. The Church has always recognized the divinely given authority of the State (cp. Rom 13, 1 Pet 2¹³⁻¹⁷). The State exists because men as social beings can only realize themselves through a common life. The existence of the State may be threatened in either of two ways, by lawlessness within or by enemies without. In either case the State is bound to use force to maintain its own existence. Public order is something that a right and wise use of force can ensure. The State is concerned primarily with acts and not motives, and hence its discipline can differ from that of the Church. The strong arm of the law is able to effect that outward obedience in those matters that are the concern of the State.

¹ See note on p. 435

(a) This is justification of that police action which is defended in the Article against the anarchial theories of Anabaptism. The rulers have authority 'to restrain with the sword the stubborn and evildoers'. Our whole social order is backed in the last resort by force. Under normal circumstances this is disguised. Even so, unpleasant duties, such as paying taxes, are enforced by the aid of the policeman. Men do them because they are obliged to. So, too, in primitive communities disputes are settled by open violence. The stronger party carries the day. Among ourselves we have political conflicts. At bottom the effective principle is the same. 'We count heads instead of breaking them.' Modern events have shown that a powerful minority, smarting under a sense of injustice, may even now tear down the disguise and appeal to the sword. Thus from its very constitution the State has the inherent right of using force for self-preservation. This is not to say that the authority of the State is simply the will of the stronger or that the only motive to obedience is fear of punishment. As civilization advances the use of force is abated. Conduct becomes moralized. Higher motives for obedience tend to supplant the lower. But at bottom there must always be the appeal to force to put down disorder.

(b) So, too, when the State's existence is threatened by an external enemy, force may rightly be used to repel him. That is, the State can call upon its citizens to take up arms in its defence. Hence '*It is lawful for Christian men, at the command of the Magistrate, to wear weapons and serve in the wars*' (Latin, *iusta bella*). This position was contested by the Anabaptists. So to-day the Quakers and many other individual Christians argue that all war is evil, and the Christian, as such, is bound not to take part in it and even to endure suffering or death rather than fight. The ordinary man finds it difficult to understand how the same persons can avail themselves of the protection of the State for their lives and property, which protection against internal disorder, as we have seen, depends in the last resort on force, and yet refuse to support the State in defending itself by war against destruction and pillage by external foes. But their position raises in an acute form the problem of the Christian's attitude to war.

When we turn to the New Testament we find that our Lord accepted social conditions as He found them. He did not directly attack abuses, such as war or slavery, rather He laid down principles through the acceptance of which such abuses would be abolished. In the case of slavery there is no explicit condemnation in the New Testament. S. Paul does not even bid Philemon set free Onesimus (Philemon v. 16). Rather he exhorts slaves to do their work faithfully. Yet in due time the conscience of Christendom came to see with increasing clearness that slavery was inconsistent with the principles of the Gospel, such as the unique value of the individual and the brotherhood of humanity. Accordingly, slavery was mitigated and in time

abolished. So in the case of war, soldiers are not bidden to abandon their profession (e.g. Lk 3¹⁴, Acts 10⁴⁸) and metaphors from the soldier's life are freely employed. War is recognized as a training ground of manly virtues. Our Lord seems to approve of the use of armed force by the 'kingdoms of this world' (*ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, i.e. having their origin from this world, Jn 18³⁶).¹ On the other hand, we are coming increasingly to see that if men and nations were really Christian, war would be impossible. War is simply the result of human sin and self-seeking. It is a symptom of the depravity of the human heart. Christianity sets itself not to abolish the symptom only but to root out the cause of the evil. After all, war is simply the exhibition on the largest and most destructive scale of those fierce and anti-social passions which lie equally behind all acts of cruelty and injustice and are in utter antagonism to the Christian spirit of love. The more Christian we become the more we are shocked at the horrors of war. Only when the whole world is Christian can we hope for war to cease. It cannot be put down by any external legislation.

It may be asked, however, ought not the Christian to carry out literally the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount and refuse to offer resistance to any enemy? One line of answer would be to point out that we have obligations not only to self but to society. What our Lord forbids is the spirit of personal revenge. If we ourselves alone are injured, we may be called on not to resist our enemy and even to suffer death. Such non-resistance may be truly Christian. But when the injury affects others, then we may be called on to resist. The evildoer is to be resisted not that we may gratify our own spite, but that he may himself learn from his punishment and be reformed, and that society may be protected. All war is sinful, and arises from unchristian ambitions and jealousies. Yet the Christian fights not from personal animosity but to save his country.

Further, as we have seen, the State is not as yet fully Christian. It contains many citizens who are not even Christian in name. It is arguable that a perfectly Christian State might be called on to render a literal obedience to the Sermon on the Mount by a policy of non-resistance, and to witness for Christ by suffering wrong patiently as our Lord did. But a semi-Christian State cannot be under any such obligation. The difficulty for the individual Christian is that he is compelled to live, as it were, on two levels. As a member of the State he must assist the State to live up to its highest standard, and that standard includes resistance to evil by force. As a Christian he believes that evil can never be conquered by force. If he accepts State protection for his own personal safety, he can hardly refuse to help the State to defend itself against external enemies. In a sinful world

¹ So, too, our Lord seems to teach that force is not intrinsically evil, but can be consecrated to the service of God, when He pictures the Good Shepherd as employing it to defend the sheep. Jn 10¹¹⁻¹².

this dual standard is unavoidable. Human sin has made the best impossible. We must choose the second best.

Political and scientific developments in the first half of the twentieth century have, however, made the problem of war both more urgent and more difficult. The total character of modern warfare, involving the mobilization of whole populations and their exposure to mass destruction by weapons of ever-increasing power, has made the idea of engaging in war repugnant to the conscience of the majority of mankind. But this fact does not in itself preclude the possibility of a new war. On the other hand the rise of totalitarian forms of government has increased the seriousness of the issues at stake in any conflict. A desire to extend the range of their power and the domination of their ideas is characteristic of these governments, and their claim to control men's minds as well as their actions makes the threat of their ultimate victory much more serious than a threat of conquest would have been in earlier ages. A nation and society united in Christian conviction might renounce war and face the probable consequences, spiritual and material, with confidence. But such a society does not anywhere yet exist. Meanwhile the Church has a clear duty to work for the promotion of international justice and co-operation and for the elimination of poverty and discontent which in different parts of the world invite a resort to tyrannical forms of government.†

(c) Again, the supreme penalty that the State can inflict is death. Without doubt in earlier stages of society the death penalty was absolutely necessary as a deterrent. It is approved by the conscience of the writers of the Old Testament and of the New (Gen 9⁶, Exod 21¹², Acts 25¹¹, etc.). Hence the cautious wording of the Article can hardly be criticized. *'The laws of the realm may punish Christian men with death, for heinous and grievous offences.'* Whether at any given time it is desirable to inflict the death penalty is left open. That is a question that can only be decided by the reason and conscience of the particular community.†

ARTICLE XXXVIII

*Of Christian men's Goods,
which are not common*

The riches and goods of Christians are not common as touching the right, title, and possession of the same, as certain Anabaptists do falsely boast. Notwithstanding, every man

*De illicita bonorum communi-
catione*

Facultates et bona Christianorum non sunt communia, quoad jus et possessionem (ut quidam Anabaptistae falso jactant); debet tamen quisque de his quae possidet, pro facultatum ratione,

ought, of such things as he pauperibus eleemosynas benignè posseseth, liberally to give alms distribuere. to the poor, according to his ability.

Composed in 1553.

§ 5. At the time of the Reformation certain Anabaptists advocated communism as an essential part of Christianity. They based their claim on a literal imitation of the life of the earliest Christian community as described in the opening chapters of Acts. There Christians are described as having 'all things in common' (see esp. 2⁴⁴⁻⁴⁶ and 4³²). Such a claim, however, fails to take account of all the facts. It is quite clear that such communism was the spontaneous product of the new spirit of brotherhood. It was based not on any formal legislation but the sharing of a common temper and outlook. It was neither compulsory nor universal. S. Peter clearly asserts that Ananias had the right, if he so wished, to retain either his property or the money for which he sold it (5⁴). Mary the mother of S. Mark clearly possessed her own house, though she put it at the disposal of the community (Acts 12¹²). It is a certain inference from the facts of S. Paul's life that he was able at times of crisis to draw upon considerable resources. Both our Lord and the teaching of the New Testament generally inculcate the duty of almsgiving, which presupposes the retention of at least some private property (Mt 6¹ ff., etc., Rom 12¹³, 1 Cor 16², 2 Cor 9⁷, Heb 13¹⁶, 1 Jn 3¹⁷, etc.). Outside Jerusalem no trace of communism is found. Before many years had passed the Church of Jerusalem was in urgent need of financial assistance (Rom 15²⁵⁻²⁸, etc.). How far this was due to the conduct described above is an interesting question.

To-day a very similar demand is often made that the Church should definitely commit herself to that economic theory known as 'socialism'.¹ Our Lord is claimed as a socialist. This demand rests upon unsound arguments. Our Lord laid down general principles. He did not formulate any system. He left it to His disciples to work out those principles to meet the needs of successive ages. If we believe that socialism is economically sound and will minister to the highest welfare of mankind, then we are bound to propagate it. But we must allow that our views are not an essential part of the Christian faith. Socialism has no place in the revelation of God. Christians must be prepared to differ on such a subject. All that loyalty to Christ demands is that whatever views they hold, they adopt them from Christian motives as the result of prayer, thought and study, not

¹ It is much to be wished that the term 'socialism' would only be employed in its proper sense. As so used it signifies the view that the community as a whole should own all the means of production. It is too often employed in a vague sense as meaning little more than 'social reform'. Socialism is not the same as communism, since it leaves room for a limited possession of private property.

simply because they will fill their own pockets and keep them full. Our Lord's teaching about wealth may be summed up in two leading thoughts. First, it is a great responsibility, to be used for the good not only of its owner but of others. Secondly, it is a great temptation, leading its possessor to rely on self rather than God. This teaching, we must note, applies not only to money but to all conspicuous gifts whether of mind or body.

The Church is not tied down to any one economic theory, but it is bound to assert Christian principles. That is where the Church has often failed. It has made little or no protest against the exploitation of the poor and weak.¹ Men have been allowed to suppose that Christian morality applies only to private life and not to business relationships. Prominent members of the Church have been known to be getting money by means that involved the suffering and loss of their fellow men and women and the Church has never rebuked them. Men have salved their conscience by gifts to the Church taken from money gained at the cost of the lives of their employees. The Christian conscience has acquiesced in the existence of slums and the employment of sweated labour. In all attempts at reform the Church has too often taken the side of wealth rather than righteousness. These ugly facts underlie the demand that the Church should adopt socialism. The Church is bound to face, in the light of the Gospel, the evils for which socialism claims to supply a remedy. But she is not bound to accept any particular political or economic remedy without investigation. She must always insist that external conditions by themselves cannot secure righteousness, though they may do much to hinder it. The real root of all social problems lies in the perverted will and heart of man, in other words, in human sin. No economic reconstruction apart from love can bring true and lasting satisfaction.

The social measures which since the second world war have set up in this country, with the general support of public opinion, what is called 'the Welfare State' must be welcomed by the Christian conscience as supplying remedies for many social evils. Some credit for these measures must go to the diffusion of Christian ideals among our people, but circumstances arising from the war probably hastened what might otherwise have taken a long time to accomplish. In this new situation the emphasis and direction of the duty of the Church to society will need some re-thinking. The Welfare State may go far towards giving 'social security' at the cost of the sense of personal responsibility for self and others, a danger which can be counteracted only by an intelligent propagation of Christian teaching on family and social relations. If the opportunities are wisely discerned and used, a wide sphere of voluntary service and influence remains open to effective Christian effort, and the official services themselves will not fulfil their possibilities unless individual Christians are ready to

¹ See the excellent statement, W. Temple, *Church and Nation*, p. 80 ff.

find a vocation in them. The problem of the relation of the Church to contemporary society has thus changed in character. The relief of economic need is no longer a primary concern. The Church now has to discover how to make Christian standards effective in a society in which education is mainly under the direct control of the State, and the large-scale influence of rapid transport, the cinema, radio and television is a constant factor.†

ARTICLE XXXIX

Of a Christian man's oath

As we confess that vain and rash Swearing is forbidden Christian men by our Lord Jesus Christ, and *James* his Apostle: So we judge, that Christian Religion doth not prohibit, but that a man may swear when the Magistrate requireth, in a cause of faith and charity, so it be done according to the Prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth.

Composed in 1553.

§ 6. The objection of the Anabaptists, like that of the Quakers in later days, to the use of oaths rests upon a misunderstanding of Scripture of the same kind as those that we have already considered. In Mt 5³³ ff. our Lord says, 'Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: but I say unto you, Swear not at all. . . . But let your speech be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; and whatsoever is more than these is of the evil one.' His words are re-echoed by S. James 5¹², 'Above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by the heaven, nor by the earth, nor by any other oath; but let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay (let yours be the yea, yea and the nay, nay, R.V. mg.), that ye fall not under judgment.' These are the passages alluded to in the Article.

To grasp the spirit of our Lord's command, we must consider the meaning of an oath. The idea of any obligation to speak the truth at all times and to all men is quite a late idea. Primitive man only felt himself bound to speak the truth to particular men, e.g. his own kinsfolk, or under particular circumstances. As the narratives of the Old Testament show, no moral blame whatever was felt to attach to untruthfulness to a stranger or an enemy. Gradually the circle of men to

De jurejurando

Quemadmodum juramentum vanum et temerarium a Domino nostro Jesu Christo, et Apostolo ejus Jacobo, Christianis hominibus interdictum esse fatemur; ita Christianorum Religionem minime prohibere censemus, quin jubente magistratu in causa fidei et charitatis jurare liceat, modo id fiat juxta Prophetæ doctrinam, in justitia, in judicio, et veritate.

whom truthfulness was felt to be a duty widened. Christian morality proclaims that all men have a right to expect the truth (Eph 4²⁵). Lying is anti-social. The Christian, if he is faithful to Christ, is bound to speak the truth. This is the real thought that underlies the exhortations of our Lord and S. James. The oath is in origin a device to obtain truthfulness on a particular occasion, when truthfulness was not necessarily to be expected. It is the solemn calling upon God to bear witness that a statement is true. The use of oaths has always tended to produce a double standard of truthfulness. Men come to feel that they are bound to speak the truth when they are on oath, but not otherwise. Further, men try to evade the sanctity of oaths by quibbles and subterfuges. Some oaths are held to be binding and others not (cp. Mt 23¹⁶⁻²²). In short, the whole system of oaths, though necessary, is at best a makeshift. What is wanted is not a code of oaths but a spirit of truthfulness. Human selfishness and ingenuity will always endeavour to evade an oath, unless there is the right inward disposition. Our Lord commands His disciples to speak the truth always, as being always in the presence of God. Hence the need of oaths is removed. The Christian will not have two standards of truth, one when he is on oath and one when he is not. His simple 'yea' or 'nay' will be sufficient. His whole speech will be on that high moral level to which the speech of the non-Christian is raised only temporarily and partially by the taking of an oath.

If, then, the world was a Christian world and all men were disciples, our Lord's command would be obeyed literally. Oaths would rightly be abolished as contrary to the spirit of Christ. But, as we saw, the State is not as yet a Christian society. Its members are not all Christians. Its action, therefore, cannot be guided by the full principles of Christian morality. Hence it is compelled to retain and enforce oaths. And the Christian, as a member of the State, will conform to the State's rule in matters that concern the State. To him, indeed, the oath will be superfluous, as he is equally bound to speak the truth at all times. He will, however, be content to follow the example of His Master, who, though He gave the command 'swear not at all', yet was willing to be put on oath by Caiaphas and recognized the authority of the State (Mt 26⁶³).¹

¹The solemn asseverations used from time to time by S. Paul (e.g. 2 Cor 1¹⁸, Gal 1²⁰, etc.) may be considered a form of oath. They were needed because his converts had hardly yet reached the full Christian standard of morality. They do not violate any Christian principle, since they in no way imply a double standard of truthfulness.

LIST OF BOOKS FOR FURTHER STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Page

- 2 See N. Micklem, *Religion* (Home University Library); E. O. James in *The Study of Theology*, c. ii (with bibliography).
- 4 On faith and conduct, see L. S. Thornton, *Conduct and the Supernatural*; V. A. Demant, *The Religious Prospect* (for Christian dogma in relation to social and political theories).
- 6 On the nature of Theology, see *Lux Mundi*, Essay ii, § 6, and Essay vi, § 1; Webb, *A Century of Anglican Theology*, Lect. iii; W. R. Matthews (editor), *Dogma in History and Thought*; essays by N. P. Williams and N. Micklem in *The Study of Theology*; Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, esp. Vol. ii, c. ii; K. Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*; E. Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics*, Vol. i; E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church*, c. xiii.

THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES. THEIR HISTORY AND PLACE IN THEOLOGY

- 21 For the background of English Church History, see J. R. H. Moorman, *A History of the Church in England* and the volumes in Stephens and Hunt's *History of the English Church*, and for an excellent brief account, T. M. Parker, *The English Reformation to 1558* (Home University Library). For the Continental Reformation, see Kidd, *The Continental Reformation*, and *Documents of the Continental Reformation*, and for the Council of Trent his *The Counter-Reformation*. See also Pullan, *Religion Since the Reformation*, Lects. i-iii. The Protestant standpoint can be studied in Lindsay, *History of the Reformation* (two Vols.). For a full history of the Articles, see Hardwick, *A History of the Articles of Religion*.

THE BEING OF GOD

- 23 For a defence of theism see Taylor's essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical* and his article, 'Theism,' in *E.R.E.* For a clear statement of the Scholastic proofs of the existence of God, Joyce, *Principles of Natural Theology*. Among larger works are A. M. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite* (a brilliant critical and constructive discussion of rational theology); E. L. Mascall, *He Who Is* (a discussion along modern Thomistic lines); Temple, *Nature, Man and God*; H. H. Farmer, *The World and God and Towards Belief in God* (the last three works containing a more idealistic and experiential approach).

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- 23 On Israel's faith in God see Hamilton, *The People of God*, Vol. i; Wheeler Robinson, *Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*; G. E. Wright, *The Old Testament against its Environment* (S.C.M. Press).
- 27 On divine personality, see Webb, *God and Personality*; Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*, Lects. i-v. Among more recent discussions, Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. iv; and on the use of the principle of analogy, A. M. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, esp. Part I; E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (Longmans).
- 29 See for a discussion of reserve in ascribing 'passibility' to God, Mozley, *The Impassibility of God*; von Hügel, *Essays*, Vol. ii, pp. 165 ff.; Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. ii, Lect. viii.
- 31 On divine providence, see H. H. Farmer, *The World and God*, cc. vi, xiii and xvi.
- 33 On the being and attributes of God see the books referred to above (pages 23 and 27) and Headlam, *Christian Theology, The Doctrine of God*; W. R. Matthews, *God in Christian Thought and Experience*; E. Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of God, Dogmatics*, Vol. i. For a discussion of divine transcendence and immanence see Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, esp. Lectures x and xi.

THE HOLY TRINITY

- 34 For a discussion of our Lord's miracles, see A. Richardson, *The Miracle Stories of the Gospels* (S.C.M. Press).
- 37 For a study of the New Testament evidence, see A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*.
- 39 See Glover, *Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*; Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics and Hellenism and Christianity*; Halliday, *The Pagan Background of Early Christianity*; A. D. Nock's essay in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, ed. Rawlinson, on 'Early Gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic Background'.
- 41 On the preparation for the doctrine of the Trinity in Judaism, see K. E. Kirk, 'The Evolution of the Doctrine of the Trinity' in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*; J. Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité*.
- 44 For ebionism, see Bethune Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, pp. 62-68; Du Bose, *Ecumenical Councils*, c. iii; Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, Vol. i, c. iv.
- 45 For docetism, see art. 'Docetism' in *E.R.E.*; Du Bose, *Ecumenical Councils*, c. iii.
- 46 On dynamic and modalist monarchianism, see Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, pp. 147 ff.; Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, Vol. i, c. viii.
- 47 For Arianism, besides the histories of dogma, see Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, c. iv; Du Bose, *Ecumenical Councils*, cc. v and vi; Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*.

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- 50 On the meaning of *ousia*, *hypostasis* and *homoousios*, see G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*.
- 52 The early history of the doctrine of the Trinity may be studied in the standard histories of doctrine, of which Tixeront is the best for general use. For more detailed treatment of the history see G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*; *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, esp. iv, v, and vi; and for more systematic treatment, L. Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Trinity*; K. Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*; R. S. Franks, *The Doctrine of the Trinity* (Duckworth).
- 53 On the subject of this note see Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, esp. Lects. i, xii and xx, and Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. ii (for criticism of the traditional distinction between natural and revealed theology); for the neo-Reformed view, see E. Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*; K. Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*; differences between Barth and Brunner on natural theology are set out in their discussion in E. Brunner and K. Barth, *Natural Theology* (Centenary Press); for a defence and exposition of the distinction between natural reason and supernatural revelation, see A. M. Farrer, *The Glass of Vision*, cc. i and ii. Cp. E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*.

THE INCARNATION

- 55 On the figure of Christ in the Gospels and on questions concerning faith and history in relation to the Gospels, see Hoskyns in *Essays Catholic and Critical*; *Mysterium Christi* (ed. Bell), Essays ii, iii and iv; A. E. J. Rawlinson, *Christ in the Gospels*; T. W. Manson, *The Servant-Messiah*; E. Brunner, *The Mediator*, cc. vi, xiii and xiv; D. M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ*, Sections i and ii. On the moral perfection of Jesus, Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. xvii.
- 56 The best brief account of Apollinarius and his teaching is G. L. Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics*, c. v. C. E. Raven, *Apollinarianism*, gives a fuller historical discussion. See also Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, pp. 196 ff.; R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies* (for the place of Apollinarius in 'Alexandrine' Christology).
- 58 For recent brief and sympathetic accounts, see G. L. Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics*, c. vi, and R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies*, c. ii (on Antiochene Christology). L. Hodgson in Appendix iv to *Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides* (ed. Driver and Hodgson) raises some valuable points about the metaphysics of Nestorius. Bethune Baker, *Nestorius and his Teaching*, defends Nestorius' orthodoxy.
- 59 On the Council of Chalcedon and the merits of its Definition, see Mackintosh, *Person of Christ*, cc. x and xi; Temple, *Christus Veritas*, c. viii; Mozley's essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*; L. Hodgson's essay in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*, esp. pp. 387 ff.; R. V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon* (S.P.C.K.). See also Bindley *The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith* (ed. Green, 1950)

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- 68 On the theology of the Incarnation, see, among older works, Gore, *The Incarnation of the Son of God* (Bampton Lectures) and *Dissertations*; Mackintosh, *The Person of Christ*; among more recent works, H. M. Relton, *A Study in Christology*; L. Hodgson, *And Was Made Man* and his essay in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation*; L. S. Thornton, *The Incarnate Lord*; E. Brunner, *The Mediator*; D. M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ*. On the relation between Christology and soteriology, Mozley's essay in *Mysterium Christi* is most valuable. For discussion of the kenotic theory see Temple, *Christus Veritas*, c. viii; Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. xiii; Baillie, *op. cit.*, c. iv. For a survey of the history of the doctrine, see Ottley, *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* (two Vols.).
- 71 On our Lord's human knowledge, see Gore, *Dissertations*; Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. xvi; E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church*, c. iii.
- 74 On our Lord's temptations and moral perfection, see L. Hodgson, *And Was Made Man*, c. iii; Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. xvii.
- 81 On the Virgin-birth, see Box, *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*; Gore, *Dissertations*; Headlam, *Miracles of the New Testament*, Lect. vii; Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, c. xv.

THE ATONEMENT

- 93 Only a few of the numerous books on the Atonement are here mentioned. Among older works, see Dale, *The Atonement*; Denney, *The Death of Christ*; Forsyth, *The Work of Christ*; Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*. Among more recent works, Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (an excellent historical and systematic survey); E. Brunner, *The Mediator*; Quick, *The Gospel of the New World and Doctrines of the Creed*, cc.xix-xxi; G. Aulen, *Christus Victor*; Mackintosh, *The Christian Experience of Forgiveness*; L. Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*; and for a valuable brief discussion, K. E. Kirk's essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*. See also, esp. for New Testament teaching, the three works by Vincent Taylor, *Jesus and His Sacrifice*, *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching*, and *Forgiveness and Reconciliation*. For a sustained and learned exposition of the 'subjective' theory, see Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, and more briefly R. S. Franks, *The Atonement* (Oxford University Press).

THE RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION

- 104 Among older books, Swete, *The Appearances of our Lord after the Passion*; Westcott, *The Revelation of the Risen Lord and The Gospel of the Resurrection* are very valuable. The best recent survey of the evidence and the theology is A. M. Ramsey, *The Resurrection of Christ*. See also the essays by E. G. Selwyn in *Essays Catholic and Critical* and H. Sasse in *Mysterium Christi*.

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- 118 On the eschatological elements in our Lord's teaching, see Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (the last two chapters); von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses* (First Series) v and vii; and more recently, C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* ('realized eschatology'); Hoskyns' essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (on the 'Liberal' view of the Gospels); H. E. W. Turner, *Jesus, Master and Lord*, esp. c. ix. On the doctrine of the Last Things (Judgment, Resurrection) see Darragh, *The Resurrection of the Flesh*; Quick, *Doctrines of the Creed*, cc. xxii-xxiv and *The Gospel of the New World*, c. viii.

THE HOLY SPIRIT

- 122 On the development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, see Swete, art. 'Holy Spirit' in *H.D.B.* and *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament and The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*. See also Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit*. For the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Person and Work of Christ, see L. S. Thornton, *The Incarnate Lord*, c. xii.
- 124 On the question of the 'double procession', see Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, c. ix. On *Filioque* in the Creed, see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, pp. 358 ff.

THE SCRIPTURES

- 138 On the inspiration and interpretation of the Bible, see Gore, *Lux Mundi*, Essay viii; Sanday, *Inspiration*, Lect. viii; and, among more recent books, A. Richardson, *A Preface to Bible Study*; C. W. Dugmore (editor), *The Interpretation of the Bible* (S.P.C.K.); McNeile (ed. C. S. C. Williams, 1953), *Introduction to the New Testament*; Wheeler Robinson, *Ancient and Modern Versions of the Bible*, Essay ix; Mozley's essay in *The Christian Faith* (ed. Matthews); A. M. Farrer, *The Glass of Vision*.
- 143 For the history of the Canon, see Westcott, *The Bible in the Church and The Canon of the New Testament*; Sanday, *Inspiration*; McNeile (1953 edn.), *Introduction to the New Testament*.
- 146 On the importance of the Old Testament, see G. E. Phillips, *The Old Testament in the World Church*; Wheeler Robinson (editor), *Record and Revelation*, Essay x; A. Richardson, *A Preface to Bible Study*, esp. cc. vi and vii; C. H. Dodd, *According to the Scriptures*.

THE CREEDS

- 161 Earlier works on the Creeds have been largely superseded by J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, which contains a full discussion of the history and interpretation of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. Swete, *The Apostles' Creed* and Turner, *The History and Use of Creeds and Anathemas* are still valuable.

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- 170 For a convenient exposition of Brewer's theory of the origin of the *Quicumque*, see Badcock, *The History of the Creeds*. Cp. Burn's article in *J.Th.S.*, Vol. xxvii (1926), pp. 19 ff., and for a criticism of Brewer, see F. Homes Dudden, *The Life and Times of S. Ambrose*, pp. 676 ff. For Burn's earlier views, see his books *An Introduction to the Creeds* (1899) and *The Athanasian Creed* (1912).

THE NATURE OF MAN, AND GRACE

- 175 For an account of primitive man, see E. O. James, *The Origin of Man*.
190 On the Christian doctrine of man, see R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*; E. Brunner, *Man in Revolt*; Quick, *The Gospel of the New World*; E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian, and the Church*; D. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*.

On sin, see Strong, *Christian Ethics*, Lect. v; Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralists*, Vol. i, Lect. v; Mackintosh, *The Christian Experience of Forgiveness*; K. E. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, c. x.

On original sin, see Williams, *The Doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin* (for the history); Bicknell, *The Christian Idea of Sin and of Original Sin*, and his essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*; C. E. Barbour, *Sin and the New Psychology*; Tennant's works referred to in the text; Quick, *op. cit.*, esp. c. ii. *Doctrine in the Church of England* (S.P.C.K.) gives a concise review of questions relating to sin and original sin.

- 198 On mortal and venial sins, see K. E. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, cc. x and xi, and on questions of penance, discipline and their relation to the Christian *summum bonum*, see his book *The Vision of God*.

On grace, see Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralists*, Vol. i, Lect. vi; Williams, *The Grace of God*; L. Hodgson, *The Grace of God in Faith and Philosophy*; *The Doctrine of Grace*, ed. W. T. Whitley, (S.C.M. Press, 1932), a symposium expounding the doctrine and its history in different parts of the Church. On grace and freedom see esp. Mosley's essay in *Essays Catholic and Critical*. On the Pelagian controversy and S. Augustine, see Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, Vol. ii, c. xi.

SALVATION

- 207 On justification, see the commentaries on Romans by Sanday and Headlam, C. H. Dodd (Moffatt) and K. E. Kirk (Clarendon Bible); Vincent Taylor, *Forgiveness and Reconciliation*; E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church*, esp. c. v (on imputation and impartation). See also C. H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law*.

- 228 On predestination, see Mozley, *The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination* (a classical exposition); F. H. Brabant, *Time and Eternity in Christian Thought*, Lect. vii; and for a modern Thomist exposition, R. Garrigou-Lagrange (trans. Rose), *Predestination* (E. Herder).

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THE CHURCH

- 248 On the doctrine of the Church, see for particular aspects the books mentioned lower down on the Authority and Ministry of the Church. On the doctrine of the Church in general, see among older books, F. D. Maurice, *The Kingdom of Christ*; Swete, *The Holy Catholic Church*; Stone, *The Christian Church*; Gore, *The Reconstruction of Belief*, Part iii; among more recent books, A. M. Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*; A. G. Hebert, *The Form of the Church*; K. E. Kirk (editor), *The Apostolic Ministry*; E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church*; S. Neill, *The Christian Society*. See also *The Parish Communion* (S.P.C.K.), esp. Essays iv, v and vi; *The Church of God* (S.P.C.K.), an Anglo-Russian symposium; W. A. Visser't Hooft and J. H. Oldham, *The Church and its Function in Society* (Allen and Unwin, 1937); E. Mersch, *The Whole Christ* (an English translation of *Le Corps Mystique du Christ*, on the historical development of the doctrine of the mystical body).

On the New Testament doctrine (in addition to most of the above), see R. Newton Flew, *Jesus and His Church*; L. S. Thornton, *The Common Life in the Body of Christ*; K. L. Schmidt, *The Church* (Bible Key Words—A. & C. Black).

On the nature of 'catholicity', see *Catholicity* (Dacre Press, 1947), *The Fulness of Christ* (S.P.C.K. 1950), and *The Catholicity of Protestantism* (Lutterworth Press, 1950), three reports presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury. See also D. T. Jenkins, *The Nature of Catholicity* (Faber), for a modern Congregationalist point of view. A more radical Protestant view is given in E. Brunner, *The Misunderstanding of the Church* (Lutterworth Press, 1952).

Questions concerning re-union may be studied in G. K. A. Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity* (Oxford University Press), three volumes; *Reports of the Lambeth Conferences* of 1920, 1930 and 1948; *The Church* (S.C.M. Press, 1951), a report of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches; A. M. Ramsey, K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*; A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The Church of England and the Church of Christ and Problems of Re-union*; W. Nicholls, *Ecumenism and Catholicity*; M. J. Congar, O.P., *Divided Christendom* (throws light on some currents of thought in the Roman Church, the French original *Chrétiens Désunis* should be used if possible). For a full bibliography of books and periodicals on the subject, see H. R. T. Brandreth, *Unity and Reunion* (second edition, 1948).

On the question of the papacy, see list of books for page 350.

THE CHURCH'S AUTHORITY IN DOCTRINE

- 256 On the authority of the Church, see Salmon, *Infallibility of the Church* (1952 edn.); Gore, *Reconstruction of Belief*, Book III, cc. v-x; essays in *Essays Catholic and Critical* by A. E. J. Rawlinson and Knox; essay by N. P. Williams in *Northern Catholicism* esp. pp. 154 ff.

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- 260 On development in doctrine, see Mozley, *Theory of Development*; Darwell Stone, *The Christian Church*, c. xiv; Turner, *Catholic and Apostolic*, cc. ii and iii; R. Hanson and R. Fuller, *The Church of Rome* (S.C.M. Press), c. iv.
- 267 On modernism, see A. R. Vidler, *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church*. English Modernism may be studied in H. D. A. Major, *English Modernism*, and E. W. Barnes, *The Rise of Christianity*. Harnack, *What is Christianity?* remains a classical exposition of the older type of Liberal Protestantism. For a review of the whole subject, see Quick, *Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition* and the Report entitled *Catholicity* (Dacre Press, 1947).
- 272 On general councils, see Darwell Stone, *The Christian Church*, c. xiii.
- 287 On purgatory, see Mason, *Purgatory*, and the brief treatment in *Doctrine in the Church of England*.
Modern Roman teaching on indulgences is set out conveniently in H. Davis, S.J., *Moral and Pastoral Theology*, Vol. iii.
- 298 On the invocation of saints, see *Doctrine in the Church of England*, pp. 213-216; Darwell Stone, *The Invocation of Saints*; Williams' essay in *Northern Catholicism*, pp. 221 ff.

THE CHURCH'S AUTHORITY IN DISCIPLINE

- 307 The Report on *The Canon Law of the Church of England* (S.P.C.K., 1947) should be consulted. See also Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, V, cc. v-x, for the classical defence of Prayer-Book ceremonies and customs.
- 314 On celibacy and the monastic ideal, see K. E. Kirk, *The Vision of God*. On clerical celibacy, see Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, iv; Lea, *History of Sacerdotal Celibacy*; the article 'Célibat Ecclésiastique' in *Dictionnaire de Théol. Catholique*.
- 319 On the early history of excommunication, see K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*

THE MINISTRY OF THE CHURCH

- 329 On the early history of the ministry, see Lightfoot's Excursus in his *Commentary on Philippians*, with Moberly's criticism in his *Ministerial Priesthood*; Gore and Turner, *The Church and the Ministry*; Swete (editor), *The Early History of the Church and the Ministry*; C. Jenkins and K. D. Mackenzie (editors), *Episcopacy, Ancient and Modern*; K. E. Kirk (editor), *The Apostolic Ministry*, with the criticism in *The Ministry of the Church*, by S. Neill and others (Canterbury Press).
- 337 For the doctrine of the apostolic succession, see the books cited above, esp. essay iii (Turner) in *The Early History of the Church and the Ministry*; A. M. Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*. For another view, see Headlam, *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion*; A. Ehrhardt, *The Apostolic Succession*. For Free

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THE SACRAMENTS

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- 364 On the history of penance, see O. D. Watkins, *A History of Penance* (fully documented); K. E. Kirk, *The Vision of God*; R. C. Mortimer, *The Origins of Private Penance*. On the practice of sacramental confession, see O. Hardman (editor), *The Christian Life*, Vol. ii. Roman Catholic theory and practice may be studied in H. Davis, *Moral and Pastoral Theology*, Vol. iii, cc. v-ix.
- 265 On the anointing of the sick, see *Liturgy and Worship*, pp. 472 ff.; *The Report on the Ministry of Healing*, (S.P.C.K., 1924); and the forms of service approved by the Convocation of Canterbury, June 1935.

HOLY BAPTISM

- 375 On baptism, see Darwell Stone, *Holy Baptism*; G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*; W. F. Flemington, *The New Testament Doctrine of Baptism*; O. Cullman, *Baptism in the New Testament* (S.C.M. Press).
- 381 For the view that confirmation for the first time bestows the Holy Spirit, see Mason, *Relation of Baptism to Confirmation*; Hall, *Confirmation*; and the lecture by Dix, *The Theology of Confirmation in Relation to Baptism* (Dacre Press). For a different view, see Stone,

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Holy Baptism; Quick, *The Christian Sacraments*, p. 181; and the extensive review of New Testament and patristic evidence in G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*. Recent discussions of theory and practice may be studied in the following Reports: *Confirmation Today* (1944) and *Baptism Today* (1949, Press and Publications Board); *The Theology of Christian Initiation* (1948, S.P.C.K., the report of a Theological Commission). See also the two volumes *Confirmation* (S.P.C.K.) and the essays by evangelical authors in *Baptism and Confirmation* (Church Book Room Press).

THE HOLY COMMUNION

- 392 For a review of the history of teaching on the Holy Communion in the Church of England, see Waterland, *A Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist* (1736); A. J. Macdonald (editor), *The Evangelical Doctrine of the Holy Communion*; C. W. Dugmore, *Eucharistic Doctrine in England from Hooker to Waterland*; Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, Vol. ii (with full quotations). Cp. Y. Brilioth, *Eucharistic Faith and Practice* (a review of the various traditions by a Swedish scholar).
- 395 On the doctrine of the real presence, see Strong, *The Real Presence*; Gore, *The Body of Christ*; Quick, *The Christian Sacraments*, c. ix; E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church*, cc. ix-xi, and *Corpus Christi*; Stone, *The Holy Communion*.
- 399 For the history of the doctrine of transubstantiation see Gore, *Dissertations*, iii; Stone, *op. cit.* (both volumes).
- 407 For a history of reservation, see Freestone, *The Sacrament Reserved* (Alcuin Club). The Article by Harris on 'The Communion of the Sick' in *Liturgy and Worship* contains much important material. *Reservation* (S.P.C.K., 1926), the Report of a representative conference, provides a full discussion of the questions at issue, and the paper by E. G. Selwyn and the Chairman's summary at the end ably state the case respectively for and against extra-liturgical devotions.
- 419 On the sacrificial aspect of the eucharist, see the works by Stone, Gore, Quick and E. L. Mascall already cited; Kidd, *The Later Medieval Doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice*; Hicks, *The Fulness of Sacrifice*. Essays iii, iv and v in *The Parish Communion* (S.P.C.K.) contain valuable discussions of the corporate character and significance of the eucharistic action. See also A. G. Hebert, *Liturgy and Society*. On the history of the liturgy, see J. H. Srawley, *The Early History of the Liturgy*; Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy*.

CHURCH AND STATE

- 432 Recent discussions will be found in *Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State*, 1916; *Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations between Church and State*, 1935; *Church and State, being the Report of a Commission appointed by the Church*

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Assembly, 1952. See also Dibdin, *Establishment in England* (essays by a distinguished authority on ecclesiastical law, 1932); C. Garbett, *Church and State in England* (1950).

For a more general treatment of the subject, see Hobhouse, *The Church and the World*; Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*.

For an account of the Enabling Act, the Constitution of the Church Assembly and a list of the Measures passed since its inception, see the annual *Official Year-Book of the Church of England*.

- 433 See *The Canon Law of the Church of England*, being the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Canon Law (S.P.C.K., 1947), which contains essays on the history of Canon Law, proposals for a Revised Body of Canons, and a Memorandum 'Lawful Authority' by Mr Justice Vaisey. See also R. C. Mortimer, *Western Canon Law*.
- 435 See the *Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission*, 1926, which is reprinted as Appendix IV in the 1935 Report on Church and State, Vol. i, mentioned above. See also the Report on Canon Law mentioned above.
- 442 (i) For a brief review of the problems connected with war, see the Report of the Lambeth Conference 1948 (Report of Committee No. ii on The Church and the Modern World). For a fuller discussion, see 'The Church and the Atom', a study of the moral and theological aspects of peace and war being the Report of a Commission appointed by the Archbishops at the request of the Church Assembly to consider the Report of the British Council of Churches' Commission entitled 'The Era of Atomic Power'.
(ii) See W. Temple, *The Ethics of Penal Action* (Clarke Hall Fellowship Lecture, 1934).
- 445 For a general review of the relation of the Church to modern society, see the Report of the Lambeth Conference 1948 (Report of Committee No. ii on The Church and the Modern World).
The following books deal with various aspects of this problem more fully: E. Brunner, *Christianity and Civilization and Justice and the Social Order*; H. Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*; V. A. Demant, *Theology of Society and Religion and the Decline of Capitalism*; T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*; D. M. Mackinnon (editor), *Christian Faith and Communist Faith*; J. Maritain, *Man and the State*; Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*; M. B. Reckitt, *Maurice to Temple*; W. Temple, *Christianity and Social Order*.

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