

the Apostles' Creed, the ancient baptismal confession of faith. The faithful adherence of the Church of England to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation is fully expressed in other liturgical forms; it remains an obligation on her pastors to teach and expound the truths set out in the 'Quicunque'. As a summary for the use of the teacher it is of outstanding and permanent value.†

ARTICLES IX-X AND XV-XVI

THE NATURE OF MAN

ARTICLE IX

Of Original or Birth Sin

Original sin standeth not in the following of *Adam*, (as the *Pelagians* do vainly talk); but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of *Adam*; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated; whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek *Φρόνημα σαρκός*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And, although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess, that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin.

Almost unchanged since 1553. The words 'which also the Anabaptists do nowadays renew' were originally present after 'as the Pelagians do vainly talk'. This sufficiently shows the object of the Article. It is directed against the Pelagian views of Anabaptists.

De peccato originali

Peccatum originis non est (ut fabulantur Pelagiani) in imitatione Adami situm, sed est vitium, et depravatio naturae, cuiuslibet hominis ex Adamo, naturaliter propagati: qua fit, ut ab originali iustitia quam longissime distet, ad malum sua natura propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat, unde in unoquoque nascentium, iram Dei atque damnationem meretur. Manet etiam in renatis haec naturae depravatio. Qua fit, ut affectus carnis, Graece *Φρόνημα σαρκός*, (quod alii sapientiam, alii sensum, alii affectum, alii studium carnis interpretantur), legi Dei non subjiciatur. Et quamquam renatis et credentibus nulla propter Christum est condemnatio, peccati tamen in sese rationem habere concupiscentiam, fatetur Apostolus.

ARTICLE X

Of free will

The condition of man after the fall of *Adam* is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God: Wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.

The latter half of the Article comes from an Article of 1553 and is based on S. Augustine. The first half was added in 1563 from the Confession of Würtemberg.

The title appears at first sight unsuitable. The Article does not deal with free-will but asserts the need of grace against Pelagian Anabaptists. But in reality the connexion is very close (v. below).

ARTICLE XV

Of Christ alone without Sin

Christ in the truth of our nature was made like unto us in all things (sin only except), from which he was clearly void, both in his flesh, and in his spirit. He came to be the Lamb without spot, who, by the sacrifice of himself once made, should take away the sins of the world, and sin (as S. *John* saith), was not in him. But all we the rest, (although baptized, and born again in Christ), yet offend in many things; and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

This article dates from 1553. Its exact object is not certain. Probably it was directed against certain Anabaptists who denied our Lord's sinlessness. Others

De libero arbitrio

Ea est hominis post lapsum Adae conditio, ut sese naturalibus suis viribus, et bonis operibus, ad fidem et invocationem Dei convertere ac praeparare non possit. Quare absque gratia Dei (quae per Christum est) nos praeveniente, ut velimus, et cooperante, dum volumus, ad pietatis opera facienda, quae Deo grata sunt et accepta, nihil valemus.

De Christo, qui solus est sine peccato

Christus in nostrae naturae veritate, per omnia similis factus est nobis, excepto peccato, a quo prorsus erat immunis, tum in carne, tum in spiritu. Venit ut agnus absque macula esset, qui mundi peccata per immolationem sui semel factam tolleret, et peccatum (ut inquit *Johannes*) in eo non erat: sed nos reliqui etiam baptizati, et in Christo regenerati, in multis tamen offendimus omnes. Et si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est.

have held that it was aimed at the belief in the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin. This is unlikely. The belief was not yet *de fide* in the Roman Church. The Articles usually are perfectly straightforward in their attack on views that they do not accept. A much shorter and more definite Article would have sufficed. Further, the Blessed Virgin was never 'baptized and born again in Christ'. Hence the former view is preferable.

ARTICLE XVI

Of Sin after Baptism

Not every deadly sin willingly committed after Baptism is sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable. Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after Baptism. After we have received the Holy Ghost, we may depart from grace given and fall into sin, and by the grace of God we may arise again, and amend our lives. And therefore they are to be condemned which say, they can no more sin as long as they live here, or deny the place of forgiveness to such as truly repent.

This Article dates from 1553 with slight changes. The present title is the third. It is aimed at Anabaptist errors.

§ 1. *The true nature of man*

It is characteristic of the age in which our Articles were written that they hasten at once to speak of 'the fault and corruption' of man's nature. '*Man is very far gone from original righteousness,*' i.e. as the Article of 1553 stated, 'his former righteousness which he had at his creation.' But we cannot understand man's present condition unless we know something of man as he is in himself. What is meant by that 'original righteousness' which man has lost? What is man's true nature and what is his relation to God?

(a) The phrase in the Article is an allusion to the picture of man's life given in the opening chapters of Genesis. The compilers of our Articles, no doubt, like all other men of their day, regarded these chapters as literal history, and Adam and Eve as historical persons. Such a view to-day is impossible, but the religious value of these chapters has been increased rather than diminished by modern knowledge. The Jews inherited from their ancestors a stock of common Semitic traditions about the origin of the world and of mankind. As

these were handed down from generation to generation, they were taken up by the prophets and under the guidance of God purged of their grosser elements and transformed into a vehicle of moral and spiritual truth. In their present form these chapters come not at the beginning but rather towards the close of God's revelation to Israel. They are, as it were, the summing up of those great truths about the nature and purpose of human life that God had been teaching the people by His prophets through the centuries. Israel had risen to a higher conception of human nature than that attained by any other pre-Christian religion. God had given to the prophets a unique insight into the meaning of man's relation to God, and into the true goal and purpose of our earthly life. In Genesis we find these truths that God had revealed set forth in an ideal picture of man living as God made and meant him to be.

Scripture, like science, represents man as the 'roof and crown' of God's creation (Gen 1²⁶, 9¹⁻⁷, Ps 8, etc.). He is the link between nature and God, God's vicegerent in the world. On the one hand he possesses a body akin to that of the beasts and made, like theirs, of the dust of the earth (Gen 2⁷ and 1⁹, etc.). Modern science tells us that our bodies are the product of long ages of evolution and are derived by physical descent from animal life. They are not one bit the less either human bodies or the creation of God because they have come to be what they are as the climax of a long process and not as the immediate result of the creative word of God. On the other hand, man is created 'in the image of God' (Gen 1²⁷) by a special in-breathing of divine spirit (2⁷). No words could bring out more clearly the dignity and possibilities of human nature made 'but little lower than God' (Ps 8⁵, R.V.).¹ It is in virtue of this 'image of God' in him that man is able to know and love God. Like can only know like. More particularly this image of God includes the possession of reason and will. Man is able to do what the animals cannot do, understand and co-operate with the divine purposes.² Further man was made for social life and development. All these elements of human life have their place in the picture of the Garden of Eden. Man is depicted as God meant him to be, at peace with himself, his neighbour, the world and God. By congenial employment in active fellowship with God his faculties are trained and developed. Did such a state of things ever exist in actual fact on this earth? We do not know. We may regard these chapters either as containing an allegorical account of human life as it once actually was, or as an

¹ The superiority of man to the animals is shown in Gen 2¹⁸⁻²⁰. Not one of the animals is found able to share Adam's life and be a 'help meet' for him. Cp. also 1²⁶ ff.

² The possession of reason and will is implied by the imposition of a definite command and prohibition (2¹⁶⁻¹⁷). No animal is treated in this way. Further, Adam learns to exercise his reason as infants to-day begin to exercise theirs by distinguishing things and giving them names (2¹⁹). The social nature of man is shown in vv. 1²⁻²⁴. The family was to be the school of love, in which man was to learn to develop his social nature. It has often been pointed out that in Scripture man begins in a garden and ends in a city.

allegorical description of man's life as God meant it to be, though His purpose was never historically realized.^{1†}

(b) But for the Christian the supreme revelation of the divine purpose for man is to be found in Jesus Christ. As Man He exhibited in their completeness all those powers that Adam is represented as exhibiting in some small and preparatory degree. He lived in unbroken fellowship with God. He displayed a perfect sympathy with the divine will and a perfect obedience. He lived His human life as Son of God because man was created to live as son of God. His human faculties were developed by the discipline of the home. He displayed an unflinching love to all men. Since man is made in the image of God, and God is love, man must be love too. In His teaching He interpreted human life from within. He knew what was in man, because He knew what was in Himself. His perfect humanity held no secrets from Him. The full meaning of 'original righteousness' may be studied in Jesus Christ. He alone fulfilled the destiny intended for man on this earth. Further He recognized in every human being the capacity for this same life. Alike in His teaching and in His behaviour He asserted the value of every human soul, just because it was human (cp. Mt 6²⁶, 12¹²). Christ came to bring light and salvation because man was made for light and salvation. Because man was created in the image of God, he was called to live up to his position. Finally, by His resurrection and ascension Christ became the first-fruits of a redeemed humanity and revealed man's nature as destined for eternal life with God.

(c) This Scripture doctrine of 'original righteousness' rules out as un-Christian many widespread views of man's nature. It insists that every part of it is 'very good'. There is no necessary conflict between the lower and higher elements. We can glorify God in our bodies no less than in our spirits (1 Cor 6²⁰, cp. Rom 12¹). Even our highest activities are conditioned by bodily functions. Every natural desire has a purpose to fulfil. Man has been endowed with reason by which to guide his desires and with will by which to control them. A holy life is not a life in which the body is neglected or ignored. It is rather one in which all the powers of the body are subordinated to a single purpose, the will of God. Our Lord's example shows us a human body fulfilling its true function as the organ of a life consecrated to God. Accordingly, the man who indulges any passion is not being 'manly' in the true sense.² True manliness consists in subduing all

¹ Whether or not the corrupted state of human nature was preceded in temporal sequence by an incorrupt state, this is the most vivid and natural way of exhibiting the truth that in God's primary purpose man was incorrupt, so that evil in him should be regarded as having a secondary or adventitious character. Ideal antecedence is, as it were, pictured in temporal antecedence.—Hort, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 329.

² It is specially necessary to insist that sins of the flesh are not 'natural' to man. They are a violation of his true nature. Impurity, for instance, is in the strict sense of the term 'abnormal', not because it is uncommon but because it destroys the balance of man's constitution. It violates the law of his being. It is also anti-social.

desires to the will. Christian asceticism aims not at annihilating such desires but at reducing them to order (1 Cor 9th). The true Christian is not the man who has learnt to desire nothing, but the man who has learnt to desire the right things. We must regard our bodies neither as evil nor as negligible. Our Lord never belittled the dignity of the body or despised its needs. A large part of His ministry was taken up in healing it.

§ 2. While the study of man's nature in the light of Scripture discloses such magnificent possibilities, his actual condition is very different. He is at peace neither with God nor with the world, nor with his neighbour, nor with himself. This disordered state of his nature is what is meant by *original sin*. Before we can discuss the meaning of such a phrase or the account of it given in the Article, we must understand the meaning of the word 'sin'.

(a) No term is more frequently misused than 'sin'. The essential nature of sin depends upon our relation to God. An act that is morally wrong, if viewed as committed against the laws of the state, is a crime: viewed as an offence against our neighbour, it is an injustice or an injury: viewed as offence against our own well-being, it is an act of folly or a piece of damage. Only as committed against God is it a sin. To an atheist the word sin has no meaning whatever. Since the state has divine authority a crime is almost always a sin. Since we are commanded to love our neighbour, to injure him is to disobey God's command. Since God's law for us is not in any sense arbitrary, but expresses at once His will and the condition of our own highest welfare, an act committed against our own self is a sin. But in every case sin involves a reference to God. We may define sin as 'personal hostility to the will of God'. It is setting our will against His: actively disobeying His command or refusing Him the love and submission that we owe. 'Sin is lawlessness' (1 Jn 3rd). The effect in ourselves is a dislocation of our inner life, a destruction of the balance and unity of our nature. Sin issues in a divided self. In relation to our fellow men sin is selfishness. The law of God represents the common welfare of all men. Disobedience results from the desire for some personal or private gain. By setting aside God's will we impair not only our own soundness but the soundness of the society in which we live. So, then, sin is primarily disobedience to the known will of God, either by doing what we ought not to do or leaving undone what we ought to do. It is often pictured as a disease, or a burden, or a stain, or again as an enemy attacking us. All these metaphors express a truth, but they are far too external. Sin is a condition of our own wills and so of our inmost selves. The definite acts of sin that we commit are evidence of and spring out of this inward disposition, a heart turned away from God and a will divided and impaired.

(b) How did sin originate? To-day we should confess that we find

no ultimate answer to this question in Scripture. Scripture represents moral evil as not originated by man or confined to him. The compilers of our Articles no doubt regarded Gen 3 as a historical account of the commission of the first sin. This has coloured the language employed, '*The condition of man after the fall of Adam . . .*' (Art. X). They regarded all men as literally the *offspring of Adam*. To-day such a view is impossible. In this, as in the preceding chapters, we have an old myth that has passed through the hands of the Hebrew prophets and been transfigured so as to teach in the form of a story the meaning of sin. It gives us not a historical account of the origin of sin but an inspired analysis of its meaning. Its value lies not in its historical but its spiritual accuracy. Through their own experience and the experience of the nation, the prophets had been led to see that sin is essentially disobedience to God. This is wonderfully brought out in the picture of the taking of the forbidden fruit.¹ Though no certain reference to this chapter occurs in the rest of the O.T. this same conception of sin is implied throughout. The story awakens an echo in our own experience. All we can say is that whatever the first sin was, in order to be sin at all, it must have involved, first a knowledge of a higher law binding on the will, and then the conscious choice of a lower course, by one who knew it to be the lower. Our Lord in His teaching accepts and deepens the O.T. doctrine of sin. He assumes sin but never explains its origin. He calls us to deal in a practical manner with the sin in ourselves, by repentance and obedience. It is more important for us to recognize the unsatisfactoriness of our present condition and the remedy for it than to know how it originated. Jesus Christ came to save men from sin and to impart new life. Through the obedience of His Cross He restores that fellowship with God which our disobedience has impaired.

(c) This then is 'actual' sin, personal antagonism to the known will of God. But our Article speaks in the main of '*original sin*'. The phrase is not Scriptural, but was used first by Tertullian. It denotes not an act or habit but a condition of our nature. '*Original sin*' is at bottom the attempt to express the fact that all men fall into sin. 'Original sin is, fundamentally, simply universal sin. This is the fact which is at once the evidence and substance of it. We know that if sin is universal, and if there is no instance of a human being without it, universal sin must receive the same interpretation that any other universal does, namely, that it implies a law in consequence of which it is universal. Nobody supposes that anything takes place universally by chance, accident, or what we call curious coincidence. . . . This consequence applies just as much to the fact of sin in the human

¹ We notice first the recognition of God's command by Eve as binding (v. 2), then the temptation that is allowed to find a response within. The appeal is made to all sides of their nature. The fruit is 'good for food'—the lust of the flesh; 'pleasant to the eye'—the lust of the eyes; 'to be desired to make one wise'—the longing for a richer and fuller experience at all costs.

race if it is universal and this law we call "original sin".¹ Our Article appears definitely to associate this universal tendency to sin with the fall of Adam. '*Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam*' (i.e. does not consist in the universal imitation of Adam's bad example), '*but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness and is of his own nature inclined to evil.*' As we have seen, we no longer believe in the historical existence of Adam, and such phrases sound strange to our ears. But the truth of original sin is not in the least affected by any view that we hold about the historical value of Genesis. The whole religious experience of Israel bore witness to the sinfulness of the human heart, and this fact of universal conviction of sin shaped the story of Genesis. The story did not create the conviction, but the conviction the story. A deeper insight into the holiness of God was always followed by a deeper sense of human unworthiness (Is 6¹⁻⁵, Jer 17⁹, etc.). Many passages in the Old Testament attest the universal sense of alienation from God (Ps 51⁵, 14³, Job 14⁴, etc.). So, too, in the New Testament, our Lord assumes the universal sinfulness of man (Mt 7¹¹). He places in the universal prayer the petition 'Forgive us our trespasses'. He has no message for the 'righteous' (Mk 2¹⁷, etc.). In order to enter the Kingdom of God repentance is always required (e.g. Mt 4¹⁷). Men need not simply to be made better but to be born 'anew' or 'from above' (Jn 3^{1 ff.}). The Cross is the remedy for sin. Our Lord died to give His life as a ransom for those who had forfeited their lives by disobedience (Mk 10⁴⁵, etc.). 'If we say that we have not sinned we make God a liar' (1 Jn 1⁹, cp. 1⁹), because all His dealings with us imply our need of a Saviour from sin. The apostolic call for repentance receives its universal authority from the fact that 'Christ died for our sins'. It is true that S. Paul twice connects our sin with the fall of Adam (Rom 5¹²⁻¹⁵, 1 Cor 15²²) following contemporary Jewish teaching. But the theory did not create the facts: the facts demanded a theory. S. Paul saw everywhere in the world of his day, among Jew and Gentile alike, the ravages of the sin that he knew in his own heart. The teaching that 'all have sinned' (Rom 3²³) was not due to a too literal interpretation of a Jewish allegory. It was the result of his own observation, sharpened by the knowledge that God had set forth Christ crucified as the universal remedy for sin.²

(d) Again, just because Jesus Christ is the revelation to us of what man was made to be, so He is also the final argument for the unnaturalness of our present condition. He convicts of sin those who come to Him. By placing their lives side by side with His, they realize the gulf between what they are and what they were meant to be. The

¹ Mozley, *Lectures and Theological Papers*, p. 136. The whole paper deserves most careful attention.

² See Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, p. 136 ff.

victorious sacrifice of the Cross and the Resurrection is the judgment as well as the salvation of the world. '*Christ in the truth of our nature was made like unto us in all things (sin only except) from which He was clearly void both in His flesh and in His spirit. He came to be the Lamb without spot, who by the sacrifice of Himself once made should take away the sins of the world; and sin (as S. John saith) was not in Him*' (1 Jn 3⁸). This is the unanimous teaching of Scripture (Heb 4¹⁵, 7²⁶⁻²⁷, 9¹⁴, 1 Pet 2²², 2 Cor 5²¹).¹ The strongest argument is not the assertions of N.T. writers nor even isolated texts from the Gospels (e.g. Which of you convicteth me of sin? Jn 8⁴⁶, cp. 14³⁰), but the whole impression that He made on others, the claims that He made publicly for Himself and the glimpses that we are allowed to catch of His inner consciousness. He preserved an unbroken union with the Father (Jn 10³⁰). As a rule it is the holiest men and those living most closely to God who are most conscious of their sinfulness and most deeply penitent. He taught others to pray for forgiveness, but never did so Himself. Even on the Cross, when His whole life seemed ending in failure, He utters no prayer for pardon. He perceived that forgiveness was needed for His murderers, not for Himself. Two passages have been quoted on the other side. (i) 'Why callest thou me good? None is good save one, even God' (Mk 10¹⁷). Our Lord's apparent refusal of the title 'good' seems at first sight to imply a consciousness of sin. But in the Greek the emphatic word is not 'me' but 'good'. He was rebuking an emotional young man who was using extravagant language without thinking what it really meant, and had no true appreciation of the meaning of goodness. (ii) The cry from the Cross 'My God, why hast thou forsaken me?' (Mk 15³⁴). Here the Greek would more accurately be translated 'Why didst thou leave me?' It was no random cry, but a definite quotation from a particular psalm. It must be interpreted in the light of its context. This psalm is the only one of its class that contains no personal confession of sin and it ends in a song of triumph. The words imply unbroken trust in God and are an appeal that His help is long delayed. They are evidence of our Lord's unbroken faith, preserved even amid great darkness of soul. The Resurrection was the divine affirmation that He had made the complete and acceptable sacrifice of the 'Lamb without spot'.

(e) Our Article goes on to describe '*original sin*' as '*the fault and corruption of the nature of every man*'. It explains the fact that all men sin by laying down that all men inherit a common human nature that is corrupt inasmuch as it possesses a positive downward tendency to evil. This statement can only be understood in the light of previous theological discussion. No attempt was made to give any

¹ In Rom 8⁴ He is said to have come in the likeness of sinful flesh. 'The flesh of Christ is "like" ours inasmuch as it is flesh "like" and only "like" because it is not sinful.—S. and H. *ad loc.*

formal account of original sin until the time of Augustine. The first traces of any controversy on the subject are to be found in the different views taken as to the origin of the human soul. The Eastern Fathers and Jerome and Hilary in the West taught that each soul was created out of nothing by God and joined to a body derived from its parents. This is known as 'Creationism'. It seems to reduce the 'solidarity' of the human race to a merely physical fact. Original sin on this view would lie in the body. The Western Fathers and Gregory of Nyssa in the East taught that the human soul was derived from its parents. Thus the first man contained within him all mankind. On this view a transmission of a tendency to sin is intelligible. The 'vitium originis'—to use Tertullian's phrase—necessarily affects all who are born of the common stock.¹ We may fairly hold that both views express a real truth. In some sense every human being is created by God. Each human life is His gift, none the less His because mediated by human action. Every man can say 'God made me'. On the other hand, no human life is an isolated unit: it would not be human if it were. And that common humanity which we share with others includes far more than merely physical attributes. It includes those moral, intellectual and spiritual capacities that distinguish man from the beasts, and can only be developed in society.

Again, the early Fathers, Eastern and Western alike, took a hopeful view of human nature.² They laid no very great stress upon the 'Fall' and its consequences. They had no very clear or unanimous teaching about the origin of sin. So far as they dealt with the results of the 'Fall', they held that man lost then a supernatural bias towards righteousness, comparable to the bias towards righteousness that follows from a good character. Man was left weak but fundamentally sound. Thus 'original sin' would be a loss of higher goodness, a 'privatio naturae'. But with S. Augustine a darker view of the results of the 'Fall' won considerable though by no means universal acceptance in the West. Augustine regarded man's original bias towards righteousness as natural. Hence Adam fell below the level of his true nature and corrupted his entire posterity. We inherit a nature that is not indeed entirely corrupt but yet has a positive inclination towards evil. The result is more than a mere 'privatio naturae': it is 'depravatio naturae'. This teaching of S. Augustine was partly drawn out in conflict with Pelagius. Pelagius denied any corruption of human nature at all. He held that Adam's sin injured no one but himself. As we should expect, he was a creationist. The widespread existence of sin he attributed, as our Article says, to the following of Adam's bad example. He was prepared to allow that some men even before the coming of Christ had lived free from sin. Thus the existence of

¹ Origen explained original sin by the theory of pre-existence. Men are really fallen spirits who fell in another world. This view won little acceptance in the Church and lies outside the main stream of Christian thought. It is maintained by theosophists.

² See N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, Lect. iv.

'original sin', so far as he allowed that it existed at all, was due to purely external causes, bad environment, bad example and education and the like.

At the Reformation these questions were again debated with great vigour. Hence our present Article. Mediaeval teaching on the whole had taken a moderate view of the effects of the 'Fall'. The Council of Trent was content to speak of 'the loss of holiness and righteousness'. On the other hand, Calvinists and many Lutherans pushed the teaching of S. Augustine so far as to assert the total corruption of human nature. Our Article adopts a mediating position. On the one side it clearly takes a gloomier view of man's present position than the Council of Trent. It follows S. Augustine so far as to speak of '*the fault and corruption (depravatio) of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil.*' It definitely repudiates the Pelagian idea that the 'Fall' had no effect on man at all. On the other side it carefully avoids the Calvinistic extravagance of saying 'Tota depravatio'. This would be obviously untrue. If man were wholly corrupt he could not be aware of his corruption. There would be no moral struggle within, no discontent with self or desire for better things. The spirit would not lust against the flesh, as S. Paul tells us that it does (Gal 5¹⁷).¹ Nothing has done more to create a prejudice against the doctrine of original sin, than the idea that it means the total badness of human nature.²

How can we regard the teaching of the Article to-day? In the light of modern knowledge much of the old language seems unreal. We begin by pointing out that 'original sin' is not altogether a happy phrase. If sin means a will hostile to God, sin in the strict sense can only be predicted of a person and not of a nature. No part of our nature, no faculty that we possess can in itself be 'sinful'. It only becomes sinful when we exercise it unlawfully. No created thing in God's universe is evil in itself. It only becomes evil when it is misused by a being who has free-will. We must avoid any mental picture of original sin that would represent it as an evil substance transmitted by inheritance in the same way as physical peculiarities are transmitted. Hence the statement of our Article that original sin '*deserves God's wrath and damnation*' is open to serious criticism. Neither charity nor common-sense allow us to suppose that an infant who cannot choose between good and evil is personally exposed to the wrath of God because it will commit actual sin when it grows up. The words of the Article are only true if we look at the matter in an

¹ So, too, our Lord appeals to the natural affection of parents for children and the like. He rouses men to use their natural powers of reason and will. Cp. also Rom 2¹⁴⁻¹⁵.

² For a discussion between two modern theologians in the Calvinistic tradition of the question, how far the *imago Dei* remains in fallen man, see E. Brunner and K. Barth, *Natural Theology*, esp. pp. 22 and 40. Cp. also D. Cairns, *The Image of God and Quick*, *The Gospel of the New World*, pp. 34 ff. (a brief and illuminating discussion).

entirely abstract way.¹ No doubt S. Paul calls us 'children' (*i.e.* simply 'objects') 'of wrath'² (Eph 2³), because apart from Christ we cannot live up to the standard of a holy God. But Scripture adds what the Article does not, that 'original sin' is an appeal not only to God's wrath but to God's pity (*e.g.* Lk 19¹⁰). The mind of God is to be seen in Christ, who hated sin and loved the sinner. The Article does, indeed, say that it is the 'nature' rather than the person that deserves God's wrath. But a nature apart from a person is a mere abstraction.

On the other hand if we reject illustrations drawn from heredity in the physical world as misleading, the great fact of the solidarity of human nature still remains. The unity of the race is moral and spiritual, not only physical. Mankind is one in sin.³ Moreover, though we cannot inherit 'sin', experience shows that we do inherit dispositions and tendencies that easily become sin. Children resemble their parents in certain tastes and characteristics which we label good and bad in themselves, apart from the actions in which they may or may not issue. Further, in the moral and spiritual life it is by no means easy to draw a hard and fast line between heredity and environment and to say when the influence of one begins and the other ends. In any case human nature does not come to us ready-made. It begins as a bundle of possibilities that need the life of the community for their development. A purely individual human life is an impossibility. If 'original sin' seems unfair, we need to remember that the good tendencies and good dispositions of our nature come down to us by inheritance as well as its deficiencies. The unity of race that conditions original sin, conditions also salvation through Christ.⁴

¹ The best defence is that given by Dean Church, *Life and Letters*, pp. 294-295. 'The fact of what is meant by original sin is as mysterious and inexplicable as the origin of evil, but it is obviously as much a fact. There is a fault and vice in the race, which, given time, as surely develops into actual sin as our physical constitution, given at birth, does into sickness and physical death. It is of this inherited sin, looked upon in the abstract and without reference to concrete cases, that I suppose the Article speaks. How can we suppose that such a nature looks in God's eyes according to the standard of perfect righteousness which we also suppose to be God's standard and law? Does it satisfy that standard? Can He look with neutrality on its divergence from His perfect standard? What He may do to cure it, to pardon it, to make allowances for it in known or unknown ways, is another matter about which His known attributes of mercy alone may reassure us; but the question is, How does He look upon this fact of our nature in itself, that without exception it has this strong efficacious germ of evil within it, of which He sees all the possibilities and all the consequences? Can He look on it even in germ with complacency or indifference? Must He not judge it and condemn it as in itself, because evil, deserving condemnation?'

² Armitage Robinson, *Ephesians*, pp. 49-50. The phrase contains no idea of inheriting God's wrath, and 'children' has nothing to do with infancy.

³ In all its forms Pelagianism is hopelessly individualistic. It is contradicted to-day by our sense of corporate and national sin, as a spiritual force hostile to God, lying behind the sins of individuals, yet in some sense independent of them.

⁴ It is a question whether S. Paul in Rom 5¹²⁻²¹ asserts the transmission of a sinful nature from Adam. The view taken of the sin of Adam is not so much that thereby human nature was infected in itself but rather that thereby sin, an alien power, got a

But we have hardly yet got to the bottom of the problem. The difference between sin and righteousness is in the last resort one of personal relationship to God. As we saw, man cannot live his true life apart from that union with God for which he was made. We cannot draw hard and fast distinctions between the natural and supernatural elements in man's nature, simply because man's essential nature is to live in fellowship with God. By sin that fellowship has been impaired. Hence man's whole constitution has become disordered. Apart from God the heart becomes cold, the will enfeebled, the mind darkened. The result is that selfish desires lack control and the body tends to become master rather than servant. We are unable to resist evil suggestions from without. This would seem to be the root of original sin. We are born into a condition of life in which our full union with God is broken. To use the old language, original sin begins with a 'privatio', a cutting-off of the needed light and strength, and inevitably ends in a 'depravatio', a positive alienation of mind and heart from God.¹ For this condition we are not personally responsible. Original sin in itself does not involve personal accountability. We believe in original sin, not original guilt.² As we have seen, it appeals to God's pity. It only becomes actual sin when of our own will we yield to temptation and choose the wrong.

The latter part of the Article deals with a question that arose out of the discussion about the results of the 'Fall'. Experience shows that sinful desires remain even in the Christian after Baptism. How far are these 'true and proper' sin? The Calvinists naturally said that concupiscence was sin. The Council of Trent said that it was not 'truly and properly sin but . . . is of sin and inclines to sin'. Our Article is purposely vague. The allusion seems to be to James 1¹⁴⁻¹⁵. But the Apostle is clearly S. Paul. The most probable reference is to 'Rom 7¹⁷' as expounded by S. Augustine.³

(f) The question still remains: 'Is this view of sin consistent with the assured results of modern science?' 'Has it not been shown that man has risen, not fallen?' It has been argued that so-called 'original sin' is no sign of any estrangement from God or any corruption of our

footing in the world, and, involving all men in actual sin, brought death upon all. This is very far short of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, which appears to be a development of 2 Es 3¹¹, 4¹⁹, rather than of anything to be found in N.T. The language of S. Paul ("sin came into the world," Rom 5¹²), leaves room for the communication of a sinful tendency, not only by heredity in the strict sense of the word, but also by all that interpenetration of the individuals by the race which makes it impossible to regard them as isolated atoms dependent only on birth for their characteristics.' E. R. Bernard, art. 'Sin', *H.D.B.* iv. pp. 534b-535a.

¹ Cp. the insistence of Aquinas (*S. Theol.* II, I, cix.) that man is not only *spoliatus gratuitis*, but also *vulneratus in naturalibus*.

² For the meaning which may be attached to 'original guilt' see *Doctrine in the Church of England*, p. 63.

³ Kidd, *Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 127.

nature. Rather it is a necessary product of man's upward development. It is the survival in us of passions and desires derived from our animal ancestry. It is the 'ape and tiger' within us. Our consciousness of a divided self is only due to the fact that these animal instincts, once useful and necessary at an earlier stage for the preservation of life, are in process of being moralized. If there has been 'a fall' at all, it has been a 'fall upwards'. That is to say there came a time when man first exchanged the life of merely animal contentment and harmony for the life of moral struggle and effort. He began to be aware, however dimly, of the distinction between a higher and a lower course of action. He learnt to contrast his gross animal habits with the idea of what he ought to be and might become. This new-born dissatisfaction with his former self was proof not of a fall but of an advance. It marked the 'passage from a brute life unconscious of moral distinctions to the spiritual consciousness of right and wrong'. There are as many 'falls' as 'souls'. It has been asserted: 'Man never possessed the original harmony of his whole being such as the doctrine of an unfallen state requires. . . . Sin is derived solely from the individual will and cannot be inborn; and the discord between flesh and spirit, lower nature and higher, animal propensity and rational morality, is no sign of a bias to evil but the inevitable outcome of man's development.'¹

Others, from a slightly different standpoint, would argue that sin is a necessary phase in the evolution of mankind, which is being outgrown. No doubt we must admit that many sins are voluntary and deserve blame. But sin is primarily a mistake. The sinner is really seeking for God, but he is seeking for God in the wrong way. Sin is only a temporary error. Man finds out his mistake by the unsatisfactory consequences that follow his action. He learns to condemn himself. His higher self passes judgment on his lower self. He turns again to the right road having learnt the lesson. The 'relics of our brute ancestry' in us, that is to say, the tendency to seek our own selfish ends instead of the common good are being gradually purged away as civilization and culture advance. 'Slowly, very slowly, the race is climbing the steep ascent.' Ultimately in every member of the human race the ideal life will be attained. Some such view of sin not formulated or put into words is exceedingly common to-day. It may be stated in forms that, as far as they go, are perfectly Christian. But the question is whether it accounts for all the facts of the moral life as we observe it in our own hearts or in the history of the world.

(i) We may doubt whether the results of physical science throw any real light upon the problem of sin. We have to deal with man as he now is, not with man as he once was. We may recognize the continuity of all life on this earth of ours, but the fact still remains that

¹ Tennant, *Original Sin*, p. 31. For a full statement of this view see his larger book, *Origin and Propagation of Sin*.

man is no longer an animal. We cannot interpret human life in terms of animal life. That would be to interpret the higher by the lower. All sound philosophy allows that a thing's nature must be estimated not by what it once was but by what it by becoming has become. An oak must be studied as an oak and not as an acorn. We can speak of a baby as a little man but not of a man as a big baby. At whatever stage distinctively human life first appeared, just because it was human life and no longer animal, new factors that were absent in animal life intervened. Hence statements and conclusions that were valid on the lower level are no longer valid on the higher. Take the case of the individual man. As an infant he has no moral life: he is not morally responsible for his behaviour. Yet when he comes to manhood he has become a rational and moral being. We may not be able to put our finger on a definite moment of time and say that then moral life begins. But the change has taken place. The man is no longer an infant. His adult life cannot be explained or expressed in terms of infant life. No knowledge, however exact, of infant life, can be applied to adult life, because the new factors of reason and conscience have now intervened. So in the development of the human race, we cannot draw a hard and fast line as to where human life first began. It is enough to know that man has become a moral being. The conclusions of physical science are absolutely valid within the sphere of facts that physical science studies. But when we get to the moral life, new influences and powers appear, with which from its abstract character physical science can have nothing to do. In this higher region its conclusions no longer possess unconditional validity. Sin belongs to this higher region. Physical science may explain whence we derive our animal desires and passions, but it can do no more. Its authority stops short just where the real problem of sin begins.

(ii) Sin in its true sense was not possible until man had reached the level of moral and rational life, however undeveloped he still was. Man did not become conscious of sin when he first looked upon his former animal behaviour and marked its unsatisfactoriness in comparison with the new and higher ideal that was dawning upon his consciousness. Rather he first became conscious of sin when he recognized the good and chose the bad instead. We should agree with S. Paul that 'sin is not imputed when there is no law' (Rom 5¹³). The fractiousness and cryings of an infant are not sinful or proofs of a fallen nature as S. Augustine supposed.¹ Science tells us that they are the natural result of evolution. The child is not responsible for them. A child can only commit actual sin when he has become conscious of some law as binding upon him and disregards it. By this time he has ceased to be a subject that can be adequately studied by physical science alone. The problem of original sin is the problem of universal

¹ Cp. Aug. *Confessions*, i. c. 7.

sin. Why is a wrong choice always made? Not, how or why did we get the materials out of which to make it? The difficulty is not that man possesses animal passions and desires that need strict control, but that these are perverted and misused as they are not in the case of animals, and that the will does not control them. Universality of sin cannot be explained by universality of animal inheritance.¹

(iii) The unsatisfactoriness of the attempt to account for sin as a by-product of man's evolution is seen more clearly when we consider those sins which are not sins of his animal nature at all. To say that the drunkard and the profligate are really seeking for God though they are seeking for Him in the wrong place, has a certain air of plausibility. In some sense they are seeking, or at any rate began by seeking, a satisfaction of self in their vices. But when we turn to sins of pride and calculated cruelty, the plausibility disappears. Is it possible to say that, for instance, a solicitor who deliberately schemes to take advantage of a client's ignorance to steal his money, is doing no more than making a mistake in his quest for God? To quote Dean Church again: 'It is important to bear in mind that in speaking of sin and sinners we are apt to take as our type one particular class of sin, the sins of the "publican and the harlot". It is natural that revolting, ruinous and flagrant as they are, they should represent sin to our minds. Yet there are sins more malignant and more difficult to conceive cured. I can conceive of many of those poor creatures whom the world speaks of as lost blindly "seeking after God". It is difficult to me to conceive this of those who with full knowledge and all advantages prey on human happiness in one way or another, the selfish seekers of their own interest and pleasure.' 'Men forget the sins of character, of the Pharisees and of the wicked, wise conspirators against human good and happiness, who are eminently the Bible type of the sinners who have everything to fear.'² If men are honest with themselves they must allow that there have been times when they saw the good and knew it to be the good and wilfully chose the evil. That is no mere survival of animal instinct nor any error of judgment, it is deliberate rebellion against God. Further, if Scripture is right in assigning the highest eminence to such virtues as faith, hope, charity, humility, meekness, purity of heart and the like, it follows that the contrary vices to these are the most grave, that is, those vices such as pride which have the least intimate connexion with our animal nature at all. We need to keep holy not only our bodies but our spirits. Spiritual sins are as real as and more deadly than bodily sins.

(iv) To say that man has risen, not fallen, involves serious con-

¹ It is significant that in his last book, *The Concept of Sin*, Dr Tennant was driven to what is essentially the Pelagian position, namely, the denial of the universality of sin (p. 268). His view of sin is far too individualistic.

² *Life*, p. 317.

fusion of thought. No doubt man has made immense advances in material prosperity, and in knowledge and culture. But such progress is not moral and spiritual progress. In the picture of God's purpose for man given in the opening chapters of Genesis, Adam is depicted as a naked savage, uncultured and undeveloped, but made for development in dependence upon God. He is further depicted as innocent rather than holy: since holiness can only be attained by the conquest of temptation. He is only making the first steps in the moral life, but as far as he went he was sound. Goodness does not depend upon civilization or knowledge, nor yet upon the possession of any complex moral ideal. It depends rather upon obedience to the will of God, so far as it is known. A child or a savage may be on the road to holiness, by living the life that God means him to live under his present circumstances. A learned and cultured professor may be unholy, simply because he does not live up to the best that he knows. Neither Scripture nor science suggests that primitive man was perfect in the sense of fully developed and possessing great powers of will and intellect. The idea, popular in the eighteenth century, that Adam in virtue of his unbroken communion with God was endowed with all knowledge, is wholly foreign to Scripture. Rather man is represented as undeveloped, but all that he ought to have been at that particular stage of his development. So far his nature was healthy. He was advancing on the right lines. He was beginning to attain holiness by obedience to the commands of God and the deliberate pursuit of good. Man's progress in the mastery of the world and in knowledge of many kinds has not been forwarded but hindered by sin. We need only reflect how to-day man possesses the knowledge and the means to put an end at once to much of the misery and disease and vice of the world. What is lacking is the will to make the effort and to endure the discomfort and trouble that the needful self-sacrifice would involve. Throughout history man's upward progress has been hampered by ineradicable selfishness and sloth. Man has indeed risen but not with that uniform and rapid progress that we should expect. God's providence may overrule men's sins and turn them to a good end. Yet 'there never was an evil action performed but a good one in its place would have led to better results'.¹ Further, man's moral and spiritual progress has lagged behind his advance in material prosperity. Civilization has brought with it new evils and new sorrows.² Every fresh discovery may be used either for the welfare or for the injury of mankind at large. All depends on the moral character of those who use it. Such knowledge in itself is non-moral.³

¹ Dinsmore, *Atonement in Literature and Life*, p. 244.

² Cp. Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, pp. 120-122.

³ In modern warfare we have seen all the resources of science being used for the destruction of human life. Their perversion is due not to any external compulsion, but to the uncontrolled passions within man's own heart. War has only revealed on a large scale man's inability to govern himself.

We do not wish to deny that there has been a real progress in moral ideals outside as well as inside the Jewish and Christian revelations. But there has not been a corresponding increase in the power or the will to live up to them. The sins of to-day may be less brutal and more refined, but they are sins none the less. Our ideals may have become more elaborate, but we have not become more holy. Our union with God is still broken. The human race shows no sign of outgrowing its sin.

(v) The question is often raised, If man's nature was ever perfect in the sense of all that God wished it at that time to be, how did temptation find any response within him? We have already seen that all human existence must from its very nature include the liability to temptation. Further, man was made in the image of God to render to Him a free love and obedience. If then man was not to be a mere conscious machine, he must in some sense be free to refuse that love and obedience. A love that is compulsory is not love at all. Thus the creation of a being endowed with free will, must, as far as we can see, include at least the possibility of the misuse of that will. If holiness can only be attained by the deliberate choice of good and the deliberate rejection of the lower, then the possibility of holiness includes within itself the possibility of something like a 'Fall'. The 'Fall' may well have been a process, rather than a single act. Further, Scripture and the teaching of Christ always suggest that behind the world lies a background of spiritual influences, good and bad alike. Our Lord quite definitely speaks of personal agencies of evil, external to man but able to influence him. Such ideas may not be popular to-day, but it is very doubtful whether we can explain the facts without them. No doubt this does not solve the problem: it only pushes it a stage further back. If we ascribe the first human sin to the suggestion of the Devil there still remains the question 'Who tempted the Devil? Whence did his temptation to sin come in the first instance?' Here again we can only conjecture that the creation of any form of free and finite being, must involve the possibility of an attempt to win a false independence of God. That is probably as far as human reason can go in attempting an intellectual solution of the problem of evil.¹

(vi) Lastly neither experience nor Scripture lend any support to the view that the progress of the human race is inevitable and necessary, or that it is in any degree assured apart from our own moral efforts. History teaches us that nations, like individuals, do not necessarily grow better as they grow older. There is no uniform advance towards perfection. Sin does not only retard progress but brings down and degrades those who commit it. The world is strewn with the wreck of nations that have fallen into decay and dissolution. Christ teaches

¹ Cp. Sanday and Headlam, pp. 145-146; and A. W. Robinson, *God and the World*, p. 63 ff.

most plainly that the loss of present opportunities may involve not a mere temporary postponement of success, but a loss which is irretrievable. He speaks of an 'eternal sin' (Mk 3²⁹), a time when 'the door was shut' (Mt 25¹⁻¹³). He warns men in terrible language borrowed from the Old Testament of the worm that dieth not and the fire that is not quenched (Mk 9⁴³⁻⁴⁶). Present acts of choice carry with them results that endure far beyond this life. We must 'strive', not only 'seek', to enter in by the narrow door (Lk 13²⁴⁻²⁵) and there are few that find it (Mt 7¹³⁻¹⁴). The language may be metaphorical, but it must not, therefore, be explained away. If language has any meaning at all, it shows that salvation is no easy or obvious thing. Again, the New Testament never looks forward to a time when by gradual upward development this present world shall have become perfect. Our Lord can contemplate the possibility that when the Son of Man comes He will not find faith on the earth (Lk 18⁸). Rather His teaching points forward to some sudden and violent catastrophe that shall usher in the new age and abolish sin. The coming of God's Kingdom in all its stages (and first of all in His own earthly ministry) involves a tremendous struggle with powerful forces of evil (the 'kingdom' of Satan) which will cease only at the day of His final *parousia*. That day is known to the Father alone (Mk 13³²). The pictures of an ideal world whose fulfilment Old Testament prophecy located on this earth are in the New Testament transferred to a new heaven and a new earth. The Christianity of the New Testament is *not* a 'Christianity whose optimism is begotten of faith in this world . . . whose courage and hope is maintained by the belief that the schism between the ideal and the actual will eventually be healed through an inherent *vis medicatrix naturae*, that the Kingdom of God is the natural term of a process of moral and social development.'¹ Moral goodness can never be the product of any mere necessity. Spiritual progress can only be won by effort. Such has always been the distinctively Christian belief and it is through such a belief that the victories of Christianity have been won. If men come to believe on any large scale that sooner or later perfection must come automatically, that men by their sins can only delay the full realization of the purpose of God for the world, human nature being what it is, it is safe to predict that men will relax their efforts to do right and reform the world. We can see the havoc wrought in the world by a view of sin other than that of Scripture. Christian teaching has proved its truth by its practical results. Christian leaders of all ages and classes have always insisted that repentance must be the foundation of a Christian life. If sin is something less than disobedience to God, if there is no need to worry about our sins, then repentance is needless and indeed unmeaning. Man needs at most an example or a teacher,

¹ Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, pp. 118-119.

not a Saviour, and historical Christianity has from first to last been based largely on error.†

§ 3. (a) *Grace*¹

'We have no power to do good works; without the grace of God.' In the language of theology grace means the power of God at work in ourselves (cp. Eph 3⁷ 'the gift of that grace of God, which was given to me according to the working of His power' and Eph 3²⁰ 'the power that worketh in us'). The Greek word *χάρις* began by meaning either 'attractiveness' in an object or subjectively 'favour', 'good-will', as, e.g. of a superior towards an inferior. In the New Testament, especially in the Epistles of S. Paul, it acquires the additional meaning of 'unearned favour'. In Eph 2³⁻⁷ God's 'grace' or 'favour' is contrasted with His 'wrath'. It is often used to emphasize the free bounty of God's gifts. In Rom 4⁴, 11⁶, etc., that which is given by God's 'grace' is compared with what we earn by our efforts, that which is a debt or deserved. The word is further extended to mean 'the state of favour' which the Christian enjoys by God's free mercy (Rom 5², 2 Cor 6¹, etc.) and even particular gifts (2 Cor 8⁶⁻⁷, Eph 3⁸, etc.). It is thus in the New Testament well on its way to its later theological meaning of the power of God bestowed on us. Grace is not something apart from God but is God Himself at work in us. The opening words of the Article need explanation: '*The condition of Man after the fall of Adam is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God without the grace of God.*' This might suggest that grace is only necessary because of the 'fall'. No doubt as sinners we need God's grace in a special way. But from the first man was absolutely dependent upon God. As we have seen, the weakness of will that these words lament is due to the separation from God that sin brought. In our whole life, physical and moral and spiritual alike, we are entirely sustained by Him. All the powers that we possess are His.

The Article speaks of grace under two aspects:

(i) We need '*the grace of God by Christ preventing us that we may have a good will*'. This is usually called 'prevenient' grace, i.e. grace that goes before (*praevenire*) or prevents us. We may compare the collect that begins 'Prevent us, O Lord,' i.e. start us. The actual term 'prevenient' comes from S. Augustine and was suggested by the Latin of Ps 59¹⁰, 'Deus meus misericordia eius praeveniet me.' We need the prompting of God even to wish to do right. All holy desires and aspirations are due to the work of the Holy Spirit within our hearts. 'It is God that worketh in us both to will and to work, for His good pleasure' (Phil 2¹³). Our Lord Himself said 'No man can

¹ This section should be read with that on Sanctification, p. 209. 'Sanctifying grace' is a comprehensive term for the redeeming work of God in us through Christ and the Holy Spirit.

come to me, except the Father which sent me, draw him' (Jn 6⁴⁴, cp. Acts 16¹⁴, James 1¹⁷).¹

(ii) We need God's grace '*working with us when we have that good will*'. We pray to God not only to 'prevent us with his gracious favour' but to 'further us with his continual help'. This is usually called 'co-operating grace'. This term again comes from S. Augustine. It is based on such phrases as 'Domino cooperante' in the Latin of Mk 16²⁰. Not only does God's favour show itself by 'putting into our minds good desires' but also by continually helping us to 'bring the same to good effect'. Our need of co-operating grace is shown by such words of our Lord as 'Abide in me', 'Apart from me ye can do nothing'. S. Paul can say 'By the grace of God I am what I am: and his grace which was bestowed upon me was not in vain; but I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me' (1 Cor 15¹⁰, cp. 2 Cor 3⁵⁻⁶, 1 Pet 5¹⁰).²

(b) *Free-will*

God's grace needs to be met by man's free-will. What do we mean when we claim that man's will is free?

(i) The popular idea of free-will is that it means 'I am equally able to do either of two opposite actions. I can equally, e.g. speak the truth or tell a lie. The more undecided that I am the more free I am.' A little consideration shows that this idea is ludicrously false. We are not really free when we are in a state of weakness and indecision. The man who is not quite sure beforehand whether he can resist any given temptation, is not really free. S. Paul describes such a state in Rom 7¹⁵⁻²⁴, 'That which I do I know not: for not what I would that do I practise; but what I hate that I do. But if what I would not that I do, I consent unto the law that it is good. So now it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me but to do that which is good is not. For the good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not that I practise, etc.' (cp. Gal 5¹⁶⁻¹⁷). But S. Paul does not call this state of vacillation and uncertainty 'freedom', he calls it 'the body of this death' (Rom 7²⁴).

(ii) So we can see that our wills are only really free when we can do what we wish. True freedom is to have such mastery over myself that, e.g. I can always speak the truth. Every time that we commit an act, our act helps to form a habit. Our aim is by a constant repetition of acts to form the corresponding habit. We are then really free. We speak indeed of slavery to habits, but we mean by that slavery to bad

¹ Varied and remarkable expression is given to the doctrine of grace in many of the Prayer Book Collects, e.g. Easter II and V, Trinity VII, XII, XVII, XIX and XXV.

² The Article is not directly concerned with the 'good works' of the heathen, but its references to 'faith' and to 'the grace of God by Christ' would naturally suggest that 'good works pleasant and acceptable to God' cannot be produced by non-Christians. This was the view generally taken by S. Augustine on whose writings the Article is based. See Art. XIII.

habits. The power of forming habits, which is the condition of our freedom, may be equally the condition of our bondage to evil. It is obvious that freedom is not to be attained by the acquiring of the power to do any kind of actions but only right actions. We are really free, when we have built up habits of acting in accordance with the will of God which is equally the law of our own nature. We start with a certain indecision of the will—something like freedom in the sense that we discarded—in order that by repeated acts of right choice we may become free in the true sense. 'Our wills are ours we know not how, our wills are ours to make them thine.' The saint is the freest person on earth, not because he can do good and bad equally at will, but because he has fixed his will in harmony with God's will and is realizing the purpose of God for his life. A man is free when he is able to do that in which alone he can find true satisfaction.

(iii) When we speak of ourselves as free, we mean that we are the ultimate and responsible authors of our own conduct. All political and social life rests upon the assumption of this responsibility. Our sense of shame when we are caught doing wrong, our feeling of personal responsibility for our actions, our attempts to influence others for good by argument and appeal to their better selves, our efforts to improve the world, the system of punishment for crimes, all these have no meaning if man is simply part of a great machine. No doubt strong scientific and philosophical arguments can be adduced in support of the position that man is the victim of his environment and that all his actions are really determined by external forces. But the moment that we turn to practical life, by our judgments on others and by our own personal behaviour, we deny the validity of these arguments. Of course our power of choice is limited at any time by many things, our environment, our training, our past actions, bad habits, inherited weakness and the like. Nor is it claimed that we can act without motives of some kind. All that we maintain is that man has the power of selecting and making his own motive and following it and that he is not simply the passive victim of the most violent desire.

(c) *The relation of grace to free-will*

In the true life of man there is union of the grace of God and human free-will. Each is necessary. Without grace the will to do good would lack strength. Without the man's free-will the action would not be the action of the man himself at all. Grace and free-will are not in any sense opposing forces. Rather grace is the source and condition of all true freedom, enabling man to realize his true self. In the actual life of the Christian the grace of God and our own natural powers are so united that we cannot separate in our consciousness what is due to the one from what is due to the other. All that we can say is that all good thoughts, desires or actions involve both. We may go further

and say that 'the very freedom of choice which grace affords can be used for the purpose of rejecting grace'. The grace of God places new possibilities within our reach but it remains with ourselves whether they shall be actualized or not. We possess 'the melancholy power of baffling the divine good-will'. Grace has been compared to true charity, that does for men just what they cannot do for themselves and no more. It does not pauperize us, but challenges us to do our utmost to respond to it. Grace is never given to save us trouble. God does nothing for us that we can do for ourselves. He 'helps those that help themselves'. Grace releases the will from bondage and warms the heart and enlightens the mind, but we must trust to it and use it. We are bidden to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in us (Phil 2¹²⁻¹³). It is I who labour, yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me (1 Cor 15¹⁰). That is the paradox of the Christian life: like our Lord Himself it is both human and divine. As the Article says the grace of God works '*with us*' not instead of us. The position may be summed up in two sayings: 'Qui fecit te sine te, non salvabit te sine te,' 'Man without God cannot, God without man will not.'

According as either side of the truth is exaggerated we get two opposite tendencies of thought. The first dwells so exclusively on the share of God in our salvation, that it practically denies human responsibility altogether. The second exaggerates the human side so as to put our need of God into the background.

(i) The extreme form of the first error is what is known as Calvinism. In the time of Elizabeth Calvinism was almost the dominant creed of the clergy of the English Church. Its doctrines have had an enormous influence on our Articles both in what they say and in what they do not say. Calvin himself did little more than push to its logical extreme one side of the teaching of S. Augustine. S. Augustine, like S. Paul, had experienced a sudden and violent conversion. Hence, inevitably, he was more conscious of the power of God in his own life and laid less stress upon the need of human effort. He felt that God Himself had intervened to save him and had bestowed upon him a salvation that he could never have achieved by his own struggles. God had entered into his life, rescued him from his former sinfulness and filled his heart with a passionate love of God that left no room for any lower desires. It seemed to him that God had done all: he had done nothing. This experience colours all his writings.¹ Calvin, taking hold of this side of his teaching, elaborated it into a formal system. He taught that man in himself is wholly corrupt, possessing no moral freedom. Till God's grace comes, all our desires and acts are inevitably sinful. When God's grace comes its action is irresistible. We do nothing at all, God's grace does the whole work. Why then

¹ See Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, Lect. V. For the problem of grace and freedom in S. Augustine, see K. E. Kirk, *Vision of God*, pp. 335 ff.

are only a few transformed by God's grace? The only possible answer is that God by His own inscrutable and irresistible decree has chosen out from all eternity some men for salvation. This choice is quite independent of any goodness or merit on man's part. Those upon whom God's grace comes, the 'elect', must be saved: they cannot finally fall from grace. The rest are left to their sin and its eternal consequences. As a result of the 'fall' all mankind deserved damnation, but by God's free love 'the elect' are redeemed from this. Christ died not for all mankind but only for the elect.¹

We must not shut our eyes to the merits of Calvin's system. It at least realized the sovereignty of God and the utter dependence of all human excellence upon Him. It emphasized the truth that all good has its source in God. It was logical and offered an explanation of certain problems in life, e.g. why some men are religious even under the greatest difficulties, while others who have every apparent advantage, are not. Further, it gave to the men who felt that they were among the elect an extraordinary strength and confidence. They were convinced that they had behind them all the resources of God, that God's plan for their lives could not be thwarted. They were ready to face death and danger in dauntless confidence, knowing that they were in the hand of God. But these advantages were purchased at a terrible cost. Calvinism forgot and allowed men to forget that God is essentially love rather than power. It treated divine justice as something different from human justice. It led inevitably to fatalism. As we shall see, Scripture never teaches us that grace is irresistible or that we cannot fall from a state of salvation, and it always assumes that God wishes all men to be saved. It has been well said, 'The more grace that a man receives the greater becomes his capacity for doing right. But it is always he who perceives

¹ Compare the Lambeth Articles which the Puritans desired to inflict upon the Church of England:

I. God from eternity has predestined some to life, and some He has reprobated to death.

II. The moving or efficient cause of predestination to life is not the foresight of faith, or of perseverance, or of good works, or of anything which is in the persons predestinated, but it is the sole will of God who is well pleased.

III. The number of the predestinated is predefined and certain, it can be neither increased nor diminished.

IV. Those who are not predestinated to salvation, of necessity will be damned on account of their sins.

V. True, living, and justifying faith, and the sanctifying Spirit of God, is not extinguished, falleth not away, vanisheth not away in the elect, either finally or totally.

VI. A man truly faithful, i.e. endued with justifying faith, is certain with the full assurance of faith, of the remission of his sins, and his eternal salvation through Christ.

VII. Saving grace is not given, is not communicated, is not granted to all men, by which they may be saved if they will.

VIII. No man can come unto Christ unless it shall have been given to him, and unless the Father shall have drawn him. And all men are not drawn by the Father, in order that they may come to the Son.

IX. It is not placed in the will or power of each man to be saved.

and desires what is right. . . . Grace is the perfection of individuality and not its abolition: the source of freedom and not its negation.¹

Further, Calvinism cast a gloom over the whole of human life. All purely human activities, such as literature, art, science and the like, were discouraged as being tainted by the wickedness of man's fallen nature. Being treated as corrupt, they tended to become corrupt. All the innocent gaiety of human life was not only ignored but condemned. Religion was too often identified with dulness. There was no grasp of the truth that the Incarnation has sanctified the whole of human life. Calvinism was the doctrine of the Scotch Presbyterians and English Puritans. After their failure to enforce it on the Church of England many of the latter separated from the Church because it was not Calvinistic. Similar teaching has been maintained by many within our own Church and in the Roman Church. In its completeness it would now be defended by very few, but traces of its teaching still haunt popular theology. What is really Calvinistic teaching has often been confused with Christian teaching. Many who have attacked or separated from Christianity have really attacked or separated from Calvinism. To-day it influences religion mainly by way of reaction. We are tempted to ignore those truths about God that Calvinism distorted and placed in a false isolation.

(ii) At the other extreme stands 'Pelagianism'. Pelagius was an excellent monk, by birth a Briton, who had always lived a decent life and known no great moral crisis. He was offended by the prayer of S. Augustine 'Give me the power to do what thou commandest and then command what thou wilt.' 'Give the power,' he cried: 'Why! you have the power.'² From the best of motives he endeavoured to rouse men to a sense that everything depended on their own moral efforts. He dwelt upon all that God expected from them. But he was led into an extreme and quite indefensible position. He taught that Adam's sin had injured no one but himself. Our will remained unaffected not only by original sin but even by our own past sins. Infants at birth were in the same condition as Adam before his fall. At any time our wills can resist sin. Even before the coming of Christ there had been men who had used their free-will so as to lead sinless lives. So far as he acknowledged grace he identified it with our own human powers and such external forces as the example of Christ and the formal gift of pardon when we had sinned. Universal or almost universal sinfulness was due only to the following of Adam's bad example. Pelagius' view was perfectly logical, but he went upon ideas without considering facts. He relied upon man's bare sense of ability as if it were an infallible footing for the most complete conclusion.³

¹ Chandler, *Spirit of Man*, p. 154.

² *Confessions*, bk. x. c. 29, 31, 37, 'Da quod iubes et iube quod vis'; cp. *de Dono Perseverantiae*, c. 53.

³ Mozley, *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, p. 64.

He never got really down to the root of the question. The difficulty is not simply 'I want to be good and I can't': it is rather 'I know that I ought to do this: I feel that I could do it if I wanted to do it: but then unfortunately I don't want to do it or at least a large part of me does not want to do it.' Pelagianism, however, is very common to-day. It flourishes especially upon its own native soil. The ordinary respectable Englishman is often a Pelagian at heart, though he has never heard of Pelagius. Partly he has very little idea of God's intense holiness and the absolute consecration and self-sacrifice that God requires of him. He confuses the standard of Christ with the standard of decent society. Virtues such as meekness and patience lie entirely outside his vision. He does not even desire to acquire them. Those qualities that he most admires, courage, fair play, truthfulness, he supposes that he can achieve by himself, if he will only make the effort to do so. As soon as a man awakens to a sense of the meaning of holiness as opposed to respectability, he learns his need of God's help and ceases to be a Pelagian.

(iii) Since this is the relation of grace to free-will it follows that a man may fall from a state of grace either through sloth or active disobedience. From quite early days some held that any man who fell into 'deadly sin' after baptism, was guilty of 'sin against the Holy Spirit'. Such sin our Lord pronounced to be unforgivable. They argued therefore that a man who fell into deadly sin not only could not be restored to communion by the Church (*locus paenitentiae*), but also could not expect forgiveness from God (*locus veniae*).¹ This teaching was revived by the Anabaptists and is directly contradicted by our Article.

The distinction between 'venial' and 'deadly' sin rests on I Jn 5¹⁶⁻¹⁷. S. John, while insisting that 'all unrighteousness is sin', speaks of 'a sin unto death'² as contrasted with 'a sin not unto death'. This distinction was already familiar among the Jews. Originally the phrase meant quite literally a sin punishable with physical death, such death being a final exclusion from Israel. Then it came to be used of any offence that morally deserved similar punishment. Hence S. John employs the phrase for sin that excludes a man from fellowship in the Divine society. As thus separated from the Body of Christ, he can no longer be prayed for as a fellow Christian.³ The distinction between 'deadly' and 'venial' sin has a practical value, but we cannot draw a hard and fast line between them. What is venial for one man under certain circumstances, may be mortal for another under other circumstances. Only God can know the full measure of guilt that

¹ Views of this kind were held among others by the Montanists, Novatianists and Donatists. Some held that though the Church could not restore to communion those who had once lapsed, still God might finally grant them His forgiveness. That is, they allowed to them a *locus veniae* but not a *locus paenitentiae*.

² ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον, i.e. a sin, the natural issue of which is death.

³ C. H. Dodd, *The Johannine Epistles*, ad loc.

attaches to any particular act of sin. It is not the outward act by itself but the motive and character lying behind it that count. On the other hand, common sense tells us that in the abstract certain sins are more serious than others.

Our Lord's teaching on 'sin against the Holy Ghost' has been the cause of much misunderstanding. In Mk 3²⁸⁻³⁰, Mt 12³¹⁻³², the Pharisees who deliberately assigned Christ's works of mercy to Beelzebul, are warned of the danger of 'blaspheming against the Holy Spirit'. Those who commit this sin, are 'guilty of an eternal sin' (Mk 3²⁹, R.V.) and never have forgiveness. In Lk 12¹⁰ similar language is used, but the context is entirely different.¹ In their present context the words about blasphemy against the Holy Spirit can only refer to Christians who publicly deny Christ under fear of punishment. In each case the sin is not simply a single act, still less a sin of the tongue, but a state of mind. It would seem to be the wilful refusal to recognize and welcome goodness, when it is seen to be goodness. The assertion that Christ's works of mercy were due to Beelzebul was evidence that the Pharisees were in danger of falling into such a state. So, too, the public repudiation of Christ by Christians would equally be evidence of the beginning of such a state. Unless there is a change of mind the position must become hopeless. If men see and know the good and from hatred or cowardice deliberately call it evil, no more can be done. If such conduct is persisted in, the whole moral nature is warped and the power to discern truth is forfeited. So a character is formed that from its very nature renders forgiveness impossible. If this account of 'sin against the Holy Ghost' is true, it is clear that '*not every deadly sin after baptism*' even approximates to it.

There are, however, certain passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews that were taken, e.g. by Origen, to teach that those who had fallen into deadly sin after baptism could not be restored to communion by the Church. The most important is 6⁴⁻⁶, 'For as touching those who were once enlightened' (i.e. probably baptized, φωτισθέντας) 'and tasted (γευσάμενους) of the heavenly gift and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost and tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age to come, and then fall away (παρὰ-πεσόντας), it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance, the while they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh (ἀνασταυροῦντας) and put him to an open shame (παραδειγματίζοντας)' (R.V. mg.). Here a study of the tenses employed brings out the meaning of the passage. So long as men go on crucifying the Son of God afresh and putting Him to an open shame, in spite of their past baptism and Christian privileges, nothing can be done to renew them again unto repentance. But there is not a word to say that if they forsake their

¹ For a commentary on these passages see C. K. Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*, pp. 103 ff.

sin and turn to God they may not be renewed unto repentance.¹ The same holds good in reference to 10²⁶⁻²⁹. Here also the 'fearful expectation of judgment' applied to those who after knowing the truth and having rejected Christ, go on sinning (*ἀμαρτανόνητων*). Nothing is said of the impossibility of repentance. So, too, in 12¹⁴⁻¹⁷, as the R.V. makes clear, what Esau sought diligently with tears and failed to find is not a 'place of repentance' but the 'blessing'.² These passages, in short, are not an assertion that no forgiveness is possible for post-baptismal sin, but an exhortation not to put off repentance too late. The failure to find pardon depends not on God's unwillingness to grant it, but on the sinner's refusal to comply with the conditions necessary for obtaining it.

Again, it follows from a right understanding of grace that 'After we have received the Holy Ghost we may depart from grace given and by the grace of God we may arise again and amend our lives.' The Calvinists taught that a man who had once received grace, even if he fell away for a time, must in the end arise again and amend his life. This was known technically as a belief in 'indefectible' grace. Such teaching is plainly contrary to Scripture and to experience. S. Paul had beyond dispute received the Holy Ghost, but he never supposed that his position was therefore secure apart from his own moral efforts (cp. 1 Cor 9²⁷, Phil 3¹²). The grace of God may be received in vain (2 Cor 6¹, Gal 5⁴, Heb 12¹⁵) or even resisted (Acts 7⁵¹, Mt 23³⁷). So, too, Saul in the Old Testament certainly received grace, but ultimately fell away (cp. 1 Sam 10⁶⁻⁹ 'God gave him another heart'). Our Lord also taught that the salt may lose its savour (Mt 5¹³) and the good seed begin to grow but be choked (Mk 4¹⁹), and the branch in the vine bear no fruit and be burnt (Jn 15⁶). We may rejoice that the efforts of the Calvinists to change 'may' into 'must' were unsuccessful.†

¹ Cp. Westcott, *ad loc.*, 'The apostasy described is marked, not only by a decisive act but also by a continuous present attitude, a hostile relation to Christ Himself and to belief in Christ; and thus there is no question of the abstract efficacy of the means of grace provided through the ordinances of the Church. The state of the men themselves is such as to preclude their application.'

² For a different interpretation of the passages in Hebrews, see K. E. Kirk, *The Vision of God*, Lect. iii. section v. See also Lect. iii and iv for evidence that in the early centuries certain sins were considered to be irremissible by the Church, *i.e.* to involve life-long penance and exclusion from communion. Even when the rigid discipline applied to these sins was modified in the third century, it remained for a long time the general rule that a second penance was life-long.

ARTICLES XI-XIV AND XVII-XVIII

SALVATION

ARTICLE XI

Of the Justification of Man

We are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by Faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.

De hominis justificatione

Tantum propter meritum Domini ac Servatoris nostri Jesu Christi, per fidem, non propter opera, et merita nostra, justi coram Deo reputamur. Quare sola fide nos justificari doctrina est saluberrima, ac consolationis plenissima, ut in homilia de justificatione hominis fusius explicatur.

In its present form this dates from 1563 and is much fuller than the corresponding Article of 1553. Many of its phrases are borrowed from the Lutheran Confession of Württemberg, others from the earlier Confession of Augsburg. Hence the avoidance of Lutheran exaggerations is remarkable. It avoids saying that a man is justified when he believes himself to be justified. *N.B.* 'by' = 'through' (Latin *per*). There is no 'Homily on Justification'. The real title is a 'Homily of Salvation'.

§ 1. *Justification by faith*

(a) The source of such words is to be found not in any abstract theological attempt to analyse the spiritual life but in the living experience of S. Paul.

(i) He uses such words as 'justified by faith' in order to describe to others the change that had taken place in his own life. As a pious Jew he had striven for years to win peace with God by his own efforts. He had tried to fulfil God's will by a complete obedience to the Jewish Law as the revelation of that will. Outwardly he had succeeded. He can write 'if any other man thinketh to have confidence in the flesh, I yet more . . . a Hebrew of the Hebrews; as touching the law a Pharisee . . . as touching the righteousness which is in the law, found blameless' (Phil 3⁴⁻⁶, cp. Gal 1¹⁴). But he did not find peace. The more earnestly that he strove to earn God's favour, the more conscious he became of his inability to satisfy the demands of an all-holy God. A perfect obedience to the law of God required absolute holiness not only in outward act but in inward motive and thought. The law could not help him to attain but could only convict him of not having attained it (cp. Rom 7⁷⁻⁸). God seemed to him to

stand over him as a taskmaster or judge, whose just demands he could never satisfy. He felt himself always condemned as coming short of God's standard. Just because he was honest with himself and unwilling to be content with a low standard, he felt that through the law God was bringing home to him the fact of his sinfulness (Rom 5²⁰, Gal 3¹⁰). However hard he tried, his best endeavours fell short of what God commanded (Rom 3¹⁹⁻²⁰, 4¹⁵, 7⁹ ff.).¹ After his conversion an utter change came over his life. Through his surrender to Jesus Christ and his acceptance of His free offer of salvation, he found peace with God. 'There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus' (Rom 8¹) was an echo of his own experience. He felt himself no longer condemned by God but 'justified' or acquitted. He no longer strove to earn or deserve his own salvation by 'works of the law', but accepted it as a free gift of God's grace won by Jesus Christ and offered freely to all who would commit themselves to Him (Rom 5¹⁻¹¹, 8¹⁻¹⁷, Gal 2¹⁶). He knew himself to be no longer a slave toiling at the impossible task of attaining a perfect holiness, but a son of God (Gal 4^{28-5¹}). His acceptance rested not on his own efforts but on the work of Christ. His religion was based not on what he had done and was to do for God, but on what God in Christ had done for him. There was no waiting. God accepted him just as he was: he had closed with God's offer of forgiveness. His pardon was not made conditional on future improvement. His acceptance was free and immediate and complete. Henceforth it was his duty to live up to the position that had been bestowed upon him.

The best illustration of the experience that S. Paul wishes to express is the parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15¹¹ ff.). The Son is not only received back but freely forgiven and treated with all honour. He is not placed in any ambiguous position until it is seen whether his repentance is genuine and lasting. The Father assumes that it is both, because that is the best means of ensuring that in actual fact it will be both. What matters is the change of attitude on the part of the son: his willingness to return, to trust himself to his father's mercy and to close with his offer. He is restored to the position of son and called to live up to that position. He has not to earn it, but the restoration is the free act of his father's love. In S. Paul's language the son is 'justified', *i.e.* forgiven and accepted, acquitted and treated as righteous.

(ii) We may now turn to examine the actual language used by S. Paul. In the opening words of the Article it is assumed that to 'justify' (*δικαιῶν*) means to account righteous. It is properly a legal or 'forensic' term, to 'acquit' and in itself says nothing about the actual state of the person acquitted. He is 'treated as righteous' whether in point of fact he is righteous or not.

¹ It is possible that S. Paul became clearly conscious of his true spiritual state under the Law only after he had accepted the Gospel.

(a) In the LXX *δικαιῶν* is used to translate a Hebrew word which means 'to do justice for a person', 'to treat him with justice' (*e.g.* 2 Sam 15⁴), and so, on the assumption that he is in the right, to 'acquit', *e.g.* in Exod 23⁷ God says 'I will not justify', *i.e.* acquit, 'the wicked'. In Is 5²³ the prophet reproves those 'which justify the wicked for a reward', *i.e.* receive bribes to acquit the guilty. It is also used in a wider meaning of showing or proving righteous. In Jer 3¹¹ 'Israel has shown herself more righteous' than Judah (*cp.* Ezek 16⁵¹⁻⁵²).

(β) So, too, in the New Testament the word is used with the same meaning, *e.g.* in Mt 11¹⁹ and Lk 7³⁵ 'Wisdom is justified of her children' or 'her works' = wisdom is vindicated or proved to be righteous by them. In Mt 12³⁷ 'By thy words thou shalt be justified' is opposed to 'By thy words thou shalt be condemned'. In Lk 10²⁹ the lawyer wished to 'justify' himself, *i.e.* to vindicate his position. In Lk 18¹⁴ the word is used almost in a Pauline sense. The publican goes home 'justified', *i.e.* forgiven by God and accepted.

(γ) The word is most common in S. Paul, being used, as we have seen, to express his own inner feeling of acceptance with God as contrasted with his former feeling of condemnation. In his Epistles there is no instance where the word must mean 'make righteous' and several where the context proves that it means 'acquit' or 'treat as righteous'. Thus, in 1 Cor 4⁴ he writes, 'I know nothing against myself, yet am I not hereby justified: but he that judgeth me is the Lord.' Again, in Rom 4⁵ we find: 'But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness.' Here it is expressly stated that the person justified has nothing to show in the way of meritorious acts: his one asset (so to speak) is faith, and this faith is taken as an 'equivalent for righteousness'.

So then from the point of view of scholarship the meaning of *δικαιῶν* is quite clear.¹ It is a forensic term, used to express the initial act by which God pardons and accepts a man.

Yet at the time of the Reformation the meaning of to justify was hotly disputed, and to-day the official theology of the Church of Rome holds it to mean 'to make righteous'. The words of our Article show that the Church of England on this point takes sides with Luther against the Council of Trent. '*We are accounted righteous before God*' is taken as the equivalent of '*We are justified by faith*'. In the earliest days of the Church no controversy arose about this point. The question of justification first came into prominence in the Pelagian controversy. S. Augustine, writing against Pelagius, asserted that all man's holiness was due to the free grace of God. He used

¹ We may add that while verbs in *-ω* that are derived from adjectives with a physical meaning, have the sense of 'making', as *e.g.* χρυσῶω = I make golden, verbs derived from adjectives with a moral meaning, have the sense of 'accounting as' or 'treating as', *e.g.* ἀξιῶω, I account worthy, not I make worthy. Thus the sense of *δικαιῶν* is naturally I account righteous.

justification to mean not only man's forgiveness and acceptance with God, but also an actual infusion of righteousness. 'It is true . . . that S. Augustine in one place admits the possibility of interpreting it either as "making just" or "reckoning just" (*De Spiritu et Litera*, § 45). But though he admits the two interpretations as far as concerns the words, practically his whole theory is that of an infusion of the grace of faith, by which men are made just.'¹ This erroneous view was no doubt assisted by the form of the Latin word 'iustifico'. In mediaeval theology justification was regularly taken to include an infusion of grace, and this view was confirmed by the Council of Trent. So in the interpretation of the Church of Rome justification includes not only free acceptance by God but also the first stage of sanctification, an imparting of actual righteousness. Our contention is that in Scripture it simply means being placed by God in a right relation to Himself. This is no doubt only a beginning. It is to be followed by sanctification, the actual impartation of holiness. It may be argued with truth that justification and sanctification can only be separated in thought rather than fact: that in actual experience God's word of pardon coming as an unspeakable surprise and striking home to the soul does quicken the possibilities of good that a man possesses. But the distinction is not only theologically sound but practically valuable. The moment that we open the door to the idea of a man's own actual righteousness having any place in God's act of forgiveness we are preparing the way, as mediaeval theology shows, for a return to those ideas of earning salvation by good works against which S. Paul's language is a protest. We are making God do what the Prodigal's Father did not do, give a place to some actual attainment of righteousness, however small, as a condition of acceptance.

(iii) Again, what does S. Paul mean by faith? The Greek word *πίστις* may be used either in an active or passive sense. It may mean either 'trustfulness, the frame of mind which relies on another' or 'trustworthiness, the frame of mind which can be relied on'.² In the LXX the verb *πιστεύειν* is used to translate the Hebrew verb 'to trust', as e.g. in the text often quoted by S. Paul 'Abraham believed in the Lord: and he counted it to him for righteousness' (Gen 15⁶), while *πίστις* is used in the passive sense as = trustworthiness. It is not used in the active sense, as Hebrew possessed no corresponding word for trustfulness. Only in S. Paul's other favourite text 'The just shall live by his faith' does the active idea seem to become blended with the passive. 'Constancy under temptation or danger with an Israelite could only spring from reliance on Jehovah.'³ In the New Testament though the passive sense is found, the active predominates. It is used in many shades of meaning, just as *πιστεύειν* may be used in different senses. With an accusative (*πιστεύειν τι*) it means to believe

¹ Sanday and Headlam, p. 150.

² Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 152-153.

³ Lightfoot, *Galatians*, pp. 152-153.

that a thing is so. With a dative of a person (*πιστεύειν τινί*) it means to believe what a man says. With *εἰς* or *ἐπί* (*πιστεύειν εἰς τινά* or *ἐπί τινί*) it means to believe in a person.¹ So *πίστις* may have every shade of meaning between bare intellectual assent to a proposition and unconditional self-surrender to a person. In S. Paul's own writings it has many meanings. In its highest sense it means not only belief in God's promises but enthusiastic self-committal to a person. It is above all a personal relationship, the attitude of a child to his father. The true son not only believes his father's promises, but, accepting all that his father has done for him in the past and relying upon the same love for the future, desires to respond to all the claims that his father's love makes upon him. That was the attitude of Abraham towards God (Rom 4³) and of the Saints of the Old Covenant (Heb 11³ ff.). In the case of the Christian it is mediated by Jesus Christ. S. Paul calls it either 'faith in Jesus Christ', Rom 3²², ²⁶ (cp. 1 Jn 5¹³, etc.), or faith in God the Father who raised Him from the dead, Rom 4²⁴, Eph 1²⁰ (cp. 1 Pet 1²¹).

We can see now why S. Paul speaks of being justified by (*i.e.* through) faith. Religion is a personal matter between the soul and God. 'Faith' is the one possible attitude for intercourse between the soul and God, just as it is for intercourse between the child and his father. It involves the looking towards God in Christ, the trustful acceptance of His free pardon and the desire to live a life of fellowship with Him. It is far more than the assent by the intellect to certain truths. It involves the whole man. It demands a venture of the will, the readiness to throw in our lot with Christ 'to be ruled as well as to be saved by Him'. By our act of self-surrender we are placed in the right relation to God, that of sonship. From another side, faith is, so to say, getting into correspondence with Christ, reaching out the hand to receive the gift that He has won and is waiting to bestow. It is like the action of the woman with the issue of blood (Mk 5²⁵⁻³⁴). The healing power was there but it needed her own act to get into touch with it. It was an act of belief in Him. So it is in virtue of this turning to Christ, this personal relation to Him begun by our act of surrender that we are justified or accounted righteous.

(b) The objection may be raised: 'if we are justified by faith, if God treats us as righteous though we are in real fact far from righteous, is not there a touch of unreality about it? Is not our salvation made to depend on a legal fiction?' We must remember in the first place that though 'justification' is no doubt a legal term in origin, it is only used by S. Paul because it corresponded with an experience common to himself and to his converts. They felt that through Christ they had passed from the darkness of God's condemnation into the sunshine of God's favour. Again, it may be said that all forgiveness contains an element of fiction. Forgiveness means that the man who forgives

¹ See Moulton, *Grammar of N.T. Greek*, pp. 67-68.

treats the offender as better than he really is. It also rests on the assumption that the person forgiven can be changed. The moment that we pass from the relation between persons as it is felt to be in actual life, and try to express the act of forgiveness in legal or any other language, it tends to appear unreal if not actually immoral. Further, the sense of unreality in 'justification' tends to disappear when we bear in mind that justification is only the beginning. The new relationship to Christ begun by our act of self-surrender is not any passing or momentary fact. It is a relationship that we are to maintain all through our lives. We have by a deliberate act of our whole being put ourselves into touch with the one Saviour, the one cure for our disease. Justification through faith might with equal accuracy be styled justification through union with Christ. So long as we remain in union with Him our progress in holiness is assured. Through Him we shall one day become all that we ought to be. But—and here comes the grand news of justification—God does not wait till all this has been accomplished. He accepts us here and now, just as we are. He treats us as righteous in anticipation of the day when we shall be righteous. He sees us not as we are but as we are becoming. 'Deus patiens quia aeternus.' Justification is only the beginning, but since it is God who begins, the result is assured and only human wilfulness can hinder it. So it is that S. Paul after dealing with justification in the first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, passes on to the 'mystical union' of the Christian with Christ in chapter 6. The story of the Prodigal Son closes with the readmission of the wanderer to his home and his restoration to all the privileges of sonship. But we cannot suppose that the Father is indifferent to his son's future behaviour. It is assumed that he is to live and grow in that home life to which he has been readmitted. 'There is no condemnation to them that believe and are baptized,' as Art. IX says, even though they are far from holy, not because God has favourites or passes over in one man what He condemns in another. It is rather that penitence and faith represent a new attitude of the person to God. If we have repented of our sins and are honestly trying in dependence upon Christ to overcome them, we have done all that we can. Our dependence on Christ is the guarantee that we shall one day be perfect. The merits of Christ could have no possible influence on God's view of us, if we were separated from Him. But so long as we are living 'in Christ', *i.e.* in vital union with Him, His merit has everything to do with us. He is in a real sense responsible for us: we have handed ourselves over to Him.

This doctrine is, as the Article says, *a most wholesome doctrine and very full of comfort*. If our acceptance with God depended upon our having attained to a certain standard of holiness, we could never be quite sure that we had reached it: God would always seem to be standing over us as a critic and a judge. But the knowledge that God

justifies us saves us both from hard thoughts of God and from morbid brooding over our own weakness and failures. It bids us look not at our very unsatisfactory selves, but at God and God's love and mercy as manifested in Christ. This attitude is the only sure foundation of a joyous and happy faith. Much of the gloominess of religious people is due to a neglect of 'justification by faith'.

(c) Our Article states that we are justified '*by faith only*'.¹ The exact phrase is not in Scripture, but it must be taken to mean just what S. Paul means when he says that men are justified by 'faith apart from works of the law' (Rom 3²⁸). We have indeed an apparent contradiction between the teaching of S. Paul and S. James on this point. S. James can write 'What doth it profit . . . if a man say he hath faith, but have not works? can that faith save him?' (2¹⁴). 'Faith if it have not works is dead in itself' (v. 17). 'By works a man is justified and not only by faith' (v. 24). Both argue from the same text (Gen 15⁶) with apparently opposite conclusions. S. Paul finds in Abraham an example of one who was justified by his faith in God: S. James the example of one 'who was justified by works in that he offered up his son Isaac upon the altar'. There is evidence that the text about Abraham was a standing subject for debate in Jewish schools. But when we get below the surface it is clear that the real difference between them is small. They were in temperament and outlook very different types of character, as the whole tone of their writings shows. Further, they were dealing with different types of error from a practical point of view. Thus to S. James 'faith' meant 'intellectual assent'. 'Thou believest that God is one: thou doest well, the devils also believe and shudder' (2¹⁹). Faith here corresponds to what S. Paul calls knowledge in 1 Cor 8¹. But faith to S. Paul means, as we have seen, personal adhesion. Again, when he speaks of 'works', S. James is thinking of Christian activities, what S. Paul calls 'good works' (*e.g.* in Eph 2¹⁰). S. Paul is always ready to admit that faith if genuine will show itself in acts of love and service. He speaks of faith as 'working' or 'active through love' (Gal 5⁶). On the other hand, when he speaks of 'works', S. Paul means 'works of the law', *i.e.* works done to earn God's favour and viewed as deserving a reward. Again, both use 'to justify' in a forensic sense, but S. James has in view the final judgment (*e.g.* 2¹⁴), S. Paul the initial act by which the soul is placed in right relation to God. Both have a practical end in view. S. James wishes to rebuke a barren orthodoxy, divorced from life; S. Paul is opposing a Jewish legalism, the spirit of the Pharisee who supposed that by the excellency of his works he could earn

¹ 'Sola fide' may suggest two erroneous ideas. (1) That faith can exist in isolation from any other Christian virtue or spiritual act. But faith in Christ's saving work cannot exist without some beginning of repentance for sin, of desire for sanctification and of love for God. (2) That life in the Church and the use of the sacraments may be superfluous or dispensable. But the New Testament assumes that faith, baptism and incorporation into Christ in the Church are inseparable aspects of one spiritual fact.

God's favour. In view of the familiarity of the question as a subject of discussion among the Jews, we cannot be sure that either had read the other's epistle. It is not certain which is the earlier. Either might quite well be rebuking a perversion of the other's teaching. There is no real contradiction between them.

This doctrine of justification by faith, almost forgotten during the middle ages and rediscovered at the time of the Reformation, was inevitably exaggerated and distorted in the reaction from mediaeval theology. The language of our Article is most cautious and avoids all exaggerations.

(i) There was a tendency on the part of the Lutherans, in their desire to exclude all human merit, to fall into what is known as 'solifidianism', and to argue that man is saved by 'faith only' in the sense that good works are not only unnecessary but positively harmful. They stated that a man was justified if he believed himself to be justified. To look for any fruit in a changed life was to deny the truth. That this is not the meaning of 'sola fide' in Article XI is shown by the following Article. This declares that '*good works . . . do spring necessarily of a true and lively faith; in so much that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.*'

(ii) Again, we must notice the careful distinction in prepositions. Faith is the instrument or means of justification. We are justified *per fidem* or *fide*. But we are justified *propter meritum Christi*; the work of Christ is the ground of our acceptance with God. The doubled preposition (*propter meritum Christi non propter opera et merita nostra*) makes it clear that the Article contrasts the merit of Christ with our own works. Luther pushed his teaching so far as to say we are justified, 'propter fidem'. But God does not account us righteous as a reward of our faith any more than as a reward for any other excellency that we display. That would be to return to salvation by works. The saving power of faith resides not in the man who believes, but in the object of the faith, namely, Jesus Christ, the Almighty Saviour on whom it rests. Further, S. Paul teaches us that faith itself is God's gift (Phil 1²⁹), and we should thank Him for it (Col 1³⁻⁴).

(iii) The mediaeval theologians had distinguished between *fides informis*, i.e. a bare intellectual belief, and *fides formata*, i.e. a faith informed or quickened by love. Accepting the distinction Luther argued that the first was sufficient for justification: the Council of Trent naturally argued for the latter. The Article ignores the whole question. The moment that we grasp that faith is faith in a person the difficulty disappears. In actual practice as between persons, we can hardly separate faith and love (cp. Gal 5⁶). Faith brings out more fully the side of trust and dependence. But in actual life we cannot trust ourselves wholly to a person whom we do not love, and love must involve trust.

(iv) Again, Luther in his attempt to explain justification spoke of

'an imputed righteousness'. God, he laid down, can treat us as righteous because Christ's righteousness is imputed to us and our sins are imputed to Him. This is a 'legal fiction', and happily our Article, like Scripture, is silent about it. Language is still used, e.g. in some of our hymns, that speaks of us as 'clothed with Christ's righteousness' as with a garment. The metaphor is an attempt to picture the truth that at any moment in our lives we fall short of God's perfect holiness; we must trust not in our own achievements, but in God's mercy through Christ. He represents what we still wish to be rather than what we actually are. The metaphor expresses a real truth, but is far too external. We cannot put on righteousness like a garment.†

ARTICLE XII

Of Good Works

Albeit that Good Works, which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's Judgment: yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.

One of the four new Articles added by Parker in 1563. It aimed at striking a mean between

- (i) Roman over-estimate of good works as earning merit and forgiveness;
- (ii) Lutheran under-estimate of good works, leading to 'solifidianism' and 'antinomianism'.

'Solifidianism' is the belief that we are saved by a bare faith. 'Antinomianism' is the assertion that the Christian is free from any restraint even of the moral law. N.B.—'Good works' is a technical term for Christian activities.

De bonis operibus

Bona opera, quae sunt fructus fidei, et justificatos sequuntur, quanquam peccata nostra expiare, et divini iudicii severitatem ferre non possunt; Deo tamen grata sunt, et accepta in Christo, atque ex vera et viva fide necessario profluunt, ut plane ex illis, aequae fides viva cognosci possit, atque arbor ex fructu iudicari.

ARTICLE XIII

Of Works before Justification

Works done before the grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to

De operibus ante justificationem

Opera quae fiunt ante gratiam Christi, et spiritus ejus afflatum, cum ex fide Jesu Christi non pro-

God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the School-authors say) deserve grace of congruity: yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin.

deant, minime Deo grata sunt, neque gratiam (ut multi vocant) de congruo merentur. Immo cum non sunt facta ut Deus illa fieri voluit et praecepit, peccati rationem habere non dubitamus.

Unchanged since 1553. Its object was to condemn the scholastic theory of congruous merit.

It is important to notice that the title does not correspond with the opening sentence. 'Works before justification' is not equivalent to 'works done before the grace of Christ and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit'. The title must give way to the text of the Article. There is abundant evidence in Scripture that God's grace is given to men before justification. God's grace was at work in the hearts of those who heard S. Peter on the day of Pentecost (Acts 2³⁷) and in the heart of S. Paul when he was converted (9¹¹). But in each case justification came later (cp. 2³⁴, 9¹⁷⁻¹⁸). So, too, in the case of Cornelius, the workings of God's grace preceded by a long interval of time his acceptance of Christ (cp. 10² ff.). Hence works 'done before the grace of God' is much narrower than 'works done before justification'. The real difficulty of the Article lies in the addition 'forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ'. This seems to rule out the efforts of good and conscientious non-Christians. The following answer was suggested in a letter of Dr Hort. 'The principle underlying Article XIII seems to me to be this, that there are not two totally different modes of access to God for men, faith for Christians, meritorious performance for non-Christians. There is but one mode of access, faith; and but one perfect, and, as it were normal faith, that which rests on the revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. But faith itself, not being an intellectual assent to propositions, but an attitude of heart and mind, is present in a more or less rudimentary state in every upward effort and aspiration of men. Doubtless the faith of non-Christians (and much of the faith of Christians, for that matter) is not in the strict sense "faith in Jesus Christ"; and therefore I wish the Article were otherwise worded. But such faith, when ripened, grows into the faith of Jesus Christ; as also it finds its rational justification in the revelation made through Him. Practically the principle of the Article teaches us to regard all the good there is in the world as what one may call *imperfect Christianity*, not as something essentially different, requiring, so to speak, to be dealt with by God in a wholly different manner.'—(*Life and Letters*, vol. 2, p. 337.)

It is, however, doubtful whether Hort's answer meets the difficulty. The 'works' of which the Article speaks must be such as are *prima facie* 'good'; otherwise there would be no point in insisting that they are nevertheless not 'pleasant to God' and do not deserve grace. If we say that all the good works or aspirations of both Christians and non-Christians spring in some sense from faith, no works done 'before the grace of Christ' would be left for the Article to refer to. The Article seems in fact to be stating the normal view of S. Augustine that good works which do not spring from explicit faith in Christ are 'empty' and as he says in one passage, *in peccata vertuntur, omne enim quod non est ex fide peccatum est* (*Contra duas Ep. Pelag. IV*, 14. Cp. *Enarr. in Psalm. 31*, 2, 4).

W. Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, p. 417 f., after saying that this Article is 'unfortunately, even calamitously expressed', gives a constructive statement.

ARTICLE XIV

Of Works of Supererogation

Voluntary Works besides, over and above God's commandments, which they call Works of Supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety. For by them men do declare, that they do not only render unto God as much as they are bound to do, but that they do more for his sake, than of bounden duty is required; whereas Christ saith plainly, When ye have done all that are commanded to you, say, We be unprofitable servants.

De operibus supererogationis

Opera quae supererogationis appellant, non possunt sine arrogantia et impietate praedicari. Nam illis declarant homines, non tantum se Deo reddere, quae tenentur, sed plus in ejus gratiam facere, quam deberent, cum aperte Christus dicat; Cum feceritis omnia quaecunque praecepta sunt vobis, dicite, Servi inutiles sumus.

Almost unchanged since 1553.

Object: to condemn 'works of supererogation'.

§ 2. *Sanctification*

(a) In our Articles there is no direct teaching on Sanctification. There is no mention of the continuous work of the Holy Spirit in us after justification nor of the practical holiness of life that God requires. So the doctrine of justification is left unfinished. Art. XII comes nearest to any teaching on this subject, and Arts. XIII and XIV deal with certain difficulties connected with it.

God's ideal for us is absolute holiness. 'Ye shall be perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect' (Mt 5⁴⁸ R.V.). Nothing short of that is the object of Christ's redemption. While we are justified by faith at the beginning of our Christian life, we shall be judged by our works at the end (2 Cor 5¹⁰, etc.). Good works are the necessary fruit of that life lived in union with God of which justification is the initial act (cp. Mt 7¹⁶⁻²⁰, etc.). If faith is all that S. Paul means by it, it must expand into action. A man who has accepted forgiveness through Christ, out of very gratitude to His Saviour, must try to serve Him and by serving Him to become like Him. We are to 'follow after . . . the sanctification without which no man shall see the Lord' (Heb 12¹⁴). Justification apart from sanctification remains incomplete.¹

¹ It is significant that at the beginning of Rom 6 S. Paul assumes that those who are justified will have been baptized. Baptism is for him the sacrament both of justifying faith and sonship and also of our incorporation into Christ, by which we die to sin and rise to new life in Him. (Cp. Gal 3²⁷⁻²⁸.) We enter on the justified and the sanctified life at the same moment. Compare Hooker, *Eccl. Pol. V*, lvi, 11, 'Thus we participate Christ partly by imputation, as when those things which he did and suffered for us are imputed unto us for righteousness; partly by habitual and real infusion, as when

Any teaching on the Atonement that regards it merely as a work wrought by Christ outside ourselves is grievously inadequate. Nothing has caused more misunderstanding about this doctrine than the neglect in popular preaching of the truth of our union with Christ and the resulting work of His Holy Spirit within ourselves, as an essential part of His Atonement. As the hymn says 'He died that we might be forgiven', but it goes on to add 'He died to make us good'. The latter is as essential as the former. Christ did not die only to save us from the punishment of sin, but from sin itself. He came to deliver us from the weakness of our fallen nature and from slavery to bad habits. He is the source of new life. Through the Holy Spirit He imparts to us His own perfect human nature—that perfect humanity which He built up by His life of obedience and consummated by His death. The will of God is our sanctification (1 Thess 4¹⁻⁹), the complete subjection of all our powers of will and heart and mind to God's Holy Spirit.

Accordingly, in our Christian life everything turns upon our realizing our membership with Christ, on our self-identification with Him. We are to do all things 'in Christ'. Our growth in holiness may be called equally either the work of Christ or of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit did not come to take the place of an absent Christ, but in His coming Christ Himself comes too. 'I will pray the Father and he shall give you another Advocate that he may be with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth. . . . I will not leave you desolate, I come unto you' (Jn 14¹⁶⁻¹⁹). It is through the Spirit that the Ascended Lord dwells in the Church and operates in believers (Rom 8¹⁻¹¹). The gift of the Holy Spirit is the seal of membership in Christ and acceptance by God (Eph 1¹⁴, 4³⁰, etc.). The presence of the Spirit is the presence of Christ (cp. 2 Cor 3¹⁷⁻¹⁸). 'We know that he (*i.e.* Christ) abideth in us by the Spirit which he gave us' (1 Jn 3²⁴). It is through the coming of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost that the Atonement is to be not an act outside ourselves, but a real transforming of our personality within, 'Calvary without Pentecost is not yet Calvary in vital relation to ourselves.' We may view the work of the Holy Spirit within us in two ways.

(i) Through Him we daily die to sin. The whole life of Christ was a dying to sin: this attitude to sin was perfected and consummated on the Cross. By that death He revealed and identified Himself with the mind of God towards sin. His whole attitude to sin was the perfection of that attitude to sin which God requires in us. Only the sinless can have a perfect antagonism to and hatred of sin. Every sin that we commit blunts our capacity for seeing sin in its true light and hating it as we ought. Our sins become a part of ourselves. It is 'I' who chose

grace is inwardly bestowed while we are on earth, and afterwards more fully both our souls and bodies made like unto his in glory.' The whole passage from which these words come deserves study.

and enjoyed the thing that was evil and there still remains in me the latent capacity of enjoying the evil thing. The Cross of Christ stands for that utter abhorrence of and resistance to sin which God requires in us, but to which we cannot attain. Our penitence in order to be perfect must rest upon and include such a complete antagonism to sin.¹ That is just what we cannot achieve. So we reach the position, that God requires of sinners true penitence, and just because we are sinners we are incapable of true penitence. Here we need the power of the Holy Spirit. He brings into our life a new capacity for penitence. Through the Holy Spirit we are to die to sin. Our sinful self is to be done to death. S. Paul speaks of us as crucified with Christ. 'I have been crucified with Christ' (Gal 2²⁰). As members of Christ we share His Cross. 'Our old man was crucified with him' (Rom 6⁶). Through the Cross of Christ 'the world has been crucified unto me and I unto the world.' 'They that are of Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with the passions and the lusts thereof' (Gal 6¹⁴, 5²⁴). Crucifixion is a slow and painful process. Our old sin-loving self was, so to speak, nailed to the Cross when we first believed in Christ and accepted Him as our Saviour. But it is not yet dead, and like a crucified man will take a long time to die. But its death is assured, so long as we do not take it down. Christ has nailed it to the Cross and it cannot survive. So through the indwelling power of the Holy Spirit our old self is slowly being crucified or done to death. We are 'becoming conformed unto his death' (Phil 3¹⁰). Christ's attitude to sin is being made our own, we are learning to hate sin as He hated it. We look forward to the day when the old self will be actually dead, slain by the power of the Cross of Christ infused into us through the Holy Spirit and made our own.

(ii) But there is also the positive side. It is not enough to be perfected in penitence, to grow into the mind of Christ towards sin. We must also be perfected in holiness. As the old self dies, the new self—the Christ-self—is being built up. We are not only to die with Christ but also to rise with Him (cp. the whole passage, Rom 6¹⁻¹¹). We are to realize in ourselves 'the power of His Resurrection' (Phil 3¹⁰). The death of Christ was the consummation of His filial obedience to the Father. He 'Through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish unto God' (Heb 9¹⁴). All through His earthly life, by repeated and unflinching acts of obedience and right choice, He had built up a perfect human character. He had grown 'in favour with God' (Lk 2⁵²). 'Though he was a Son,' yet He 'learned obedience by the things which he suffered.' That is, as His life continued, new opportunities were given and new temptations overcome. He was

¹ Dr Moberly speaks of Christ as 'the perfect penitent', *i.e.* as realizing that attitude towards sin which in us would be penitence. He maintains that only the sinless can be perfectly penitent. The difficulty in this use of the term is that 'penitence' in ordinary usage implies the sense of personal responsibility for sins committed. See, however, W. H. Moberly's Essay in *Foundations*.

ever learning the fulness of perfect obedience (Heb 5⁸⁻¹⁰, cp. 10⁸⁻¹⁰). On the evening of His Passion He could say 'I glorified Thee on the earth, having accomplished the work which Thou hast given me to do' (Jn 17⁴). The Cross represented the climax of human obedience, the utter submission to the Father's will, the complete surrender of self. 'He humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the Cross' (Phil 2⁸). So through the Holy Spirit we are to be built up into the likeness of His perfect obedience. Christ is to be found in us. We are to learn to say with S. Paul 'I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me' (Gal 2²⁰). When sanctification is complete, the old self will be dead and the new man will be found in the image of Christ (Rom 8²⁹). We shall have become our true selves in Christ. The secret of the Christian life is 'Christ in you the hope of glory' (Col 1²⁷).

As we have seen, God does not wait until this has been accomplished. He accepts us here and now. But so long as our union with Christ is maintained, the end is certain. Seeing that it is God 'which began a good work' in us, we may be confident that He 'will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ' (Phil 1⁶). Hence S. Paul can look forward and speak in anticipation of it as already accomplished. Thus he can write, 'If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature; the old things are passed away; behold they are become new' (2 Cor 5¹⁷), though it is clear that in actual fact a great deal of the old man was still left in the Christians of Corinth. So, too, in Col 3¹⁻⁴ he tells the Colossians in the same breath 'ye died and your life is hid with Christ in God', and also that, as having been raised with Christ, 'they must seek those things that are above.' So in Eph 1³ God has 'blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ'. That is to say, God views us and we are to view ourselves as identical with the perfected saints that we hope one day to become.

Our final destiny is to enjoy God for ever and to be made like Christ when 'we see Him as He is' (1 Jn 3²). So the new life, born in baptism and growing in Christ by grace, is to reach its fulfilment in the resurrection life of the age to come, for the resurrection too will be the work of God's 'Spirit that dwelleth in us'. The Christian will then have become all that he was 'made' in baptism, 'a member of Christ, the child of God and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven' (The Catechism). By incorporation into Christ through the Holy Spirit we are, S. Paul says, already the children of God and joint-heirs with Christ. In the life to come we shall receive our full adoption and inherit the glory of those who are conformed to the image of God's Son (Rom 8¹¹⁻³⁰). The salvation or supernatural end of man in God's purpose is the life in which sin and death are finally conquered and God's people are gathered to Him in the heavenly Jerusalem. This is only another way of saying that the members of Christ's body are to be made like Him, that by adoption in Him and union with

Him they are to be raised to the glory which His own victorious humanity now enjoys in heaven.

(b) We have already seen that 'good works' are the necessary fruit of 'a lively faith'. As representing our best efforts to please, God accepts them through Christ. The kindness of the Philippian to S. Paul is 'an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing to God' (Phil 4¹⁸). We are 'created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God afore prepared that we should walk in them' (Eph 2¹⁰). Titus is bidden to show himself 'an ensample of good works' (Tit 2⁷). S. Paul always appeals to the commonsense of his converts against the perversion of his teaching known as 'antinomianism', that is, the doctrine that since our salvation from first to last depends on the grace of God, we need make no effort to observe the moral law. 'The more that we sin, the more opportunity for the grace of God to forgive' (cp. Rom 6¹ ff.). This error reappeared at the Reformation. Our Article employs needlessly harsh language about good works. It may be perfectly true in the abstract that '*good works which are the fruits of faith and follow after justification cannot put away our sins and endure the severity of God's judgment*'. Since we are imperfect, our noblest actions bear the mark of our imperfection. As being tainted by sin they cannot endure the judgment of an all-holy God (Rom 3²³, cp. 1s 64⁹). But religion is a personal matter. God is our Father. To use the best illustration, the presents that a small child brings to his parent may be intrinsically worthless, but are very precious to the parent as tokens of the child's wish to please him. So our good works may be full of imperfection but yet acceptable to God as an expression of our desire to serve Him. Of course they cannot earn or deserve our forgiveness.

(c) As we saw, our salvation can only be realized by the co-operation of our wills with the grace of God. Our own effort, therefore, plays a real part in obtaining it. Further, all salvation is social. The right use of grace benefits not only the user but his fellow men. The saint saves not only his own soul but forwards God's purpose for mankind. Under God he is a real means of saving others. Humanly speaking, if he had failed to do his part, not only he but others would have suffered loss. Hence, from one point of view, salvation is acquired as the result of 'good works' and holy living, in the sense that without them it would not have been acquired. The Church, as a whole, has won through the labours of the saints blessings that without them she would never have enjoyed. This truth is fully recognized in Scripture. The welfare of one member of Christ affects all the members (1 Cor 12²⁶, cp. Rom 12⁵). It is the supplication of a 'righteous' man that avails much (Jas 5¹⁶). S. Paul speaks of his work and sufferings as being endured for the salvation of others (2 Cor 1⁶, cp. 12¹⁵, Eph 3¹³, 2 Tim 2¹⁰). Further, in Col 1²⁴ he writes, 'I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake and fill up on my part that

which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh, for his body's sake, which is the church.' These words mean more than that he suffers as Christ suffered, or even that Christ in a real sense suffers in His members' sufferings on earth (cp. Phil 3¹⁰ and 2 Cor 1⁵). They mean what they say. S. Paul asserts that his own sufferings have a real place in affecting the salvation of the world. In the case of the individual Christ's sufferings need to be filled up by our own self-identification with them (cp. 1 Pet 4¹ with Bigg's note). We must take up our Cross and be crucified with Him. So in the case of the world, Christ's sufferings need to be filled up by the sufferings of His members. As Christians can forward the salvation of others by their intercessions, so they can by their sufferings.¹ As prayer for another is no substitute for his own personal faith and repentance, but rather a means of forwarding them, so the sufferings of the saints are not a substitute for the penitence of sinners, but a means through which such penitence may be brought about. There is such a thing as vicarious suffering, but never vicarious sanctification. But without vicarious suffering there would be little sanctification in the world. It is these two truths, first, that our sanctification demands our own effort, secondly, that by our efforts we can help forward the sanctification of others, that, however distorted, underlie the whole doctrine of merit as held in mediaeval times, and attacked in Articles XII-XIV.

(i) The idea of 'merit' is found quite early in the writings of Tertullian.² He taught first that a man could 'satisfy' God by doing what he knew to be His will and by not doing what God has forbidden, or, in the case of falling into sin, by voluntarily taking upon himself an equivalent amount of punishment. In this latter case the 'satisfaction' may be attained by alms, fasting, or the like, and above all by martyrdom. Such suffering is of the nature of an expiatory sacrifice. It balances the debt due to God. Further, if this suffering exceeds the amount required, the superfluity counts as 'merit'. It is reckoned as a 'good work' and so to say places God in our debt. Secondly, he taught that in many matters God has left man free to choose between a higher and a lower course. No man may do what God has forbidden, but if he takes advantage of God's permission to follow his natural inclinations he does not commit sin. If, on the other hand, he does not take advantage of God's permission and takes the highest course of all—what God wills, instead of what God merely allows—then he earns merit in the sight of God. This teaching was carried a step further by Cyprian. He held that in certain

¹ Bp. Lightfoot, in his note on Col 1²⁴, distinguishes between Christ's sufferings as 'satisfactoriae' and as 'aedificatoriae'. He maintains that we fill up the sufferings of Christ merely in forwarding His Kingdom, not in any sense in making atonement. Such a distinction is quite arbitrary and implies a view of the atonement as a transaction effected entirely outside human life. Cp. Chandler, *Cult of the Passing Moment*, p. 106 ff.

² See Bethune Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, pp. 353-355.

cases it is possible to acquire an amount of merit more than sufficient to deserve even the highest reward of heaven. In that case, the surplus may be passed on to benefit others, through an act of God's grace done in answer to the prayers of the saint, though the benefit is always conditioned by the state of the recipient. In these ideas we have in germ the mediaeval teaching on merit, on works of supererogation and on indulgences.

(ii) In mediaeval times it had come to be accepted that in some sense good works carried 'merit': further, that the merits of the saints were available to make up the deficiencies of others. This being the current belief and practice of the Church, the duty was laid upon the Schoolmen or School-authors mentioned in Art. XIII, to place the whole system on a rational basis. The Schoolmen were the systematic theologians of the middle ages.¹ Their object was with the aid of the newly discovered philosophy of Aristotle to reconcile faith and reason. Taking the doctrine and discipline of the Church as they found them, without questioning their origin or validity, they strove to present them as a symmetrical whole, agreeable to reason no less than to faith. Their task was not criticism nor the discovery of new truth, but the harmonization of the old. Their achievement took the form of 'sums of theology', weaving into a consistent and orderly system, complete even in the minutest detail, all that the Church had seen fit to say or to do.²

The Schoolmen explained the idea of merit by a distinction. They argued that the case of Cornelius showed that human free-will could go a certain way in its own strength in turning towards God. Such an effort done by man's unaided power did not indeed deserve a reward, but it was fitting that God's liberality should reward it. In technical language it earned merit not as a matter of debt, but 'of congruity' (*de congruo*), i.e. 'of fitness'. This is repudiated in Art. XIII. On the other hand, good works done by the aid of grace deserved a reward. They earned merit 'de condigno', as a matter of debt.³ This is attacked in Art. XII.

Before we criticize the whole idea of merit, it is only fair to remember that the scholastic doctrine of merit can only be fully understood and judged as a part of a very complex and intricate system of

¹ The Schoolmen were the successors of the Fathers. Usually S. Bernard (d. 1115) is styled the last of the Fathers and S. Anselm (d. 1109) the first of the Schoolmen. The change of name marks a very real change of aim. 'Doctores they claimed to be, not Patres; not, as fathers, productive; not professing to bring out of their treasures things new, but only to justify and establish things old.' See Trench, *Mediaeval Church History*, Lect. XIV.

² The most famous is the *Summa* of S. Thomas Aquinas (1270), still the standard work of theology on the whole in the Roman Church. Scarcely less famous in their day were the writings of Albertus Magnus (1280), Bonaventura (1274) and later William of Occam and Duns Scotus.

³ We may compare the illustration that is often given. 'A servant deserves his wages *ex condigno*: he may deserve support in sickness or old age *ex congruo*.'

theology. It is there balanced by statements of a very different nature. But popular religion is unable to make subtle distinctions. What is attacked in our Articles is the use made of the scholastic teaching in popular religion.

The mediaeval idea of merit is abstract and artificial. Our Lord in His teaching no doubt uses current Jewish language about the rewards given by God to those who serve Him. But in so doing He transforms the whole idea of reward. It becomes qualitative rather than quantitative. 'Since opportunities are a divine gift (Mt 25¹⁴), service is a mere duty which cannot merit reward (Lk 17⁹ ff.). Reward, therefore, becomes free undeserved grace and is pictured as great out of all proportion to the service rendered (Mt 19²⁹, 24⁴⁷, 25²¹, etc.). This teaching really eliminates the idea of reward altogether.¹ In other words the reward is not something external that can be abstracted from the man who receives it. It is primarily an inward quickening of soul, a new capacity for service and a closer union with God. Further, the whole idea of 'merit', in the sense of running up a debtor and creditor account with God, is utterly un-Christian. 'Merit lives from man to man, and not from man, O God, to Thee.' For our whole life, for every power that we possess as well as for every opportunity of exercising it, we are utterly dependent upon God. He has an absolute claim upon all our life. Nothing that we can do can give us a claim against Him. Hence not only is the 'reward' that we receive from Him non-transferable, but from the nature of the case even the holiest saint can never possess any 'merit' that belongs to him, as it were, in his own right and can be transferred to another's account. Our personal relationship to our Heavenly Father cannot be expressed in terms of arithmetic.

The theory of congruous merit attacked in Art. XIII does indeed represent in a distorted form the great truth that any effort that we make will be met by God with an ever-increasing supply of grace. It is most surely congruous with the character of God to bestow more abundant grace on those who are unconsciously striving to serve and know Him. But this, like all God's gifts, is freely given. His grace is so magnificent a gift that we could never deserve it by the excellence of our own efforts. Further, the scholastic theory is frankly semi-Pelagian. It denies the need of prevenient grace. This is illustrated by the case of Cornelius. His prayers and alms were certainly good works done before justification. But equally certainly they were not done apart from God's grace. From first to last his salvation was due to divine grace. The whole idea of having to earn God's grace by making a good start in our own strength flatly contradicts S. Paul's teaching on Abraham (Rom 4¹⁻⁴, cp. 9¹¹⁻¹³).

So, too, with the idea of 'merit *de condigno*'. As we saw above,

¹ McNeile on Mt 5²: The whole note deserves reading in this connexion. On the motive of reward in the Gospels, see K. E. Kirk, *Vision of God*, Lect. III, Sect. iv.

even our best efforts come far short of perfection. They cannot 'deserve' or 'earn' our acceptance or anything else. At the same time, it is sure at all times that the more fully we respond to God's calls, the more grace He bestows. But the right to expect this grace depends on the unfailing generosity of God, not on any excellence residing in our own works.

At the Council of Trent the phrases 'merit *de congruo*' and 'merit *de condigno*' were entirely avoided. The need of prevenient grace was clearly asserted. On the other hand, the assertion that 'all works done before justification . . . are truly sins or deserve the hatred of God' was anathematized. Still the idea of 'merit' was retained, and to-day, in spite of the balanced statements of her theologians, the Church of Rome in her ordinary teaching and practice never seems able to get away from the idea of accumulating merit by good works. There are large portions of S. Paul's Epistles which find no place in her teaching. On this point her teaching is un-Catholic. Popular Protestantism, with its insistence—often exaggerated insistence—on the freedom of God's salvation, bears witness to a portion of Catholic truth that Rome ignores.

(iii) In close dependence on mediaeval views about merit came the idea of 'works of supererogation',¹ i.e. 'voluntary works over and above God's commandments'. We have seen that as early as Tertullian a distinction was drawn between what God 'permits' and what God 'wills'. It is not sin to do what God permits, but it is meritorious to do what God wills. In defence of this distinction the chief passage alleged is 1 Cor 7. Here S. Paul permits marriage, but 'by reason of the present distress', encourages celibacy. 'Concerning virgins I have no commandment (*praeceptum*) of the Lord, but I give my judgment (*consilium*)' (cp. also 2 Cor 8⁸ and 10, where we find a similar contrast between 'commandment' and 'judgment'.) On the basis of this text a formal distinction was made between 'precepts' and 'counsels'. 'Precepts' were commands of God binding upon all men, which it was sin to disobey. 'Counsels' or 'Counsels of perfection' were, as it were, recommendations, which it was not necessary for a Christian to follow. Such refusal was not sinful. Such 'counsels' would include poverty, celibacy, the monastic life and the like. The performance of these, as being over and above God's commandment, would earn merit for those who performed them.²

The words of our Article on this subject are perfectly justified. No one can render to God more than he is bound to render, for God has a claim on the whole life of man. There is a very real truth that underlies the distinction between 'precepts' and 'counsels'. Some

¹ The term 'supererogation' comes from the Latin versions of Lk 10²⁴. *Quodcumque supererogaveris* = ὁ τι ἄν προδραπανήσῃς. *Erogare* = to disburse money; *supererogare*, 'to pay over and above.'

² On 'precepts and counsels' and 'the double standard', see K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, esp. Lect. V.

laws of God are binding upon all Christians without exception, as Christians. But there are other duties to which all Christians are clearly not called, as, for instance, the ministry. Those, however, who receive a call from God to one of these special duties, are bound to obey at the peril of their souls. The 'counsel' has become a 'precept' for them. They do not earn merit by complying, but they would disobey God by refusing. This principle is clearly seen in the case of the rich young ruler (Mk 10¹⁷⁻³⁰). The command to sell all that he had was clearly not a command to do 'a work of supererogation'. 'One thing thou lackest' shows that his life still came short of God's purpose for him. Further, the command was an 'ad hominem' command. Our Lord did not give it to all His disciples. By refusing it the man did not simply fail to earn merit, but he endangered his entrance into the Kingdom of God at all (v. 23).¹ Neither in S. Paul nor in the Gospels can any basis be found for 'works of supererogation'. Lk 17¹⁰ quoted in the Article is perfectly clear.

ARTICLE XVII

Of Predestination and Election

Predestination to Life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his counsel secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God be called according to God's purpose by his Spirit working in due season: they through Grace obey the calling: they be justified freely: they be made sons of God by adoption: they be made like the image of his only begotten Son Jesus Christ: they walk religiously in good works, and at

De praedestinatione et electione

Praedestinatio ad vitam est aeternum Dei propositum, quo ante jacta mundi fundamenta, suo consilio, nobis quidem occulto, constanter decrevit, eos quos in Christo elegit ex hominum genere, a maledicto et exitio liberare, atque (ut vasa in honorem efficta) per Christum, ad aeternam salutem adducere. Unde qui tam praeclaro Dei beneficio sunt donati, illi spiritu ejus, opportuno tempore operante, secundum propositum ejus vocantur, vocationi per gratiam parent, justificantur gratis, adoptantur in filios Dei, unigeniti ejus Jesu Christi imagini efficiuntur conformes, in bonis operibus sancte ambulant, et demum ex Dei misericordia pertingunt ad sempiternam felicitatem.

¹ In S. Matthew's account of this incident (19¹⁶⁻²¹) a distinction appears to be made between what is required for 'entering into life' and for 'being perfect,' i.e. a 'double standard' is suggested. See K. E. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 69

length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity.

As the godly consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God: so, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchedness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.

Furthermore, we must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture: and, in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God.

An Article of 1553 with slight alterations. The whole question of Predestination was a burning question at the time. The most important point to notice is that it keeps to the language of Scripture throughout. The similarity between the Latin of the Article and the Vulgate is especially close. The chief passages on which it is based are Rom 8²⁸⁻³⁰, 9²¹ and Eph 1³⁻¹¹.

ARTICLE XVIII

Of obtaining eternal Salvation only by the Name of Christ

They also are to be had accur-

Quemadmodum praedestinationis et electionis nostrae in Christo pia consideratio, dulcis, suavis, et ineffabilis consolationis plena est vere piis, et his qui sentiunt in se vim spiritus Christi, facta carnis, et membra, quae adhuc sunt super terram, mortificantem, animumque ad coelestia et superna rapientem; tum quia fidem nostram de aeterna salute consequenda per Christum plurimum stabilit atque confirmat, tum quia amorem nostrum in Deum vehementer accendit: ita hominibus curiosis, carnalibus, et spiritu Christi destitutis, ob oculos perpetuo versari praedestinationis Dei sententiam perniciosissimum est praecipitium, unde illos diabolus protrudit, vel in desperationem, vel in aequae perniciosam impurissimae vitae securitatem; deinde promissiones divinas sic amplecti oportet, ut nobis in sacris literis generaliter propositae sunt, et Dei voluntas in nostris actionibus ea sequenda est, quam in verbo Dei habemus, discrete revelatam.

De speranda aeterna salute tantum in nomine Christi

Sunt et illi anathematizandi,

sed that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that Law, and the light of Nature. For holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the Name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved.

qui dicere audent unumquemque in lege aut secta quam profitetur esse servandum, modo juxta illam et lumen naturae accurate vixerit, cum sacrae literae tantum Jesu Christi nomen praedicent, in quo salvos fieri homines oporteat.

Unchanged from 1553 except in the form of the title. The 'et' in the opening sentence was omitted in 1563 and restored in 1571. It would seem to connect it with the last clause of Art. XVI.

§ 3. Predestination and Election

(a) Under these theological terms there lie two great problems.

(a) How can we reconcile God's omniscience with man's responsibility? If God when He creates a man foreknows that he will go wrong, is not God responsible for his sin in creating him? How can a God of love create a man who will never enjoy that happiness and union with God for which mankind was made?

(β) What do we mean when we speak of God's elect or God's chosen? To what are they chosen, some privileged position or eternal life? Has then God got favourites? Why are others not elect? Are they outside God's love?

The questions were violently debated at the time of the Reformation. In some form they exercise the minds of all men. Historically, three main solutions have been given.

(i) S. Augustine in his controversy with Pelagianism formulated his views on this question. In dealing with him we need to remember that they are coloured by his own strong religious experience. He felt that quite apart from any merit of his own God had called him. God's grace had come into his life, bringing with it a new power to love and serve God. He was convinced that God had a purpose of love for him from all eternity and that God's grace was enabling him to fulfil it. In the light of this he faced the question 'Why is the gift of this transforming grace given to some and not to others?' His own case showed that it was not earned by any goodness. Hence he answered that we cannot know. It depends on God's will alone. By God's decree, without any reference to future conduct, some are chosen as 'vessels of mercy' to redemption, others are simply left as 'vessels of wrath'. He himself went no further, but some of his followers carried his views to the logical conclusion that these last were definitely predestined to sin and evil. God's elect are kept faithful to Him by fresh supplies of grace, which endow them with the gift of 'perseverance'. This again is a mystery beyond human comprehension. Perseverance to the end is a sign that a man is predestinated to eternal life. The purpose of God for His elect cannot fail. S. Augustine had to explain

away such texts as 'God willeth that all men should be saved' (1 Tim 2⁴), as meaning only that God, as no respecter of persons, willed some men of every age and class to be saved.

(ii) Calvin did little more than systematize this view and draw out its full implications (v. above). This doctrine—apart from personal experience—is based upon one side of S. Paul's teaching especially Rom 8 and 9, such as 8²⁸⁻³⁰, 'We know that to them that love God all things work together for good, even to them that are called according to his purpose. For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first among many brethren: and whom he foreordained, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.'

Again, in discussing why Jacob was chosen and Esau rejected even before they were born and had done anything good or bad (9¹¹), and pointing to it as evidence of the freeness of God's choice, he adds, 'What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. For the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, For this very purpose did I raise thee up, that I might show in thee my power and that my name might be published abroad in all the earth. So then he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he still find fault? For who withstandeth his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus? Or hath not the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy?'

The general impression gained by reading such a passage in isolation at first sight is favourable to something very like Calvinism. Exclusive stress seems to be laid on the power of God and the mysteriousness of its working. But a closer study corrects any such impression. S. Paul is speaking here primarily of nations, not individuals. Jacob stands for the nation of Israel and Esau for Edom (cp. 9²⁵ ff.). Again, S. Paul avoids saying that God Himself prepared vessels of wrath unto destruction: he only says that 'God endured vessels of wrath fitted into destruction'. He does say explicitly that God 'prepared vessels unto glory' (v. 23). But no doubt from one point of view he would even say that God formed vessels unto wrath, just as he says above that God 'hardened Pharaoh's heart'. In such language, he speaks as a Jew. The Jews, ignoring all intermediate causes,

assigned all that happened to its ultimate cause, *viz.* God. A Jew would say equally that God hardens a man's heart or that a man hardens his own heart; that God fits a man for wrath or a man fits himself for wrath. For the process of hardening is due to one of God's laws, the law of character, and in this sense is the work of God. The man acts, and his actions produce the result that God's law renders inevitable. Even so it is worth noting that God's delay in manifesting His power in punishment is due to His 'long-suffering' (cp. Rom 2⁴). More important still, these passages cannot be taken by themselves. They represent only one side of S. Paul's teaching. Elsewhere He speaks of God's love for all men and of the natural love in man for what is good. His exhortations assume the truth of man's responsibility. We cannot isolate one step in a long and involved argument such as that of the Epistle to the Romans and base a complete theology upon it.

(iii) In opposition to Calvinism, Arminius, who taught at Leyden about 1604 (and therefore after the date of this Article), formulated views previously held by many. He taught that God predestines to eternal life certain men because He foresees that they will use their free-will aright and be faithful to the grace that is given them. This view is called 'praedestinatio ex praevisis meritis'. A very similar view was held by many of the Fathers; in fact, so far as any doctrine on the subject was formulated at all in the Church, it was Arminian even in the West until the time of S. Augustine. In the East Augustinianism never won general acceptance. The only text that offers any support to such a view is Rom 8²⁸⁻²⁹. The great majority of Greek commentators take 'according to his purpose' to refer not to God's purpose but to man's purpose 'in accordance with man's free act of choice'. This is impossible.

Again, the word 'foreknew' in the next verse has been pressed in an Arminian sense. But the word must be understood in accordance with Biblical usage, and means 'took note of', 'fixed His regard on' with a view to selection for some special purpose. The strong point of the Arminian view is that it lays stress on human responsibility, and on the truth that sufficient grace is given to all. Its weak point is that it appears to make God's election not a free gift, as S. Paul tells us it is, but a reward earned in advance by man's own efforts. Further, it does not really escape the harshness of Calvinism. Predestination according to foreseen merit logically implies condemnation according to foreseen failure.

(b) We need to bear in mind that Scripture insists upon three great thoughts. (i) God has an eternal purpose of love for all nations and individuals whom He has made. (ii) Salvation and grace are from first to last the gifts of God's free bounty. (iii) Man is responsible to God for his conduct.

(i) Whatever God has done or is now doing for us, He eternally intended to do. The Gospel is the mystery or secret 'which hath been

kept in silence through times eternal, but now is manifested' (Rom 16²⁵). God 'called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before times eternal but hath now been manifested by the appearing of our Saviour, Christ Jesus' (2 Tim 1⁹⁻¹⁰, cp. Tit 1²). God, by creating a human life, has in some sense made Himself responsible for it. A God of love and justice must have a purpose of love for every single being whom He creates, in the fulfilment of which the created being will find his true satisfaction. In this sense all must be predestined to life. It is this thought that, rightly grasped, has such great moral power. A man needs to feel that he has behind him not only his own efforts but God's eternal love: that God has a place for him to fill: that nothing can happen to him from outside without God's knowledge and permission: that it is God's will for him that he should do right and realize his best self. The success of our life must depend not simply on ourselves but on God's purpose of love.

(ii) God's purpose for us is to be realized through union with Himself. This union is brought within our reach through Jesus Christ. It was God's eternal purpose to sum up all things in Him (Eph 1¹⁰). 'It was the good pleasure of the Father . . . through him to reconcile all things unto himself' (Col 1²⁰). His redeeming work was no afterthought. He was from all eternity God's elect or chosen (Is 42¹, 1 Pet 2⁴), 'the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world' (Rev 13⁸). When we are made members of Christ we share His election. We are '*chosen in Christ out of mankind*'. It is God's purpose to bring us '*by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour*'. 'He chose us in him before the foundation of the world . . . having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved' (Eph 1⁴⁻⁵, cp. 2⁴⁻⁷). The glorious position, 'sitting in the heavenly places with him in Christ Jesus,' is, as S. Paul's language shows, not the reward of our own merit, but God's free gift. He chose us, not we Him. The initial act is God's, not our own (1 Pet 1¹⁻²). How is it then that all are not chosen or elect? The answer lies in the thought that God works out His purpose for the world gradually. No one can deny that spiritual graces and opportunities, no less than temporal, are unequally distributed (cp. Lk 12⁴⁷⁻⁴⁸). Under the old Covenant Israel was by God's choice an elect nation. To them God granted a special revelation of Himself. They were His people (Deut 7⁶, etc.). They had many spiritual advantages that the other nations did not have. So to-day the Christian Church is the new Israel (Gal 6¹⁶, Phil 3³): it has inherited the unique spiritual privileges of the old Israel. The Christian has spiritual advantages that those outside do not as yet enjoy (1 Pet 2⁹⁻¹⁰, Heb 13¹⁰). The Christian, like the Jew of old, is elect, or, to put it in modern English, selected, not because

God arbitrarily saves one man and passes over or condemns another, but because God's plan is to save men through men. The privilege of being elect carries with it the duty of using the advantages bestowed for the good of others. Abraham was chosen that ultimately in him 'all the families of the earth might be blessed' (Gen 12³). Israel was chosen to do a work for God for the ultimate benefit of the whole world (Is 49⁶, 60). Every Christian is called upon to say with our Lord Himself 'For their sakes I sanctify myself' (Jn 17¹⁹). The Church is the Body of Christ through which the world is to be won back to God (cp. Eph 3⁸⁻¹¹).

(iii) Accordingly, either a nation or an individual may at this moment not be elect for one of two reasons. (a) Their opportunity may not yet have come. As the Article says, God's spirit works *in due season*. (b) Their opportunity may have come and been rejected (cp. Acts 13⁴⁶). In Scripture the 'reprobate' are not those doomed to eternal damnation by some arbitrary decree of God, but those who disobey the light that is given to them (Rom 1²⁸, 2 Cor 13⁵). Thus Scripture seems to show that election is primarily to privilege, but such, if rightly accepted and used, is the means to eternal life. God's purpose is that it shall be so used. There is the very closest connexion between election and salvation. We are chosen according to God's purpose, not to any merely earthly destiny. But whether we attain it, or no depends upon ourselves. Such election is God's method of leading us to salvation, but it needs to be made sure by our own efforts to live up to it (2 Pet 1¹⁰, cp. Col 3¹²). Attempts have been made to show that election is necessarily to eternal life. Our Lord's words are quoted 'Many are called but few chosen', where 'called' refers obviously to privilege and 'chosen' to final salvation, and the two are distinguished. But there is nothing in this contrary to what we have said above. Everything depends on the context in which the terms are used. In 2 Pet 1¹⁰ they are identified: here they are contrasted, and 'chosen' refers not to this life but to the day of judgment, when God's award depends upon the right use of the opportunities bestowed upon those who are called. No doubt it is God's purpose of love to bring those who are chosen in Christ to salvation: only our own sloth or wilfulness can thwart this. But as long as we live here we need care and watchfulness (cp. 1 Cor 9²⁷).

(c) We may ask, Is this the teaching of the Articles? There is nothing in the Articles that contradicts it, but the general impression produced is not the same. The reason is that the Articles give only one side of the teaching of Scripture. They deal with salvation entirely from God's side and ignore man's co-operation. The complementary side of the teaching of Scripture is passed over in silence. Our relation to God is a very complex one. If we consider all the metaphors by which our Lord illustrates it, we get a very long list. God is our King, our Master, our Judge, our Shepherd and above all our Father. To

gain a true proportion we must take into account all these. This group of Articles is practically based upon one and one only, and that the most severe. God is viewed above all as 'a Lord Chief-Justice' or a 'moral connoisseur'. His Fatherly love for the souls whom He has made, His personal dealings with us, our response and all the nobler side of human nature are ignored. Hence the chilly and unreal feeling of these Articles. There is nothing untrue in them, but rather a want of proportion.

(d) Behind all these questions lies the problem of the relation of God's omniscience to man's free-will. This in turn is only one part of the standing mystery of the relation of the finite to the infinite and time to eternity. A definite solution is obviously impossible. Even if the human mind were competent to grasp truth, a large portion of the facts obviously lie outside any human experience. On such questions moral insight can go further than merely intellectual skill. The teaching of Scripture on such points can hardly be reduced to a system. It is always practical rather than speculative. Scripture holds before us two great counter-truths—first, God's absolute sovereignty (cp. Rom 9²⁰ ff.), and secondly, man's responsibility. Our intellects cannot reconcile them. So far as we can reconcile them at all it is by right action and vigorous moral life. Each truth finds its complete fulfilment in the moral life of Jesus Christ. We must not shut our eyes to either side of the truth, because it conflicts with our theories. The difficulty reaches its climax in such a case as that of Judas Iscariot. He was elect (Jn 6⁷⁰). We cannot but suppose that our Lord called him, because he had certain powers that he might have employed in the work of an apostle and that there was a work in the purpose of God waiting for him to do. On the one hand Christ has the moral insight to foresee his coming fall and its awful consequences (Mk 14¹⁸ ff.). On the other hand Judas is regarded as personally responsible. Up to the end Christ does all in His power to save him (Mt 26⁵⁰, Lk 22⁴⁸). We may not think that such efforts were in any sense unreal or that it was not God's purpose that he should live up to his privileged position.

Most theologians, no doubt, have held that God's omniscience is such that He possesses an accurate knowledge of every detail of the future and can foresee who will use the grace given to them. Others, however, hold that though God is indeed omniscient, He can only know what is knowable, and that by creating man with free-will He Himself introduced a certain element of contingency into the course of the world's history. For instance, Martensen writes:

'The contradiction which has been supposed to exist between the idea of the free progress of the world and the *omniscience* of God, rests upon a one-sided conception of omniscience, as a mere knowing *beforehand* and an ignoring of the *conditional* in the divine decrees. An unconditional fore-knowledge undeniably militates against the

freedom of the creature, as far as freedom of choice is concerned ; and against the undecided, the contingent, which is an idea inseparable from the development of freedom in time. . . . But such an unconditional fore-knowledge not only militates against the freedom of the creature, it equally is opposed to the idea of a freely working God in history. A God literally foreknowing all things, would be merely the spectator of events decided and predestined from eternity, not the all-directed governor in a drama of freedom which He carries on in reciprocal conflict and work with the freedom of the creature. If we would preserve this reciprocal relation between God and His creatures, we must not make the whole actual course of the world the subject of His foreknowledge, but only its essential import, the essential truth it involves. The final goal of this world's development, together with the entire series of its essentially necessary stages, must be regarded as fixed in the eternal counsel of God ; but the practical carrying out of this eternal counsel, the entire fulness of actual limitations on the part of this world's progress, in so far as these are conditioned by the freedom of the creature, can only be the subject of a conditional foreknowledge, *i.e.* they can be foreknown as possibilities, as *Futurabilia*, but not as realities, because other possibilities may actually take place. . . . While God neither foreknows nor will foreknow what He leaves undecided, in order to be decided in time, He is no less *cognizant* of and *privy* to all that occurs. . . . His knowledge penetrates the entanglements of this world's progress at every point ; the unerring eye of His wisdom discerns in every moment the relation subsisting between free beings and His eternal plan ; and His almighty hand, His power, pregnant of great designs, guides and influences the movements of the world as His counsels require.¹

We may compare with this a passage from James' *Will to Believe* (p. 181).

'Suppose two men before a chess-board—the one a novice, the other an expert player of the game. The expert intends to beat. But he cannot foresee exactly what any one actual move of his adversary may be. He knows however all the *possible* moves of the latter ; and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the direction of victory. And the victory infallibly arrives, after no matter how devious a course, in the one predestined form of checkmate to the novice's king.'

It may be that such mental pictures are as near as we can get to a systematized understanding of God's plan as it is revealed in Scripture and experience. We must maintain God's sovereignty. He knows all the possibilities that His universe contains. He is always able to overrule history to His purpose. But it may be that it rests with human choice and effort to determine by which of many possible roads the goal shall be reached. Modern thought is increasingly

¹ Martensen, *Dogmatics*, pp. 218–219.

dissatisfied with the idea of life as the mere unrolling of a previously determined system and insists on the part played by the free exercise of rational purpose. Choice has in a very true sense a creative power, since it determines the line along which evolution shall go forward. No doubt when acts are past we can trace them back to the causes that produced them : as we look back on them now they seem to be the one and inevitable result of those causes. But that does not show that the possibility that was actually realized was the only possibility before us at the actual time of choice. Our consciousness seems to point the other way. We must believe, however, that God's infinite love and power and wisdom can never be baffled or defeated in the final issue.

(e) *The moral effect of the doctrine of Predestination*

The meaning of the second paragraph may be put thus :

(i) On the one hand a knowledge of God's eternal purpose for us is a challenge to us to live up to it (cp. the closing sentence of the first paragraph). As Dr Mozley says, 'The sense of predestination which the New Testament encourages is connected with strength of moral principle in the individual. . . . No idea can be more opposed to Scripture or more unwarrantable than any idea of predestination separate from this consciousness and not arising upon this foundation.'¹ Again, God's election is a call to us to pass through those stages of the moral life which are the appointed road to sanctification and to use the means of grace that God has ordained. As Hooker says, 'There are that elevate too much the ordinary and immediate means of light, relying wholly upon the bare conceit of that eternal election which notwithstanding includeth subordination of means, without which we are not actually brought to enjoy what God secretly did intend : and therefore to build upon God's election, if we keep not ourselves to the ways which He hath appointed for man to walk in, is but a self-deceiving vanity.'²

(ii) The second half of the paragraph points out the dangers of brooding over the idea of predestination, dangers that were only too apparent at the time of the Reformation. If a man believes himself to be eternally lost by God's decree, then he may either be led to despair and possibly suicide, or he may decide that as he is to be damned anyhow, he may as well deserve it by having a good time during his life here. We hear of men taking their lives out of 'desperation'. Others, again, who believed themselves to be saved by the decree of God, claimed to live a life of unbridled license since nothing could destroy their election. Thus, whether a man felt himself to be lost or saved he might be thrust '*into wretchedness (i.e. recklessness) of most unclean living*'.

(f) If the opening paragraph of the Article might suggest a Calvinistic interpretation, the last two sentences effectually dispel it. They

¹ *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*, pp. 44–45.

² Hooker, V. c. 60 § 3.

deny the Calvinistic doctrine of 'particular redemption', *i.e.* that Christ died for the elect only. 'We must receive God's promises in such wise as they are generally (*i.e.* universally, for all men) set forth in Holy Scripture.' The reference is to such passages as 1 Tim 2⁴. The second sentence runs 'In our doings that will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared to us in the word of God.' This rules out a view current at the time among certain Anabaptists that God had a secret will besides His will revealed in Scripture, and that this secret will might cancel the revealed will. Thus God's promises of salvation offered to all might not ultimately be valid.¹

Art. XVIII at first sight seems hardly consistent with this last statement. It appears to deny salvation, *e.g.* to the heathen and those who have never heard of Christ. But this was not in the mind of those who composed it. It is aimed at a particular set of people at a particular time. The Latin title 'De speranda aeterna salute' shows that it is aimed at those who have the opportunity of being Christians. Two alternatives are possible: (i) That it was aimed at those who hoped to win salvation by joining some religious order (here called a law or sect), and observing its rule of life.² (ii) That it is aimed at Anabaptists, who rejected Christ as Saviour and treated any definite Christian belief as unimportant. In any case it raises a wide question: if belief in Christ is essential to salvation, what are we to say of good heathen or those among ourselves who reject the Christian faith. The answer is this: Christ claims to be the one and only Saviour (cp. Acts 4¹²). 'God gave unto us eternal life and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life and he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life' (1 Jn 5¹¹⁻¹⁶). But the Church never dares to say of any man that he is finally lost. Those who do not yet know Christ or who die without knowing Him will not 'be saved by the law or sect they profess'. There is no Saviour but Christ. But we trust that in His own way and at His own time, He will make Himself known to them. Those who are faithful to the highest that they know are unconsciously serving Him even now. There are many unconscious Christians (cp. Jn 10¹⁶). Christ is the 'Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe' (1 Tim 4¹⁰).³ In the parable of the sheep and the goats, those who have observed simple moral duties of love and kindness have really been doing them to Christ, and they seem to be the heathen (τὰ ἔθνη, Mt 25³²). All that we must insist on is that men are bound to do their utmost to attain to further truth, and, when it is found, to live up to it and to the claims that it makes upon them (cp. Jn 7¹⁷).†

¹ It is worth noting that to-day the moral difficulty for most men lies not in the apparent inequality of opportunities for attaining heaven, but rather in the inequality of opportunities in this present life. The centre of gravity has shifted from the other world to this.

² See Dixon, vol. v. p. 397.

³ On the question of the operation of the grace of Christ outside the visible economy of the Church, see E. L. Mascall, *Christ, the Christian and the Church*, p. 149.

THE CHURCH

ARTICLE XIX

Of the Church

The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same.

As the Church of *Jerusalem*, *Alexandria*, and *Antioch* have erred; so also the Church of *Rome* hath erred, not only in their living and manner of Ceremonies, but also in matters of Faith.

Almost unchanged since 1553. Its object was to give such a definition of the Church as would:

- (i) Exclude various Anabaptist sects.
- (ii) Deny the claim of Rome to be the only Church.

The latter section justifies the breach with Rome by denying her infallibility. As she has erred in the past, so she may err again at the Council of Trent. The allusion is to such events as the acceptance by Pope Liberius of an Arian creed, the acquittal of Pelagius by Pope Zosimus and the lapse of Pope Honorius into Monothelism.

N.B.—A comparison of the title with the opening words shows that the Church and the visible Church are the same. The adjective is virtually a predicate.

§ 1. The Article starts off with the assumption that the Church of God is a visible society, *The visible Church of Christ*.

The Church as it appears in the New Testament is the successor or rather the continuation of Israel in the Old Testament. Among all primitive peoples religion is essentially social. The God is above all the God of the tribe. The individual worships Him as a member of the tribe. Only slowly does the idea of personal religion emerge. Israel is no exception to this rule. Jehovah made His Covenant with the nation as a whole. The individual Israelite shared its blessing as a member of the nation. To be cut off from Israel was to be cut off from Jehovah (cp. Gen 17¹³⁻¹⁴). The nation as a whole was God's son (Hos 11¹, Ex 4²²) and God's servant (Is 49³⁻⁶). The idea of personal responsibility and personal salvation did not become prominent till